summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/drivers/tty
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-11-27 11:25:04 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-11-27 11:25:04 -0800
commit80eb5fea3c14fb171facb5242a1555b3aafea4d0 (patch)
tree08c6840f7d25876ff515dab190a38bfcfecaea88 /drivers/tty
parent9a3d7fd275be4559277667228902824165153c80 (diff)
parentaf2e8c68b9c5403f77096969c516f742f5bb29e0 (diff)
Merge tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle
Pull powerpc Spectre-RSB fixes from Michael Ellerman: "We failed to activate the mitigation for Spectre-RSB (Return Stack Buffer, aka. ret2spec) on context switch, on CPUs prior to Power9 DD2.3. That allows a process to poison the RSB (called Link Stack on Power CPUs) and possibly misdirect speculative execution of another process. If the victim process can be induced to execute a leak gadget then it may be possible to extract information from the victim via a side channel. The fix is to correctly activate the link stack flush mitigation on all CPUs that have any mitigation of Spectre v2 in userspace enabled. There's a second commit which adds a link stack flush in the KVM guest exit path. A leak via that path has not been demonstrated, but we believe it's at least theoretically possible. This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660" * tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of /home/torvalds/Downloads/powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/tty')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions