diff options
| author | Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> | 2024-03-18 08:54:08 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> | 2024-03-18 22:01:52 +0000 |
| commit | f2580a907e5c0e8fc9354fd095b011301c64f949 (patch) | |
| tree | 6d599608b5466b7920dc59831c89b4bb5cd2cb37 /arch/x86 | |
| parent | eac03d81cdd941358511ffb8c19bd7d384874430 (diff) | |
x86/hyperv: Use Hyper-V entropy to seed guest random number generator
A Hyper-V host provides its guest VMs with entropy in a custom ACPI
table named "OEM0". The entropy bits are updated each time Hyper-V
boots the VM, and are suitable for seeding the Linux guest random
number generator (rng). See a brief description of OEM0 in [1].
Generation 2 VMs on Hyper-V use UEFI to boot. Existing EFI code in
Linux seeds the rng with entropy bits from the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL.
Via this path, the rng is seeded very early during boot with good
entropy. The ACPI OEM0 table provided in such VMs is an additional
source of entropy.
Generation 1 VMs on Hyper-V boot from BIOS. For these VMs, Linux
doesn't currently get any entropy from the Hyper-V host. While this
is not fundamentally broken because Linux can generate its own entropy,
using the Hyper-V host provided entropy would get the rng off to a
better start and would do so earlier in the boot process.
Improve the rng seeding for Generation 1 VMs by having Hyper-V specific
code in Linux take advantage of the OEM0 table to seed the rng. For
Generation 2 VMs, use the OEM0 table to provide additional entropy
beyond the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL. Because the OEM0 table is custom to
Hyper-V, parse it directly in the Hyper-V code in the Linux kernel
and use add_bootloader_randomness() to add it to the rng. Once the
entropy bits are read from OEM0, zero them out in the table so
they don't appear in /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/OEM0 in the running
VM. The zero'ing is done out of an abundance of caution to avoid
potential security risks to the rng. Also set the OEM0 data length
to zero so a kexec or other subsequent use of the table won't try
to use the zero'ed bits.
[1] https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/c/9/1c9813b8-089c-4fef-b2ad-ad80e79403ba/Whitepaper%20-%20The%20Windows%2010%20random%20number%20generation%20infrastructure.pdf
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240318155408.216851-1-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20240318155408.216851-1-mhklinux@outlook.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c index 909a6236a4c0..faf438dce9db 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c @@ -639,6 +639,7 @@ const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_ms_hyperv = { .init.x2apic_available = ms_hyperv_x2apic_available, .init.msi_ext_dest_id = ms_hyperv_msi_ext_dest_id, .init.init_platform = ms_hyperv_init_platform, + .init.guest_late_init = ms_hyperv_late_init, #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT .runtime.sev_es_hcall_prepare = hv_sev_es_hcall_prepare, .runtime.sev_es_hcall_finish = hv_sev_es_hcall_finish, |