landlock: Support filesystem access-control

Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain.  To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file)
and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
landlock_add_rule(2).  When checking if a file access request is
allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
the different mount layers.  The access to each "tagged" inodes are
collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
access to the requested file hierarchy.  This makes possible to identify
a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
has from the filesystem.

Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are
in use.

This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions.  This is the
result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease
review.  Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
without breaking user space will not be a problem.  Moreover, seccomp
filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
not be currently handled by Landlock.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

12 files changed, 866 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 87a2738dfdec..70ec117efa8a 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -10003,6 +10003,7 @@ L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 W:	https://landlock.io
 T:	git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git
+F:	include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 F:	security/landlock/
 K:	landlock
 K:	LANDLOCK
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index ecfd3520b676..8160ab7e3e03 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -1013,6 +1013,13 @@ config COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
 config ARCH_NO_PREEMPT
 	bool
 
+config ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
+	def_bool n
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if it doesn't keep track of inode
+	  instances on its own, but instead relies on something else (e.g. the
+	  host kernel for an UML kernel).
+
 config ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT
 	bool
 
diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig b/arch/um/Kconfig
index c3030db3325f..57cfd9a1c082 100644
--- a/arch/um/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/um/Kconfig
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ menu "UML-specific options"
 config UML
 	bool
 	default y
+	select ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_NO_PREEMPT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b1a81b5a8b86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+/*
+ * Landlock - User space API
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
+
+/**
+ * DOC: fs_access
+ *
+ * A set of actions on kernel objects may be defined by an attribute (e.g.
+ * &struct landlock_path_beneath_attr) including a bitmask of access.
+ *
+ * Filesystem flags
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of actions on
+ * files and directories.  Files or directories opened before the sandboxing
+ * are not subject to these restrictions.
+ *
+ * A file can only receive these access rights:
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access.
+ *
+ * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories.  The
+ * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
+ * directories beneath it:
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR: Open a directory or list its content.
+ *
+ * However, the following access rights only apply to the content of a
+ * directory, not the directory itself:
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR: Remove an empty directory or rename one.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE: Unlink (or rename) a file.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR: Create (or rename or link) a character
+ *   device.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR: Create (or rename) a directory.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG: Create (or rename or link) a regular file.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK: Create (or rename or link) a UNIX domain
+ *   socket.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO: Create (or rename or link) a named pipe.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK: Create (or rename or link) a block device.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM: Create (or rename or link) a symbolic link.
+ *
+ * .. warning::
+ *
+ *   It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions
+ *   accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
+ *   :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`,
+ *   :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`,
+ *   :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`,
+ *   :manpage:`access(2)`.
+ *   Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
+ */
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE			(1ULL << 0)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE			(1ULL << 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE			(1ULL << 2)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR			(1ULL << 3)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR			(1ULL << 4)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE			(1ULL << 5)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR			(1ULL << 6)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR			(1ULL << 7)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG			(1ULL << 8)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK			(1ULL << 9)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO			(1ULL << 10)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK			(1ULL << 11)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM			(1ULL << 12)
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
index c1e862a38410..8e33c4e8ffb8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Kconfig
+++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
 	bool "Landlock support"
-	depends on SECURITY
+	depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
 	select SECURITY_PATH
 	help
 	  Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
index f1d1eb72fa76..92e3d80ab8ed 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Makefile
+++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
 
 landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
-	cred.o ptrace.o
+	cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..97b8e421f617
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,692 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "object.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+/* Underlying object management */
+
+static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
+	__releases(object->lock)
+{
+	struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+
+	if (!inode) {
+		spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference
+	 * to the underlying inode.
+	 */
+	object->underobj = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
+	 * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
+	 */
+	sb = inode->i_sb;
+	atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
+	spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+	/*
+	 * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
+	 * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset
+	 * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.  It is therefore
+	 * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
+	 */
+	rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
+	/*
+	 * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object().
+	 */
+
+	iput(inode);
+	if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
+		wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
+}
+
+static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
+	.release = release_inode
+};
+
+/* Ruleset management */
+
+static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
+{
+	struct landlock_object *object, *new_object;
+	struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+retry:
+	object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object);
+	if (object) {
+		if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return object;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going
+		 * away.  Wait for release_inode(), then retry.
+		 */
+		spin_lock(&object->lock);
+		spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+		goto retry;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without
+	 * holding any locks).
+	 */
+	new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_object))
+		return new_object;
+
+	/*
+	 * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or
+	 * hook_sb_delete().
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+	if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) {
+		/* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */
+		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+		kfree(new_object);
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock
+	 * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the
+	 * related object.
+	 */
+	ihold(inode);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object);
+	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+	return new_object;
+}
+
+/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */
+#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+
+/*
+ * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
+ */
+int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+		const struct path *const path, u32 access_rights)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct landlock_object *object;
+
+	/* Files only get access rights that make sense. */
+	if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) !=
+			ACCESS_FILE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
+	access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0];
+	object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
+	if (IS_ERR(object))
+		return PTR_ERR(object);
+	mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
+	err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights);
+	mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
+	/*
+	 * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
+	 * increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
+	 */
+	landlock_put_object(object);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* Access-control management */
+
+static inline u64 unmask_layers(
+		const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+		const struct path *const path, const u32 access_request,
+		u64 layer_mask)
+{
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+	const struct inode *inode;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (d_is_negative(path->dentry))
+		/* Ignore nonexistent leafs. */
+		return layer_mask;
+	inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	rule = landlock_find_rule(domain,
+			rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!rule)
+		return layer_mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
+	 * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses,
+	 * regardless of their position in the layer stack.  We must then check
+	 * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to
+	 * the last one.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) {
+		const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i];
+		const u64 layer_level = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1);
+
+		/* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */
+		if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) {
+			layer_mask &= ~layer_level;
+
+			if (layer_mask == 0)
+				return layer_mask;
+		}
+	}
+	return layer_mask;
+}
+
+static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+		const struct path *const path, u32 access_request)
+{
+	bool allowed = false;
+	struct path walker_path;
+	u64 layer_mask;
+	size_t i;
+
+	/* Make sure all layers can be checked. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask) < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+
+	if (!access_request)
+		return 0;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path))
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable
+	 * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
+	 * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor> .
+	 */
+	if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
+			(d_is_positive(path->dentry) &&
+			 unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))))
+		return 0;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	/* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */
+	layer_mask = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) {
+		if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request)
+			layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i);
+	}
+	/* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */
+	if (layer_mask == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	walker_path = *path;
+	path_get(&walker_path);
+	/*
+	 * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant
+	 * restriction.
+	 */
+	while (true) {
+		struct dentry *parent_dentry;
+
+		layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path,
+				access_request, layer_mask);
+		if (layer_mask == 0) {
+			/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
+			allowed = true;
+			break;
+		}
+
+jump_up:
+		if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
+			if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
+				/* Ignores hidden mount points. */
+				goto jump_up;
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * Stops at the real root.  Denies access
+				 * because not all layers have granted access.
+				 */
+				allowed = false;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) {
+			/*
+			 * Stops at disconnected root directories.  Only allows
+			 * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is
+			 * reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>).
+			 */
+			allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL);
+			break;
+		}
+		parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);
+		dput(walker_path.dentry);
+		walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
+	}
+	path_put(&walker_path);
+	return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
+		const u32 access_request)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+		landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+	return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
+}
+
+/* Inode hooks */
+
+static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode)
+{
+	/*
+	 * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by
+	 * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete().
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
+}
+
+/* Super-block hooks */
+
+/*
+ * Release the inodes used in a security policy.
+ *
+ * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes()
+ */
+static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb)
+{
+	struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL;
+
+	if (!landlock_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
+		struct landlock_object *object;
+
+		/* Only handles referenced inodes. */
+		if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g.
+		 * from get_inode_object()).
+		 */
+		spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+		/*
+		 * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE  to protect against a race
+		 * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which
+		 * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a
+		 * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object.  Also
+		 * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
+			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
+		if (!object) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */
+		__iget(inode);
+		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we
+		 * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we
+		 * will just wait for it to finish.
+		 */
+		spin_lock(&object->lock);
+		if (object->underobj == inode) {
+			object->underobj = NULL;
+			spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			/*
+			 * Because object->underobj was not NULL,
+			 * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee
+			 * that it is safe to reset
+			 * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.
+			 * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
+			 */
+			rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
+			/*
+			 * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was
+			 * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the
+			 * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop
+			 * walk.  Therefore the following call to iput() will
+			 * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at
+			 * least two references to it.
+			 */
+			iput(inode);
+		} else {
+			spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+		}
+
+		if (prev_inode) {
+			/*
+			 * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference
+			 * that we just set in this loop walk.  Therefore we
+			 * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't
+			 * disappear from under us until the next loop walk.
+			 */
+			spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+			/*
+			 * We can now actually put the inode reference from the
+			 * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore.
+			 */
+			iput(prev_inode);
+			cond_resched();
+			spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+		}
+		prev_inode = inode;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+
+	/* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */
+	if (prev_inode)
+		iput(prev_inode);
+	/* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */
+	wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read(
+				&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem
+ * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files
+ * not previously allowed.
+ *
+ * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked
+ * processes.  Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a
+ * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide
+ * access-control security policy.
+ *
+ * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount
+ * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process.  Indeed, we could
+ * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into
+ * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point.
+ * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically
+ * inherit these new constraints.  Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons,
+ * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag).
+ */
+static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
+		const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
+		const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
+{
+	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
+		const struct path *const to_path)
+{
+	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which
+ * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden.
+ */
+static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
+{
+	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
+{
+	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace.  It must
+ * then be forbidden for a landlocked process.
+ *
+ * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root
+ * directory of the current process.  Moreover, it can be used to restrict the
+ * view of the filesystem.
+ */
+static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
+		const struct path *const new_path)
+{
+	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/* Path hooks */
+
+static inline u32 get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
+{
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFLNK:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
+	case 0:
+		/* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
+	case S_IFREG:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
+	case S_IFDIR:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not
+ * handled properly.  Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more
+ * privileges by being accessible from the destination.  This is getting more
+ * complex when dealing with multiple layers.  The whole picture can be seen as
+ * a multilayer partial ordering problem.  A future version of Landlock will
+ * deal with that.
+ */
+static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
+		const struct path *const new_dir,
+		struct dentry *const new_dentry)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+		landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+	/* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
+	if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry)
+		/* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */
+		return -EXDEV;
+	if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+	return check_access_path(dom, new_dir,
+			get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
+}
+
+static inline u32 maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	if (d_is_negative(dentry))
+		return 0;
+	return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
+		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
+}
+
+static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir,
+		struct dentry *const old_dentry,
+		const struct path *const new_dir,
+		struct dentry *const new_dentry)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+		landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+	/* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
+	if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry)
+		/* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */
+		return -EXDEV;
+	if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+	/* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */
+	return check_access_path(dom, old_dir, maybe_remove(old_dentry) |
+			maybe_remove(new_dentry) |
+			get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
+}
+
+static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir,
+		struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
+		struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
+		const unsigned int dev)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+		landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+	return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode));
+}
+
+static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir,
+		struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir,
+		struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
+		struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
+}
+
+/* File hooks */
+
+static inline u32 get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
+{
+	u32 access = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
+		/* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */
+		if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+			return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+		access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
+	}
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
+	/* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */
+	if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
+		access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
+	return access;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+		landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
+	 * return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
+	 * evolution.
+	 */
+	return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
+};
+
+__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
+			LANDLOCK_NAME);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..187284b421c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_inode_security - Inode security blob
+ *
+ * Enable to reference a &struct landlock_object tied to an inode (i.e.
+ * underlying object).
+ */
+struct landlock_inode_security {
+	/**
+	 * @object: Weak pointer to an allocated object.  All assignments of a
+	 * new object are protected by the underlying inode->i_lock.  However,
+	 * atomically disassociating @object from the inode is only protected
+	 * by @object->lock, from the time @object's usage refcount drops to
+	 * zero to the time this pointer is nulled out (cf. release_inode() and
+	 * hook_sb_delete()).  Indeed, such disassociation doesn't require
+	 * inode->i_lock thanks to the careful rcu_access_pointer() check
+	 * performed by get_inode_object().
+	 */
+	struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
+ *
+ * Enable hook_sb_delete() to wait for concurrent calls to release_inode().
+ */
+struct landlock_superblock_security {
+	/**
+	 * @inode_refs: Number of pending inodes (from this superblock) that
+	 * are being released by release_inode().
+	 * Cf. struct super_block->s_fsnotify_inode_refs .
+	 */
+	atomic_long_t inode_refs;
+};
+
+static inline struct landlock_inode_security *landlock_inode(
+		const struct inode *const inode)
+{
+	return inode->i_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
+static inline struct landlock_superblock_security *landlock_superblock(
+		const struct super_block *const superblock)
+{
+	return superblock->s_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
+__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void);
+
+int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+		const struct path *const path, u32 access_hierarchy);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index b734f597bb0e..2a0a1095ee27 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@
 #define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H
 
 #include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
 
 #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS		64
 #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES		U32_MAX
 
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
+
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 2e616f6d5274..ec72b9262bf3 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -116,9 +116,11 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
 		.num_rules = ~0,
 		.num_layers = ~0,
 	};
+	typeof(ruleset.fs_access_masks[0]) fs_access_mask = ~0;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(fs_access_mask < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -217,9 +219,11 @@ static void build_check_layer(void)
 {
 	const struct landlock_layer layer = {
 		.level = ~0,
+		.access = ~0,
 	};
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
 }
 
 /* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index a5d6ef334991..f8e8e980454c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -11,17 +11,24 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "cred.h"
+#include "fs.h"
 #include "ptrace.h"
 #include "setup.h"
 
+bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
+
 struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
 };
 
 static int __init landlock_init(void)
 {
 	landlock_add_cred_hooks();
 	landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
+	landlock_add_fs_hooks();
+	landlock_initialized = true;
 	pr_info("Up and running.\n");
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
index 9fdbf33fcc33..1daffab1ab4b 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.h
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
+extern bool landlock_initialized;
+
 extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
 
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */