diff options
| author | Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> | 2019-08-19 17:17:44 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2019-08-19 21:54:15 -0700 |
| commit | 99d5cadfde2b1acb7650021df5abaa5ec447dd10 (patch) | |
| tree | 49af3ab9d60ad3191426f616750002f1720562cc /crypto | |
| parent | fef5dad9876034253d59acbf8c0c314f4d94cf87 (diff) | |
kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index 3b303fe2f061..cc9dbcecaaca 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) { pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n"); - return -EKEYREJECTED; + return -ENODATA; } chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address, @@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ error_no_desc: * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust * keyring, or: * + * (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present. + * * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a * chain. * |