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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2020-05-03 06:48:17 -0500
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2020-05-07 16:55:47 -0500
commit96ecee29b0b560662ec082ee9b6f2049f2a79090 (patch)
tree96d03c2e68da53a482ee126b9363b67cad0ee8dd /fs
parent1507b7a30ad284a2a136ee79c214c0e86c62da64 (diff)
exec: Merge install_exec_creds into setup_new_exec
The two functions are now always called one right after the other so merge them together to make future maintenance easier. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/binfmt_aout.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/binfmt_elf.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/binfmt_flat.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c56
5 files changed, 26 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_aout.c b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
index ace587b66904..c8ba28f285e5 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_aout.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
@@ -162,7 +162,6 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
set_personality(PER_LINUX);
#endif
setup_new_exec(bprm);
- install_exec_creds(bprm);
current->mm->end_code = ex.a_text +
(current->mm->start_code = N_TXTADDR(ex));
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 13f25e241ac4..e6b586623035 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -858,7 +858,6 @@ out_free_interp:
current->flags |= PF_RANDOMIZE;
setup_new_exec(bprm);
- install_exec_creds(bprm);
/* Do this so that we can load the interpreter, if need be. We will
change some of these later */
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
index 6c94c6d53d97..9a1aa61b4cc3 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
@@ -353,7 +353,6 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
setup_new_exec(bprm);
- install_exec_creds(bprm);
set_binfmt(&elf_fdpic_format);
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
index 1a1d1fcb893f..252878969582 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
@@ -541,7 +541,6 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
/* OK, This is the point of no return */
set_personality(PER_LINUX_32BIT);
setup_new_exec(bprm);
- install_exec_creds(bprm);
}
/*
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 71de9f57ae09..93e40f865523 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1443,6 +1443,31 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
group */
WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1);
flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * install the new credentials for this executable
+ */
+ security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
+
+ commit_creds(bprm->cred);
+ bprm->cred = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Disable monitoring for regular users
+ * when executing setuid binaries. Must
+ * wait until new credentials are committed
+ * by commit_creds() above
+ */
+ if (get_dumpable(current->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ perf_event_exit_task(current);
+ /*
+ * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
+ * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
+ * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
+ */
+ security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->signal->exec_update_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
@@ -1458,7 +1483,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec);
/*
* Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex.
- * install_exec_creds() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
+ * setup_new_exec() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
* Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred and
* and unlock.
*/
@@ -1505,35 +1530,6 @@ int bprm_change_interp(const char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp);
/*
- * install the new credentials for this executable
- */
-void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
- commit_creds(bprm->cred);
- bprm->cred = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Disable monitoring for regular users
- * when executing setuid binaries. Must
- * wait until new credentials are committed
- * by commit_creds() above
- */
- if (get_dumpable(current->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
- perf_event_exit_task(current);
- /*
- * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
- * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
- * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
- */
- security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
- mutex_unlock(&current->signal->exec_update_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
-
-/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
* - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
* PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync