diff options
author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2018-01-10 23:25:05 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2018-01-10 14:46:39 -0800 |
commit | bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 (patch) | |
tree | 41ae826df7e3369e27a24c0936322b832f895dff /kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | |
parent | 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f (diff) |
bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.
However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.
Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.
This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/arraymap.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 18 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c index aaa319848e7d..ab94d304a634 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries; bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); struct bpf_array *array; - u64 array_size; + u64 array_size, mask64; /* check sanity of attributes */ if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 || @@ -74,13 +74,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8); max_entries = attr->max_entries; - index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1; - if (unpriv) + /* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has + * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to + * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space. + */ + mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1); + mask64 = 1ULL << mask64; + mask64 -= 1; + + index_mask = mask64; + if (unpriv) { /* round up array size to nearest power of 2, * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits */ max_entries = index_mask + 1; + /* Check for overflows. */ + if (max_entries < attr->max_entries) + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + } array_size = sizeof(*array); if (percpu) |