diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-04-29 14:47:17 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-04-29 14:47:17 -0700 |
commit | bdda8303f764d844e7b2fb69e5fd21c650c60943 (patch) | |
tree | c1e19e24009f14fb6e3d5174082aa0be3b1b7d92 | |
parent | bd383b8e32f6aab08c9485b1fe86e2e932b1df69 (diff) | |
parent | 5a7e470e460fb90657343d843732325e53bb875f (diff) |
Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc5-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:
- Eric noticed that the memmove() in crng_fast_key_erasure() was bogus,
so this has been changed to a memcpy() and the confusing situation
clarified with a detailed comment.
- [Half]SipHash documentation updates from Bagas and Eric, after Eric
pointed out that the use of HalfSipHash in random.c made a bit of the
text potentially misleading.
* tag 'random-5.18-rc5-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
Documentation: siphash: disambiguate HalfSipHash algorithm from hsiphash functions
Documentation: siphash: enclose HalfSipHash usage example in the literal block
Documentation: siphash: convert danger note to warning for HalfSipHash
random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/siphash.rst | 46 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 9 |
2 files changed, 36 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/siphash.rst b/Documentation/security/siphash.rst index bd9363025fcb..a10380cb78e5 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/siphash.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/siphash.rst @@ -121,26 +121,36 @@ even scarier, uses an easily brute-forcable 64-bit key (with a 32-bit output) instead of SipHash's 128-bit key. However, this may appeal to some high-performance `jhash` users. -Danger! - -Do not ever use HalfSipHash except for as a hashtable key function, and only -then when you can be absolutely certain that the outputs will never be -transmitted out of the kernel. This is only remotely useful over `jhash` as a -means of mitigating hashtable flooding denial of service attacks. - -Generating a HalfSipHash key -============================ +HalfSipHash support is provided through the "hsiphash" family of functions. + +.. warning:: + Do not ever use the hsiphash functions except for as a hashtable key + function, and only then when you can be absolutely certain that the outputs + will never be transmitted out of the kernel. This is only remotely useful + over `jhash` as a means of mitigating hashtable flooding denial of service + attacks. + +On 64-bit kernels, the hsiphash functions actually implement SipHash-1-3, a +reduced-round variant of SipHash, instead of HalfSipHash-1-3. This is because in +64-bit code, SipHash-1-3 is no slower than HalfSipHash-1-3, and can be faster. +Note, this does *not* mean that in 64-bit kernels the hsiphash functions are the +same as the siphash ones, or that they are secure; the hsiphash functions still +use a less secure reduced-round algorithm and truncate their outputs to 32 +bits. + +Generating a hsiphash key +========================= Keys should always be generated from a cryptographically secure source of -random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once: +random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once:: -hsiphash_key_t key; -get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key)); + hsiphash_key_t key; + get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key)); If you're not deriving your key from here, you're doing it wrong. -Using the HalfSipHash functions -=============================== +Using the hsiphash functions +============================ There are two variants of the function, one that takes a list of integers, and one that takes a buffer:: @@ -183,7 +193,7 @@ You may then iterate like usual over the returned hash bucket. Performance =========== -HalfSipHash is roughly 3 times slower than JenkinsHash. For many replacements, -this will not be a problem, as the hashtable lookup isn't the bottleneck. And -in general, this is probably a good sacrifice to make for the security and DoS -resistance of HalfSipHash. +hsiphash() is roughly 3 times slower than jhash(). For many replacements, this +will not be a problem, as the hashtable lookup isn't the bottleneck. And in +general, this is probably a good sacrifice to make for the security and DoS +resistance of hsiphash(). diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 3a293f919af9..4c9adb4f3d5d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -318,6 +318,13 @@ static void crng_reseed(bool force) * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. + * + * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old + * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out + * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy. + * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is + * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so + * that this function overwrites it before returning. */ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], @@ -333,7 +340,7 @@ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block); memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); - memmove(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len); + memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len); memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block)); } |