diff options
author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2024-03-05 19:19:26 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> | 2024-03-06 15:17:31 -0800 |
commit | 011832b97b311bb9e3c27945bc0d1089a14209c9 (patch) | |
tree | 895a1b974a1b6edcd101286dcf3436fffad046b2 /kernel | |
parent | 9a9d1d36050e486822dc54990c896761b04e7446 (diff) |
bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction
Introduce may_goto instruction that from the verifier pov is similar to
open coded iterators bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() and bpf_loop() helper, but it
doesn't iterate any objects.
In assembly 'may_goto' is a nop most of the time until bpf runtime has to
terminate the program for whatever reason. In the current implementation
may_goto has a hidden counter, but other mechanisms can be used.
For programs written in C the later patch introduces 'cond_break' macro
that combines 'may_goto' with 'break' statement and has similar semantics:
cond_break is a nop until bpf runtime has to break out of this loop.
It can be used in any normal "for" or "while" loop, like
for (i = zero; i < cnt; cond_break, i++) {
The verifier recognizes that may_goto is used in the program, reserves
additional 8 bytes of stack, initializes them in subprog prologue, and
replaces may_goto instruction with:
aux_reg = *(u64 *)(fp - 40)
if aux_reg == 0 goto pc+off
aux_reg -= 1
*(u64 *)(fp - 40) = aux_reg
may_goto instruction can be used by LLVM to implement __builtin_memcpy,
__builtin_strcmp.
may_goto is not a full substitute for bpf_for() macro.
bpf_for() doesn't have induction variable that verifiers sees,
so 'i' in bpf_for(i, 0, 100) is seen as imprecise and bounded.
But when the code is written as:
for (i = 0; i < 100; cond_break, i++)
the verifier see 'i' as precise constant zero,
hence cond_break (aka may_goto) doesn't help to converge the loop.
A static or global variable can be used as a workaround:
static int zero = 0;
for (i = zero; i < 100; cond_break, i++) // works!
may_goto works well with arena pointers that don't need to be bounds
checked on access. Load/store from arena returns imprecise unbounded
scalar and loops with may_goto pass the verifier.
Reserve new opcode BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND for may_goto insn.
JCOND stands for conditional pseudo jump.
Since goto_or_nop insn was proposed, it may use the same opcode.
may_goto vs goto_or_nop can be distinguished by src_reg:
code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND
src_reg = 0 - may_goto
src_reg = 1 - goto_or_nop
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Tested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240306031929.42666-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/core.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/disasm.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 163 |
3 files changed, 138 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 71c459a51d9e..9ee4536d0a09 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -1675,6 +1675,7 @@ bool bpf_opcode_in_insntable(u8 code) [BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_B] = true, [BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_H] = true, [BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_W] = true, + [BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND] = true, }; #undef BPF_INSN_3_TBL #undef BPF_INSN_2_TBL diff --git a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c index 49940c26a227..82b2dbdd048f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c @@ -322,6 +322,10 @@ void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_insn_cbs *cbs, } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { verbose(cbs->private_data, "(%02x) goto pc%+d\n", insn->code, insn->off); + } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) && + insn->src_reg == BPF_MAY_GOTO) { + verbose(cbs->private_data, "(%02x) may_goto pc%+d\n", + insn->code, insn->off); } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA)) { verbose(cbs->private_data, "(%02x) gotol pc%+d\n", insn->code, insn->imm); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 4dd84e13bbfe..8030b50d3b45 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -533,6 +533,16 @@ static bool is_async_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) return bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_async_callback_calling_function(insn->imm); } +static bool is_may_goto_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) && insn->src_reg == BPF_MAY_GOTO; +} + +static bool is_may_goto_insn_at(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) +{ + return is_may_goto_insn(&env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]); +} + static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) { return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || @@ -1429,6 +1439,7 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth; dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth; dst_state->used_as_loop_entry = src->used_as_loop_entry; + dst_state->may_goto_depth = src->may_goto_depth; for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { dst = dst_state->frame[i]; if (!dst) { @@ -14871,11 +14882,36 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int err; /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ - if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { + if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JCOND) { verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); return -EINVAL; } + if (opcode == BPF_JCOND) { + struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st; + int idx = *insn_idx; + + if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) || + insn->src_reg != BPF_MAY_GOTO || + insn->dst_reg || insn->imm || insn->off == 0) { + verbose(env, "invalid may_goto off %d imm %d\n", + insn->off, insn->imm); + return -EINVAL; + } + prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, idx); + + /* branch out 'fallthrough' insn as a new state to explore */ + queued_st = push_stack(env, idx + 1, idx, false); + if (!queued_st) + return -ENOMEM; + + queued_st->may_goto_depth++; + if (prev_st) + widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); + *insn_idx += insn->off; + return 0; + } + /* check src2 operand */ err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); if (err) @@ -15659,6 +15695,8 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) default: /* conditional jump with two edges */ mark_prune_point(env, t); + if (is_may_goto_insn(insn)) + mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); if (ret) @@ -17135,6 +17173,13 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) } goto skip_inf_loop_check; } + if (is_may_goto_insn_at(env, insn_idx)) { + if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) { + update_loop_entry(cur, &sl->state); + goto hit; + } + goto skip_inf_loop_check; + } if (calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) { if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) goto hit; @@ -17144,6 +17189,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true) && !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) && + sl->state.may_goto_depth == cur->may_goto_depth && sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) { verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); @@ -19408,7 +19454,10 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; struct bpf_prog *new_prog; struct bpf_map *map_ptr; - int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; + int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0, cur_subprog = 0; + struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; + u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; + u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; if (env->seen_exception && !env->exception_callback_subprog) { struct bpf_insn patch[] = { @@ -19428,7 +19477,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) mark_subprog_exc_cb(env, env->exception_callback_subprog); } - for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { + for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt;) { /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || @@ -19467,7 +19516,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ @@ -19487,7 +19536,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ @@ -19502,7 +19551,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; if (!aux->alu_state || aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) - continue; + goto next_insn; isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == @@ -19540,19 +19589,39 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; + } + + if (is_may_goto_insn(insn)) { + int stack_off = -stack_depth - 8; + + stack_depth_extra = 8; + insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off); + insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 2); + insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1); + insn_buf[3] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off); + cnt = 4; + + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + + delta += cnt - 1; + env->prog = prog = new_prog; + insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; + goto next_insn; } if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) - continue; + goto next_insn; if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) - continue; + goto next_insn; if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); if (ret) return ret; if (cnt == 0) - continue; + goto next_insn; new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); if (!new_prog) @@ -19561,7 +19630,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) @@ -19609,11 +19678,11 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } insn->imm = ret + 1; - continue; + goto next_insn; } if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) - continue; + goto next_insn; /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call * emit two extra insns: @@ -19642,7 +19711,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { @@ -19754,7 +19823,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, @@ -19785,31 +19854,31 @@ patch_map_ops_generic: switch (insn->imm) { case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); - continue; + goto next_insn; case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); - continue; + goto next_insn; } goto patch_call_imm; @@ -19837,7 +19906,7 @@ patch_map_ops_generic: delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ @@ -19862,7 +19931,7 @@ patch_map_ops_generic: delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ @@ -19890,7 +19959,7 @@ patch_map_ops_generic: delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ @@ -19905,7 +19974,7 @@ patch_map_ops_generic: env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ @@ -19920,7 +19989,7 @@ patch_map_ops_generic: env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } /* Implement bpf_kptr_xchg inline */ @@ -19938,7 +20007,7 @@ patch_map_ops_generic: delta += cnt - 1; env->prog = prog = new_prog; insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; - continue; + goto next_insn; } patch_call_imm: fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); @@ -19952,6 +20021,40 @@ patch_call_imm: return -EFAULT; } insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; +next_insn: + if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { + subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; + subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_extra = stack_depth_extra; + cur_subprog++; + stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; + stack_depth_extra = 0; + } + i++; + insn++; + } + + env->prog->aux->stack_depth = subprogs[0].stack_depth; + for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { + int subprog_start = subprogs[i].start; + int stack_slots = subprogs[i].stack_extra / 8; + + if (!stack_slots) + continue; + if (stack_slots > 1) { + verbose(env, "verifier bug: stack_slots supports may_goto only\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + + /* Add ST insn to subprog prologue to init extra stack */ + insn_buf[0] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, + -subprogs[i].stack_depth, BPF_MAX_LOOPS); + /* Copy first actual insn to preserve it */ + insn_buf[1] = env->prog->insnsi[subprog_start]; + + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, subprog_start, insn_buf, 2); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + env->prog = prog = new_prog; } /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ |