diff options
| author | Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> | 2019-01-30 14:01:57 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> | 2019-02-13 11:14:46 +0100 |
| commit | 993a0b2aec52754f0897b1dab4c453be8217cae5 (patch) | |
| tree | b2e1d4fbcb37495bea2aaa9ecf3ba8562382f208 /fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | |
| parent | 5f32879ea35523b9842bdbdc0065e13635caada2 (diff) | |
ovl: Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up
If a file has been copied up metadata only, and later data is copied up,
upper loses any security.capability xattr it has (underlying filesystem
clears it as upon file write).
From a user's point of view, this is just a file copy-up and that should
not result in losing security.capability xattr. Hence, before data copy
up, save security.capability xattr (if any) and restore it on upper after
data copy up is complete.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0c2888749363 ("ovl: A new xattr OVL_XATTR_METACOPY for file on upper")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h index 5e45cb3630a0..9c6018287d57 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h @@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir); int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry); bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry); char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding); +ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value, + size_t padding); static inline bool ovl_is_impuredir(struct dentry *dentry) { |