fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing

Add the beginnings of the fs/verity/ support layer, including the
Kconfig option and various helper functions for hashing.  To start, only
SHA-256 is supported, but other hash algorithms can easily be added.

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

5 files changed, 446 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c2bca0b01ecf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+config FS_VERITY
+	bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)"
+	select CRYPTO
+	# SHA-256 is selected as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm.
+	# To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly.
+	select CRYPTO_SHA256
+	help
+	  This option enables fs-verity.  fs-verity is the dm-verity
+	  mechanism implemented at the file level.  On supported
+	  filesystems (currently EXT4 and F2FS), userspace can use an
+	  ioctl to enable verity for a file, which causes the filesystem
+	  to build a Merkle tree for the file.  The filesystem will then
+	  transparently verify any data read from the file against the
+	  Merkle tree.  The file is also made read-only.
+
+	  This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the
+	  Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting
+	  various use cases where normally the whole file would need to
+	  be hashed at once, such as: (a) auditing (logging the file's
+	  hash), or (b) authenticity verification (comparing the hash
+	  against a known good value, e.g. from a digital signature).
+
+	  fs-verity is especially useful on large files where not all
+	  the contents may actually be needed.  Also, fs-verity verifies
+	  data each time it is paged back in, which provides better
+	  protection against malicious disks vs. an ahead-of-time hash.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config FS_VERITY_DEBUG
+	bool "FS Verity debugging"
+	depends on FS_VERITY
+	help
+	  Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default.
+
+	  Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer.
diff --git a/fs/verity/Makefile b/fs/verity/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..398f3f85fa18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/verity/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += hash_algs.o \
+			   init.o
diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9697aaebb5dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
+ *
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
+#define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG
+#define DEBUG
+#endif
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
+
+struct ahash_request;
+
+/*
+ * Implementation limit: maximum depth of the Merkle tree.  For now 8 is plenty;
+ * it's enough for over U64_MAX bytes of data using SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
+ */
+#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS		8
+
+/*
+ * Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
+ * Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
+ */
+#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */
+struct fsverity_hash_alg {
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* hash tfm, allocated on demand */
+	const char *name;	  /* crypto API name, e.g. sha256 */
+	unsigned int digest_size; /* digest size in bytes, e.g. 32 for SHA-256 */
+	unsigned int block_size;  /* block size in bytes, e.g. 64 for SHA-256 */
+};
+
+/* Merkle tree parameters: hash algorithm, initial hash state, and topology */
+struct merkle_tree_params {
+	const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; /* the hash algorithm */
+	const u8 *hashstate;		/* initial hash state or NULL */
+	unsigned int digest_size;	/* same as hash_alg->digest_size */
+	unsigned int block_size;	/* size of data and tree blocks */
+	unsigned int hashes_per_block;	/* number of hashes per tree block */
+	unsigned int log_blocksize;	/* log2(block_size) */
+	unsigned int log_arity;		/* log2(hashes_per_block) */
+	unsigned int num_levels;	/* number of levels in Merkle tree */
+	u64 tree_size;			/* Merkle tree size in bytes */
+
+	/*
+	 * Starting block index for each tree level, ordered from leaf level (0)
+	 * to root level ('num_levels - 1')
+	 */
+	u64 level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
+};
+
+/* hash_algs.c */
+
+extern struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[];
+
+const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(const struct inode *inode,
+						      unsigned int num);
+const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
+				      const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
+int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
+		       const struct inode *inode,
+		       struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out);
+int fsverity_hash_buffer(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
+			 const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out);
+void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void);
+
+/* init.c */
+
+extern void __printf(3, 4) __cold
+fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
+	     const char *fmt, ...);
+
+#define fsverity_warn(inode, fmt, ...)		\
+	fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_WARNING, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define fsverity_err(inode, fmt, ...)		\
+	fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7df1d67742b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * fs/verity/hash_algs.c: fs-verity hash algorithms
+ *
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include "fsverity_private.h"
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+
+/* The hash algorithms supported by fs-verity */
+struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[] = {
+	[FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256] = {
+		.name = "sha256",
+		.digest_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	},
+};
+
+/**
+ * fsverity_get_hash_alg() - validate and prepare a hash algorithm
+ * @inode: optional inode for logging purposes
+ * @num: the hash algorithm number
+ *
+ * Get the struct fsverity_hash_alg for the given hash algorithm number, and
+ * ensure it has a hash transform ready to go.  The hash transforms are
+ * allocated on-demand so that we don't waste resources unnecessarily, and
+ * because the crypto modules may be initialized later than fs/verity/.
+ *
+ * Return: pointer to the hash alg on success, else an ERR_PTR()
+ */
+const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(const struct inode *inode,
+						      unsigned int num)
+{
+	struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg;
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+	int err;
+
+	if (num >= ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs) ||
+	    !fsverity_hash_algs[num].name) {
+		fsverity_warn(inode, "Unknown hash algorithm number: %u", num);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[num];
+
+	/* pairs with cmpxchg() below */
+	tfm = READ_ONCE(alg->tfm);
+	if (likely(tfm != NULL))
+		return alg;
+	/*
+	 * Using the shash API would make things a bit simpler, but the ahash
+	 * API is preferable as it allows the use of crypto accelerators.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg->name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+			fsverity_warn(inode,
+				      "Missing crypto API support for hash algorithm \"%s\"",
+				      alg->name);
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG);
+		}
+		fsverity_err(inode,
+			     "Error allocating hash algorithm \"%s\": %ld",
+			     alg->name, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return ERR_CAST(tfm);
+	}
+
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	if (WARN_ON(alg->digest_size != crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm)))
+		goto err_free_tfm;
+	if (WARN_ON(alg->block_size != crypto_ahash_blocksize(tfm)))
+		goto err_free_tfm;
+
+	pr_info("%s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
+		alg->name, crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm));
+
+	/* pairs with READ_ONCE() above */
+	if (cmpxchg(&alg->tfm, NULL, tfm) != NULL)
+		crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+
+	return alg;
+
+err_free_tfm:
+	crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/**
+ * fsverity_prepare_hash_state() - precompute the initial hash state
+ * @alg: hash algorithm
+ * @salt: a salt which is to be prepended to all data to be hashed
+ * @salt_size: salt size in bytes, possibly 0
+ *
+ * Return: NULL if the salt is empty, otherwise the kmalloc()'ed precomputed
+ *	   initial hash state on success or an ERR_PTR() on failure.
+ */
+const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
+				      const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size)
+{
+	u8 *hashstate = NULL;
+	struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
+	u8 *padded_salt = NULL;
+	size_t padded_salt_size;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	int err;
+
+	if (salt_size == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hashstate = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_statesize(alg->tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hashstate)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	req = ahash_request_alloc(alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_free;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Zero-pad the salt to the next multiple of the input size of the hash
+	 * algorithm's compression function, e.g. 64 bytes for SHA-256 or 128
+	 * bytes for SHA-512.  This ensures that the hash algorithm won't have
+	 * any bytes buffered internally after processing the salt, thus making
+	 * salted hashing just as fast as unsalted hashing.
+	 */
+	padded_salt_size = round_up(salt_size, alg->block_size);
+	padded_salt = kzalloc(padded_salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!padded_salt) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_free;
+	}
+	memcpy(padded_salt, salt, salt_size);
+
+	sg_init_one(&sg, padded_salt, padded_salt_size);
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
+					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, padded_salt_size);
+
+	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free;
+
+	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), &wait);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free;
+
+	err = crypto_ahash_export(req, hashstate);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free;
+out:
+	ahash_request_free(req);
+	kfree(padded_salt);
+	return hashstate;
+
+err_free:
+	kfree(hashstate);
+	hashstate = ERR_PTR(err);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fsverity_hash_page() - hash a single data or hash page
+ * @params: the Merkle tree's parameters
+ * @inode: inode for which the hashing is being done
+ * @req: preallocated hash request
+ * @page: the page to hash
+ * @out: output digest, size 'params->digest_size' bytes
+ *
+ * Hash a single data or hash block, assuming block_size == PAGE_SIZE.
+ * The hash is salted if a salt is specified in the Merkle tree parameters.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
+		       const struct inode *inode,
+		       struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	int err;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
+	sg_set_page(&sg, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
+					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	if (params->hashstate) {
+		err = crypto_ahash_import(req, params->hashstate);
+		if (err) {
+			fsverity_err(inode,
+				     "Error %d importing hash state", err);
+			return err;
+		}
+		err = crypto_ahash_finup(req);
+	} else {
+		err = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
+	if (err)
+		fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing page hash", err);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fsverity_hash_buffer() - hash some data
+ * @alg: the hash algorithm to use
+ * @data: the data to hash
+ * @size: size of data to hash, in bytes
+ * @out: output digest, size 'alg->digest_size' bytes
+ *
+ * Hash some data which is located in physically contiguous memory (i.e. memory
+ * allocated by kmalloc(), not by vmalloc()).  No salt is used.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+int fsverity_hash_buffer(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
+			 const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct ahash_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	int err;
+
+	req = ahash_request_alloc(alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sg_init_one(&sg, data, size);
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
+					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, size);
+
+	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
+
+	ahash_request_free(req);
+	return err;
+}
+
+void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check the hash algorithms (could be a build-time check, but
+	 * they're in an array)
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs); i++) {
+		const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[i];
+
+		if (!alg->name)
+			continue;
+
+		BUG_ON(alg->digest_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+		/*
+		 * For efficiency, the implementation currently assumes the
+		 * digest and block sizes are powers of 2.  This limitation can
+		 * be lifted if the code is updated to handle other values.
+		 */
+		BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->digest_size));
+		BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->block_size));
+	}
+}
diff --git a/fs/verity/init.c b/fs/verity/init.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..40076bbe452a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/verity/init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * fs/verity/init.c: fs-verity module initialization and logging
+ *
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include "fsverity_private.h"
+
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+
+void fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
+		  const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
+				      DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
+	struct va_format vaf;
+	va_list args;
+
+	if (!__ratelimit(&rs))
+		return;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vaf.fmt = fmt;
+	vaf.va = &args;
+	if (inode)
+		printk("%sfs-verity (%s, inode %lu): %pV\n",
+		       level, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, &vaf);
+	else
+		printk("%sfs-verity: %pV\n", level, &vaf);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+static int __init fsverity_init(void)
+{
+	fsverity_check_hash_algs();
+
+	pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(fsverity_init)