diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
| commit | 7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch) | |
| tree | 65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /fs | |
| parent | f022814633e1c600507b3a99691b4d624c2813f0 (diff) | |
| parent | 3986f65d4f408ce9d0a361e3226a3246a5fb701c (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra:
"Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen),
which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge
Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must
target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP.
Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation
is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets
not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next
sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1].
CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides,
as described above, speculation limits itself"
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
* tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR
x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0
x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0
kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes
x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy
x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability
x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls
objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions
objtool: Validate IBT assumptions
objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding
objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation
x86: Annotate idtentry_df()
x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h
x86: Annotate call_on_stack()
objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE
x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn
exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn
x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn
objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code
objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/fuse/ioctl.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl32.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fuse/ioctl.c b/fs/fuse/ioctl.c index df58966bc874..33cde4bbccdc 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/fuse/ioctl.c @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ long fuse_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg, #else if (flags & FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT) { inarg.flags |= FUSE_IOCTL_32BIT; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32 +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI if (in_x32_syscall()) inarg.flags |= FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT_X32; #endif diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl32.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl32.c index 004ed2a251e8..ca25ed89b706 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl32.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl32.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ xfs_compat_ioc_fsbulkstat( inumbers_fmt_pf inumbers_func = xfs_fsinumbers_fmt_compat; bulkstat_one_fmt_pf bs_one_func = xfs_fsbulkstat_one_fmt_compat; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32 +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI if (in_x32_syscall()) { /* * ... but on x32 the input xfs_fsop_bulkreq has pointers |