diff options
author | Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> | 2017-11-03 13:56:30 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-11-05 22:26:20 +0900 |
commit | b37a530613104aa3f592376c67a462823298759c (patch) | |
tree | 8993f6c89d54cc54d2fb083635abe832d4f3b5bb /kernel | |
parent | c6c580d7bc390f864488c66153a487057e76d9d8 (diff) |
bpf: remove old offload/analyzer
Thanks to the ability to load a program for a specific device,
running verifier twice is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 75 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 51aabb32ad67..add845fe788a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -949,9 +949,6 @@ static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, */ *reg_type = info.reg_type; - if (env->analyzer_ops) - return 0; - env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) @@ -3736,9 +3733,6 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx) { - if (env->analyzer_ops && env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook) - return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, - prev_insn_idx); if (env->dev_ops && env->dev_ops->insn_hook) return env->dev_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx); @@ -4601,72 +4595,3 @@ err_free_env: kfree(env); return ret; } - -static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_analyzer_ops[] = { -#ifdef CONFIG_NET - [BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP] = &xdp_analyzer_ops, - [BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS] = &tc_cls_act_analyzer_ops, -#endif -}; - -int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops, - void *priv) -{ - struct bpf_verifier_env *env; - int ret; - - if (prog->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_analyzer_ops) || - !bpf_analyzer_ops[prog->type]) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!env) - return -ENOMEM; - - env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * - prog->len); - ret = -ENOMEM; - if (!env->insn_aux_data) - goto err_free_env; - env->prog = prog; - env->ops = bpf_analyzer_ops[env->prog->type]; - env->analyzer_ops = ops; - env->analyzer_priv = priv; - - /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ - mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); - - env->strict_alignment = false; - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) - env->strict_alignment = true; - - env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len, - sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), - GFP_KERNEL); - ret = -ENOMEM; - if (!env->explored_states) - goto skip_full_check; - - ret = check_cfg(env); - if (ret < 0) - goto skip_full_check; - - env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); - - ret = do_check(env); - if (env->cur_state) { - free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); - env->cur_state = NULL; - } - -skip_full_check: - while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL)); - free_states(env); - - mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); - vfree(env->insn_aux_data); -err_free_env: - kfree(env); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer); |