diff options
| author | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2018-09-21 17:17:25 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2019-01-08 13:18:44 -0800 |
| commit | 98c88651365767c72ec6dc672072423bc19a39aa (patch) | |
| tree | 82204d5efbc14a204669c5092646e7604add60c2 /kernel | |
| parent | 0c6cfa622cf57109607f3416b286b6b55561a2ea (diff) | |
SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning
The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
at some later date.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/cred.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 21f4a97085b4..45d77284aed0 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -760,19 +760,6 @@ bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred) { if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC) return true; -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX - /* - * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or - * security_prepare_creds() returned an error. - */ - if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) { - if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE) - return true; - if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) == - (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)) - return true; - } -#endif return false; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid); |