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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-08-22 09:56:06 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-08-22 09:56:06 -0700 |
commit | 467e9e51d07d43d32a1dd8b6ead2351e28fff084 (patch) | |
tree | d925caa3c94036ba2457f0de64b6e6c40236ca46 /fs | |
parent | 23dcfa61bac244e1200ff9ad19c6e9144dcb6bb5 (diff) | |
parent | 88ec2789d856056344161aa20420dd37e893b0fe (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull assorted fixes - mostly vfs - from Al Viro:
"Assorted fixes, with an unexpected detour into vfio refcounting logics
(fell out when digging in an analog of eventpoll race in there)."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
task_work: add a scheduling point in task_work_run()
fs: fix fs/namei.c kernel-doc warnings
eventpoll: use-after-possible-free in epoll_create1()
vfio: grab vfio_device reference *before* exposing the sucker via fd_install()
vfio: get rid of vfio_device_put()/vfio_group_get_device* races
vfio: get rid of open-coding kref_put_mutex
introduce kref_put_mutex()
vfio: don't dereference after kfree...
mqueue: lift mnt_want_write() outside ->i_mutex, clean up a bit
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/eventpoll.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c index 1c8b55670804..eedec84c1809 100644 --- a/fs/eventpoll.c +++ b/fs/eventpoll.c @@ -1654,8 +1654,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(epoll_create1, int, flags) error = PTR_ERR(file); goto out_free_fd; } - fd_install(fd, file); ep->file = file; + fd_install(fd, file); return fd; out_free_fd: diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index db76b866a097..dd1ed1b8e98e 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ int __inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) /** * sb_permission - Check superblock-level permissions * @sb: Superblock of inode to check permission on + * @inode: Inode to check permission on * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC) * * Separate out file-system wide checks from inode-specific permission checks. @@ -656,6 +657,7 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1; /** * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations * @link: The path of the symlink + * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data * * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled, * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is |