diff options
author | David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> | 2021-04-23 10:29:59 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> | 2021-09-03 18:42:01 +0200 |
commit | fe69d560b5bd9ec77b5d5749bd7027344daef47e (patch) | |
tree | d326cdd1de311c30c88008ffd2f1f3a9ac34e227 /kernel | |
parent | 35d7bdc86031a2c1ae05ac27dfa93b2acdcbaecc (diff) |
kernel/fork: always deny write access to current MM exe_file
We want to remove VM_DENYWRITE only currently only used when mapping the
executable during exec. During exec, we already deny_write_access() the
executable, however, after exec completes the VMAs mapped
with VM_DENYWRITE effectively keeps write access denied via
deny_write_access().
Let's deny write access when setting or replacing the MM exe_file. With
this change, we can remove VM_DENYWRITE for mapping executables.
Make set_mm_exe_file() return an error in case deny_write_access()
fails; note that this should never happen, because exec code does a
deny_write_access() early and keeps write access denied when calling
set_mm_exe_file. However, it makes the code easier to read and makes
set_mm_exe_file() and replace_mm_exe_file() look more similar.
This represents a minor user space visible change:
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) can now fail if the file is already
opened writable. Also, after sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) the file
cannot be opened writable. Note that we can already fail with -EACCES if
the file doesn't have execute permissions.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/fork.c | 50 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index f4ac883c4a1e..7677f897ecb6 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -470,6 +470,20 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task); +static void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) +{ + struct file *exe_file; + + exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm); + RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, exe_file); + /* + * We depend on the oldmm having properly denied write access to the + * exe_file already. + */ + if (exe_file && deny_write_access(exe_file)) + pr_warn_once("deny_write_access() failed in %s\n", __func__); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) @@ -493,7 +507,7 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, mmap_write_lock_nested(mm, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); /* No ordering required: file already has been exposed. */ - RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm)); + dup_mm_exe_file(mm, oldmm); mm->total_vm = oldmm->total_vm; mm->data_vm = oldmm->data_vm; @@ -639,7 +653,7 @@ static inline void mm_free_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm) static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) { mmap_write_lock(oldmm); - RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm)); + dup_mm_exe_file(mm, oldmm); mmap_write_unlock(oldmm); return 0; } @@ -1149,8 +1163,10 @@ void mmput_async(struct mm_struct *mm) * Main users are mmput() and sys_execve(). Callers prevent concurrent * invocations: in mmput() nobody alive left, in execve task is single * threaded. + * + * Can only fail if new_exe_file != NULL. */ -void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) +int set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) { struct file *old_exe_file; @@ -1161,11 +1177,21 @@ void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) */ old_exe_file = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->exe_file); - if (new_exe_file) + if (new_exe_file) { + /* + * We expect the caller (i.e., sys_execve) to already denied + * write access, so this is unlikely to fail. + */ + if (unlikely(deny_write_access(new_exe_file))) + return -EACCES; get_file(new_exe_file); + } rcu_assign_pointer(mm->exe_file, new_exe_file); - if (old_exe_file) + if (old_exe_file) { + allow_write_access(old_exe_file); fput(old_exe_file); + } + return 0; } /** @@ -1201,10 +1227,22 @@ int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) } /* set the new file, lockless */ + ret = deny_write_access(new_exe_file); + if (ret) + return -EACCES; get_file(new_exe_file); + old_exe_file = xchg(&mm->exe_file, new_exe_file); - if (old_exe_file) + if (old_exe_file) { + /* + * Don't race with dup_mmap() getting the file and disallowing + * write access while someone might open the file writable. + */ + mmap_read_lock(mm); + allow_write_access(old_exe_file); fput(old_exe_file); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + } return 0; } |