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authorJonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>2019-06-06 13:59:40 -0700
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2019-06-10 23:31:26 -0700
commitfada7fdc83c0bf8755956bff707c42b609223301 (patch)
tree905e559b4c1aa750e8a08b2c357e8a358d35e9fb /kernel/bpf
parent4ecabd55c90469629460f035f4bf4c8ae3d2743b (diff)
bpf: Allow bpf_map_lookup_elem() on an xskmap
Currently, the AF_XDP code uses a separate map in order to determine if an xsk is bound to a queue. Instead of doing this, have bpf_map_lookup_elem() return a xdp_sock. Rearrange some xdp_sock members to eliminate structure holes. Remove selftest - will be added back in later patch. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c26
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/xskmap.c7
2 files changed, 31 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 5c2cb5bd84ce..8d1786357a09 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -334,7 +334,8 @@ static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
- type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK;
+ type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
+ type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
}
static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
@@ -406,6 +407,7 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
[PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock",
[PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null",
[PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer",
+ [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock",
};
static char slot_type_char[] = {
@@ -1363,6 +1365,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
return true;
default:
return false;
@@ -1843,6 +1846,9 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
break;
+ case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
+ valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
+ break;
default:
valid = false;
}
@@ -2007,6 +2013,9 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
pointer_desc = "tcp_sock ";
break;
+ case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
+ pointer_desc = "xdp_sock ";
+ break;
default:
break;
}
@@ -2905,10 +2914,14 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* appear.
*/
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
- case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
goto error;
break;
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
+ if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
+ func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
+ goto error;
+ break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
@@ -3799,6 +3812,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
@@ -5038,6 +5052,9 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) {
reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta;
+ } else if (reg->map_ptr->map_type ==
+ BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) {
+ reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
} else {
reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
}
@@ -6299,6 +6316,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
* would have accepted
*/
@@ -6693,6 +6711,7 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)
case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
return false;
default:
return true;
@@ -7826,6 +7845,9 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
break;
+ case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
+ convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
+ break;
default:
continue;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/xskmap.c b/kernel/bpf/xskmap.c
index 413d75f4fc72..ef7338cebd18 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/xskmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/xskmap.c
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ void __xsk_map_flush(struct bpf_map *map)
static void *xsk_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
+ return __xsk_map_lookup_elem(map, *(u32 *)key);
+}
+
+static void *xsk_map_lookup_elem_sys_only(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
+{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
@@ -218,6 +224,7 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops xsk_map_ops = {
.map_free = xsk_map_free,
.map_get_next_key = xsk_map_get_next_key,
.map_lookup_elem = xsk_map_lookup_elem,
+ .map_lookup_elem_sys_only = xsk_map_lookup_elem_sys_only,
.map_update_elem = xsk_map_update_elem,
.map_delete_elem = xsk_map_delete_elem,
.map_check_btf = map_check_no_btf,