diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-09-07 20:35:29 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-09-07 20:35:29 -0700 |
commit | 828f4257d1d33aed0f9ef82982dcb8ace8b7fe86 (patch) | |
tree | ce9e1fc4eaae2c66e8a5bba25579c32c229352b4 /fs | |
parent | 44ccba3f7b230af1bd7ebe173cbf5803df1df486 (diff) | |
parent | fe8993b3a05cbba6318a54e0f85901aaea6fc244 (diff) |
Merge tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull secureexec update from Kees Cook:
"This series has the ultimate goal of providing a sane stack rlimit
when running set*id processes.
To do this, the bprm_secureexec LSM hook is collapsed into the
bprm_set_creds hook so the secureexec-ness of an exec can be
determined early enough to make decisions about rlimits and the
resulting memory layouts. Other logic acting on the secureexec-ness of
an exec is similarly consolidated. Capabilities needed some special
handling, but the refactoring removed other special handling, so that
was a wash"
* tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
exec: Consolidate dumpability logic
smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal
exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability
LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook
commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds
commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag
exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/binfmt_flat.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 56 |
4 files changed, 44 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 6466153f2bf0..ec45d24875b1 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec, NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid)); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, bprm->secureexec); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_RANDOM, (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_rand_bytes); #ifdef ELF_HWCAP2 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_HWCAP2, ELF_HWCAP2); diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c index cf93a4fad012..5aa9199dfb13 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, (elf_addr_t) from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, (elf_addr_t) from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, (elf_addr_t) from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid)); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, bprm->secureexec); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec); #ifdef ARCH_DLINFO diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c index a1e6860b6f46..604a176df0c2 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c @@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ static int load_flat_shared_library(int id, struct lib_info *libs) * as we're past the point of no return and are dealing with shared * libraries. */ - bprm.cred_prepared = 1; + bprm.called_set_creds = 1; res = prepare_binprm(&bprm); diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 62175cbcc801..01a9fb9d8ac3 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1259,6 +1259,12 @@ void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec) perf_event_comm(tsk, exec); } +/* + * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be + * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal + * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised + * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handlers (see below). + */ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) { int retval; @@ -1286,7 +1292,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) if (retval) goto out; - bprm->mm = NULL; /* We're using it now */ + /* + * After clearing bprm->mm (to mark that current is using the + * prepared mm now), we have nothing left of the original + * process. If anything from here on returns an error, the check + * in search_binary_handler() will SEGV current. + */ + bprm->mm = NULL; set_fs(USER_DS); current->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD | @@ -1331,15 +1343,38 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump); void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) { + /* + * Once here, prepare_binrpm() will not be called any more, so + * the final state of setuid/setgid/fscaps can be merged into the + * secureexec flag. + */ + bprm->secureexec |= bprm->cap_elevated; + + if (bprm->secureexec) { + /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */ + current->pdeath_signal = 0; + + /* + * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to + * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to + * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines + * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid + * needing to clean up the change on failure. + */ + if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur > _STK_LIM) + current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur = _STK_LIM; + } + arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm); - /* This is the point of no return */ current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0; - if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())) - set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); - else + /* Figure out dumpability. */ + if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || + bprm->secureexec) set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); + else + set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); arch_setup_new_exec(); perf_event_exec(); @@ -1351,15 +1386,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) */ current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE; - /* install the new credentials */ - if (!uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, current_euid()) || - !gid_eq(bprm->cred->gid, current_egid())) { - current->pdeath_signal = 0; - } else { - if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP) - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - } - /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread group */ current->self_exec_id++; @@ -1548,7 +1574,7 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm); if (retval) return retval; - bprm->cred_prepared = 1; + bprm->called_set_creds = 1; memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); |