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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-29 10:26:35 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-29 10:26:35 -0700
commit95d3652eec4103977ac96a86f46fa589f7abe012 (patch)
tree80f262561ecb3272d3f70b9c0f553f5ea05f6110 /include
parent770b782f555d663d133fcd4dc1632023f79357b9 (diff)
parent2569e7e1d684e418ba7ffc9d0ad9a5f5247df0a0 (diff)
Merge branch 'fixes-v4.14-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull keys fixes from James Morris: "Notable here is a rewrite of big_key crypto by Jason Donenfeld to address some issues in the original code. From Jason's commit log: "This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing, trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to fix these cryptographic flaws." There has been positive review of the new code by Eric Biggers and Herbert Xu, and it passes basic testing via the keyutils test suite. Eric also manually tested it. Generally speaking, we likely need to improve the amount of crypto review for kernel crypto users including keys (I'll post a note separately to ksummit-discuss)" * 'fixes-v4.14-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key KEYS: use kmemdup() in request_key_auth_new() KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time KEYS: reset parent each time before searching key_user_tree KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read() KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_read_key() KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_assume_authority() KEYS: don't revoke uninstantiated key in request_key_auth_new() KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key.h2
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 044114185120..e315e16b6ff8 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ struct key {
#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 8 /* set if key is built in to the kernel */
#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 9 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10 /* set if key should not be removed */
+#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 11 /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
/* the key type and key description string
* - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -243,6 +244,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */
#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0004 /* Key is built into kernel */
#define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION 0x0008 /* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING 0x0010 /* allocating a user or user session keyring */
extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);