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authorXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>2021-10-20 07:42:45 -0400
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2021-10-22 12:36:44 -0700
commitaa0f697e45286a6b5f0ceca9418acf54b9099d99 (patch)
tree660f04d0e0692b8ddfafa80f729055c319a64871
parenta64b341b8695e1c744dd972b39868371b4f68f83 (diff)
sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_violation
sctp_sf_violation() is called when processing HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk in cookie_wait state, and some other places are also using it. The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 96a069d725e9..36328ab88bdd 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -4669,6 +4669,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net,
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+ if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,