diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-06-05 08:43:41 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-06-05 08:43:41 -0700 |
commit | 71d7b52cc33bc3b6697cce8a0a5ac9032f372e47 (patch) | |
tree | b4d543cec4fc087b244d219c62868076742b1305 /arch | |
parent | 51214520ad62e6cd5ec216e9b840999b4aaceb5f (diff) | |
parent | db574f2f96d0c9a245a9e787e3d9ec288fb2b445 (diff) |
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"This is dominated by a couple large series for ARM and x86
respectively, but apart from that things are calm.
ARM:
- Large set of FP/SVE fixes for pKVM, addressing the fallout from the
per-CPU data rework and making sure that the host is not involved
in the FP/SVE switching any more
- Allow FEAT_BTI to be enabled with NV now that FEAT_PAUTH is
completely supported
- Fix for the respective priorities of Failed PAC, Illegal Execution
state and Instruction Abort exceptions
- Fix the handling of AArch32 instruction traps failing their
condition code, which was broken by the introduction of
ESR_EL2.ISS2
- Allow vcpus running in AArch32 state to be restored in System mode
- Fix AArch32 GPR restore that would lose the 64 bit state under some
conditions
RISC-V:
- No need to use mask when hart-index-bits is 0
- Fix incorrect reg_subtype labels in
kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_reg_isa_ext()
x86:
- Fixes and debugging help for the #VE sanity check.
Also disable it by default, even for CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL, because
it was found to trigger spuriously (most likely a processor erratum
as the exact symptoms vary by generation).
- Avoid WARN() when two NMIs arrive simultaneously during an
NMI-disabled situation (GIF=0 or interrupt shadow) when the
processor supports virtual NMI.
While generally KVM will not request an NMI window when virtual
NMIs are supported, in this case it *does* have to single-step over
the interrupt shadow or enable the STGI intercept, in order to
deliver the latched second NMI.
- Drop support for hand tuning APIC timer advancement from userspace.
Since we have adaptive tuning, and it has proved to work well, drop
the module parameter for manual configuration and with it a few
stupid bugs that it had"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (32 commits)
KVM: x86/mmu: Don't save mmu_invalidate_seq after checking private attr
KVM: arm64: Ensure that SME controls are disabled in protected mode
KVM: arm64: Refactor CPACR trap bit setting/clearing to use ELx format
KVM: arm64: Consolidate initializing the host data's fpsimd_state/sve in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Eagerly restore host fpsimd/sve state in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Allocate memory mapped at hyp for host sve state in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Specialize handling of host fpsimd state on trap
KVM: arm64: Abstract set/clear of CPTR_EL2 bits behind helper
KVM: arm64: Fix prototype for __sve_save_state/__sve_restore_state
KVM: arm64: Reintroduce __sve_save_state
KVM: x86: Drop support for hand tuning APIC timer advancement from userspace
KVM: SEV-ES: Delegate LBR virtualization to the processor
KVM: SEV-ES: Disallow SEV-ES guests when X86_FEATURE_LBRV is absent
KVM: SEV-ES: Prevent MSR access post VMSA encryption
RISC-V: KVM: Fix incorrect reg_subtype labels in kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_reg_isa_ext function
RISC-V: KVM: No need to use mask when hart-index-bit is 0
KVM: arm64: nv: Expose BTI and CSV_frac to a guest hypervisor
KVM: arm64: nv: Fix relative priorities of exceptions generated by ERETAx
KVM: arm64: AArch32: Fix spurious trapping of conditional instructions
KVM: arm64: Allow AArch32 PSTATE.M to be restored as System mode
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
38 files changed, 558 insertions, 150 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h index e4546b29dd0c..fd87c4b8f984 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ /* Coprocessor traps */ .macro __init_el2_cptr __check_hvhe .LnVHE_\@, x1 - mov x0, #(CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN) + mov x0, #CPACR_ELx_FPEN msr cpacr_el1, x0 b .Lskip_set_cptr_\@ .LnVHE_\@: @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ // (h)VHE case mrs x0, cpacr_el1 // Disable SVE traps - orr x0, x0, #(CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN) + orr x0, x0, #CPACR_ELx_ZEN msr cpacr_el1, x0 b .Lskip_set_cptr_\@ @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ // (h)VHE case mrs x0, cpacr_el1 // Disable SME traps - orr x0, x0, #(CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN) + orr x0, x0, #CPACR_ELx_SMEN msr cpacr_el1, x0 b .Lskip_set_cptr_sme_\@ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h index e01bb5ca13b7..b2adc2c6c82a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h @@ -305,6 +305,12 @@ GENMASK(19, 14) | \ BIT(11)) +#define CPTR_VHE_EL2_RES0 (GENMASK(63, 32) | \ + GENMASK(27, 26) | \ + GENMASK(23, 22) | \ + GENMASK(19, 18) | \ + GENMASK(15, 0)) + /* Hyp Debug Configuration Register bits */ #define MDCR_EL2_E2TB_MASK (UL(0x3)) #define MDCR_EL2_E2TB_SHIFT (UL(24)) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h index 501e3e019c93..21650e7924d4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h @@ -557,6 +557,68 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_incr_pc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu_set_flag((v), e); \ } while (0) +#define __build_check_all_or_none(r, bits) \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(((r) & (bits)) && ((r) & (bits)) != (bits)) + +#define __cpacr_to_cptr_clr(clr, set) \ + ({ \ + u64 cptr = 0; \ + \ + if ((set) & CPACR_ELx_FPEN) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TFP; \ + if ((set) & CPACR_ELx_ZEN) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TZ; \ + if ((set) & CPACR_ELx_SMEN) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TSM; \ + if ((clr) & CPACR_ELx_TTA) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TTA; \ + if ((clr) & CPTR_EL2_TAM) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TAM; \ + if ((clr) & CPTR_EL2_TCPAC) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TCPAC; \ + \ + cptr; \ + }) + +#define __cpacr_to_cptr_set(clr, set) \ + ({ \ + u64 cptr = 0; \ + \ + if ((clr) & CPACR_ELx_FPEN) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TFP; \ + if ((clr) & CPACR_ELx_ZEN) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TZ; \ + if ((clr) & CPACR_ELx_SMEN) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TSM; \ + if ((set) & CPACR_ELx_TTA) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TTA; \ + if ((set) & CPTR_EL2_TAM) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TAM; \ + if ((set) & CPTR_EL2_TCPAC) \ + cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TCPAC; \ + \ + cptr; \ + }) + +#define cpacr_clear_set(clr, set) \ + do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON((set) & CPTR_VHE_EL2_RES0); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON((clr) & CPACR_ELx_E0POE); \ + __build_check_all_or_none((clr), CPACR_ELx_FPEN); \ + __build_check_all_or_none((set), CPACR_ELx_FPEN); \ + __build_check_all_or_none((clr), CPACR_ELx_ZEN); \ + __build_check_all_or_none((set), CPACR_ELx_ZEN); \ + __build_check_all_or_none((clr), CPACR_ELx_SMEN); \ + __build_check_all_or_none((set), CPACR_ELx_SMEN); \ + \ + if (has_vhe() || has_hvhe()) \ + sysreg_clear_set(cpacr_el1, clr, set); \ + else \ + sysreg_clear_set(cptr_el2, \ + __cpacr_to_cptr_clr(clr, set), \ + __cpacr_to_cptr_set(clr, set));\ + } while (0) + static __always_inline void kvm_write_cptr_el2(u64 val) { if (has_vhe() || has_hvhe()) @@ -570,17 +632,16 @@ static __always_inline u64 kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) u64 val; if (has_vhe()) { - val = (CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN | - CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN); + val = (CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN); if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) val |= CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN; } else if (has_hvhe()) { - val = (CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN); + val = CPACR_ELx_FPEN; if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu) || !guest_owns_fp_regs()) - val |= CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN; + val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN; if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) - val |= CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN; + val |= CPACR_ELx_SMEN; } else { val = CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1; diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 8170c04fde91..36b8e97bf49e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static inline enum kvm_mode kvm_get_mode(void) { return KVM_MODE_NONE; }; DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(userspace_irqchip_in_use); extern unsigned int __ro_after_init kvm_sve_max_vl; +extern unsigned int __ro_after_init kvm_host_sve_max_vl; int __init kvm_arm_init_sve(void); u32 __attribute_const__ kvm_target_cpu(void); @@ -521,6 +522,20 @@ struct kvm_cpu_context { u64 *vncr_array; }; +struct cpu_sve_state { + __u64 zcr_el1; + + /* + * Ordering is important since __sve_save_state/__sve_restore_state + * relies on it. + */ + __u32 fpsr; + __u32 fpcr; + + /* Must be SVE_VQ_BYTES (128 bit) aligned. */ + __u8 sve_regs[]; +}; + /* * This structure is instantiated on a per-CPU basis, and contains * data that is: @@ -534,7 +549,15 @@ struct kvm_cpu_context { */ struct kvm_host_data { struct kvm_cpu_context host_ctxt; - struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd_state; /* hyp VA */ + + /* + * All pointers in this union are hyp VA. + * sve_state is only used in pKVM and if system_supports_sve(). + */ + union { + struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd_state; + struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state; + }; /* Ownership of the FP regs */ enum { diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h index 3e80464f8953..b05bceca3385 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h @@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ void __debug_restore_host_buffers_nvhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void __fpsimd_save_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *fp_regs); void __fpsimd_restore_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *fp_regs); -void __sve_restore_state(void *sve_pffr, u32 *fpsr); +void __sve_save_state(void *sve_pffr, u32 *fpsr, int save_ffr); +void __sve_restore_state(void *sve_pffr, u32 *fpsr, int restore_ffr); u64 __guest_enter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); @@ -142,5 +143,6 @@ extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64smfr0_el1_sys_val); extern unsigned long kvm_nvhe_sym(__icache_flags); extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_arm_vmid_bits); +extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_sve_max_vl); #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HYP_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h index ad9cfb5c1ff4..cd56acd9a842 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h @@ -128,4 +128,13 @@ static inline unsigned long hyp_ffa_proxy_pages(void) return (2 * KVM_FFA_MBOX_NR_PAGES) + DIV_ROUND_UP(desc_max, PAGE_SIZE); } +static inline size_t pkvm_host_sve_state_size(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_sve()) + return 0; + + return size_add(sizeof(struct cpu_sve_state), + SVE_SIG_REGS_SIZE(sve_vq_from_vl(kvm_host_sve_max_vl))); +} + #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_PKVM_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index 9996a989b52e..59716789fe0f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -1931,6 +1931,11 @@ static unsigned long nvhe_percpu_order(void) return size ? get_order(size) : 0; } +static size_t pkvm_host_sve_state_order(void) +{ + return get_order(pkvm_host_sve_state_size()); +} + /* A lookup table holding the hypervisor VA for each vector slot */ static void *hyp_spectre_vector_selector[BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS]; @@ -2310,12 +2315,20 @@ static void __init teardown_subsystems(void) static void __init teardown_hyp_mode(void) { + bool free_sve = system_supports_sve() && is_protected_kvm_enabled(); int cpu; free_hyp_pgds(); for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { free_page(per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu)); free_pages(kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_arm_hyp_percpu_base)[cpu], nvhe_percpu_order()); + + if (free_sve) { + struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state; + + sve_state = per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->sve_state; + free_pages((unsigned long) sve_state, pkvm_host_sve_state_order()); + } } } @@ -2398,6 +2411,58 @@ static int __init kvm_hyp_init_protection(u32 hyp_va_bits) return 0; } +static int init_pkvm_host_sve_state(void) +{ + int cpu; + + if (!system_supports_sve()) + return 0; + + /* Allocate pages for host sve state in protected mode. */ + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + struct page *page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, pkvm_host_sve_state_order()); + + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + + per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->sve_state = page_address(page); + } + + /* + * Don't map the pages in hyp since these are only used in protected + * mode, which will (re)create its own mapping when initialized. + */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Finalizes the initialization of hyp mode, once everything else is initialized + * and the initialziation process cannot fail. + */ +static void finalize_init_hyp_mode(void) +{ + int cpu; + + if (system_supports_sve() && is_protected_kvm_enabled()) { + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state; + + sve_state = per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->sve_state; + per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->sve_state = + kern_hyp_va(sve_state); + } + } else { + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd_state; + + fpsimd_state = &per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->host_ctxt.fp_regs; + per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->fpsimd_state = + kern_hyp_va(fpsimd_state); + } + } +} + static void pkvm_hyp_init_ptrauth(void) { struct kvm_cpu_context *hyp_ctxt; @@ -2566,6 +2631,10 @@ static int __init init_hyp_mode(void) goto out_err; } + err = init_pkvm_host_sve_state(); + if (err) + goto out_err; + err = kvm_hyp_init_protection(hyp_va_bits); if (err) { kvm_err("Failed to init hyp memory protection\n"); @@ -2730,6 +2799,13 @@ static __init int kvm_arm_init(void) if (err) goto out_subs; + /* + * This should be called after initialization is done and failure isn't + * possible anymore. + */ + if (!in_hyp_mode) + finalize_init_hyp_mode(); + kvm_arm_initialised = true; return 0; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/emulate-nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/emulate-nested.c index 72d733c74a38..54090967a335 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/emulate-nested.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/emulate-nested.c @@ -2181,16 +2181,23 @@ void kvm_emulate_nested_eret(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (forward_traps(vcpu, HCR_NV)) return; + spsr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SPSR_EL2); + spsr = kvm_check_illegal_exception_return(vcpu, spsr); + /* Check for an ERETAx */ esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu); if (esr_iss_is_eretax(esr) && !kvm_auth_eretax(vcpu, &elr)) { /* - * Oh no, ERETAx failed to authenticate. If we have - * FPACCOMBINE, deliver an exception right away. If we - * don't, then let the mangled ELR value trickle down the + * Oh no, ERETAx failed to authenticate. + * + * If we have FPACCOMBINE and we don't have a pending + * Illegal Execution State exception (which has priority + * over FPAC), deliver an exception right away. + * + * Otherwise, let the mangled ELR value trickle down the * ERET handling, and the guest will have a little surprise. */ - if (kvm_has_pauth(vcpu->kvm, FPACCOMBINE)) { + if (kvm_has_pauth(vcpu->kvm, FPACCOMBINE) && !(spsr & PSR_IL_BIT)) { esr &= ESR_ELx_ERET_ISS_ERETA; esr |= FIELD_PREP(ESR_ELx_EC_MASK, ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC); kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, esr); @@ -2201,17 +2208,11 @@ void kvm_emulate_nested_eret(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) preempt_disable(); kvm_arch_vcpu_put(vcpu); - spsr = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, SPSR_EL2); - spsr = kvm_check_illegal_exception_return(vcpu, spsr); if (!esr_iss_is_eretax(esr)) elr = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ELR_EL2); trace_kvm_nested_eret(vcpu, elr, spsr); - /* - * Note that the current exception level is always the virtual EL2, - * since we set HCR_EL2.NV bit only when entering the virtual EL2. - */ *vcpu_pc(vcpu) = elr; *vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) = spsr; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c index 1807d3a79a8a..521b32868d0d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c @@ -90,6 +90,13 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state(); } } + + /* + * If normal guests gain SME support, maintain this behavior for pKVM + * guests, which don't support SME. + */ + WARN_ON(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sme() && + read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR)); } /* @@ -161,9 +168,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (has_vhe() && system_supports_sme()) { /* Also restore EL0 state seen on entry */ if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED)) - sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, - CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN | - CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN); + sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_ELx_SMEN); else sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c index e2f762d959bb..11098eb7eb44 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) case PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC: case PSR_AA32_MODE_ABT: case PSR_AA32_MODE_UND: + case PSR_AA32_MODE_SYS: if (!vcpu_el1_is_32bit(vcpu)) return -EINVAL; break; @@ -276,7 +277,7 @@ static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) if (*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) & PSR_MODE32_BIT) { int i, nr_reg; - switch (*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu)) { + switch (*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) & PSR_AA32_MODE_MASK) { /* * Either we are dealing with user mode, and only the * first 15 registers (+ PC) must be narrowed to 32bit. diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/aarch32.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/aarch32.c index 8d9670e6615d..449fa58cf3b6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/aarch32.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/aarch32.c @@ -50,9 +50,23 @@ bool kvm_condition_valid32(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) u32 cpsr_cond; int cond; - /* Top two bits non-zero? Unconditional. */ - if (kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu) >> 30) + /* + * These are the exception classes that could fire with a + * conditional instruction. + */ + switch (kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(vcpu)) { + case ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32: + case ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_64: + case ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_MR: + case ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_LS: + case ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD: + case ESR_ELx_EC_CP10_ID: + case ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_64: + case ESR_ELx_EC_SVC32: + break; + default: return true; + } /* Is condition field valid? */ cond = kvm_vcpu_get_condition(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/fpsimd.S index 61e6f3ba7b7d..e950875e31ce 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/fpsimd.S @@ -25,3 +25,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__sve_restore_state) sve_load 0, x1, x2, 3 ret SYM_FUNC_END(__sve_restore_state) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__sve_save_state) + mov x2, #1 + sve_save 0, x1, x2, 3 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__sve_save_state) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h index a92566f36022..0c4de44534b7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h @@ -316,10 +316,24 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_restore_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1, SYS_ZCR_EL2); __sve_restore_state(vcpu_sve_pffr(vcpu), - &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs.fpsr); + &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs.fpsr, + true); write_sysreg_el1(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1), SYS_ZCR); } +static inline void __hyp_sve_save_host(void) +{ + struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state = *host_data_ptr(sve_state); + + sve_state->zcr_el1 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR); + write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2); + __sve_save_state(sve_state->sve_regs + sve_ffr_offset(kvm_host_sve_max_vl), + &sve_state->fpsr, + true); +} + +static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + /* * We trap the first access to the FP/SIMD to save the host context and * restore the guest context lazily. @@ -330,7 +344,6 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code) { bool sve_guest; u8 esr_ec; - u64 reg; if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) return false; @@ -353,24 +366,15 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code) /* Valid trap. Switch the context: */ /* First disable enough traps to allow us to update the registers */ - if (has_vhe() || has_hvhe()) { - reg = CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN; - if (sve_guest) - reg |= CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN; - - sysreg_clear_set(cpacr_el1, 0, reg); - } else { - reg = CPTR_EL2_TFP; - if (sve_guest) - reg |= CPTR_EL2_TZ; - - sysreg_clear_set(cptr_el2, reg, 0); - } + if (sve_guest || (is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sve())) + cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN); + else + cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN); isb(); /* Write out the host state if it's in the registers */ if (host_owns_fp_regs()) - __fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state)); + kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(vcpu); /* Restore the guest state */ if (sve_guest) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h index 22f374e9f532..24a9a8330d19 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h @@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ static inline bool pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) } void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl); -void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init(void); int __pkvm_init_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm, unsigned long vm_hva, unsigned long pgd_hva); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c index d5c48dc98f67..f43d845f3c4e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c @@ -23,20 +23,80 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, kvm_init_params); void __kvm_hyp_host_forward_smc(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt); +static void __hyp_sve_save_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1) = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR); + /* + * On saving/restoring guest sve state, always use the maximum VL for + * the guest. The layout of the data when saving the sve state depends + * on the VL, so use a consistent (i.e., the maximum) guest VL. + */ + sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1, SYS_ZCR_EL2); + __sve_save_state(vcpu_sve_pffr(vcpu), &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs.fpsr, true); + write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2); +} + +static void __hyp_sve_restore_host(void) +{ + struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state = *host_data_ptr(sve_state); + + /* + * On saving/restoring host sve state, always use the maximum VL for + * the host. The layout of the data when saving the sve state depends + * on the VL, so use a consistent (i.e., the maximum) host VL. + * + * Setting ZCR_EL2 to ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK sets the effective length + * supported by the system (or limited at EL3). + */ + write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2); + __sve_restore_state(sve_state->sve_regs + sve_ffr_offset(kvm_host_sve_max_vl), + &sve_state->fpsr, + true); + write_sysreg_el1(sve_state->zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR); +} + +static void fpsimd_sve_flush(void) +{ + *host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED; +} + +static void fpsimd_sve_sync(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + if (!guest_owns_fp_regs()) + return; + + cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN); + isb(); + + if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) + __hyp_sve_save_guest(vcpu); + else + __fpsimd_save_state(&vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs); + + if (system_supports_sve()) + __hyp_sve_restore_host(); + else + __fpsimd_restore_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state)); + + *host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED; +} + static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) { struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu; + fpsimd_sve_flush(); + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt; hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_state = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu->arch.sve_state); - hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_max_vl = host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl; + /* Limit guest vector length to the maximum supported by the host. */ + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_max_vl = min(host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl, kvm_host_sve_max_vl); hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hw_mmu = host_vcpu->arch.hw_mmu; hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2; hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2; - hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.cptr_el2; hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags = host_vcpu->arch.iflags; @@ -54,10 +114,11 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3; unsigned int i; + fpsimd_sve_sync(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); + host_vcpu->arch.ctxt = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt; host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2; - host_vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2; host_vcpu->arch.fault = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.fault; @@ -79,6 +140,17 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu; struct kvm *host_kvm; + /* + * KVM (and pKVM) doesn't support SME guests for now, and + * ensures that SME features aren't enabled in pstate when + * loading a vcpu. Therefore, if SME features enabled the host + * is misbehaving. + */ + if (unlikely(system_supports_sme() && read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR))) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + host_kvm = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu->kvm); hyp_vcpu = pkvm_load_hyp_vcpu(host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle, host_vcpu->vcpu_idx); @@ -405,11 +477,7 @@ void handle_trap(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) handle_host_smc(host_ctxt); break; case ESR_ELx_EC_SVE: - if (has_hvhe()) - sysreg_clear_set(cpacr_el1, 0, (CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN | - CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN)); - else - sysreg_clear_set(cptr_el2, CPTR_EL2_TZ, 0); + cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_ZEN); isb(); sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2); break; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c index 16aa4875ddb8..95cf18574251 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ unsigned long __icache_flags; /* Used by kvm_get_vttbr(). */ unsigned int kvm_arm_vmid_bits; +unsigned int kvm_host_sve_max_vl; + /* * Set trap register values based on features in ID_AA64PFR0. */ @@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* Trap SVE */ if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SVE), feature_ids)) { if (has_hvhe()) - cptr_clear |= CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN; + cptr_clear |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN; else cptr_set |= CPTR_EL2_TZ; } @@ -247,17 +249,6 @@ void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) vm_table = tbl; } -void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init(void) -{ - unsigned long i; - - for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) { - struct kvm_host_data *host_data = per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_data, i); - - host_data->fpsimd_state = &host_data->host_ctxt.fp_regs; - } -} - /* * Return the hyp vm structure corresponding to the handle. */ @@ -586,6 +577,8 @@ unlock: if (ret) unmap_donated_memory(hyp_vcpu, sizeof(*hyp_vcpu)); + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2 = kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); + return ret; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c index 859f22f754d3..f4350ba07b0b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c @@ -67,6 +67,28 @@ static int divide_memory_pool(void *virt, unsigned long size) return 0; } +static int pkvm_create_host_sve_mappings(void) +{ + void *start, *end; + int ret, i; + + if (!system_supports_sve()) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) { + struct kvm_host_data *host_data = per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_data, i); + struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state = host_data->sve_state; + + start = kern_hyp_va(sve_state); + end = start + PAGE_ALIGN(pkvm_host_sve_state_size()); + ret = pkvm_create_mappings(start, end, PAGE_HYP); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + static int recreate_hyp_mappings(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size, unsigned long *per_cpu_base, u32 hyp_va_bits) @@ -125,6 +147,8 @@ static int recreate_hyp_mappings(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size, return ret; } + pkvm_create_host_sve_mappings(); + /* * Map the host sections RO in the hypervisor, but transfer the * ownership from the host to the hypervisor itself to make sure they @@ -300,7 +324,6 @@ void __noreturn __pkvm_init_finalise(void) goto out; pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(vm_table_base); - pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init(); out: /* * We tail-called to here from handle___pkvm_init() and will not return, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c index 6758cd905570..6af179c6356d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c @@ -48,15 +48,14 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) val |= has_hvhe() ? CPACR_EL1_TTA : CPTR_EL2_TTA; if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) { if (has_hvhe()) - val &= ~(CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN); + val &= ~CPACR_ELx_SMEN; else val |= CPTR_EL2_TSM; } if (!guest_owns_fp_regs()) { if (has_hvhe()) - val &= ~(CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN | - CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN); + val &= ~(CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN); else val |= CPTR_EL2_TFP | CPTR_EL2_TZ; @@ -182,6 +181,25 @@ static bool kvm_handle_pvm_sys64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code) kvm_handle_pvm_sysreg(vcpu, exit_code)); } +static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + /* + * Non-protected kvm relies on the host restoring its sve state. + * Protected kvm restores the host's sve state as not to reveal that + * fpsimd was used by a guest nor leak upper sve bits. + */ + if (unlikely(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sve())) { + __hyp_sve_save_host(); + + /* Re-enable SVE traps if not supported for the guest vcpu. */ + if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) + cpacr_clear_set(CPACR_ELx_ZEN, 0); + + } else { + __fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state)); + } +} + static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = { [0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = NULL, [ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c index d7af5f46f22a..8fbb6a2e0559 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c @@ -93,8 +93,7 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) val = read_sysreg(cpacr_el1); val |= CPACR_ELx_TTA; - val &= ~(CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN | - CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN); + val &= ~(CPACR_ELx_ZEN | CPACR_ELx_SMEN); /* * With VHE (HCR.E2H == 1), accesses to CPACR_EL1 are routed to @@ -109,9 +108,9 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) { if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) - val |= CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN; + val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN; } else { - val &= ~(CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN); + val &= ~CPACR_ELx_FPEN; __activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu); } @@ -262,6 +261,11 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_eret(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code) return true; } +static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + __fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state)); +} + static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = { [0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = NULL, [ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c index 6813c7c7f00a..bae8536cbf00 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c @@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ static u64 limit_nv_id_reg(u32 id, u64 val) break; case SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1: - /* Only support SSBS */ - val &= NV_FTR(PFR1, SSBS); + /* Only support BTI, SSBS, CSV2_frac */ + val &= (NV_FTR(PFR1, BT) | + NV_FTR(PFR1, SSBS) | + NV_FTR(PFR1, CSV2_frac)); break; case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1: diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c index 1b7b58cb121f..3fc8ca164dbe 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ /* Maximum phys_shift supported for any VM on this host */ static u32 __ro_after_init kvm_ipa_limit; +unsigned int __ro_after_init kvm_host_sve_max_vl; /* * ARMv8 Reset Values @@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ int __init kvm_arm_init_sve(void) { if (system_supports_sve()) { kvm_sve_max_vl = sve_max_virtualisable_vl(); + kvm_host_sve_max_vl = sve_max_vl(); + kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) = kvm_host_sve_max_vl; /* * The get_sve_reg()/set_sve_reg() ioctl interface will need diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/aia_device.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/aia_device.c index 0eb689351b7d..5cd407c6a8e4 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kvm/aia_device.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/aia_device.c @@ -237,10 +237,11 @@ static gpa_t aia_imsic_ppn(struct kvm_aia *aia, gpa_t addr) static u32 aia_imsic_hart_index(struct kvm_aia *aia, gpa_t addr) { - u32 hart, group = 0; + u32 hart = 0, group = 0; - hart = (addr >> (aia->nr_guest_bits + IMSIC_MMIO_PAGE_SHIFT)) & - GENMASK_ULL(aia->nr_hart_bits - 1, 0); + if (aia->nr_hart_bits) + hart = (addr >> (aia->nr_guest_bits + IMSIC_MMIO_PAGE_SHIFT)) & + GENMASK_ULL(aia->nr_hart_bits - 1, 0); if (aia->nr_group_bits) group = (addr >> aia->nr_group_shift) & GENMASK_ULL(aia->nr_group_bits - 1, 0); diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c index c676275ea0a0..62874fbca29f 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c @@ -724,9 +724,9 @@ static int kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_reg_isa_ext(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, switch (reg_subtype) { case KVM_REG_RISCV_ISA_SINGLE: return riscv_vcpu_set_isa_ext_single(vcpu, reg_num, reg_val); - case KVM_REG_RISCV_SBI_MULTI_EN: + case KVM_REG_RISCV_ISA_MULTI_EN: return riscv_vcpu_set_isa_ext_multi(vcpu, reg_num, reg_val, true); - case KVM_REG_RISCV_SBI_MULTI_DIS: + case KVM_REG_RISCV_ISA_MULTI_DIS: return riscv_vcpu_set_isa_ext_multi(vcpu, reg_num, reg_val, false); default: return -ENOENT; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index ece45b3f6f20..f8ca74e7678f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -2154,6 +2154,7 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code, void *insn, int insn_len); +void kvm_mmu_print_sptes(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const char *msg); void kvm_mmu_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva); void kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, u64 addr, unsigned long roots); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h index 266daf5b5b84..695f36664889 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ #define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLS_EXITING ( 2*32+ 15) /* "" VM-Exit on ENCLS (leaf dependent) */ #define VMX_FEATURE_RDSEED_EXITING ( 2*32+ 16) /* "" VM-Exit on RDSEED */ #define VMX_FEATURE_PAGE_MOD_LOGGING ( 2*32+ 17) /* "pml" Log dirty pages into buffer */ -#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_VIOLATION_VE ( 2*32+ 18) /* "" Conditionally reflect EPT violations as #VE exceptions */ +#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_VIOLATION_VE ( 2*32+ 18) /* Conditionally reflect EPT violations as #VE exceptions */ #define VMX_FEATURE_PT_CONCEAL_VMX ( 2*32+ 19) /* "" Suppress VMX indicators in Processor Trace */ #define VMX_FEATURE_XSAVES ( 2*32+ 20) /* "" Enable XSAVES and XRSTORS in guest */ #define VMX_FEATURE_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC ( 2*32+ 22) /* "ept_mode_based_exec" Enable separate EPT EXEC bits for supervisor vs. user */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig index d64fb2b3eb69..fec95a770270 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ config KVM select KVM_VFIO select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING + select KVM_WERROR if WERROR help Support hosting fully virtualized guest machines using hardware virtualization extensions. You will need a fairly recent @@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ config KVM_WERROR # FRAME_WARN, i.e. KVM_WERROR=y with KASAN=y requires special tuning. # Building KVM with -Werror and KASAN is still doable via enabling # the kernel-wide WERROR=y. - depends on KVM && EXPERT && !KASAN + depends on KVM && ((EXPERT && !KASAN) || WERROR) help Add -Werror to the build flags for KVM. @@ -97,15 +98,17 @@ config KVM_INTEL config KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE bool "Check that guests do not receive #VE exceptions" - default KVM_PROVE_MMU || DEBUG_KERNEL - depends on KVM_INTEL + depends on KVM_INTEL && EXPERT help - Checks that KVM's page table management code will not incorrectly let guests receive a virtualization exception. Virtualization exceptions will be trapped by the hypervisor rather than injected in the guest. + Note: some CPUs appear to generate spurious EPT Violations #VEs + that trigger KVM's WARN, in particular with eptad=0 and/or nested + virtualization. + If unsure, say N. config X86_SGX_KVM diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index ebf41023be38..acd7d48100a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -59,7 +59,17 @@ #define MAX_APIC_VECTOR 256 #define APIC_VECTORS_PER_REG 32 -static bool lapic_timer_advance_dynamic __read_mostly; +/* + * Enable local APIC timer advancement (tscdeadline mode only) with adaptive + * tuning. When enabled, KVM programs the host timer event to fire early, i.e. + * before the deadline expires, to account for the delay between taking the + * VM-Exit (to inject the guest event) and the subsequent VM-Enter to resume + * the guest, i.e. so that the interrupt arrives in the guest with minimal + * latency relative to the deadline programmed by the guest. + */ +static bool lapic_timer_advance __read_mostly = true; +module_param(lapic_timer_advance, bool, 0444); + #define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_MIN 100 /* clock cycles */ #define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_MAX 10000 /* clock cycles */ #define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_INIT 1000 @@ -1854,16 +1864,14 @@ static void __kvm_wait_lapic_expire(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc()); trace_kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu->vcpu_id, guest_tsc - tsc_deadline); - if (lapic_timer_advance_dynamic) { - adjust_lapic_timer_advance(vcpu, guest_tsc - tsc_deadline); - /* - * If the timer fired early, reread the TSC to account for the - * overhead of the above adjustment to avoid waiting longer - * than is necessary. - */ - if (guest_tsc < tsc_deadline) - guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc()); - } + adjust_lapic_timer_advance(vcpu, guest_tsc - tsc_deadline); + + /* + * If the timer fired early, reread the TSC to account for the overhead + * of the above adjustment to avoid waiting longer than is necessary. + */ + if (guest_tsc < tsc_deadline) + guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc()); if (guest_tsc < tsc_deadline) __wait_lapic_expire(vcpu, tsc_deadline - guest_tsc); @@ -2812,7 +2820,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart apic_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *data) return HRTIMER_NORESTART; } -int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns) +int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_lapic *apic; @@ -2845,13 +2853,8 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns) hrtimer_init(&apic->lapic_timer.timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD); apic->lapic_timer.timer.function = apic_timer_fn; - if (timer_advance_ns == -1) { + if (lapic_timer_advance) apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns = LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_INIT; - lapic_timer_advance_dynamic = true; - } else { - apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns = timer_advance_ns; - lapic_timer_advance_dynamic = false; - } /* * Stuff the APIC ENABLE bit in lieu of temporarily incrementing diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h index 0a0ea4b5dd8c..a69e706b9080 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct kvm_lapic { struct dest_map; -int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns); +int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_free_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 662f62dfb2aa..8d74bdef68c1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -336,16 +336,19 @@ static int is_cpuid_PSE36(void) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 static void __set_spte(u64 *sptep, u64 spte) { + KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(is_ept_ve_possible(spte)); WRITE_ONCE(*sptep, spte); } static void __update_clear_spte_fast(u64 *sptep, u64 spte) { + KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(is_ept_ve_possible(spte)); WRITE_ONCE(*sptep, spte); } static u64 __update_clear_spte_slow(u64 *sptep, u64 spte) { + KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(is_ept_ve_possible(spte)); return xchg(sptep, spte); } @@ -4101,23 +4104,31 @@ static int get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes, int *root_level return leaf; } -/* return true if reserved bit(s) are detected on a valid, non-MMIO SPTE. */ -static bool get_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptep) +static int get_sptes_lockless(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes, + int *root_level) { - u64 sptes[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + 1]; - struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check; - int root, leaf, level; - bool reserved = false; + int leaf; walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu); if (is_tdp_mmu_active(vcpu)) - leaf = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(vcpu, addr, sptes, &root); + leaf = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(vcpu, addr, sptes, root_level); else - leaf = get_walk(vcpu, addr, sptes, &root); + leaf = get_walk(vcpu, addr, sptes, root_level); walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(vcpu); + return leaf; +} + +/* return true if reserved bit(s) are detected on a valid, non-MMIO SPTE. */ +static bool get_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptep) +{ + u64 sptes[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + 1]; + struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check; + int root, leaf, level; + bool reserved = false; + leaf = get_sptes_lockless(vcpu, addr, sptes, &root); if (unlikely(leaf < 0)) { *sptep = 0ull; return reserved; @@ -4400,9 +4411,6 @@ static int kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, return RET_PF_EMULATE; } - fault->mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; - smp_rmb(); - /* * Check for a relevant mmu_notifier invalidation event before getting * the pfn from the primary MMU, and before acquiring mmu_lock. @@ -5921,6 +5929,22 @@ emulate: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_page_fault); +void kvm_mmu_print_sptes(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const char *msg) +{ + u64 sptes[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + 1]; + int root_level, leaf, level; + + leaf = get_sptes_lockless(vcpu, gpa, sptes, &root_level); + if (unlikely(leaf < 0)) + return; + + pr_err("%s %llx", msg, gpa); + for (level = root_level; level >= leaf; level--) + pr_cont(", spte[%d] = 0x%llx", level, sptes[level]); + pr_cont("\n"); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_print_sptes); + static void __kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, u64 addr, hpa_t root_hpa) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h index 5dd5405fa07a..52fa004a1fbc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ #ifndef KVM_X86_MMU_SPTE_H #define KVM_X86_MMU_SPTE_H +#include <asm/vmx.h> + #include "mmu.h" #include "mmu_internal.h" @@ -276,6 +278,13 @@ static inline bool is_shadow_present_pte(u64 pte) return !!(pte & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK); } +static inline bool is_ept_ve_possible(u64 spte) +{ + return (shadow_present_mask & VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT) && + !(spte & VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT) && + (spte & VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) != VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE; +} + /* * Returns true if A/D bits are supported in hardware and are enabled by KVM. * When enabled, KVM uses A/D bits for all non-nested MMUs. Because L1 can diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h index fae559559a80..2880fd392e0c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h @@ -21,11 +21,13 @@ static inline u64 kvm_tdp_mmu_read_spte(tdp_ptep_t sptep) static inline u64 kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte_atomic(tdp_ptep_t sptep, u64 new_spte) { + KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(is_ept_ve_possible(new_spte)); return xchg(rcu_dereference(sptep), new_spte); } static inline void __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(tdp_ptep_t sptep, u64 new_spte) { + KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(is_ept_ve_possible(new_spte)); WRITE_ONCE(*rcu_dereference(sptep), new_spte); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c index 1259dd63defc..36539c1b36cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c @@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm, * SPTEs. */ handle_changed_spte(kvm, iter->as_id, iter->gfn, iter->old_spte, - 0, iter->level, true); + SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, iter->level, true); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 0623cfaa7bb0..95095a233a45 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -779,6 +779,14 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, */ fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu); vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true; + + /* + * SEV-ES guest mandates LBR Virtualization to be _always_ ON. Enable it + * only after setting guest_state_protected because KVM_SET_MSRS allows + * dynamic toggling of LBRV (for performance reason) on write access to + * MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR when guest_state_protected is not set. + */ + svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); return 0; } @@ -2406,6 +2414,12 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES)) goto out; + if (!lbrv) { + WARN_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV), + "LBRV must be present for SEV-ES support"); + goto out; + } + /* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */ if (min_sev_asid == 1) goto out; @@ -3216,7 +3230,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE; - svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; /* * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the @@ -3268,10 +3281,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1); set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1); - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1); - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1); - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1); - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1); } void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index c8dc25886c16..296c524988f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs { { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false }, @@ -215,7 +216,7 @@ int vgif = true; module_param(vgif, int, 0444); /* enable/disable LBR virtualization */ -static int lbrv = true; +int lbrv = true; module_param(lbrv, int, 0444); static int tsc_scaling = true; @@ -990,7 +991,7 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb) vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR); } -static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); @@ -1000,6 +1001,9 @@ static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1); set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1); + if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, 1, 1); + /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr); @@ -1009,6 +1013,8 @@ static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm); + svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0); set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0); @@ -2822,10 +2828,24 @@ static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr) return 0; } +static bool +sev_es_prevent_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) +{ + return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) && + vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected && + svm_msrpm_offset(msr_info->index) != MSR_INVALID && + !msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, msr_info->index); +} + static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + if (sev_es_prevent_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) { + msr_info->data = 0; + return -EINVAL; + } + switch (msr_info->index) { case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && @@ -2976,6 +2996,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) u32 ecx = msr->index; u64 data = msr->data; + + if (sev_es_prevent_msr_access(vcpu, msr)) + return -EINVAL; + switch (ecx) { case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO: @@ -3846,16 +3870,27 @@ static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); /* - * KVM should never request an NMI window when vNMI is enabled, as KVM - * allows at most one to-be-injected NMI and one pending NMI, i.e. if - * two NMIs arrive simultaneously, KVM will inject one and set - * V_NMI_PENDING for the other. WARN, but continue with the standard - * single-step approach to try and salvage the pending NMI. + * If NMIs are outright masked, i.e. the vCPU is already handling an + * NMI, and KVM has not yet intercepted an IRET, then there is nothing + * more to do at this time as KVM has already enabled IRET intercepts. + * If KVM has already intercepted IRET, then single-step over the IRET, + * as NMIs aren't architecturally unmasked until the IRET completes. + * + * If vNMI is enabled, KVM should never request an NMI window if NMIs + * are masked, as KVM allows at most one to-be-injected NMI and one + * pending NMI. If two NMIs arrive simultaneously, KVM will inject one + * NMI and set V_NMI_PENDING for the other, but if and only if NMIs are + * unmasked. KVM _will_ request an NMI window in some situations, e.g. + * if the vCPU is in an STI shadow or if GIF=0, KVM can't immediately + * inject the NMI. In those situations, KVM needs to single-step over + * the STI shadow or intercept STGI. */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vnmi_enabled(svm)); + if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu)) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vnmi_enabled(svm)); - if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu) && !svm->awaiting_iret_completion) - return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */ + if (!svm->awaiting_iret_completion) + return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */ + } /* * SEV-ES guests are responsible for signaling when a vCPU is ready to @@ -5265,6 +5300,12 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) nrips = nrips && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS); + if (lbrv) { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV)) + lbrv = false; + else + pr_info("LBR virtualization supported\n"); + } /* * Note, SEV setup consumes npt_enabled and enable_mmio_caching (which * may be modified by svm_adjust_mmio_mask()), as well as nrips. @@ -5318,14 +5359,6 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) svm_x86_ops.set_vnmi_pending = NULL; } - - if (lbrv) { - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV)) - lbrv = false; - else - pr_info("LBR virtualization supported\n"); - } - if (!enable_pmu) pr_info("PMU virtualization is disabled\n"); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index be57213cd295..0f1472690b59 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ #define IOPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 3 #define MSRPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 2 -#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 47 +#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 48 #define MSRPM_OFFSETS 32 extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly; extern bool npt_enabled; @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ extern int vgif; extern bool intercept_smi; extern bool x2avic_enabled; extern bool vnmi; +extern int lbrv; /* * Clean bits in VMCB. @@ -552,6 +553,7 @@ u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void); void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm); void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm); void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb); +void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index d5b832126e34..643935a0f70a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -2242,6 +2242,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_constant_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, construct_eptp(&vmx->vcpu, 0, PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL)); + if (vmx->ve_info) + vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS, __pa(vmx->ve_info)); + /* All VMFUNCs are currently emulated through L0 vmexits. */ if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc()) vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0); @@ -6230,6 +6233,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, else if (is_alignment_check(intr_info) && !vmx_guest_inject_ac(vcpu)) return true; + else if (is_ve_fault(intr_info)) + return true; return false; case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT: return true; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 6051fad5945f..b3c83c06f826 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -5218,8 +5218,15 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info)) return handle_ud(vcpu); - if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_ve_fault(intr_info), vcpu->kvm)) - return -EIO; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_ve_fault(intr_info))) { + struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info = vmx->ve_info; + + WARN_ONCE(ve_info->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION, + "Unexpected #VE on VM-Exit reason 0x%x", ve_info->exit_reason); + dump_vmcs(vcpu); + kvm_mmu_print_sptes(vcpu, ve_info->guest_physical_address, "#VE"); + return 1; + } error_code = 0; if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 082ac6d95a3a..8c9e4281d978 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -164,15 +164,6 @@ module_param(kvmclock_periodic_sync, bool, 0444); static u32 __read_mostly tsc_tolerance_ppm = 250; module_param(tsc_tolerance_ppm, uint, 0644); -/* - * lapic timer advance (tscdeadline mode only) in nanoseconds. '-1' enables - * adaptive tuning starting from default advancement of 1000ns. '0' disables - * advancement entirely. Any other value is used as-is and disables adaptive - * tuning, i.e. allows privileged userspace to set an exact advancement time. - */ -static int __read_mostly lapic_timer_advance_ns = -1; -module_param(lapic_timer_advance_ns, int, 0644); - static bool __read_mostly vector_hashing = true; module_param(vector_hashing, bool, 0444); @@ -12169,7 +12160,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (r < 0) return r; - r = kvm_create_lapic(vcpu, lapic_timer_advance_ns); + r = kvm_create_lapic(vcpu); if (r < 0) goto fail_mmu_destroy; |