scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)

This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:

  https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html

Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of
shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading
and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack
control flow by modifying the stacks.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
[will: Numerous cosmetic changes]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..38f8f31c9451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/scs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Shadow Call Stack support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <asm/scs.h>
+
+static struct kmem_cache *scs_cache;
+
+static void *scs_alloc(int node)
+{
+	void *s;
+
+	s = kmem_cache_alloc_node(scs_cache, GFP_SCS, node);
+	if (s) {
+		*__scs_magic(s) = SCS_END_MAGIC;
+		/*
+		 * Poison the allocation to catch unintentional accesses to
+		 * the shadow stack when KASAN is enabled.
+		 */
+		kasan_poison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
+	}
+
+	return s;
+}
+
+static void scs_free(void *s)
+{
+	kasan_unpoison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
+	kmem_cache_free(scs_cache, s);
+}
+
+void __init scs_init(void)
+{
+	scs_cache = kmem_cache_create("scs_cache", SCS_SIZE, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
+{
+	void *s = scs_alloc(node);
+
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	task_scs(tsk) = s;
+	task_scs_offset(tsk) = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	void *s = task_scs(tsk);
+
+	if (!s)
+		return;
+
+	WARN(scs_corrupted(tsk), "corrupted shadow stack detected when freeing task\n");
+	scs_free(s);
+}