Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM:

   - Initial infrastructure for shadow stage-2 MMUs, as part of nested
     virtualization enablement

   - Support for userspace changes to the guest CTR_EL0 value, enabling
     (in part) migration of VMs between heterogenous hardware

   - Fixes + improvements to pKVM's FF-A proxy, adding support for v1.1
     of the protocol

   - FPSIMD/SVE support for nested, including merged trap configuration
     and exception routing

   - New command-line parameter to control the WFx trap behavior under
     KVM

   - Introduce kCFI hardening in the EL2 hypervisor

   - Fixes + cleanups for handling presence/absence of FEAT_TCRX

   - Miscellaneous fixes + documentation updates

  LoongArch:

   - Add paravirt steal time support

   - Add support for KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET

   - Add perf kvm-stat support for loongarch

  RISC-V:

   - Redirect AMO load/store access fault traps to guest

   - perf kvm stat support

   - Use guest files for IMSIC virtualization, when available

  s390:

   - Assortment of tiny fixes which are not time critical

  x86:

   - Fixes for Xen emulation

   - Add a global struct to consolidate tracking of host values, e.g.
     EFER

   - Add KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS to allow configuring the
     effective APIC bus frequency, because TDX

   - Print the name of the APICv/AVIC inhibits in the relevant
     tracepoint

   - Clean up KVM's handling of vendor specific emulation to
     consistently act on "compatible with Intel/AMD", versus checking
     for a specific vendor

   - Drop MTRR virtualization, and instead always honor guest PAT on
     CPUs that support self-snoop

   - Update to the newfangled Intel CPU FMS infrastructure

   - Don't advertise IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL as an MSR-to-be-saved, as
     it reads '0' and writes from userspace are ignored

   - Misc cleanups

  x86 - MMU:

   - Small cleanups, renames and refactoring extracted from the upcoming
     Intel TDX support

   - Don't allocate kvm_mmu_page.shadowed_translation for shadow pages
     that can't hold leafs SPTEs

   - Unconditionally drop mmu_lock when allocating TDP MMU page tables
     for eager page splitting, to avoid stalling vCPUs when splitting
     huge pages

   - Bug the VM instead of simply warning if KVM tries to split a SPTE
     that is non-present or not-huge. KVM is guaranteed to end up in a
     broken state because the callers fully expect a valid SPTE, it's
     all but dangerous to let more MMU changes happen afterwards

  x86 - AMD:

   - Make per-CPU save_area allocations NUMA-aware

   - Force sev_es_host_save_area() to be inlined to avoid calling into
     an instrumentable function from noinstr code

   - Base support for running SEV-SNP guests. API-wise, this includes a
     new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type, encrypting/measure the initial image into
     guest memory, and finalizing it before launching it. Internally,
     there are some gmem/mmu hooks needed to prepare gmem-allocated
     pages before mapping them into guest private memory ranges

     This includes basic support for attestation guest requests, enough
     to say that KVM supports the GHCB 2.0 specification

     There is no support yet for loading into the firmware those signing
     keys to be used for attestation requests, and therefore no need yet
     for the host to provide certificate data for those keys.

     To support fetching certificate data from userspace, a new KVM exit
     type will be needed to handle fetching the certificate from
     userspace.

     An attempt to define a new KVM_EXIT_COCO / KVM_EXIT_COCO_REQ_CERTS
     exit type to handle this was introduced in v1 of this patchset, but
     is still being discussed by community, so for now this patchset
     only implements a stub version of SNP Extended Guest Requests that
     does not provide certificate data

  x86 - Intel:

   - Remove an unnecessary EPT TLB flush when enabling hardware

   - Fix a series of bugs that cause KVM to fail to detect nested
     pending posted interrupts as valid wake eents for a vCPU executing
     HLT in L2 (with HLT-exiting disable by L1)

   - KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch
     emulation

     Explicitly suppress userspace emulated MMIO exits that are
     triggered when emulating a task switch as KVM doesn't support
     userspace MMIO during complex (multi-step) emulation

     Silently ignoring the exit request can result in the
     WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->mmio_needed) firing if KVM exits to userspace
     for some other reason prior to purging mmio_needed

     See commit 0dc902267cb3 ("KVM: x86: Suppress pending MMIO write
     exits if emulator detects exception") for more details on KVM's
     limitations with respect to emulated MMIO during complex emulator
     flows

  Generic:

   - Rename the AS_UNMOVABLE flag that was introduced for KVM to
     AS_INACCESSIBLE, because the special casing needed by these pages
     is not due to just unmovability (and in fact they are only
     unmovable because the CPU cannot access them)

   - New ioctl to populate the KVM page tables in advance, which is
     useful to mitigate KVM page faults during guest boot or after live
     migration. The code will also be used by TDX, but (probably) not
     through the ioctl

   - Enable halt poll shrinking by default, as Intel found it to be a
     clear win

   - Setup empty IRQ routing when creating a VM to avoid having to
     synchronize SRCU when creating a split IRQCHIP on x86

   - Rework the sched_in/out() paths to replace kvm_arch_sched_in() with
     a flag that arch code can use for hooking both sched_in() and
     sched_out()

   - Take the vCPU @id as an "unsigned long" instead of "u32" to avoid
     truncating a bogus value from userspace, e.g. to help userspace
     detect bugs

   - Mark a vCPU as preempted if and only if it's scheduled out while in
     the KVM_RUN loop, e.g. to avoid marking it preempted and thus
     writing guest memory when retrieving guest state during live
     migration blackout

  Selftests:

   - Remove dead code in the memslot modification stress test

   - Treat "branch instructions retired" as supported on all AMD Family
     17h+ CPUs

   - Print the guest pseudo-RNG seed only when it changes, to avoid
     spamming the log for tests that create lots of VMs

   - Make the PMU counters test less flaky when counting LLC cache
     misses by doing CLFLUSH{OPT} in every loop iteration"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits)
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command
  KVM: x86/pmu: Add kvm_pmu_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_pmu_ops
  KVM: x86: Introduce kvm_x86_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_x86_ops
  KVM: x86: Replace static_call_cond() with static_call()
  KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
  x86/sev: Move sev_guest.h into common SEV header
  KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
  KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch emulation
  KVM: x86/mmu: Clean up make_huge_page_split_spte() definition and intro
  KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM tries to split a !hugepage SPTE
  KVM: selftests: x86: Add test for KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
  KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Make kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() return mapped level
  KVM: x86/mmu: Account pf_{fixed,emulate,spurious} in callers of "do page fault"
  KVM: x86/mmu: Bump pf_taken stat only in the "real" page fault handler
  KVM: Add KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY vcpu ioctl to pre-populate guest memory
  KVM: Document KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl
  mm, virt: merge AS_UNMOVABLE and AS_INACCESSIBLE
  perf kvm: Add kvm-stat for loongarch64
  LoongArch: KVM: Add PV steal time support in guest side
  ...

7 files changed, 312 insertions, 42 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 7c19a5fd75e4..530ebe9b11cd 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2722,6 +2722,24 @@
 			[KVM,ARM,EARLY] Allow use of GICv4 for direct
 			injection of LPIs.
 
+	kvm-arm.wfe_trap_policy=
+			[KVM,ARM] Control when to set WFE instruction trap for
+			KVM VMs. Traps are allowed but not guaranteed by the
+			CPU architecture.
+
+			trap: set WFE instruction trap
+
+			notrap: clear WFE instruction trap
+
+	kvm-arm.wfi_trap_policy=
+			[KVM,ARM] Control when to set WFI instruction trap for
+			KVM VMs. Traps are allowed but not guaranteed by the
+			CPU architecture.
+
+			trap: set WFI instruction trap
+
+			notrap: clear WFI instruction trap
+
 	kvm_cma_resv_ratio=n [PPC,EARLY]
 			Reserves given percentage from system memory area for
 			contiguous memory allocation for KVM hash pagetable
@@ -4036,9 +4054,9 @@
 			prediction) vulnerability. System may allow data
 			leaks with this option.
 
-	no-steal-acc	[X86,PV_OPS,ARM64,PPC/PSERIES,RISCV,EARLY] Disable
-			paravirtualized steal time accounting. steal time is
-			computed, but won't influence scheduler behaviour
+	no-steal-acc	[X86,PV_OPS,ARM64,PPC/PSERIES,RISCV,LOONGARCH,EARLY]
+			Disable paravirtualized steal time accounting. steal time
+			is computed, but won't influence scheduler behaviour
 
 	nosync		[HW,M68K] Disables sync negotiation for all devices.
 
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
index 9d00967a5b2b..93debceb6eb0 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
@@ -176,6 +176,25 @@ to SNP_CONFIG command defined in the SEV-SNP spec. The current values of
 the firmware parameters affected by this command can be queried via
 SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS.
 
+2.7 SNP_VLEK_LOAD
+-----------------
+:Technology: sev-snp
+:Type: hypervisor ioctl cmd
+:Parameters (in): struct sev_user_data_snp_vlek_load
+:Returns (out): 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+When requesting an attestation report a guest is able to specify whether
+it wants SNP firmware to sign the report using either a Versioned Chip
+Endorsement Key (VCEK), which is derived from chip-unique secrets, or a
+Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) which is obtained from an AMD
+Key Derivation Service (KDS) and derived from seeds allocated to
+enrolled cloud service providers.
+
+In the case of VLEK keys, the SNP_VLEK_LOAD SNP command is used to load
+them into the system after obtaining them from the KDS, and corresponds
+closely to the SNP_VLEK_LOAD firmware command specified in the SEV-SNP
+spec.
+
 3. SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
 ============================
 
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 899480d4acaf..fe722c5dada9 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -891,12 +891,12 @@ like this::
 
 The irq_type field has the following values:
 
-- irq_type[0]:
+- KVM_ARM_IRQ_TYPE_CPU:
 	       out-of-kernel GIC: irq_id 0 is IRQ, irq_id 1 is FIQ
-- irq_type[1]:
+- KVM_ARM_IRQ_TYPE_SPI:
 	       in-kernel GIC: SPI, irq_id between 32 and 1019 (incl.)
                (the vcpu_index field is ignored)
-- irq_type[2]:
+- KVM_ARM_IRQ_TYPE_PPI:
 	       in-kernel GIC: PPI, irq_id between 16 and 31 (incl.)
 
 (The irq_id field thus corresponds nicely to the IRQ ID in the ARM GIC specs)
@@ -1403,6 +1403,12 @@ Instead, an abort (data abort if the cause of the page-table update
 was a load or a store, instruction abort if it was an instruction
 fetch) is injected in the guest.
 
+S390:
+^^^^^
+
+Returns -EINVAL if the VM has the KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL flag set.
+Returns -EINVAL if called on a protected VM.
+
 4.36 KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR
 ---------------------
 
@@ -1921,7 +1927,7 @@ flags:
 
 If KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID is set, devid contains a unique device identifier
 for the device that wrote the MSI message.  For PCI, this is usually a
-BFD identifier in the lower 16 bits.
+BDF identifier in the lower 16 bits.
 
 On x86, address_hi is ignored unless the KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS
 feature of KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API capability is enabled.  If it is enabled,
@@ -2989,7 +2995,7 @@ flags:
 
 If KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID is set, devid contains a unique device identifier
 for the device that wrote the MSI message.  For PCI, this is usually a
-BFD identifier in the lower 16 bits.
+BDF identifier in the lower 16 bits.
 
 On x86, address_hi is ignored unless the KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS
 feature of KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API capability is enabled.  If it is enabled,
@@ -6276,6 +6282,12 @@ state.  At VM creation time, all memory is shared, i.e. the PRIVATE attribute
 is '0' for all gfns.  Userspace can control whether memory is shared/private by
 toggling KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE via KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES as needed.
 
+S390:
+^^^^^
+
+Returns -EINVAL if the VM has the KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL flag set.
+Returns -EINVAL if called on a protected VM.
+
 4.141 KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
 -------------------------------
 
@@ -6355,6 +6367,61 @@ a single guest_memfd file, but the bound ranges must not overlap).
 
 See KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 for additional details.
 
+4.143 KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
+:Architectures: none
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_pre_fault_memory (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 if at least one page is processed, < 0 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+  ========== ===============================================================
+  EINVAL     The specified `gpa` and `size` were invalid (e.g. not
+             page aligned, causes an overflow, or size is zero).
+  ENOENT     The specified `gpa` is outside defined memslots.
+  EINTR      An unmasked signal is pending and no page was processed.
+  EFAULT     The parameter address was invalid.
+  EOPNOTSUPP Mapping memory for a GPA is unsupported by the
+             hypervisor, and/or for the current vCPU state/mode.
+  EIO        unexpected error conditions (also causes a WARN)
+  ========== ===============================================================
+
+::
+
+  struct kvm_pre_fault_memory {
+	/* in/out */
+	__u64 gpa;
+	__u64 size;
+	/* in */
+	__u64 flags;
+	__u64 padding[5];
+  };
+
+KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY populates KVM's stage-2 page tables used to map memory
+for the current vCPU state.  KVM maps memory as if the vCPU generated a
+stage-2 read page fault, e.g. faults in memory as needed, but doesn't break
+CoW.  However, KVM does not mark any newly created stage-2 PTE as Accessed.
+
+In some cases, multiple vCPUs might share the page tables.  In this
+case, the ioctl can be called in parallel.
+
+When the ioctl returns, the input values are updated to point to the
+remaining range.  If `size` > 0 on return, the caller can just issue
+the ioctl again with the same `struct kvm_map_memory` argument.
+
+Shadow page tables cannot support this ioctl because they
+are indexed by virtual address or nested guest physical address.
+Calling this ioctl when the guest is using shadow page tables (for
+example because it is running a nested guest with nested page tables)
+will fail with `EOPNOTSUPP` even if `KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION` reports
+the capability to be present.
+
+`flags` must currently be zero.
+
+
 5. The kvm_run structure
 ========================
 
@@ -6419,9 +6486,12 @@ More architecture-specific flags detailing state of the VCPU that may
 affect the device's behavior. Current defined flags::
 
   /* x86, set if the VCPU is in system management mode */
-  #define KVM_RUN_X86_SMM     (1 << 0)
+  #define KVM_RUN_X86_SMM          (1 << 0)
   /* x86, set if bus lock detected in VM */
-  #define KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK    (1 << 1)
+  #define KVM_RUN_X86_BUS_LOCK     (1 << 1)
+  /* x86, set if the VCPU is executing a nested (L2) guest */
+  #define KVM_RUN_X86_GUEST_MODE   (1 << 2)
+
   /* arm64, set for KVM_EXIT_DEBUG */
   #define KVM_DEBUG_ARCH_HSR_HIGH_VALID  (1 << 0)
 
@@ -7767,29 +7837,31 @@ Valid bits in args[0] are::
   #define KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF      (1 << 0)
   #define KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT     (1 << 1)
 
-Enabling this capability on a VM provides userspace with a way to select
-a policy to handle the bus locks detected in guest. Userspace can obtain
-the supported modes from the result of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION and define it
-through the KVM_ENABLE_CAP.
+Enabling this capability on a VM provides userspace with a way to select a
+policy to handle the bus locks detected in guest. Userspace can obtain the
+supported modes from the result of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION and define it through
+the KVM_ENABLE_CAP. The supported modes are mutually-exclusive.
 
-KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF and KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT are supported
-currently and mutually exclusive with each other. More bits can be added in
-the future.
+This capability allows userspace to force VM exits on bus locks detected in the
+guest, irrespective whether or not the host has enabled split-lock detection
+(which triggers an #AC exception that KVM intercepts). This capability is
+intended to mitigate attacks where a malicious/buggy guest can exploit bus
+locks to degrade the performance of the whole system.
 
-With KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF set, bus locks in guest will not cause vm exits
-so that no additional actions are needed. This is the default mode.
+If KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF is set, KVM doesn't force guest bus locks to VM
+exit, although the host kernel's split-lock #AC detection still applies, if
+enabled.
 
-With KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT set, vm exits happen when bus lock detected
-in VM. KVM just exits to userspace when handling them. Userspace can enforce
-its own throttling or other policy based mitigations.
+If KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT is set, KVM enables a CPU feature that ensures
+bus locks in the guest trigger a VM exit, and KVM exits to userspace for all
+such VM exits, e.g. to allow userspace to throttle the offending guest and/or
+apply some other policy-based mitigation. When exiting to userspace, KVM sets
+KVM_RUN_X86_BUS_LOCK in vcpu-run->flags, and conditionally sets the exit_reason
+to KVM_EXIT_X86_BUS_LOCK.
 
-This capability is aimed to address the thread that VM can exploit bus locks to
-degree the performance of the whole system. Once the userspace enable this
-capability and select the KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT mode, KVM will set the
-KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag in vcpu-run->flags field and exit to userspace. Concerning
-the bus lock vm exit can be preempted by a higher priority VM exit, the exit
-notifications to userspace can be KVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK or other reasons.
-KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag is used to distinguish between them.
+Note! Detected bus locks may be coincident with other exits to userspace, i.e.
+KVM_RUN_X86_BUS_LOCK should be checked regardless of the primary exit reason if
+userspace wants to take action on all detected bus locks.
 
 7.23 KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1
 ----------------------
@@ -7905,10 +7977,10 @@ perform a bulk copy of tags to/from the guest.
 7.29 KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
 -------------------------------------
 
-Architectures: x86 SEV enabled
-Type: vm
-Parameters: args[0] is the fd of the source vm
-Returns: 0 on success
+:Architectures: x86 SEV enabled
+:Type: vm
+:Parameters: args[0] is the fd of the source vm
+:Returns: 0 on success
 
 This capability enables userspace to migrate the encryption context from the VM
 indicated by the fd to the VM this is called on.
@@ -7956,7 +8028,11 @@ The valid bits in cap.args[0] are:
                                     When this quirk is disabled, the reset value
                                     is 0x10000 (APIC_LVT_MASKED).
 
- KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED        By default, KVM clears CR0.CD and CR0.NW.
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED        By default, KVM clears CR0.CD and CR0.NW on
+                                    AMD CPUs to workaround buggy guest firmware
+                                    that runs in perpetuity with CR0.CD, i.e.
+                                    with caches in "no fill" mode.
+
                                     When this quirk is disabled, KVM does not
                                     change the value of CR0.CD and CR0.NW.
 
@@ -8073,6 +8149,37 @@ error/annotated fault.
 
 See KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT for more information.
 
+7.35 KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS
+-----------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is the desired APIC bus clock rate, in nanoseconds
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if args[0] contains an invalid value for the
+          frequency or if any vCPUs have been created, -ENXIO if a virtual
+          local APIC has not been created using KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP.
+
+This capability sets the VM's APIC bus clock frequency, used by KVM's in-kernel
+virtual APIC when emulating APIC timers.  KVM's default value can be retrieved
+by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION.
+
+Note: Userspace is responsible for correctly configuring CPUID 0x15, a.k.a. the
+core crystal clock frequency, if a non-zero CPUID 0x15 is exposed to the guest.
+
+7.36 KVM_CAP_X86_GUEST_MODE
+------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Returns: Informational only, -EINVAL on direct KVM_ENABLE_CAP.
+
+The presence of this capability indicates that KVM_RUN will update the
+KVM_RUN_X86_GUEST_MODE bit in kvm_run.flags to indicate whether the
+vCPU was executing nested guest code when it exited.
+
+KVM exits with the register state of either the L1 or L2 guest
+depending on which executed at the time of an exit. Userspace must
+take care to differentiate between these cases.
+
 8. Other capabilities.
 ======================
 
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst
index 40bdeea1d86e..19f0c6756891 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Groups:
     KVM_VGIC_V2_ADDR_TYPE_CPU (rw, 64-bit)
       Base address in the guest physical address space of the GIC virtual cpu
       interface register mappings. Only valid for KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V2.
-      This address needs to be 4K aligned and the region covers 4 KByte.
+      This address needs to be 4K aligned and the region covers 8 KByte.
 
   Errors:
 
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst
index c82a04b709b4..a6790a67e205 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst
@@ -79,11 +79,11 @@ adjustment of the polling interval.
 Module Parameters
 =================
 
-The kvm module has 3 tuneable module parameters to adjust the global max
-polling interval as well as the rate at which the polling interval is grown and
-shrunk. These variables are defined in include/linux/kvm_host.h and as module
-parameters in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c, or arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c in the
-powerpc kvm-hv case.
+The kvm module has 4 tunable module parameters to adjust the global max polling
+interval, the initial value (to grow from 0), and the rate at which the polling
+interval is grown and shrunk. These variables are defined in
+include/linux/kvm_host.h and as module parameters in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c, or
+arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c in the powerpc kvm-hv case.
 
 +-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
 |Module Parameter	|   Description		    |	     Default Value    |
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ powerpc kvm-hv case.
 |			| grow_halt_poll_ns()	    |			      |
 |			| function.		    |			      |
 +-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
-|halt_poll_ns_shrink	| The value by which the    | 0			      |
+|halt_poll_ns_shrink	| The value by which the    | 2			      |
 |			| halt polling interval is  |			      |
 |			| divided in the	    |			      |
 |			| shrink_halt_poll_ns()	    |			      |
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 9677a0714a39..1ddb6a86ce7f 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -466,6 +466,112 @@ issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution.
 
 Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
 
+18. KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START
+----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context for the SEV-SNP guest. It must be called prior to issuing
+KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE or KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH;
+
+Parameters (in): struct  kvm_sev_snp_launch_start
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
+                __u64 policy;           /* Guest policy to use. */
+                __u8 gosvw[16];         /* Guest OS visible workarounds. */
+                __u16 flags;            /* Must be zero. */
+                __u8 pad0[6];
+                __u64 pad1[4];
+        };
+
+See SNP_LAUNCH_START in the SEV-SNP specification [snp-fw-abi]_ for further
+details on the input parameters in ``struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start``.
+
+19. KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE
+-----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command is used for loading userspace-provided
+data into a guest GPA range, measuring the contents into the SNP guest context
+created by KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, and then encrypting/validating that GPA
+range so that it will be immediately readable using the encryption key
+associated with the guest context once it is booted, after which point it can
+attest the measurement associated with its context before unlocking any
+secrets.
+
+It is required that the GPA ranges initialized by this command have had the
+KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE attribute set in advance. See the documentation
+for KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES for more details on this aspect.
+
+Upon success, this command is not guaranteed to have processed the entire
+range requested. Instead, the ``gfn_start``, ``uaddr``, and ``len`` fields of
+``struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update`` will be updated to correspond to the
+remaining range that has yet to be processed. The caller should continue
+calling this command until those fields indicate the entire range has been
+processed, e.g. ``len`` is 0, ``gfn_start`` is equal to the last GFN in the
+range plus 1, and ``uaddr`` is the last byte of the userspace-provided source
+buffer address plus 1. In the case where ``type`` is KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO,
+``uaddr`` will be ignored completely.
+
+Parameters (in): struct  kvm_sev_snp_launch_update
+
+Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error, -EAGAIN if caller should retry
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update {
+                __u64 gfn_start;        /* Guest page number to load/encrypt data into. */
+                __u64 uaddr;            /* Userspace address of data to be loaded/encrypted. */
+                __u64 len;              /* 4k-aligned length in bytes to copy into guest memory.*/
+                __u8 type;              /* The type of the guest pages being initialized. */
+                __u8 pad0;
+                __u16 flags;            /* Must be zero. */
+                __u32 pad1;
+                __u64 pad2[4];
+
+        };
+
+where the allowed values for page_type are #define'd as::
+
+        KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL
+        KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO
+        KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED
+        KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS
+        KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID
+
+See the SEV-SNP spec [snp-fw-abi]_ for further details on how each page type is
+used/measured.
+
+20. KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH
+-----------------------------
+
+After completion of the SNP guest launch flow, the KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH
+command can be issued to make the guest ready for execution.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish {
+                __u64 id_block_uaddr;
+                __u64 id_auth_uaddr;
+                __u8 id_block_en;
+                __u8 auth_key_en;
+                __u8 vcek_disabled;
+                __u8 host_data[32];
+                __u8 pad0[3];
+                __u16 flags;                    /* Must be zero */
+                __u64 pad1[4];
+        };
+
+
+See SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH in the SEV-SNP specification [snp-fw-abi]_ for further
+details on the input parameters in ``struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish``.
+
 Device attribute API
 ====================
 
@@ -497,9 +603,11 @@ References
 ==========
 
 
-See [white-paper]_, [api-spec]_, [amd-apm]_ and [kvm-forum]_ for more info.
+See [white-paper]_, [api-spec]_, [amd-apm]_, [kvm-forum]_, and [snp-fw-abi]_
+for more info.
 
 .. [white-paper] https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
 .. [api-spec] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
 .. [amd-apm] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34)
 .. [kvm-forum]  https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
+.. [snp-fw-abi] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst
index 49a05f24747b..4116045a8744 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst
@@ -48,3 +48,21 @@ have the same physical APIC ID, KVM will deliver events targeting that APIC ID
 only to the vCPU with the lowest vCPU ID.  If KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS is
 not enabled, KVM follows x86 architecture when processing interrupts (all vCPUs
 matching the target APIC ID receive the interrupt).
+
+MTRRs
+-----
+KVM does not virtualize guest MTRR memory types.  KVM emulates accesses to MTRR
+MSRs, i.e. {RD,WR}MSR in the guest will behave as expected, but KVM does not
+honor guest MTRRs when determining the effective memory type, and instead
+treats all of guest memory as having Writeback (WB) MTRRs.
+
+CR0.CD
+------
+KVM does not virtualize CR0.CD on Intel CPUs.  Similar to MTRR MSRs, KVM
+emulates CR0.CD accesses so that loads and stores from/to CR0 behave as
+expected, but setting CR0.CD=1 has no impact on the cachaeability of guest
+memory.
+
+Note, this erratum does not affect AMD CPUs, which fully virtualize CR0.CD in
+hardware, i.e. put the CPU caches into "no fill" mode when CR0.CD=1, even when
+running in the guest.
\ No newline at end of file