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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-08-23 22:38:08 -0700
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-08-23 22:38:08 -0700
commit81152518e985e2db22f22ca89b12169851644af6 (patch)
tree180afe2c34f0bd7901b27138d06c6ede1d1456c5
parent60890e046081aef61980dbc812ac5100ad078a87 (diff)
parent8e9cd9ce90d48369b2c5ddd79fe3d4a4cb1ccb56 (diff)
Merge branch 'bpf-verifier-fixes'
Edward Cree says: ==================== bpf: verifier fixes Fix a couple of bugs introduced in my recent verifier patches. Patch #2 does slightly increase the insn count on bpf_lxc.o, but only by about a hundred insns (i.e. 0.2%). v2: added test for write-marks bug (patch #1); reworded comment on propagate_liveness() for clarity. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r--include/linux/bpf_verifier.h14
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c78
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c44
3 files changed, 103 insertions, 33 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 91d07efed2ba..b8d200f60a40 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -21,6 +21,19 @@
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ INT_MAX
+/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
+ * Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
+ * "one of this state's descendants read this reg" (and therefore the reg is
+ * relevant for states_equal() checks).
+ * Write marks collect downwards and do not propagate; they record that "the
+ * straight-line code that reached this state (from its parent) wrote this reg"
+ * (and therefore that reads propagated from this state or its descendants
+ * should not propagate to its parent).
+ * A state with a write mark can receive read marks; it just won't propagate
+ * them to its parent, since the write mark is a property, not of the state,
+ * but of the link between it and its parent. See mark_reg_read() and
+ * mark_stack_slot_read() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.
+ */
enum bpf_reg_liveness {
REG_LIVE_NONE = 0, /* reg hasn't been read or written this branch */
REG_LIVE_READ, /* reg was read, so we're sensitive to initial value */
@@ -125,7 +138,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
bool seen_direct_write;
- bool varlen_map_value_access;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
};
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index e42c096ba20d..d690c7dd1f1a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -832,11 +832,6 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
*/
if (log_level)
print_verifier_state(state);
- /* If the offset is variable, we will need to be stricter in state
- * pruning from now on.
- */
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
- env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
/* The minimum value is only important with signed
* comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
* value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
@@ -3247,9 +3242,8 @@ static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap)
}
/* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
-static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
- struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
- bool varlen_map_access, struct idpair *idmap)
+static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
+ struct idpair *idmap)
{
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
@@ -3281,22 +3275,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
}
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
- if (varlen_map_access) {
- /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
- * everything else matches, we are OK.
- * We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing
- * uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL)
- */
- return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
- range_within(rold, rcur) &&
- tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
- } else {
- /* If the ranges/var_off were not the same, but
- * everything else was and we didn't do a variable
- * access into a map then we are a-ok.
- */
- return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0;
- }
+ /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
+ * everything else matches, we are OK.
+ * We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing
+ * uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL)
+ */
+ return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
+ range_within(rold, rcur) &&
+ tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
/* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
@@ -3380,7 +3366,6 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
- bool varlen_map_access = env->varlen_map_value_access;
struct idpair *idmap;
bool ret = false;
int i;
@@ -3391,8 +3376,7 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
- if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], varlen_map_access,
- idmap))
+ if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap))
goto out_free;
}
@@ -3412,7 +3396,7 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
continue;
if (!regsafe(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
&cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
- varlen_map_access, idmap))
+ idmap))
/* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
* spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
* are the same as well.
@@ -3433,9 +3417,16 @@ out_free:
return ret;
}
+/* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the
+ * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at a
+ * jump target (in the first iteration of the propagate_liveness() loop),
+ * we didn't arrive by the straight-line code, so read marks in state must
+ * propagate to parent regardless of state's write marks.
+ */
static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
{
+ bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
bool touched = false; /* any changes made? */
int i;
@@ -3447,7 +3438,9 @@ static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
if (parent->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
continue;
- if (state->regs[i].live == REG_LIVE_READ) {
+ if (writes && (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
+ continue;
+ if (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
parent->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
touched = true;
}
@@ -3460,7 +3453,9 @@ static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
continue;
if (parent->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
continue;
- if (state->spilled_regs[i].live == REG_LIVE_READ) {
+ if (writes && (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
+ continue;
+ if (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
parent->spilled_regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
touched = true;
}
@@ -3468,6 +3463,15 @@ static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
return touched;
}
+/* "parent" is "a state from which we reach the current state", but initially
+ * it is not the state->parent (i.e. "the state whose straight-line code leads
+ * to the current state"), instead it is the state that happened to arrive at
+ * a (prunable) equivalent of the current state. See comment above
+ * do_propagate_liveness() for consequences of this.
+ * This function is just a more efficient way of calling mark_reg_read() or
+ * mark_stack_slot_read() on each reg in "parent" that is read in "state",
+ * though it requires that parent != state->parent in the call arguments.
+ */
static void propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
{
@@ -3496,6 +3500,12 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
* prune the search.
* Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
+ * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they
+ * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation
+ * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our
+ * own state will get the read marks recorded, but
+ * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning
+ * this state and will pop a new one.
*/
propagate_liveness(&sl->state, &env->cur_state);
return 1;
@@ -3519,7 +3529,12 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl;
/* connect new state to parentage chain */
env->cur_state.parent = &new_sl->state;
- /* clear liveness marks in current state */
+ /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes
+ * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us.
+ * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark
+ * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only
+ * explored_states can get read marks.)
+ */
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
env->cur_state.regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
@@ -3550,7 +3565,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
init_reg_state(regs);
state->parent = NULL;
insn_idx = 0;
- env->varlen_map_value_access = false;
for (;;) {
struct bpf_insn *insn;
u8 class;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index c03542c417db..353d17015641 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -6487,6 +6487,50 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
+ {
+ "liveness pruning and write screening",
+ .insns = {
+ /* Get an unknown value */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ /* branch conditions teach us nothing about R2 */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, 0, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, 0, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "R0 !read_ok",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
+ },
+ {
+ "varlen_map_value_access pruning",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
+ BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 8),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_2, MAX_ENTRIES),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 1),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
+ .errstr = "R0 unbounded memory access",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
+ },
};
static int probe_filter_length(const struct bpf_insn *fp)