Merge tag 'v6.11-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: "API: - Test setkey in no-SIMD context - Add skcipher speed test for user-specified algorithm Algorithms: - Add x25519 support on ppc64le - Add VAES and AVX512 / AVX10 optimized AES-GCM on x86 - Remove sm2 algorithm Drivers: - Add Allwinner H616 support to sun8i-ce - Use DMA in stm32 - Add Exynos850 hwrng support to exynos" * tag 'v6.11-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (81 commits) hwrng: core - remove (un)register_miscdev() crypto: lib/mpi - delete unnecessary condition crypto: testmgr - generate power-of-2 lengths more often crypto: mxs-dcp - Ensure payload is zero when using key slot hwrng: Kconfig - Do not enable by default CN10K driver crypto: starfive - Fix nent assignment in rsa dec crypto: starfive - Align rsa input data to 32-bit crypto: qat - fix unintentional re-enabling of error interrupts crypto: qat - extend scope of lock in adf_cfg_add_key_value_param() Documentation: qat: fix auto_reset attribute details crypto: sun8i-ce - add Allwinner H616 support crypto: sun8i-ce - wrap accesses to descriptor address fields dt-bindings: crypto: sun8i-ce: Add compatible for H616 hwrng: core - Fix wrong quality calculation at hw rng registration hwrng: exynos - Enable Exynos850 support hwrng: exynos - Add SMC based TRNG operation hwrng: exynos - Implement bus clock control hwrng: exynos - Use devm_clk_get_enabled() to get the clock hwrng: exynos - Improve coding style dt-bindings: rng: Add Exynos850 support to exynos-trng ...
author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 2024-07-19 08:52:58 -0700
committer: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 2024-07-19 08:52:58 -0700
commit: c434e25b62f8efcfbb6bf1f7ce55960206c1137e (patch)
tree: 824a68893982c718225a1821fda98c495178473d
parent: 720261cfc7329406a50c2a8536e0039b9dd9a4e5 (diff)
parent: df1e9791998a92fe9f1e7d3f031b34daaad39e2f (diff)
114 files changed, 5484 insertions, 5897 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-qat b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-qat
index 96020fb051c3..f290e77cd590 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-qat
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-qat
@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ Description:
 		This attribute is only available for qat_4xxx devices.
 
 What:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<BDF>/qat/auto_reset
-Date:		March 2024
-KernelVersion:	6.8
+Date:		May 2024
+KernelVersion:	6.9
 Contact:	qat-linux@intel.com
 Description:	(RW) Reports the current state of the autoreset feature
 		for a QAT device
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/crypto/allwinner,sun8i-ce.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/crypto/allwinner,sun8i-ce.yaml
index 4287678aa79f..da47b601c165 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/crypto/allwinner,sun8i-ce.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/crypto/allwinner,sun8i-ce.yaml
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ properties:
       - allwinner,sun50i-a64-crypto
       - allwinner,sun50i-h5-crypto
       - allwinner,sun50i-h6-crypto
+      - allwinner,sun50i-h616-crypto
 
   reg:
     maxItems: 1
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ if:
     compatible:
       enum:
         - allwinner,sun20i-d1-crypto
+        - allwinner,sun50i-h616-crypto
 then:
   properties:
     clocks:
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/amlogic,meson-rng.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/amlogic,meson-rng.yaml
index afa52af442a7..f03b87e1b01c 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/amlogic,meson-rng.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/amlogic,meson-rng.yaml
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ properties:
     items:
       - const: core
 
+  power-domains:
+    maxItems: 1
+
 required:
   - compatible
   - reg
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/samsung,exynos5250-trng.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/samsung,exynos5250-trng.yaml
index 765d9f9edd6e..1a71935d8a19 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/samsung,exynos5250-trng.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/samsung,exynos5250-trng.yaml
@@ -12,14 +12,17 @@ maintainers:
 
 properties:
   compatible:
-    const: samsung,exynos5250-trng
+    enum:
+      - samsung,exynos5250-trng
+      - samsung,exynos850-trng
 
   clocks:
-    maxItems: 1
+    minItems: 1
+    maxItems: 2
 
   clock-names:
-    items:
-      - const: secss
+    minItems: 1
+    maxItems: 2
 
   reg:
     maxItems: 1
@@ -30,6 +33,35 @@ required:
   - clock-names
   - reg
 
+allOf:
+  - if:
+      properties:
+        compatible:
+          contains:
+            const: samsung,exynos850-trng
+
+    then:
+      properties:
+        clocks:
+          items:
+            - description: SSS (Security Sub System) operating clock
+            - description: SSS (Security Sub System) bus clock
+
+        clock-names:
+          items:
+            - const: secss
+            - const: pclk
+
+    else:
+      properties:
+        clocks:
+          items:
+            - description: SSS (Security Sub System) operating clock
+
+        clock-names:
+          items:
+            - const: secss
+
 additionalProperties: false
 
 examples:
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 63af77fcdd32..5694c59f1fdc 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -980,6 +980,12 @@ F:	include/uapi/linux/psp-dbc.h
 F:	tools/crypto/ccp/*.c
 F:	tools/crypto/ccp/*.py
 
+AMD CRYPTOGRAPHIC COPROCESSOR (CCP) DRIVER - HSTI SUPPORT
+M:	Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+L:	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
+S:	Supported
+F:	drivers/crypto/ccp/hsti.*
+
 AMD DISPLAY CORE
 M:	Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
 M:	Leo Li <sunpeng.li@amd.com>
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
index f00f042ef357..201eb35dde37 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Bit sliced AES using NEON instructions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb(aes)");
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-core.S
index 3f13a76b9066..88f9edf94e95 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-core.S
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-core.S
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/cfi_types.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
 
 	.text
@@ -123,11 +124,12 @@
 	 * uint crc32_pmull_le(unsigned char const *buffer,
 	 *                     size_t len, uint crc32)
 	 */
-ENTRY(crc32_pmull_le)
+SYM_FUNC_START(crc32_pmull_le)
 	adr		r3, .Lcrc32_constants
 	b		0f
+SYM_FUNC_END(crc32_pmull_le)
 
-ENTRY(crc32c_pmull_le)
+SYM_FUNC_START(crc32c_pmull_le)
 	adr		r3, .Lcrc32c_constants
 
 0:	bic		LEN, LEN, #15
@@ -236,8 +238,7 @@ fold_64:
 	vmov		r0, s5
 
 	bx		lr
-ENDPROC(crc32_pmull_le)
-ENDPROC(crc32c_pmull_le)
+SYM_FUNC_END(crc32c_pmull_le)
 
 	.macro		__crc32, c
 	subs		ip, r2, #8
@@ -296,11 +297,11 @@ ARM_BE8(rev16		r3, r3		)
 	.endm
 
 	.align		5
-ENTRY(crc32_armv8_le)
+SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(crc32_armv8_le)
 	__crc32
-ENDPROC(crc32_armv8_le)
+SYM_FUNC_END(crc32_armv8_le)
 
 	.align		5
-ENTRY(crc32c_armv8_le)
+SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(crc32c_armv8_le)
 	__crc32		c
-ENDPROC(crc32c_armv8_le)
+SYM_FUNC_END(crc32c_armv8_le)
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-glue.c
index 2208445808d7..4ff18044af07 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-glue.c
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ module_init(crc32_pmull_mod_init);
 module_exit(crc32_pmull_mod_exit);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Accelerated CRC32(C) using ARM CRC, NEON and Crypto Extensions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c");
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c
index e9191a8c87b9..79f3b204d8c0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c
@@ -84,5 +84,6 @@ module_init(crc_t10dif_mod_init);
 module_exit(crc_t10dif_mod_exit);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Accelerated CRC-T10DIF using ARM NEON and Crypto Extensions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crct10dif");
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
index 9bdafd57888c..e7b87e09dd99 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
@@ -133,4 +133,5 @@ module_exit(arm_curve25519_exit);
 
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519-neon");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Public key crypto: Curve25519 (NEON-accelerated)");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
index c31bd8f7c092..8482e302c45a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ static void __exit arm_poly1305_mod_exit(void)
 module_init(arm_poly1305_mod_init);
 module_exit(arm_poly1305_mod_exit);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Accelerated Poly1305 transform for ARM");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("poly1305");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("poly1305-arm");
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
index 467ac2f768ac..46425e7b9755 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Bit sliced AES using NEON instructions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb(aes)");
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c
index 09eb1456aed4..606d25c559ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static struct shash_alg crc_t10dif_alg[] = {{
 
 	.base.cra_name		= "crct10dif",
 	.base.cra_driver_name	= "crct10dif-arm64-neon",
-	.base.cra_priority	= 100,
+	.base.cra_priority	= 150,
 	.base.cra_blocksize	= CRC_T10DIF_BLOCK_SIZE,
 	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
 }, {
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ module_cpu_feature_match(ASIMD, crc_t10dif_mod_init);
 module_exit(crc_t10dif_mod_exit);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("CRC-T10DIF using arm64 NEON and Crypto Extensions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crct10dif");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crct10dif-arm64-ce");
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
index 1fae18ba11ed..9c4bfd62e789 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static void __exit neon_poly1305_mod_exit(void)
 module_init(neon_poly1305_mod_init);
 module_exit(neon_poly1305_mod_exit);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Poly1305 transform using NEON instructions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("poly1305");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("poly1305-neon");
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/crypto/Kconfig
index 1e201b7ae2fc..09ebcbdfb34f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -2,6 +2,17 @@
 
 menu "Accelerated Cryptographic Algorithms for CPU (powerpc)"
 
+config CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PPC64
+	tristate "Public key crypto: Curve25519 (PowerPC64)"
+	depends on PPC64 && CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
+	select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
+	help
+	  Curve25519 algorithm
+
+	  Architecture: PowerPC64
+	  - Little-endian
+
 config CRYPTO_CRC32C_VPMSUM
 	tristate "CRC32c"
 	depends on PPC64 && ALTIVEC
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/crypto/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/crypto/Makefile
index fca0e9739869..59808592f0a1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/crypto/Makefile
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_GCM_P10) += aes-gcm-p10-crypto.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_P10) += chacha-p10-crypto.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305_P10) += poly1305-p10-crypto.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_VMX_ENCRYPT) += vmx-crypto.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PPC64) += curve25519-ppc64le.o
 
 aes-ppc-spe-y := aes-spe-core.o aes-spe-keys.o aes-tab-4k.o aes-spe-modes.o aes-spe-glue.o
 md5-ppc-y := md5-asm.o md5-glue.o
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ aes-gcm-p10-crypto-y := aes-gcm-p10-glue.o aes-gcm-p10.o ghashp10-ppc.o aesp10-p
 chacha-p10-crypto-y := chacha-p10-glue.o chacha-p10le-8x.o
 poly1305-p10-crypto-y := poly1305-p10-glue.o poly1305-p10le_64.o
 vmx-crypto-objs := vmx.o aesp8-ppc.o ghashp8-ppc.o aes.o aes_cbc.o aes_ctr.o aes_xts.o ghash.o
+curve25519-ppc64le-y := curve25519-ppc64le-core.o curve25519-ppc64le_asm.o
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN),y)
 override flavour := linux-ppc64le
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/crypto/curve25519-ppc64le-core.c b/arch/powerpc/crypto/curve25519-ppc64le-core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4e3e44ea4484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/crypto/curve25519-ppc64le-core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright 2024- IBM Corp.
+ *
+ * X25519 scalar multiplication with 51 bits limbs for PPC64le.
+ *   Based on RFC7748 and AArch64 optimized implementation for X25519
+ *     - Algorithm 1 Scalar multiplication of a variable point
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/curve25519.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/processor.h>
+
+typedef uint64_t fe51[5];
+
+asmlinkage void x25519_fe51_mul(fe51 h, const fe51 f, const fe51 g);
+asmlinkage void x25519_fe51_sqr(fe51 h, const fe51 f);
+asmlinkage void x25519_fe51_mul121666(fe51 h, fe51 f);
+asmlinkage void x25519_fe51_sqr_times(fe51 h, const fe51 f, int n);
+asmlinkage void x25519_fe51_frombytes(fe51 h, const uint8_t *s);
+asmlinkage void x25519_fe51_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const fe51 h);
+asmlinkage void x25519_cswap(fe51 p, fe51 q, unsigned int bit);
+
+#define fmul x25519_fe51_mul
+#define fsqr x25519_fe51_sqr
+#define fmul121666 x25519_fe51_mul121666
+#define fe51_tobytes x25519_fe51_tobytes
+
+static void fadd(fe51 h, const fe51 f, const fe51 g)
+{
+	h[0] = f[0] + g[0];
+	h[1] = f[1] + g[1];
+	h[2] = f[2] + g[2];
+	h[3] = f[3] + g[3];
+	h[4] = f[4] + g[4];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prime = 2 ** 255 - 19, 255 bits
+ *    (0x7fffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffed)
+ *
+ * Prime in 5 51-bit limbs
+ */
+static fe51 prime51 = { 0x7ffffffffffed, 0x7ffffffffffff, 0x7ffffffffffff, 0x7ffffffffffff, 0x7ffffffffffff};
+
+static void fsub(fe51 h, const fe51 f, const fe51 g)
+{
+	h[0] = (f[0] + ((prime51[0] * 2))) - g[0];
+	h[1] = (f[1] + ((prime51[1] * 2))) - g[1];
+	h[2] = (f[2] + ((prime51[2] * 2))) - g[2];
+	h[3] = (f[3] + ((prime51[3] * 2))) - g[3];
+	h[4] = (f[4] + ((prime51[4] * 2))) - g[4];
+}
+
+static void fe51_frombytes(fe51 h, const uint8_t *s)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Make sure 64-bit aligned.
+	 */
+	unsigned char sbuf[32+8];
+	unsigned char *sb = PTR_ALIGN((void *)sbuf, 8);
+
+	memcpy(sb, s, 32);
+	x25519_fe51_frombytes(h, sb);
+}
+
+static void finv(fe51 o, const fe51 i)
+{
+	fe51 a0, b, c, t00;
+
+	fsqr(a0, i);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, a0, 2);
+
+	fmul(b, t00, i);
+	fmul(a0, b, a0);
+
+	fsqr(t00, a0);
+
+	fmul(b, t00, b);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, b, 5);
+
+	fmul(b, t00, b);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, b, 10);
+
+	fmul(c, t00, b);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, c, 20);
+
+	fmul(t00, t00, c);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, t00, 10);
+
+	fmul(b, t00, b);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, b, 50);
+
+	fmul(c, t00, b);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, c, 100);
+
+	fmul(t00, t00, c);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, t00, 50);
+
+	fmul(t00, t00, b);
+	x25519_fe51_sqr_times(t00, t00, 5);
+
+	fmul(o, t00, a0);
+}
+
+static void curve25519_fe51(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32],
+			    const uint8_t point[32])
+{
+	fe51 x1, x2, z2, x3, z3;
+	uint8_t s[32];
+	unsigned int swap = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	memcpy(s, scalar, 32);
+	s[0]  &= 0xf8;
+	s[31] &= 0x7f;
+	s[31] |= 0x40;
+	fe51_frombytes(x1, point);
+
+	z2[0] = z2[1] = z2[2] = z2[3] = z2[4] = 0;
+	x3[0] = x1[0];
+	x3[1] = x1[1];
+	x3[2] = x1[2];
+	x3[3] = x1[3];
+	x3[4] = x1[4];
+
+	x2[0] = z3[0] = 1;
+	x2[1] = z3[1] = 0;
+	x2[2] = z3[2] = 0;
+	x2[3] = z3[3] = 0;
+	x2[4] = z3[4] = 0;
+
+	for (i = 254; i >= 0; --i) {
+		unsigned int k_t = 1 & (s[i / 8] >> (i & 7));
+		fe51 a, b, c, d, e;
+		fe51 da, cb, aa, bb;
+		fe51 dacb_p, dacb_m;
+
+		swap ^= k_t;
+		x25519_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+		x25519_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+		swap = k_t;
+
+		fsub(b, x2, z2);		// B = x_2 - z_2
+		fadd(a, x2, z2);		// A = x_2 + z_2
+		fsub(d, x3, z3);		// D = x_3 - z_3
+		fadd(c, x3, z3);		// C = x_3 + z_3
+
+		fsqr(bb, b);			// BB = B^2
+		fsqr(aa, a);			// AA = A^2
+		fmul(da, d, a);			// DA = D * A
+		fmul(cb, c, b);			// CB = C * B
+
+		fsub(e, aa, bb);		// E = AA - BB
+		fmul(x2, aa, bb);		// x2 = AA * BB
+		fadd(dacb_p, da, cb);		// DA + CB
+		fsub(dacb_m, da, cb);		// DA - CB
+
+		fmul121666(z3, e);		// 121666 * E
+		fsqr(z2, dacb_m);		// (DA - CB)^2
+		fsqr(x3, dacb_p);		// x3 = (DA + CB)^2
+		fadd(b, bb, z3);		// BB + 121666 * E
+		fmul(z3, x1, z2);		// z3 = x1 * (DA - CB)^2
+		fmul(z2, e, b);		// z2 = e * (BB + (DA + CB)^2)
+	}
+
+	finv(z2, z2);
+	fmul(x2, x2, z2);
+	fe51_tobytes(out, x2);
+}
+
+void curve25519_arch(u8 mypublic[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+		     const u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+		     const u8 basepoint[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+	curve25519_fe51(mypublic, secret, basepoint);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_arch);
+
+void curve25519_base_arch(u8 pub[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+			  const u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+	curve25519_fe51(pub, secret, curve25519_base_point);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_base_arch);
+
+static int curve25519_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
+				 unsigned int len)
+{
+	u8 *secret = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (!len)
+		curve25519_generate_secret(secret);
+	else if (len == CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE &&
+		 crypto_memneq(buf, curve25519_null_point, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE))
+		memcpy(secret, buf, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE);
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int curve25519_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
+	const u8 *secret = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 buf[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE];
+	int copied, nbytes;
+
+	if (req->src)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	curve25519_base_arch(buf, secret);
+
+	/* might want less than we've got */
+	nbytes = min_t(size_t, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE, req->dst_len);
+	copied = sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents_for_len(req->dst,
+								nbytes),
+				     buf, nbytes);
+	if (copied != nbytes)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int curve25519_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
+	const u8 *secret = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 public_key[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE];
+	u8 buf[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE];
+	int copied, nbytes;
+
+	if (!req->src)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	copied = sg_copy_to_buffer(req->src,
+				   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
+						    CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE),
+				   public_key, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE);
+	if (copied != CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	curve25519_arch(buf, secret, public_key);
+
+	/* might want less than we've got */
+	nbytes = min_t(size_t, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE, req->dst_len);
+	copied = sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents_for_len(req->dst,
+								nbytes),
+				     buf, nbytes);
+	if (copied != nbytes)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int curve25519_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
+{
+	return CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE;
+}
+
+static struct kpp_alg curve25519_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		= "curve25519",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	= "curve25519-ppc64le",
+	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	= CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE,
+
+	.set_secret		= curve25519_set_secret,
+	.generate_public_key	= curve25519_generate_public_key,
+	.compute_shared_secret	= curve25519_compute_shared_secret,
+	.max_size		= curve25519_max_size,
+};
+
+
+static int __init curve25519_mod_init(void)
+{
+	return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP) ?
+		crypto_register_kpp(&curve25519_alg) : 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit curve25519_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP))
+		crypto_unregister_kpp(&curve25519_alg);
+}
+
+module_init(curve25519_mod_init);
+module_exit(curve25519_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519-ppc64le");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Danny Tsen <dtsen@us.ibm.com>");
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/crypto/curve25519-ppc64le_asm.S b/arch/powerpc/crypto/curve25519-ppc64le_asm.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..06c1febe24b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/crypto/curve25519-ppc64le_asm.S
@@ -0,0 +1,671 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+#
+# This code is taken from CRYPTOGAMs[1] and is included here using the option
+# in the license to distribute the code under the GPL. Therefore this program
+# is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
+# the GNU General Public License version 2 as published by the Free Software
+# Foundation.
+#
+# [1] https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/
+
+# Copyright (c) 2006-2017, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro@openssl.org>
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+#
+#       * Redistributions of source code must retain copyright notices,
+#         this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+#
+#       * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+#         copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+#         disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
+#         provided with the distribution.
+#
+#       * Neither the name of the CRYPTOGAMS nor the names of its
+#         copyright holder and contributors may be used to endorse or
+#         promote products derived from this software without specific
+#         prior written permission.
+#
+# ALTERNATIVELY, provided that this notice is retained in full, this
+# product may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public
+# License (GPL), in which case the provisions of the GPL apply INSTEAD OF
+# those given above.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER AND CONTRIBUTORS
+# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+# A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+# OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+# LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+# OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see https://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written and Modified by Danny Tsen <dtsen@us.ibm.com>
+# - Added x25519_fe51_sqr_times, x25519_fe51_frombytes, x25519_fe51_tobytes
+#   and x25519_cswap
+#
+# Copyright 2024- IBM Corp.
+#
+# X25519 lower-level primitives for PPC64.
+#
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+
+.text
+
+.align	5
+SYM_FUNC_START(x25519_fe51_mul)
+
+	stdu	1,-144(1)
+	std	21,56(1)
+	std	22,64(1)
+	std	23,72(1)
+	std	24,80(1)
+	std	25,88(1)
+	std	26,96(1)
+	std	27,104(1)
+	std	28,112(1)
+	std	29,120(1)
+	std	30,128(1)
+	std	31,136(1)
+
+	ld	6,0(5)
+	ld	7,0(4)
+	ld	8,8(4)
+	ld	9,16(4)
+	ld	10,24(4)
+	ld	11,32(4)
+
+	mulld	22,7,6
+	mulhdu	23,7,6
+
+	mulld	24,8,6
+	mulhdu	25,8,6
+
+	mulld	30,11,6
+	mulhdu	31,11,6
+	ld	4,8(5)
+	mulli	11,11,19
+
+	mulld	26,9,6
+	mulhdu	27,9,6
+
+	mulld	28,10,6
+	mulhdu	29,10,6
+	mulld	12,11,4
+	mulhdu	21,11,4
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,21
+
+	mulld	12,7,4
+	mulhdu	21,7,4
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,21
+
+	mulld	12,10,4
+	mulhdu	21,10,4
+	ld	6,16(5)
+	mulli	10,10,19
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,21
+
+	mulld	12,8,4
+	mulhdu	21,8,4
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,21
+
+	mulld	12,9,4
+	mulhdu	21,9,4
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,21
+	mulld	12,10,6
+	mulhdu	21,10,6
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,21
+
+	mulld	12,11,6
+	mulhdu	21,11,6
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,21
+
+	mulld	12,9,6
+	mulhdu	21,9,6
+	ld	4,24(5)
+	mulli	9,9,19
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,21
+
+	mulld	12,7,6
+	mulhdu	21,7,6
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,21
+
+	mulld	12,8,6
+	mulhdu	21,8,6
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,21
+	mulld	12,9,4
+	mulhdu	21,9,4
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,21
+
+	mulld	12,10,4
+	mulhdu	21,10,4
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,21
+
+	mulld	12,8,4
+	mulhdu	21,8,4
+	ld	6,32(5)
+	mulli	8,8,19
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,21
+
+	mulld	12,11,4
+	mulhdu	21,11,4
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,21
+
+	mulld	12,7,4
+	mulhdu	21,7,4
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,21
+	mulld	12,8,6
+	mulhdu	21,8,6
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,21
+
+	mulld	12,9,6
+	mulhdu	21,9,6
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,21
+
+	mulld	12,10,6
+	mulhdu	21,10,6
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,21
+
+	mulld	12,11,6
+	mulhdu	21,11,6
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,21
+
+	mulld	12,7,6
+	mulhdu	21,7,6
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,21
+
+.Lfe51_reduce:
+	li	0,-1
+	srdi	0,0,13
+
+	srdi	12,26,51
+	and	9,26,0
+	insrdi	12,27,51,0
+	srdi	21,22,51
+	and	7,22,0
+	insrdi	21,23,51,0
+	addc	28,28,12
+	addze	29,29
+	addc	24,24,21
+	addze	25,25
+
+	srdi	12,28,51
+	and	10,28,0
+	insrdi	12,29,51,0
+	srdi	21,24,51
+	and	8,24,0
+	insrdi	21,25,51,0
+	addc	30,30,12
+	addze	31,31
+	add	9,9,21
+
+	srdi	12,30,51
+	and	11,30,0
+	insrdi	12,31,51,0
+	mulli	12,12,19
+
+	add	7,7,12
+
+	srdi	21,9,51
+	and	9,9,0
+	add	10,10,21
+
+	srdi	12,7,51
+	and	7,7,0
+	add	8,8,12
+
+	std	9,16(3)
+	std	10,24(3)
+	std	11,32(3)
+	std	7,0(3)
+	std	8,8(3)
+
+	ld	21,56(1)
+	ld	22,64(1)
+	ld	23,72(1)
+	ld	24,80(1)
+	ld	25,88(1)
+	ld	26,96(1)
+	ld	27,104(1)
+	ld	28,112(1)
+	ld	29,120(1)
+	ld	30,128(1)
+	ld	31,136(1)
+	addi	1,1,144
+	blr
+SYM_FUNC_END(x25519_fe51_mul)
+
+.align	5
+SYM_FUNC_START(x25519_fe51_sqr)
+
+	stdu	1,-144(1)
+	std	21,56(1)
+	std	22,64(1)
+	std	23,72(1)
+	std	24,80(1)
+	std	25,88(1)
+	std	26,96(1)
+	std	27,104(1)
+	std	28,112(1)
+	std	29,120(1)
+	std	30,128(1)
+	std	31,136(1)
+
+	ld	7,0(4)
+	ld	8,8(4)
+	ld	9,16(4)
+	ld	10,24(4)
+	ld	11,32(4)
+
+	add	6,7,7
+	mulli	21,11,19
+
+	mulld	22,7,7
+	mulhdu	23,7,7
+	mulld	24,8,6
+	mulhdu	25,8,6
+	mulld	26,9,6
+	mulhdu	27,9,6
+	mulld	28,10,6
+	mulhdu	29,10,6
+	mulld	30,11,6
+	mulhdu	31,11,6
+	add	6,8,8
+	mulld	12,11,21
+	mulhdu	11,11,21
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,11
+
+	mulli	5,10,19
+
+	mulld	12,8,8
+	mulhdu	11,8,8
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,11
+	mulld	12,9,6
+	mulhdu	11,9,6
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,11
+	mulld	12,10,6
+	mulhdu	11,10,6
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,11
+	mulld	12,21,6
+	mulhdu	11,21,6
+	add	6,10,10
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,11
+	mulld	12,10,5
+	mulhdu	10,10,5
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,10
+	mulld	12,6,21
+	mulhdu	10,6,21
+	add	6,9,9
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,10
+
+	mulld	12,9,9
+	mulhdu	10,9,9
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,10
+	mulld	12,5,6
+	mulhdu	10,5,6
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,10
+	mulld	12,21,6
+	mulhdu	10,21,6
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,10
+
+	b	.Lfe51_reduce
+SYM_FUNC_END(x25519_fe51_sqr)
+
+.align	5
+SYM_FUNC_START(x25519_fe51_mul121666)
+
+	stdu	1,-144(1)
+	std	21,56(1)
+	std	22,64(1)
+	std	23,72(1)
+	std	24,80(1)
+	std	25,88(1)
+	std	26,96(1)
+	std	27,104(1)
+	std	28,112(1)
+	std	29,120(1)
+	std	30,128(1)
+	std	31,136(1)
+
+	lis	6,1
+	ori	6,6,56130
+	ld	7,0(4)
+	ld	8,8(4)
+	ld	9,16(4)
+	ld	10,24(4)
+	ld	11,32(4)
+
+	mulld	22,7,6
+	mulhdu	23,7,6
+	mulld	24,8,6
+	mulhdu	25,8,6
+	mulld	26,9,6
+	mulhdu	27,9,6
+	mulld	28,10,6
+	mulhdu	29,10,6
+	mulld	30,11,6
+	mulhdu	31,11,6
+
+	b	.Lfe51_reduce
+SYM_FUNC_END(x25519_fe51_mul121666)
+
+.align	5
+SYM_FUNC_START(x25519_fe51_sqr_times)
+
+	stdu	1,-144(1)
+	std	21,56(1)
+	std	22,64(1)
+	std	23,72(1)
+	std	24,80(1)
+	std	25,88(1)
+	std	26,96(1)
+	std	27,104(1)
+	std	28,112(1)
+	std	29,120(1)
+	std	30,128(1)
+	std	31,136(1)
+
+	ld	7,0(4)
+	ld	8,8(4)
+	ld	9,16(4)
+	ld	10,24(4)
+	ld	11,32(4)
+
+	mtctr	5
+
+.Lsqr_times_loop:
+	add	6,7,7
+	mulli	21,11,19
+
+	mulld	22,7,7
+	mulhdu	23,7,7
+	mulld	24,8,6
+	mulhdu	25,8,6
+	mulld	26,9,6
+	mulhdu	27,9,6
+	mulld	28,10,6
+	mulhdu	29,10,6
+	mulld	30,11,6
+	mulhdu	31,11,6
+	add	6,8,8
+	mulld	12,11,21
+	mulhdu	11,11,21
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,11
+
+	mulli	5,10,19
+
+	mulld	12,8,8
+	mulhdu	11,8,8
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,11
+	mulld	12,9,6
+	mulhdu	11,9,6
+	addc	28,28,12
+	adde	29,29,11
+	mulld	12,10,6
+	mulhdu	11,10,6
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,11
+	mulld	12,21,6
+	mulhdu	11,21,6
+	add	6,10,10
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,11
+	mulld	12,10,5
+	mulhdu	10,10,5
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,10
+	mulld	12,6,21
+	mulhdu	10,6,21
+	add	6,9,9
+	addc	26,26,12
+	adde	27,27,10
+
+	mulld	12,9,9
+	mulhdu	10,9,9
+	addc	30,30,12
+	adde	31,31,10
+	mulld	12,5,6
+	mulhdu	10,5,6
+	addc	22,22,12
+	adde	23,23,10
+	mulld	12,21,6
+	mulhdu	10,21,6
+	addc	24,24,12
+	adde	25,25,10
+
+	# fe51_reduce
+	li	0,-1
+	srdi	0,0,13
+
+	srdi	12,26,51
+	and	9,26,0
+	insrdi	12,27,51,0
+	srdi	21,22,51
+	and	7,22,0
+	insrdi	21,23,51,0
+	addc	28,28,12
+	addze	29,29
+	addc	24,24,21
+	addze	25,25
+
+	srdi	12,28,51
+	and	10,28,0
+	insrdi	12,29,51,0
+	srdi	21,24,51
+	and	8,24,0
+	insrdi	21,25,51,0
+	addc	30,30,12
+	addze	31,31
+	add	9,9,21
+
+	srdi	12,30,51
+	and	11,30,0
+	insrdi	12,31,51,0
+	mulli	12,12,19
+
+	add	7,7,12
+
+	srdi	21,9,51
+	and	9,9,0
+	add	10,10,21
+
+	srdi	12,7,51
+	and	7,7,0
+	add	8,8,12
+
+	bdnz	.Lsqr_times_loop
+
+	std	9,16(3)
+	std	10,24(3)
+	std	11,32(3)
+	std	7,0(3)
+	std	8,8(3)
+
+	ld	21,56(1)
+	ld	22,64(1)
+	ld	23,72(1)
+	ld	24,80(1)
+	ld	25,88(1)
+	ld	26,96(1)
+	ld	27,104(1)
+	ld	28,112(1)
+	ld	29,120(1)
+	ld	30,128(1)
+	ld	31,136(1)
+	addi	1,1,144
+	blr
+SYM_FUNC_END(x25519_fe51_sqr_times)
+
+.align	5
+SYM_FUNC_START(x25519_fe51_frombytes)
+
+	li	12, -1
+	srdi	12, 12, 13	# 0x7ffffffffffff
+
+	ld	5, 0(4)
+	ld	6, 8(4)
+	ld	7, 16(4)
+	ld	8, 24(4)
+
+	srdi	10, 5, 51
+	and	5, 5, 12	# h0
+
+	sldi	11, 6, 13
+	or	11, 10, 11	# h1t
+	srdi	10, 6, 38
+	and	6, 11, 12	# h1
+
+	sldi	11, 7, 26
+	or	10, 10, 11	# h2t
+
+	srdi	11, 7, 25
+	and	7, 10, 12	# h2
+	sldi	10, 8, 39
+	or	11, 11, 10	# h3t
+
+	srdi	9, 8, 12
+	and	8, 11, 12	# h3
+	and	9, 9, 12	# h4
+
+	std	5, 0(3)
+	std	6, 8(3)
+	std	7, 16(3)
+	std	8, 24(3)
+	std	9, 32(3)
+
+	blr
+SYM_FUNC_END(x25519_fe51_frombytes)
+
+.align	5
+SYM_FUNC_START(x25519_fe51_tobytes)
+
+	ld	5, 0(4)
+	ld	6, 8(4)
+	ld	7, 16(4)
+	ld	8, 24(4)
+	ld	9, 32(4)
+
+	li	12, -1
+	srdi	12, 12, 13	# 0x7ffffffffffff
+
+	# Full reducuction
+	addi	10, 5, 19
+	srdi	10, 10, 51
+	add	10, 10, 6
+	srdi	10, 10, 51
+	add	10, 10, 7
+	srdi	10, 10, 51
+	add	10, 10, 8
+	srdi	10, 10, 51
+	add	10, 10, 9
+	srdi	10, 10, 51
+
+	mulli	10, 10, 19
+	add	5, 5, 10
+	srdi	11, 5, 51
+	add	6, 6, 11
+	srdi	11, 6, 51
+	add	7, 7, 11
+	srdi	11, 7, 51
+	add	8, 8, 11
+	srdi	11, 8, 51
+	add	9, 9, 11
+
+	and	5, 5, 12
+	and	6, 6, 12
+	and	7, 7, 12
+	and	8, 8, 12
+	and	9, 9, 12
+
+	sldi	10, 6, 51
+	or	5, 5, 10	# s0
+
+	srdi	11, 6, 13
+	sldi	10, 7, 38
+	or	6, 11, 10	# s1
+
+	srdi	11, 7, 26
+	sldi	10, 8, 25
+	or	7, 11, 10	# s2
+
+	srdi	11, 8, 39
+	sldi	10, 9, 12
+	or	8, 11, 10	# s4
+
+	std	5, 0(3)
+	std	6, 8(3)
+	std	7, 16(3)
+	std	8, 24(3)
+
+	blr
+SYM_FUNC_END(x25519_fe51_tobytes)
+
+.align	5
+SYM_FUNC_START(x25519_cswap)
+
+	li	7, 5
+	neg	6, 5
+	mtctr	7
+
+.Lswap_loop:
+	ld	8, 0(3)
+	ld	9, 0(4)
+	xor	10, 8, 9
+	and	10, 10, 6
+	xor	11, 8, 10
+	xor	12, 9, 10
+	std	11, 0(3)
+	addi	3, 3, 8
+	std	12, 0(4)
+	addi	4, 4, 8
+	bdnz	.Lswap_loop
+
+	blr
+SYM_FUNC_END(x25519_cswap)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/x86/crypto/Kconfig
index c9e59589a1ce..24875e6295f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL
 	depends on X86
 	select CRYPTO_AEAD
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_GF128MUL
 	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
 	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
 	select CRYPTO_SIMD
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
index 9c5ce5613738..53b4a277809e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
@@ -48,8 +48,12 @@ chacha-x86_64-$(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) += chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL) += aesni-intel.o
 aesni-intel-y := aesni-intel_asm.o aesni-intel_glue.o
-aesni-intel-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.o \
-	aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.o aes-xts-avx-x86_64.o
+aesni-intel-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.o \
+			       aes-gcm-aesni-x86_64.o \
+			       aes-xts-avx-x86_64.o
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_AS_VAES)$(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ),yy)
+aesni-intel-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += aes-gcm-avx10-x86_64.o
+endif
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_SSSE3) += sha1-ssse3.o
 sha1-ssse3-y := sha1_avx2_x86_64_asm.o sha1_ssse3_asm.o sha1_ssse3_glue.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-gcm-aesni-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-gcm-aesni-x86_64.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..45940e2883a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-gcm-aesni-x86_64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1128 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */
+//
+// AES-NI optimized AES-GCM for x86_64
+//
+// Copyright 2024 Google LLC
+//
+// Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+//
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// This file is dual-licensed, meaning that you can use it under your choice of
+// either of the following two licenses:
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may obtain a copy
+// of the License at
+//
+//	http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+// or
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+//    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+//    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+//    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+// AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+// IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+// ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+// LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+// CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+// SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+// CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+// ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+// POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+//
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// This file implements AES-GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) for x86_64 CPUs that
+// support the original set of AES instructions, i.e. AES-NI.  Two
+// implementations are provided, one that uses AVX and one that doesn't.  They
+// are very similar, being generated by the same macros.  The only difference is
+// that the AVX implementation takes advantage of VEX-coded instructions in some
+// places to avoid some 'movdqu' and 'movdqa' instructions.  The AVX
+// implementation does *not* use 256-bit vectors, as AES is not supported on
+// 256-bit vectors until the VAES feature (which this file doesn't target).
+//
+// The specific CPU feature prerequisites are AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ, plus SSE4.1
+// for the *_aesni functions or AVX for the *_aesni_avx ones.  (But it seems
+// there are no CPUs that support AES-NI without also PCLMULQDQ and SSE4.1.)
+//
+// The design generally follows that of aes-gcm-avx10-x86_64.S, and that file is
+// more thoroughly commented.  This file has the following notable changes:
+//
+//    - The vector length is fixed at 128-bit, i.e. xmm registers.  This means
+//      there is only one AES block (and GHASH block) per register.
+//
+//    - Without AVX512 / AVX10, only 16 SIMD registers are available instead of
+//      32.  We work around this by being much more careful about using
+//      registers, relying heavily on loads to load values as they are needed.
+//
+//    - Masking is not available either.  We work around this by implementing
+//      partial block loads and stores using overlapping scalar loads and stores
+//      combined with shifts and SSE4.1 insertion and extraction instructions.
+//
+//    - The main loop is organized differently due to the different design
+//      constraints.  First, with just one AES block per SIMD register, on some
+//      CPUs 4 registers don't saturate the 'aesenc' throughput.  We therefore
+//      do an 8-register wide loop.  Considering that and the fact that we have
+//      just 16 SIMD registers to work with, it's not feasible to cache AES
+//      round keys and GHASH key powers in registers across loop iterations.
+//      That's not ideal, but also not actually that bad, since loads can run in
+//      parallel with other instructions.  Significantly, this also makes it
+//      possible to roll up the inner loops, relying on hardware loop unrolling
+//      instead of software loop unrolling, greatly reducing code size.
+//
+//    - We implement the GHASH multiplications in the main loop using Karatsuba
+//      multiplication instead of schoolbook multiplication.  This saves one
+//      pclmulqdq instruction per block, at the cost of one 64-bit load, one
+//      pshufd, and 0.25 pxors per block.  (This is without the three-argument
+//      XOR support that would be provided by AVX512 / AVX10, which would be
+//      more beneficial to schoolbook than Karatsuba.)
+//
+//      As a rough approximation, we can assume that Karatsuba multiplication is
+//      faster than schoolbook multiplication in this context if one pshufd and
+//      0.25 pxors are cheaper than a pclmulqdq.  (We assume that the 64-bit
+//      load is "free" due to running in parallel with arithmetic instructions.)
+//      This is true on AMD CPUs, including all that support pclmulqdq up to at
+//      least Zen 3.  It's also true on older Intel CPUs: Westmere through
+//      Haswell on the Core side, and Silvermont through Goldmont Plus on the
+//      low-power side.  On some of these CPUs, pclmulqdq is quite slow, and the
+//      benefit of Karatsuba should be substantial.  On newer Intel CPUs,
+//      schoolbook multiplication should be faster, but only marginally.
+//
+//      Not all these CPUs were available to be tested.  However, benchmarks on
+//      available CPUs suggest that this approximation is plausible.  Switching
+//      to Karatsuba showed negligible change (< 1%) on Intel Broadwell,
+//      Skylake, and Cascade Lake, but it improved AMD Zen 1-3 by 6-7%.
+//      Considering that and the fact that Karatsuba should be even more
+//      beneficial on older Intel CPUs, it seems like the right choice here.
+//
+//      An additional 0.25 pclmulqdq per block (2 per 8 blocks) could be
+//      saved by using a multiplication-less reduction method.  We don't do that
+//      because it would require a large number of shift and xor instructions,
+//      making it less worthwhile and likely harmful on newer CPUs.
+//
+//      It does make sense to sometimes use a different reduction optimization
+//      that saves a pclmulqdq, though: precompute the hash key times x^64, and
+//      multiply the low half of the data block by the hash key with the extra
+//      factor of x^64.  This eliminates one step of the reduction.  However,
+//      this is incompatible with Karatsuba multiplication.  Therefore, for
+//      multi-block processing we use Karatsuba multiplication with a regular
+//      reduction.  For single-block processing, we use the x^64 optimization.
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+
+.section .rodata
+.p2align 4
+.Lbswap_mask:
+	.octa   0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
+.Lgfpoly:
+	.quad	0xc200000000000000
+.Lone:
+	.quad	1
+.Lgfpoly_and_internal_carrybit:
+	.octa	0xc2000000000000010000000000000001
+	// Loading 16 bytes from '.Lzeropad_mask + 16 - len' produces a mask of
+	// 'len' 0xff bytes and the rest zeroes.
+.Lzeropad_mask:
+	.octa	0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+	.octa	0
+
+// Offsets in struct aes_gcm_key_aesni
+#define OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN	480
+#define OFFSETOF_H_POWERS	496
+#define OFFSETOF_H_POWERS_XORED	624
+#define OFFSETOF_H_TIMES_X64	688
+
+.text
+
+// Do a vpclmulqdq, or fall back to a movdqa and a pclmulqdq.  The fallback
+// assumes that all operands are distinct and that any mem operand is aligned.
+.macro	_vpclmulqdq	imm, src1, src2, dst
+.if USE_AVX
+	vpclmulqdq	\imm, \src1, \src2, \dst
+.else
+	movdqa		\src2, \dst
+	pclmulqdq	\imm, \src1, \dst
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// Do a vpshufb, or fall back to a movdqa and a pshufb.  The fallback assumes
+// that all operands are distinct and that any mem operand is aligned.
+.macro	_vpshufb	src1, src2, dst
+.if USE_AVX
+	vpshufb		\src1, \src2, \dst
+.else
+	movdqa		\src2, \dst
+	pshufb		\src1, \dst
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// Do a vpand, or fall back to a movdqu and a pand.  The fallback assumes that
+// all operands are distinct.
+.macro	_vpand		src1, src2, dst
+.if USE_AVX
+	vpand		\src1, \src2, \dst
+.else
+	movdqu		\src1, \dst
+	pand		\src2, \dst
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// XOR the unaligned memory operand \mem into the xmm register \reg.  \tmp must
+// be a temporary xmm register.
+.macro	_xor_mem_to_reg	mem, reg, tmp
+.if USE_AVX
+	vpxor		\mem, \reg, \reg
+.else
+	movdqu		\mem, \tmp
+	pxor		\tmp, \reg
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// Test the unaligned memory operand \mem against the xmm register \reg.  \tmp
+// must be a temporary xmm register.
+.macro	_test_mem	mem, reg, tmp
+.if USE_AVX
+	vptest		\mem, \reg
+.else
+	movdqu		\mem, \tmp
+	ptest		\tmp, \reg
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// Load 1 <= %ecx <= 15 bytes from the pointer \src into the xmm register \dst
+// and zeroize any remaining bytes.  Clobbers %rax, %rcx, and \tmp{64,32}.
+.macro	_load_partial_block	src, dst, tmp64, tmp32
+	sub		$8, %ecx		// LEN - 8
+	jle		.Lle8\@
+
+	// Load 9 <= LEN <= 15 bytes.
+	movq		(\src), \dst		// Load first 8 bytes
+	mov		(\src, %rcx), %rax	// Load last 8 bytes
+	neg		%ecx
+	shl		$3, %ecx
+	shr		%cl, %rax		// Discard overlapping bytes
+	pinsrq		$1, %rax, \dst
+	jmp		.Ldone\@
+
+.Lle8\@:
+	add		$4, %ecx		// LEN - 4
+	jl		.Llt4\@
+
+	// Load 4 <= LEN <= 8 bytes.
+	mov		(\src), %eax		// Load first 4 bytes
+	mov		(\src, %rcx), \tmp32	// Load last 4 bytes
+	jmp		.Lcombine\@
+
+.Llt4\@:
+	// Load 1 <= LEN <= 3 bytes.
+	add		$2, %ecx		// LEN - 2
+	movzbl		(\src), %eax		// Load first byte
+	jl		.Lmovq\@
+	movzwl		(\src, %rcx), \tmp32	// Load last 2 bytes
+.Lcombine\@:
+	shl		$3, %ecx
+	shl		%cl, \tmp64
+	or		\tmp64, %rax		// Combine the two parts
+.Lmovq\@:
+	movq		%rax, \dst
+.Ldone\@:
+.endm
+
+// Store 1 <= %ecx <= 15 bytes from the xmm register \src to the pointer \dst.
+// Clobbers %rax, %rcx, and %rsi.
+.macro	_store_partial_block	src, dst
+	sub		$8, %ecx		// LEN - 8
+	jl		.Llt8\@
+
+	// Store 8 <= LEN <= 15 bytes.
+	pextrq		$1, \src, %rax
+	mov		%ecx, %esi
+	shl		$3, %ecx
+	ror		%cl, %rax
+	mov		%rax, (\dst, %rsi)	// Store last LEN - 8 bytes
+	movq		\src, (\dst)		// Store first 8 bytes
+	jmp		.Ldone\@
+
+.Llt8\@:
+	add		$4, %ecx		// LEN - 4
+	jl		.Llt4\@
+
+	// Store 4 <= LEN <= 7 bytes.
+	pextrd		$1, \src, %eax
+	mov		%ecx, %esi
+	shl		$3, %ecx
+	ror		%cl, %eax
+	mov		%eax, (\dst, %rsi)	// Store last LEN - 4 bytes
+	movd		\src, (\dst)		// Store first 4 bytes
+	jmp		.Ldone\@
+
+.Llt4\@:
+	// Store 1 <= LEN <= 3 bytes.
+	pextrb		$0, \src, 0(\dst)
+	cmp		$-2, %ecx		// LEN - 4 == -2, i.e. LEN == 2?
+	jl		.Ldone\@
+	pextrb		$1, \src, 1(\dst)
+	je		.Ldone\@
+	pextrb		$2, \src, 2(\dst)
+.Ldone\@:
+.endm
+
+// Do one step of GHASH-multiplying \a by \b and storing the reduced product in
+// \b.  To complete all steps, this must be invoked with \i=0 through \i=9.
+// \a_times_x64 must contain \a * x^64 in reduced form, \gfpoly must contain the
+// .Lgfpoly constant, and \t0-\t1 must be temporary registers.
+.macro	_ghash_mul_step	i, a, a_times_x64, b, gfpoly, t0, t1
+
+	// MI = (a_L * b_H) + ((a*x^64)_L * b_L)
+.if \i == 0
+	_vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \a, \b, \t0
+.elseif \i == 1
+	_vpclmulqdq	$0x00, \a_times_x64, \b, \t1
+.elseif \i == 2
+	pxor		\t1, \t0
+
+	// HI = (a_H * b_H) + ((a*x^64)_H * b_L)
+.elseif \i == 3
+	_vpclmulqdq	$0x11, \a, \b, \t1
+.elseif \i == 4
+	pclmulqdq	$0x10, \a_times_x64, \b
+.elseif \i == 5
+	pxor		\t1, \b
+.elseif \i == 6
+
+	// Fold MI into HI.
+	pshufd		$0x4e, \t0, \t1		// Swap halves of MI
+.elseif \i == 7
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, \gfpoly, \t0	// MI_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57)
+.elseif \i == 8
+	pxor		\t1, \b
+.elseif \i == 9
+	pxor		\t0, \b
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// GHASH-multiply \a by \b and store the reduced product in \b.
+// See _ghash_mul_step for details.
+.macro	_ghash_mul	a, a_times_x64, b, gfpoly, t0, t1
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
+	_ghash_mul_step	\i, \a, \a_times_x64, \b, \gfpoly, \t0, \t1
+.endr
+.endm
+
+// GHASH-multiply \a by \b and add the unreduced product to \lo, \mi, and \hi.
+// This does Karatsuba multiplication and must be paired with _ghash_reduce.  On
+// the first call, \lo, \mi, and \hi must be zero.  \a_xored must contain the
+// two halves of \a XOR'd together, i.e. a_L + a_H.  \b is clobbered.
+.macro	_ghash_mul_noreduce	a, a_xored, b, lo, mi, hi, t0
+
+	// LO += a_L * b_L
+	_vpclmulqdq	$0x00, \a, \b, \t0
+	pxor		\t0, \lo
+
+	// b_L + b_H
+	pshufd		$0x4e, \b, \t0
+	pxor		\b, \t0
+
+	// HI += a_H * b_H
+	pclmulqdq	$0x11, \a, \b
+	pxor		\b, \hi
+
+	// MI += (a_L + a_H) * (b_L + b_H)
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, \a_xored, \t0
+	pxor		\t0, \mi
+.endm
+
+// Reduce the product from \lo, \mi, and \hi, and store the result in \dst.
+// This assumes that _ghash_mul_noreduce was used.
+.macro	_ghash_reduce	lo, mi, hi, dst, t0
+
+	movq		.Lgfpoly(%rip), \t0
+
+	// MI += LO + HI (needed because we used Karatsuba multiplication)
+	pxor		\lo, \mi
+	pxor		\hi, \mi
+
+	// Fold LO into MI.
+	pshufd		$0x4e, \lo, \dst
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, \t0, \lo
+	pxor		\dst, \mi
+	pxor		\lo, \mi
+
+	// Fold MI into HI.
+	pshufd		$0x4e, \mi, \dst
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, \t0, \mi
+	pxor		\hi, \dst
+	pxor		\mi, \dst
+.endm
+
+// Do the first step of the GHASH update of a set of 8 ciphertext blocks.
+//
+// The whole GHASH update does:
+//
+//	GHASH_ACC = (blk0+GHASH_ACC)*H^8 + blk1*H^7 + blk2*H^6 + blk3*H^5 +
+//				blk4*H^4 + blk5*H^3 + blk6*H^2 + blk7*H^1
+//
+// This macro just does the first step: it does the unreduced multiplication
+// (blk0+GHASH_ACC)*H^8 and starts gathering the unreduced product in the xmm
+// registers LO, MI, and GHASH_ACC a.k.a. HI.  It also zero-initializes the
+// inner block counter in %rax, which is a value that counts up by 8 for each
+// block in the set of 8 and is used later to index by 8*blknum and 16*blknum.
+//
+// To reduce the number of pclmulqdq instructions required, both this macro and
+// _ghash_update_continue_8x use Karatsuba multiplication instead of schoolbook
+// multiplication.  See the file comment for more details about this choice.
+//
+// Both macros expect the ciphertext blocks blk[0-7] to be available at DST if
+// encrypting, or SRC if decrypting.  They also expect the precomputed hash key
+// powers H^i and their XOR'd-together halves to be available in the struct
+// pointed to by KEY.  Both macros clobber TMP[0-2].
+.macro	_ghash_update_begin_8x	enc
+
+	// Initialize the inner block counter.
+	xor		%eax, %eax
+
+	// Load the highest hash key power, H^8.
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS(KEY), TMP0
+
+	// Load the first ciphertext block and byte-reflect it.
+.if \enc
+	movdqu		(DST), TMP1
+.else
+	movdqu		(SRC), TMP1
+.endif
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, TMP1
+
+	// Add the GHASH accumulator to the ciphertext block to get the block
+	// 'b' that needs to be multiplied with the hash key power 'a'.
+	pxor		TMP1, GHASH_ACC
+
+	// b_L + b_H
+	pshufd		$0x4e, GHASH_ACC, MI
+	pxor		GHASH_ACC, MI
+
+	// LO = a_L * b_L
+	_vpclmulqdq	$0x00, TMP0, GHASH_ACC, LO
+
+	// HI = a_H * b_H
+	pclmulqdq	$0x11, TMP0, GHASH_ACC
+
+	// MI = (a_L + a_H) * (b_L + b_H)
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, OFFSETOF_H_POWERS_XORED(KEY), MI
+.endm
+
+// Continue the GHASH update of 8 ciphertext blocks as described above by doing
+// an unreduced multiplication of the next ciphertext block by the next lowest
+// key power and accumulating the result into LO, MI, and GHASH_ACC a.k.a. HI.
+.macro	_ghash_update_continue_8x enc
+	add		$8, %eax
+
+	// Load the next lowest key power.
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS(KEY,%rax,2), TMP0
+
+	// Load the next ciphertext block and byte-reflect it.
+.if \enc
+	movdqu		(DST,%rax,2), TMP1
+.else
+	movdqu		(SRC,%rax,2), TMP1
+.endif
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, TMP1
+
+	// LO += a_L * b_L
+	_vpclmulqdq	$0x00, TMP0, TMP1, TMP2
+	pxor		TMP2, LO
+
+	// b_L + b_H
+	pshufd		$0x4e, TMP1, TMP2
+	pxor		TMP1, TMP2
+
+	// HI += a_H * b_H
+	pclmulqdq	$0x11, TMP0, TMP1
+	pxor		TMP1, GHASH_ACC
+
+	// MI += (a_L + a_H) * (b_L + b_H)
+	movq		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS_XORED(KEY,%rax), TMP1
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, TMP1, TMP2
+	pxor		TMP2, MI
+.endm
+
+// Reduce LO, MI, and GHASH_ACC a.k.a. HI into GHASH_ACC.  This is similar to
+// _ghash_reduce, but it's hardcoded to use the registers of the main loop and
+// it uses the same register for HI and the destination.  It's also divided into
+// two steps.  TMP1 must be preserved across steps.
+//
+// One pshufd could be saved by shuffling MI and XOR'ing LO into it, instead of
+// shuffling LO, XOR'ing LO into MI, and shuffling MI.  However, this would
+// increase the critical path length, and it seems to slightly hurt performance.
+.macro	_ghash_update_end_8x_step	i
+.if \i == 0
+	movq		.Lgfpoly(%rip), TMP1
+	pxor		LO, MI
+	pxor		GHASH_ACC, MI
+	pshufd		$0x4e, LO, TMP2
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, TMP1, LO
+	pxor		TMP2, MI
+	pxor		LO, MI
+.elseif \i == 1
+	pshufd		$0x4e, MI, TMP2
+	pclmulqdq	$0x00, TMP1, MI
+	pxor		TMP2, GHASH_ACC
+	pxor		MI, GHASH_ACC
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// void aes_gcm_precompute_##suffix(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key);
+//
+// Given the expanded AES key, derive the GHASH subkey and initialize the GHASH
+// related fields in the key struct.
+.macro	_aes_gcm_precompute
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+
+	// Additional local variables.
+	// %xmm0-%xmm1 and %rax are used as temporaries.
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST_PTR,	%rsi
+	.set	H_CUR,		%xmm2
+	.set	H_POW1,		%xmm3	// H^1
+	.set	H_POW1_X64,	%xmm4	// H^1 * x^64
+	.set	GFPOLY,		%xmm5
+
+	// Encrypt an all-zeroes block to get the raw hash subkey.
+	movl		OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN(KEY), %eax
+	lea		6*16(KEY,%rax,4), RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	movdqa		(KEY), H_POW1  // Zero-th round key XOR all-zeroes block
+	lea		16(KEY), %rax
+1:
+	aesenc		(%rax), H_POW1
+	add		$16, %rax
+	cmp		%rax, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	jne		1b
+	aesenclast	(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), H_POW1
+
+	// Preprocess the raw hash subkey as needed to operate on GHASH's
+	// bit-reflected values directly: reflect its bytes, then multiply it by
+	// x^-1 (using the backwards interpretation of polynomial coefficients
+	// from the GCM spec) or equivalently x^1 (using the alternative,
+	// natural interpretation of polynomial coefficients).
+	pshufb		.Lbswap_mask(%rip), H_POW1
+	movdqa		H_POW1, %xmm0
+	pshufd		$0xd3, %xmm0, %xmm0
+	psrad		$31, %xmm0
+	paddq		H_POW1, H_POW1
+	pand		.Lgfpoly_and_internal_carrybit(%rip), %xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm0, H_POW1
+
+	// Store H^1.
+	movdqa		H_POW1, OFFSETOF_H_POWERS+7*16(KEY)
+
+	// Compute and store H^1 * x^64.
+	movq		.Lgfpoly(%rip), GFPOLY
+	pshufd		$0x4e, H_POW1, %xmm0
+	_vpclmulqdq	$0x00, H_POW1, GFPOLY, H_POW1_X64
+	pxor		%xmm0, H_POW1_X64
+	movdqa		H_POW1_X64, OFFSETOF_H_TIMES_X64(KEY)
+
+	// Compute and store the halves of H^1 XOR'd together.
+	pxor		H_POW1, %xmm0
+	movq		%xmm0, OFFSETOF_H_POWERS_XORED+7*8(KEY)
+
+	// Compute and store the remaining key powers H^2 through H^8.
+	movdqa		H_POW1, H_CUR
+	mov		$6*8, %eax
+.Lprecompute_next\@:
+	// Compute H^i = H^{i-1} * H^1.
+	_ghash_mul	H_POW1, H_POW1_X64, H_CUR, GFPOLY, %xmm0, %xmm1
+	// Store H^i.
+	movdqa		H_CUR, OFFSETOF_H_POWERS(KEY,%rax,2)
+	// Compute and store the halves of H^i XOR'd together.
+	pshufd		$0x4e, H_CUR, %xmm0
+	pxor		H_CUR, %xmm0
+	movq		%xmm0, OFFSETOF_H_POWERS_XORED(KEY,%rax)
+	sub		$8, %eax
+	jge		.Lprecompute_next\@
+
+	RET
+.endm
+
+// void aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+//				 u8 ghash_acc[16], const u8 *aad, int aadlen);
+//
+// This function processes the AAD (Additional Authenticated Data) in GCM.
+// Using the key |key|, it updates the GHASH accumulator |ghash_acc| with the
+// data given by |aad| and |aadlen|.  On the first call, |ghash_acc| must be all
+// zeroes.  |aadlen| must be a multiple of 16, except on the last call where it
+// can be any length.  The caller must do any buffering needed to ensure this.
+.macro	_aes_gcm_aad_update
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_PTR,	%rsi
+	.set	AAD,		%rdx
+	.set	AADLEN,		%ecx
+	// Note: _load_partial_block relies on AADLEN being in %ecx.
+
+	// Additional local variables.
+	// %rax, %r10, and %xmm0-%xmm1 are used as temporary registers.
+	.set	BSWAP_MASK,	%xmm2
+	.set	GHASH_ACC,	%xmm3
+	.set	H_POW1,		%xmm4	// H^1
+	.set	H_POW1_X64,	%xmm5	// H^1 * x^64
+	.set	GFPOLY,		%xmm6
+
+	movdqa		.Lbswap_mask(%rip), BSWAP_MASK
+	movdqu		(GHASH_ACC_PTR), GHASH_ACC
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS+7*16(KEY), H_POW1
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_TIMES_X64(KEY), H_POW1_X64
+	movq		.Lgfpoly(%rip), GFPOLY
+
+	// Process the AAD one full block at a time.
+	sub		$16, AADLEN
+	jl		.Laad_loop_1x_done\@
+.Laad_loop_1x\@:
+	movdqu		(AAD), %xmm0
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, %xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm0, GHASH_ACC
+	_ghash_mul	H_POW1, H_POW1_X64, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, %xmm0, %xmm1
+	add		$16, AAD
+	sub		$16, AADLEN
+	jge		.Laad_loop_1x\@
+.Laad_loop_1x_done\@:
+	// Check whether there is a partial block at the end.
+	add		$16, AADLEN
+	jz		.Laad_done\@
+
+	// Process a partial block of length 1 <= AADLEN <= 15.
+	// _load_partial_block assumes that %ecx contains AADLEN.
+	_load_partial_block	AAD, %xmm0, %r10, %r10d
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, %xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm0, GHASH_ACC
+	_ghash_mul	H_POW1, H_POW1_X64, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, %xmm0, %xmm1
+
+.Laad_done\@:
+	movdqu		GHASH_ACC, (GHASH_ACC_PTR)
+	RET
+.endm
+
+// Increment LE_CTR eight times to generate eight little-endian counter blocks,
+// swap each to big-endian, and store them in AESDATA[0-7].  Also XOR them with
+// the zero-th AES round key.  Clobbers TMP0 and TMP1.
+.macro	_ctr_begin_8x
+	movq		.Lone(%rip), TMP0
+	movdqa		(KEY), TMP1		// zero-th round key
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7
+	_vpshufb	BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, AESDATA\i
+	pxor		TMP1, AESDATA\i
+	paddd		TMP0, LE_CTR
+.endr
+.endm
+
+// Do a non-last round of AES on AESDATA[0-7] using \round_key.
+.macro	_aesenc_8x	round_key
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7
+	aesenc		\round_key, AESDATA\i
+.endr
+.endm
+
+// Do the last round of AES on AESDATA[0-7] using \round_key.
+.macro	_aesenclast_8x	round_key
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7
+	aesenclast	\round_key, AESDATA\i
+.endr
+.endm
+
+// XOR eight blocks from SRC with the keystream blocks in AESDATA[0-7], and
+// store the result to DST.  Clobbers TMP0.
+.macro	_xor_data_8x
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7
+	_xor_mem_to_reg	\i*16(SRC), AESDATA\i, tmp=TMP0
+.endr
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7
+	movdqu		AESDATA\i, \i*16(DST)
+.endr
+.endm
+
+// void aes_gcm_{enc,dec}_update_##suffix(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+//					  const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+//					  const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+//
+// This macro generates a GCM encryption or decryption update function with the
+// above prototype (with \enc selecting which one).
+//
+// This function computes the next portion of the CTR keystream, XOR's it with
+// |datalen| bytes from |src|, and writes the resulting encrypted or decrypted
+// data to |dst|.  It also updates the GHASH accumulator |ghash_acc| using the
+// next |datalen| ciphertext bytes.
+//
+// |datalen| must be a multiple of 16, except on the last call where it can be
+// any length.  The caller must do any buffering needed to ensure this.  Both
+// in-place and out-of-place en/decryption are supported.
+//
+// |le_ctr| must give the current counter in little-endian format.  For a new
+// message, the low word of the counter must be 2.  This function loads the
+// counter from |le_ctr| and increments the loaded counter as needed, but it
+// does *not* store the updated counter back to |le_ctr|.  The caller must
+// update |le_ctr| if any more data segments follow.  Internally, only the low
+// 32-bit word of the counter is incremented, following the GCM standard.
+.macro	_aes_gcm_update	enc
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+	.set	LE_CTR_PTR,	%rsi	// Note: overlaps with usage as temp reg
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_PTR,	%rdx
+	.set	SRC,		%rcx
+	.set	DST,		%r8
+	.set	DATALEN,	%r9d
+	.set	DATALEN64,	%r9	// Zero-extend DATALEN before using!
+	// Note: the code setting up for _load_partial_block assumes that SRC is
+	// in %rcx (and that DATALEN is *not* in %rcx).
+
+	// Additional local variables
+
+	// %rax and %rsi are used as temporary registers.  Note: %rsi overlaps
+	// with LE_CTR_PTR, which is used only at the beginning.
+
+	.set	AESKEYLEN,	%r10d	// AES key length in bytes
+	.set	AESKEYLEN64,	%r10
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST_PTR,	%r11	// Pointer to last AES round key
+
+	// Put the most frequently used values in %xmm0-%xmm7 to reduce code
+	// size.  (%xmm0-%xmm7 take fewer bytes to encode than %xmm8-%xmm15.)
+	.set	TMP0,		%xmm0
+	.set	TMP1,		%xmm1
+	.set	TMP2,		%xmm2
+	.set	LO,		%xmm3	// Low part of unreduced product
+	.set	MI,		%xmm4	// Middle part of unreduced product
+	.set	GHASH_ACC,	%xmm5	// GHASH accumulator; in main loop also
+					// the high part of unreduced product
+	.set	BSWAP_MASK,	%xmm6	// Shuffle mask for reflecting bytes
+	.set	LE_CTR,		%xmm7	// Little-endian counter value
+	.set	AESDATA0,	%xmm8
+	.set	AESDATA1,	%xmm9
+	.set	AESDATA2,	%xmm10
+	.set	AESDATA3,	%xmm11
+	.set	AESDATA4,	%xmm12
+	.set	AESDATA5,	%xmm13
+	.set	AESDATA6,	%xmm14
+	.set	AESDATA7,	%xmm15
+
+	movdqa		.Lbswap_mask(%rip), BSWAP_MASK
+	movdqu		(GHASH_ACC_PTR), GHASH_ACC
+	movdqu		(LE_CTR_PTR), LE_CTR
+
+	movl		OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN(KEY), AESKEYLEN
+	lea		6*16(KEY,AESKEYLEN64,4), RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+
+	// If there are at least 8*16 bytes of data, then continue into the main
+	// loop, which processes 8*16 bytes of data per iteration.
+	//
+	// The main loop interleaves AES and GHASH to improve performance on
+	// CPUs that can execute these instructions in parallel.  When
+	// decrypting, the GHASH input (the ciphertext) is immediately
+	// available.  When encrypting, we instead encrypt a set of 8 blocks
+	// first and then GHASH those blocks while encrypting the next set of 8,
+	// repeat that as needed, and finally GHASH the last set of 8 blocks.
+	//
+	// Code size optimization: Prefer adding or subtracting -8*16 over 8*16,
+	// as this makes the immediate fit in a signed byte, saving 3 bytes.
+	add		$-8*16, DATALEN
+	jl		.Lcrypt_loop_8x_done\@
+.if \enc
+	// Encrypt the first 8 plaintext blocks.
+	_ctr_begin_8x
+	lea		16(KEY), %rsi
+	.p2align 4
+1:
+	movdqa		(%rsi), TMP0
+	_aesenc_8x	TMP0
+	add		$16, %rsi
+	cmp		%rsi, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	jne		1b
+	movdqa		(%rsi), TMP0
+	_aesenclast_8x	TMP0
+	_xor_data_8x
+	// Don't increment DST until the ciphertext blocks have been hashed.
+	sub		$-8*16, SRC
+	add		$-8*16, DATALEN
+	jl		.Lghash_last_ciphertext_8x\@
+.endif
+
+	.p2align 4
+.Lcrypt_loop_8x\@:
+
+	// Generate the next set of 8 counter blocks and start encrypting them.
+	_ctr_begin_8x
+	lea		16(KEY), %rsi
+
+	// Do a round of AES, and start the GHASH update of 8 ciphertext blocks
+	// by doing the unreduced multiplication for the first ciphertext block.
+	movdqa		(%rsi), TMP0
+	add		$16, %rsi
+	_aesenc_8x	TMP0
+	_ghash_update_begin_8x \enc
+
+	// Do 7 more rounds of AES, and continue the GHASH update by doing the
+	// unreduced multiplication for the remaining ciphertext blocks.
+	.p2align 4
+1:
+	movdqa		(%rsi), TMP0
+	add		$16, %rsi
+	_aesenc_8x	TMP0
+	_ghash_update_continue_8x \enc
+	cmp		$7*8, %eax
+	jne		1b
+
+	// Do the remaining AES rounds.
+	.p2align 4
+1:
+	movdqa		(%rsi), TMP0
+	add		$16, %rsi
+	_aesenc_8x	TMP0
+	cmp		%rsi, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	jne		1b
+
+	// Do the GHASH reduction and the last round of AES.
+	movdqa		(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), TMP0
+	_ghash_update_end_8x_step	0
+	_aesenclast_8x	TMP0
+	_ghash_update_end_8x_step	1
+
+	// XOR the data with the AES-CTR keystream blocks.
+.if \enc
+	sub		$-8*16, DST
+.endif
+	_xor_data_8x
+	sub		$-8*16, SRC
+.if !\enc
+	sub		$-8*16, DST
+.endif
+	add		$-8*16, DATALEN
+	jge		.Lcrypt_loop_8x\@
+
+.if \enc
+.Lghash_last_ciphertext_8x\@:
+	// Update GHASH with the last set of 8 ciphertext blocks.
+	_ghash_update_begin_8x		\enc
+	.p2align 4
+1:
+	_ghash_update_continue_8x	\enc
+	cmp		$7*8, %eax
+	jne		1b
+	_ghash_update_end_8x_step	0
+	_ghash_update_end_8x_step	1
+	sub		$-8*16, DST
+.endif
+
+.Lcrypt_loop_8x_done\@:
+
+	sub		$-8*16, DATALEN
+	jz		.Ldone\@
+
+	// Handle the remainder of length 1 <= DATALEN < 8*16 bytes.  We keep
+	// things simple and keep the code size down by just going one block at
+	// a time, again taking advantage of hardware loop unrolling.  Since
+	// there are enough key powers available for all remaining data, we do
+	// the GHASH multiplications unreduced, and only reduce at the very end.
+
+	.set	HI,		TMP2
+	.set	H_POW,		AESDATA0
+	.set	H_POW_XORED,	AESDATA1
+	.set	ONE,		AESDATA2
+
+	movq		.Lone(%rip), ONE
+
+	// Start collecting the unreduced GHASH intermediate value LO, MI, HI.
+	pxor		LO, LO
+	pxor		MI, MI
+	pxor		HI, HI
+
+	// Set up a block counter %rax to contain 8*(8-n), where n is the number
+	// of blocks that remain, counting any partial block.  This will be used
+	// to access the key powers H^n through H^1.
+	mov		DATALEN, %eax
+	neg		%eax
+	and		$~15, %eax
+	sar		$1, %eax
+	add		$64, %eax
+
+	sub		$16, DATALEN
+	jl		.Lcrypt_loop_1x_done\@
+
+	// Process the data one full block at a time.
+.Lcrypt_loop_1x\@:
+
+	// Encrypt the next counter block.
+	_vpshufb	BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, TMP0
+	paddd		ONE, LE_CTR
+	pxor		(KEY), TMP0
+	lea		-6*16(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), %rsi	// Reduce code size
+	cmp		$24, AESKEYLEN
+	jl		128f	// AES-128?
+	je		192f	// AES-192?
+	// AES-256
+	aesenc		-7*16(%rsi), TMP0
+	aesenc		-6*16(%rsi), TMP0
+192:
+	aesenc		-5*16(%rsi), TMP0
+	aesenc		-4*16(%rsi), TMP0
+128:
+.irp i, -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,4,5
+	aesenc		\i*16(%rsi), TMP0
+.endr
+	aesenclast	(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), TMP0
+
+	// Load the next key power H^i.
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS(KEY,%rax,2), H_POW
+	movq		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS_XORED(KEY,%rax), H_POW_XORED
+
+	// XOR the keystream block that was just generated in TMP0 with the next
+	// source data block and store the resulting en/decrypted data to DST.
+.if \enc
+	_xor_mem_to_reg	(SRC), TMP0, tmp=TMP1
+	movdqu		TMP0, (DST)
+.else
+	movdqu		(SRC), TMP1
+	pxor		TMP1, TMP0
+	movdqu		TMP0, (DST)
+.endif
+
+	// Update GHASH with the ciphertext block.
+.if \enc
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, TMP0
+	pxor		TMP0, GHASH_ACC
+.else
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, TMP1
+	pxor		TMP1, GHASH_ACC
+.endif
+	_ghash_mul_noreduce	H_POW, H_POW_XORED, GHASH_ACC, LO, MI, HI, TMP0
+	pxor		GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC
+
+	add		$8, %eax
+	add		$16, SRC
+	add		$16, DST
+	sub		$16, DATALEN
+	jge		.Lcrypt_loop_1x\@
+.Lcrypt_loop_1x_done\@:
+	// Check whether there is a partial block at the end.
+	add		$16, DATALEN
+	jz		.Lghash_reduce\@
+
+	// Process a partial block of length 1 <= DATALEN <= 15.
+
+	// Encrypt a counter block for the last time.
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR
+	pxor		(KEY), LE_CTR
+	lea		16(KEY), %rsi
+1:
+	aesenc		(%rsi), LE_CTR
+	add		$16, %rsi
+	cmp		%rsi, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	jne		1b
+	aesenclast	(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), LE_CTR
+
+	// Load the lowest key power, H^1.
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS(KEY,%rax,2), H_POW
+	movq		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS_XORED(KEY,%rax), H_POW_XORED
+
+	// Load and zero-pad 1 <= DATALEN <= 15 bytes of data from SRC.  SRC is
+	// in %rcx, but _load_partial_block needs DATALEN in %rcx instead.
+	// RNDKEYLAST_PTR is no longer needed, so reuse it for SRC.
+	mov		SRC, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	mov		DATALEN, %ecx
+	_load_partial_block	RNDKEYLAST_PTR, TMP0, %rsi, %esi
+
+	// XOR the keystream block that was just generated in LE_CTR with the
+	// source data block and store the resulting en/decrypted data to DST.
+	pxor		TMP0, LE_CTR
+	mov		DATALEN, %ecx
+	_store_partial_block	LE_CTR, DST
+
+	// If encrypting, zero-pad the final ciphertext block for GHASH.  (If
+	// decrypting, this was already done by _load_partial_block.)
+.if \enc
+	lea		.Lzeropad_mask+16(%rip), %rax
+	sub		DATALEN64, %rax
+	_vpand		(%rax), LE_CTR, TMP0
+.endif
+
+	// Update GHASH with the final ciphertext block.
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, TMP0
+	pxor		TMP0, GHASH_ACC
+	_ghash_mul_noreduce	H_POW, H_POW_XORED, GHASH_ACC, LO, MI, HI, TMP0
+
+.Lghash_reduce\@:
+	// Finally, do the GHASH reduction.
+	_ghash_reduce	LO, MI, HI, GHASH_ACC, TMP0
+
+.Ldone\@:
+	// Store the updated GHASH accumulator back to memory.
+	movdqu		GHASH_ACC, (GHASH_ACC_PTR)
+
+	RET
+.endm
+
+// void aes_gcm_enc_final_##suffix(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+//				   const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+//				   u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen);
+// bool aes_gcm_dec_final_##suffix(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+//				   const u32 le_ctr[4], const u8 ghash_acc[16],
+//				   u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen,
+//				   const u8 tag[16], int taglen);
+//
+// This macro generates one of the above two functions (with \enc selecting
+// which one).  Both functions finish computing the GCM authentication tag by
+// updating GHASH with the lengths block and encrypting the GHASH accumulator.
+// |total_aadlen| and |total_datalen| must be the total length of the additional
+// authenticated data and the en/decrypted data in bytes, respectively.
+//
+// The encryption function then stores the full-length (16-byte) computed
+// authentication tag to |ghash_acc|.  The decryption function instead loads the
+// expected authentication tag (the one that was transmitted) from the 16-byte
+// buffer |tag|, compares the first 4 <= |taglen| <= 16 bytes of it to the
+// computed tag in constant time, and returns true if and only if they match.
+.macro	_aes_gcm_final	enc
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+	.set	LE_CTR_PTR,	%rsi
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_PTR,	%rdx
+	.set	TOTAL_AADLEN,	%rcx
+	.set	TOTAL_DATALEN,	%r8
+	.set	TAG,		%r9
+	.set	TAGLEN,		%r10d	// Originally at 8(%rsp)
+	.set	TAGLEN64,	%r10
+
+	// Additional local variables.
+	// %rax and %xmm0-%xmm2 are used as temporary registers.
+	.set	AESKEYLEN,	%r11d
+	.set	AESKEYLEN64,	%r11
+	.set	BSWAP_MASK,	%xmm3
+	.set	GHASH_ACC,	%xmm4
+	.set	H_POW1,		%xmm5	// H^1
+	.set	H_POW1_X64,	%xmm6	// H^1 * x^64
+	.set	GFPOLY,		%xmm7
+
+	movdqa		.Lbswap_mask(%rip), BSWAP_MASK
+	movl		OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN(KEY), AESKEYLEN
+
+	// Set up a counter block with 1 in the low 32-bit word.  This is the
+	// counter that produces the ciphertext needed to encrypt the auth tag.
+	movdqu		(LE_CTR_PTR), %xmm0
+	mov		$1, %eax
+	pinsrd		$0, %eax, %xmm0
+
+	// Build the lengths block and XOR it into the GHASH accumulator.
+	movq		TOTAL_DATALEN, GHASH_ACC
+	pinsrq		$1, TOTAL_AADLEN, GHASH_ACC
+	psllq		$3, GHASH_ACC	// Bytes to bits
+	_xor_mem_to_reg	(GHASH_ACC_PTR), GHASH_ACC, %xmm1
+
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_POWERS+7*16(KEY), H_POW1
+	movdqa		OFFSETOF_H_TIMES_X64(KEY), H_POW1_X64
+	movq		.Lgfpoly(%rip), GFPOLY
+
+	// Make %rax point to the 6th from last AES round key.  (Using signed
+	// byte offsets -7*16 through 6*16 decreases code size.)
+	lea		(KEY,AESKEYLEN64,4), %rax
+
+	// AES-encrypt the counter block and also multiply GHASH_ACC by H^1.
+	// Interleave the AES and GHASH instructions to improve performance.
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, %xmm0
+	pxor		(KEY), %xmm0
+	cmp		$24, AESKEYLEN
+	jl		128f	// AES-128?
+	je		192f	// AES-192?
+	// AES-256
+	aesenc		-7*16(%rax), %xmm0
+	aesenc		-6*16(%rax), %xmm0
+192:
+	aesenc		-5*16(%rax), %xmm0
+	aesenc		-4*16(%rax), %xmm0
+128:
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8
+	aesenc		(\i-3)*16(%rax), %xmm0
+	_ghash_mul_step	\i, H_POW1, H_POW1_X64, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, %xmm1, %xmm2
+.endr
+	aesenclast	6*16(%rax), %xmm0
+	_ghash_mul_step	9, H_POW1, H_POW1_X64, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, %xmm1, %xmm2
+
+	// Undo the byte reflection of the GHASH accumulator.
+	pshufb		BSWAP_MASK, GHASH_ACC
+
+	// Encrypt the GHASH accumulator.
+	pxor		%xmm0, GHASH_ACC
+
+.if \enc
+	// Return the computed auth tag.
+	movdqu		GHASH_ACC, (GHASH_ACC_PTR)
+.else
+	.set		ZEROPAD_MASK_PTR, TOTAL_AADLEN // Reusing TOTAL_AADLEN!
+
+	// Verify the auth tag in constant time by XOR'ing the transmitted and
+	// computed auth tags together and using the ptest instruction to check
+	// whether the first TAGLEN bytes of the result are zero.
+	_xor_mem_to_reg	(TAG), GHASH_ACC, tmp=%xmm0
+	movl		8(%rsp), TAGLEN
+	lea		.Lzeropad_mask+16(%rip), ZEROPAD_MASK_PTR
+	sub		TAGLEN64, ZEROPAD_MASK_PTR
+	xor		%eax, %eax
+	_test_mem	(ZEROPAD_MASK_PTR), GHASH_ACC, tmp=%xmm0
+	sete		%al
+.endif
+	RET
+.endm
+
+.set	USE_AVX, 0
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_precompute_aesni)
+	_aes_gcm_precompute
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_precompute_aesni)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni)
+	_aes_gcm_aad_update
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni)
+	_aes_gcm_update	1
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni)
+	_aes_gcm_update	0
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni)
+	_aes_gcm_final	1
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni)
+	_aes_gcm_final	0
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni)
+
+.set	USE_AVX, 1
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_precompute_aesni_avx)
+	_aes_gcm_precompute
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_precompute_aesni_avx)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni_avx)
+	_aes_gcm_aad_update
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni_avx)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni_avx)
+	_aes_gcm_update	1
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni_avx)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni_avx)
+	_aes_gcm_update	0
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni_avx)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni_avx)
+	_aes_gcm_final	1
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni_avx)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni_avx)
+	_aes_gcm_final	0
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni_avx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-gcm-avx10-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-gcm-avx10-x86_64.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..97e0ee515fc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-gcm-avx10-x86_64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1222 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */
+//
+// VAES and VPCLMULQDQ optimized AES-GCM for x86_64
+//
+// Copyright 2024 Google LLC
+//
+// Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+//
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// This file is dual-licensed, meaning that you can use it under your choice of
+// either of the following two licenses:
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may obtain a copy
+// of the License at
+//
+//	http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+// or
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+//    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+//    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+//    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+// AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+// IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+// ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+// LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+// CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+// SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+// CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+// ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+// POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+//
+//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// This file implements AES-GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) for x86_64 CPUs that
+// support VAES (vector AES), VPCLMULQDQ (vector carryless multiplication), and
+// either AVX512 or AVX10.  Some of the functions, notably the encryption and
+// decryption update functions which are the most performance-critical, are
+// provided in two variants generated from a macro: one using 256-bit vectors
+// (suffix: vaes_avx10_256) and one using 512-bit vectors (vaes_avx10_512).  The
+// other, "shared" functions (vaes_avx10) use at most 256-bit vectors.
+//
+// The functions that use 512-bit vectors are intended for CPUs that support
+// 512-bit vectors *and* where using them doesn't cause significant
+// downclocking.  They require the following CPU features:
+//
+//	VAES && VPCLMULQDQ && BMI2 && ((AVX512BW && AVX512VL) || AVX10/512)
+//
+// The other functions require the following CPU features:
+//
+//	VAES && VPCLMULQDQ && BMI2 && ((AVX512BW && AVX512VL) || AVX10/256)
+//
+// All functions use the "System V" ABI.  The Windows ABI is not supported.
+//
+// Note that we use "avx10" in the names of the functions as a shorthand to
+// really mean "AVX10 or a certain set of AVX512 features".  Due to Intel's
+// introduction of AVX512 and then its replacement by AVX10, there doesn't seem
+// to be a simple way to name things that makes sense on all CPUs.
+//
+// Note that the macros that support both 256-bit and 512-bit vectors could
+// fairly easily be changed to support 128-bit too.  However, this would *not*
+// be sufficient to allow the code to run on CPUs without AVX512 or AVX10,
+// because the code heavily uses several features of these extensions other than
+// the vector length: the increase in the number of SIMD registers from 16 to
+// 32, masking support, and new instructions such as vpternlogd (which can do a
+// three-argument XOR).  These features are very useful for AES-GCM.
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+
+.section .rodata
+.p2align 6
+
+	// A shuffle mask that reflects the bytes of 16-byte blocks
+.Lbswap_mask:
+	.octa   0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
+
+	// This is the GHASH reducing polynomial without its constant term, i.e.
+	// x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x, represented using the backwards mapping
+	// between bits and polynomial coefficients.
+	//
+	// Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the naturally-ordered
+	// representation of the polynomial x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1, i.e. the
+	// "reversed" GHASH reducing polynomial without its x^128 term.
+.Lgfpoly:
+	.octa	0xc2000000000000000000000000000001
+
+	// Same as above, but with the (1 << 64) bit set.
+.Lgfpoly_and_internal_carrybit:
+	.octa	0xc2000000000000010000000000000001
+
+	// The below constants are used for incrementing the counter blocks.
+	// ctr_pattern points to the four 128-bit values [0, 1, 2, 3].
+	// inc_2blocks and inc_4blocks point to the single 128-bit values 2 and
+	// 4.  Note that the same '2' is reused in ctr_pattern and inc_2blocks.
+.Lctr_pattern:
+	.octa	0
+	.octa	1
+.Linc_2blocks:
+	.octa	2
+	.octa	3
+.Linc_4blocks:
+	.octa	4
+
+// Number of powers of the hash key stored in the key struct.  The powers are
+// stored from highest (H^NUM_H_POWERS) to lowest (H^1).
+#define NUM_H_POWERS		16
+
+// Offset to AES key length (in bytes) in the key struct
+#define OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN	480
+
+// Offset to start of hash key powers array in the key struct
+#define OFFSETOF_H_POWERS	512
+
+// Offset to end of hash key powers array in the key struct.
+//
+// This is immediately followed by three zeroized padding blocks, which are
+// included so that partial vectors can be handled more easily.  E.g. if VL=64
+// and two blocks remain, we load the 4 values [H^2, H^1, 0, 0].  The most
+// padding blocks needed is 3, which occurs if [H^1, 0, 0, 0] is loaded.
+#define OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS	(OFFSETOF_H_POWERS + (NUM_H_POWERS * 16))
+
+.text
+
+// Set the vector length in bytes.  This sets the VL variable and defines
+// register aliases V0-V31 that map to the ymm or zmm registers.
+.macro	_set_veclen	vl
+	.set	VL,	\vl
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, \
+	16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31
+.if VL == 32
+	.set	V\i,	%ymm\i
+.elseif VL == 64
+	.set	V\i,	%zmm\i
+.else
+	.error "Unsupported vector length"
+.endif
+.endr
+.endm
+
+// The _ghash_mul_step macro does one step of GHASH multiplication of the
+// 128-bit lanes of \a by the corresponding 128-bit lanes of \b and storing the
+// reduced products in \dst.  \t0, \t1, and \t2 are temporary registers of the
+// same size as \a and \b.  To complete all steps, this must invoked with \i=0
+// through \i=9.  The division into steps allows users of this macro to
+// optionally interleave the computation with other instructions.  Users of this
+// macro must preserve the parameter registers across steps.
+//
+// The multiplications are done in GHASH's representation of the finite field
+// GF(2^128).  Elements of GF(2^128) are represented as binary polynomials
+// (i.e. polynomials whose coefficients are bits) modulo a reducing polynomial
+// G.  The GCM specification uses G = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1.  Addition is
+// just XOR, while multiplication is more complex and has two parts: (a) do
+// carryless multiplication of two 128-bit input polynomials to get a 256-bit
+// intermediate product polynomial, and (b) reduce the intermediate product to
+// 128 bits by adding multiples of G that cancel out terms in it.  (Adding
+// multiples of G doesn't change which field element the polynomial represents.)
+//
+// Unfortunately, the GCM specification maps bits to/from polynomial
+// coefficients backwards from the natural order.  In each byte it specifies the
+// highest bit to be the lowest order polynomial coefficient, *not* the highest!
+// This makes it nontrivial to work with the GHASH polynomials.  We could
+// reflect the bits, but x86 doesn't have an instruction that does that.
+//
+// Instead, we operate on the values without bit-reflecting them.  This *mostly*
+// just works, since XOR and carryless multiplication are symmetric with respect
+// to bit order, but it has some consequences.  First, due to GHASH's byte
+// order, by skipping bit reflection, *byte* reflection becomes necessary to
+// give the polynomial terms a consistent order.  E.g., considering an N-bit
+// value interpreted using the G = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 convention, bits 0
+// through N-1 of the byte-reflected value represent the coefficients of x^(N-1)
+// through x^0, whereas bits 0 through N-1 of the non-byte-reflected value
+// represent x^7...x^0, x^15...x^8, ..., x^(N-1)...x^(N-8) which can't be worked
+// with.  Fortunately, x86's vpshufb instruction can do byte reflection.
+//
+// Second, forgoing the bit reflection causes an extra multiple of x (still
+// using the G = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 convention) to be introduced by each
+// multiplication.  This is because an M-bit by N-bit carryless multiplication
+// really produces a (M+N-1)-bit product, but in practice it's zero-extended to
+// M+N bits.  In the G = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 convention, which maps bits
+// to polynomial coefficients backwards, this zero-extension actually changes
+// the product by introducing an extra factor of x.  Therefore, users of this
+// macro must ensure that one of the inputs has an extra factor of x^-1, i.e.
+// the multiplicative inverse of x, to cancel out the extra x.
+//
+// Third, the backwards coefficients convention is just confusing to work with,
+// since it makes "low" and "high" in the polynomial math mean the opposite of
+// their normal meaning in computer programming.  This can be solved by using an
+// alternative interpretation: the polynomial coefficients are understood to be
+// in the natural order, and the multiplication is actually \a * \b * x^-128 mod
+// x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1.  This doesn't change the inputs, outputs,
+// or the implementation at all; it just changes the mathematical interpretation
+// of what each instruction is doing.  Starting from here, we'll use this
+// alternative interpretation, as it's easier to understand the code that way.
+//
+// Moving onto the implementation, the vpclmulqdq instruction does 64 x 64 =>
+// 128-bit carryless multiplication, so we break the 128 x 128 multiplication
+// into parts as follows (the _L and _H suffixes denote low and high 64 bits):
+//
+//     LO = a_L * b_L
+//     MI = (a_L * b_H) + (a_H * b_L)
+//     HI = a_H * b_H
+//
+// The 256-bit product is x^128*HI + x^64*MI + LO.  LO, MI, and HI are 128-bit.
+// Note that MI "overlaps" with LO and HI.  We don't consolidate MI into LO and
+// HI right away, since the way the reduction works makes that unnecessary.
+//
+// For the reduction, we cancel out the low 128 bits by adding multiples of G =
+// x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1.  This is done by two iterations, each of
+// which cancels out the next lowest 64 bits.  Consider a value x^64*A + B,
+// where A and B are 128-bit.  Adding B_L*G to that value gives:
+//
+//       x^64*A + B + B_L*G
+//     = x^64*A + x^64*B_H + B_L + B_L*(x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1)
+//     = x^64*A + x^64*B_H + B_L + x^128*B_L + x^64*B_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57) + B_L
+//     = x^64*A + x^64*B_H + x^128*B_L + x^64*B_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57) + B_L + B_L
+//     = x^64*(A + B_H + x^64*B_L + B_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57))
+//
+// So: if we sum A, B with its halves swapped, and the low half of B times x^63
+// + x^62 + x^57, we get a 128-bit value C where x^64*C is congruent to the
+// original value x^64*A + B.  I.e., the low 64 bits got canceled out.
+//
+// We just need to apply this twice: first to fold LO into MI, and second to
+// fold the updated MI into HI.
+//
+// The needed three-argument XORs are done using the vpternlogd instruction with
+// immediate 0x96, since this is faster than two vpxord instructions.
+//
+// A potential optimization, assuming that b is fixed per-key (if a is fixed
+// per-key it would work the other way around), is to use one iteration of the
+// reduction described above to precompute a value c such that x^64*c = b mod G,
+// and then multiply a_L by c (and implicitly by x^64) instead of by b:
+//
+//     MI = (a_L * c_L) + (a_H * b_L)
+//     HI = (a_L * c_H) + (a_H * b_H)
+//
+// This would eliminate the LO part of the intermediate product, which would
+// eliminate the need to fold LO into MI.  This would save two instructions,
+// including a vpclmulqdq.  However, we currently don't use this optimization
+// because it would require twice as many per-key precomputed values.
+//
+// Using Karatsuba multiplication instead of "schoolbook" multiplication
+// similarly would save a vpclmulqdq but does not seem to be worth it.
+.macro	_ghash_mul_step	i, a, b, dst, gfpoly, t0, t1, t2
+.if \i == 0
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x00, \a, \b, \t0	  // LO = a_L * b_L
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \a, \b, \t1	  // MI_0 = a_L * b_H
+.elseif \i == 1
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x10, \a, \b, \t2	  // MI_1 = a_H * b_L
+.elseif \i == 2
+	vpxord		\t2, \t1, \t1		  // MI = MI_0 + MI_1
+.elseif \i == 3
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \t0, \gfpoly, \t2  // LO_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57)
+.elseif \i == 4
+	vpshufd		$0x4e, \t0, \t0		  // Swap halves of LO
+.elseif \i == 5
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, \t2, \t0, \t1	  // Fold LO into MI
+.elseif \i == 6
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x11, \a, \b, \dst	  // HI = a_H * b_H
+.elseif \i == 7
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \t1, \gfpoly, \t0  // MI_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57)
+.elseif \i == 8
+	vpshufd		$0x4e, \t1, \t1		  // Swap halves of MI
+.elseif \i == 9
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, \t0, \t1, \dst	  // Fold MI into HI
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// GHASH-multiply the 128-bit lanes of \a by the 128-bit lanes of \b and store
+// the reduced products in \dst.  See _ghash_mul_step for full explanation.
+.macro	_ghash_mul	a, b, dst, gfpoly, t0, t1, t2
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
+	_ghash_mul_step	\i, \a, \b, \dst, \gfpoly, \t0, \t1, \t2
+.endr
+.endm
+
+// GHASH-multiply the 128-bit lanes of \a by the 128-bit lanes of \b and add the
+// *unreduced* products to \lo, \mi, and \hi.
+.macro	_ghash_mul_noreduce	a, b, lo, mi, hi, t0, t1, t2, t3
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x00, \a, \b, \t0	// a_L * b_L
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \a, \b, \t1	// a_L * b_H
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x10, \a, \b, \t2	// a_H * b_L
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x11, \a, \b, \t3	// a_H * b_H
+	vpxord		\t0, \lo, \lo
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, \t2, \t1, \mi
+	vpxord		\t3, \hi, \hi
+.endm
+
+// Reduce the unreduced products from \lo, \mi, and \hi and store the 128-bit
+// reduced products in \hi.  See _ghash_mul_step for explanation of reduction.
+.macro	_ghash_reduce	lo, mi, hi, gfpoly, t0
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \lo, \gfpoly, \t0
+	vpshufd		$0x4e, \lo, \lo
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, \t0, \lo, \mi
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \mi, \gfpoly, \t0
+	vpshufd		$0x4e, \mi, \mi
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, \t0, \mi, \hi
+.endm
+
+// void aes_gcm_precompute_##suffix(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key);
+//
+// Given the expanded AES key |key->aes_key|, this function derives the GHASH
+// subkey and initializes |key->ghash_key_powers| with powers of it.
+//
+// The number of key powers initialized is NUM_H_POWERS, and they are stored in
+// the order H^NUM_H_POWERS to H^1.  The zeroized padding blocks after the key
+// powers themselves are also initialized.
+//
+// This macro supports both VL=32 and VL=64.  _set_veclen must have been invoked
+// with the desired length.  In the VL=32 case, the function computes twice as
+// many key powers than are actually used by the VL=32 GCM update functions.
+// This is done to keep the key format the same regardless of vector length.
+.macro	_aes_gcm_precompute
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+
+	// Additional local variables.  V0-V2 and %rax are used as temporaries.
+	.set	POWERS_PTR,	%rsi
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST_PTR,	%rdx
+	.set	H_CUR,		V3
+	.set	H_CUR_YMM,	%ymm3
+	.set	H_CUR_XMM,	%xmm3
+	.set	H_INC,		V4
+	.set	H_INC_YMM,	%ymm4
+	.set	H_INC_XMM,	%xmm4
+	.set	GFPOLY,		V5
+	.set	GFPOLY_YMM,	%ymm5
+	.set	GFPOLY_XMM,	%xmm5
+
+	// Get pointer to lowest set of key powers (located at end of array).
+	lea		OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS-VL(KEY), POWERS_PTR
+
+	// Encrypt an all-zeroes block to get the raw hash subkey.
+	movl		OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN(KEY), %eax
+	lea		6*16(KEY,%rax,4), RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	vmovdqu		(KEY), %xmm0  // Zero-th round key XOR all-zeroes block
+	add		$16, KEY
+1:
+	vaesenc		(KEY), %xmm0, %xmm0
+	add		$16, KEY
+	cmp		KEY, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	jne		1b
+	vaesenclast	(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), %xmm0, %xmm0
+
+	// Reflect the bytes of the raw hash subkey.
+	vpshufb		.Lbswap_mask(%rip), %xmm0, H_CUR_XMM
+
+	// Zeroize the padding blocks.
+	vpxor		%xmm0, %xmm0, %xmm0
+	vmovdqu		%ymm0, VL(POWERS_PTR)
+	vmovdqu		%xmm0, VL+2*16(POWERS_PTR)
+
+	// Finish preprocessing the first key power, H^1.  Since this GHASH
+	// implementation operates directly on values with the backwards bit
+	// order specified by the GCM standard, it's necessary to preprocess the
+	// raw key as follows.  First, reflect its bytes.  Second, multiply it
+	// by x^-1 mod x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 (if using the backwards
+	// interpretation of polynomial coefficients), which can also be
+	// interpreted as multiplication by x mod x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121
+	// + 1 using the alternative, natural interpretation of polynomial
+	// coefficients.  For details, see the comment above _ghash_mul_step.
+	//
+	// Either way, for the multiplication the concrete operation performed
+	// is a left shift of the 128-bit value by 1 bit, then an XOR with (0xc2
+	// << 120) | 1 if a 1 bit was carried out.  However, there's no 128-bit
+	// wide shift instruction, so instead double each of the two 64-bit
+	// halves and incorporate the internal carry bit into the value XOR'd.
+	vpshufd		$0xd3, H_CUR_XMM, %xmm0
+	vpsrad		$31, %xmm0, %xmm0
+	vpaddq		H_CUR_XMM, H_CUR_XMM, H_CUR_XMM
+	vpand		.Lgfpoly_and_internal_carrybit(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm0
+	vpxor		%xmm0, H_CUR_XMM, H_CUR_XMM
+
+	// Load the gfpoly constant.
+	vbroadcasti32x4	.Lgfpoly(%rip), GFPOLY
+
+	// Square H^1 to get H^2.
+	//
+	// Note that as with H^1, all higher key powers also need an extra
+	// factor of x^-1 (or x using the natural interpretation).  Nothing
+	// special needs to be done to make this happen, though: H^1 * H^1 would
+	// end up with two factors of x^-1, but the multiplication consumes one.
+	// So the product H^2 ends up with the desired one factor of x^-1.
+	_ghash_mul	H_CUR_XMM, H_CUR_XMM, H_INC_XMM, GFPOLY_XMM, \
+			%xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2
+
+	// Create H_CUR_YMM = [H^2, H^1] and H_INC_YMM = [H^2, H^2].
+	vinserti128	$1, H_CUR_XMM, H_INC_YMM, H_CUR_YMM
+	vinserti128	$1, H_INC_XMM, H_INC_YMM, H_INC_YMM
+
+.if VL == 64
+	// Create H_CUR = [H^4, H^3, H^2, H^1] and H_INC = [H^4, H^4, H^4, H^4].
+	_ghash_mul	H_INC_YMM, H_CUR_YMM, H_INC_YMM, GFPOLY_YMM, \
+			%ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm2
+	vinserti64x4	$1, H_CUR_YMM, H_INC, H_CUR
+	vshufi64x2	$0, H_INC, H_INC, H_INC
+.endif
+
+	// Store the lowest set of key powers.
+	vmovdqu8	H_CUR, (POWERS_PTR)
+
+	// Compute and store the remaining key powers.  With VL=32, repeatedly
+	// multiply [H^(i+1), H^i] by [H^2, H^2] to get [H^(i+3), H^(i+2)].
+	// With VL=64, repeatedly multiply [H^(i+3), H^(i+2), H^(i+1), H^i] by
+	// [H^4, H^4, H^4, H^4] to get [H^(i+7), H^(i+6), H^(i+5), H^(i+4)].
+	mov		$(NUM_H_POWERS*16/VL) - 1, %eax
+.Lprecompute_next\@:
+	sub		$VL, POWERS_PTR
+	_ghash_mul	H_INC, H_CUR, H_CUR, GFPOLY, V0, V1, V2
+	vmovdqu8	H_CUR, (POWERS_PTR)
+	dec		%eax
+	jnz		.Lprecompute_next\@
+
+	vzeroupper	// This is needed after using ymm or zmm registers.
+	RET
+.endm
+
+// XOR together the 128-bit lanes of \src (whose low lane is \src_xmm) and store
+// the result in \dst_xmm.  This implicitly zeroizes the other lanes of dst.
+.macro	_horizontal_xor	src, src_xmm, dst_xmm, t0_xmm, t1_xmm, t2_xmm
+	vextracti32x4	$1, \src, \t0_xmm
+.if VL == 32
+	vpxord		\t0_xmm, \src_xmm, \dst_xmm
+.elseif VL == 64
+	vextracti32x4	$2, \src, \t1_xmm
+	vextracti32x4	$3, \src, \t2_xmm
+	vpxord		\t0_xmm, \src_xmm, \dst_xmm
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, \t1_xmm, \t2_xmm, \dst_xmm
+.else
+	.error "Unsupported vector length"
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// Do one step of the GHASH update of the data blocks given in the vector
+// registers GHASHDATA[0-3].  \i specifies the step to do, 0 through 9.  The
+// division into steps allows users of this macro to optionally interleave the
+// computation with other instructions.  This macro uses the vector register
+// GHASH_ACC as input/output; GHASHDATA[0-3] as inputs that are clobbered;
+// H_POW[4-1], GFPOLY, and BSWAP_MASK as inputs that aren't clobbered; and
+// GHASHTMP[0-2] as temporaries.  This macro handles the byte-reflection of the
+// data blocks.  The parameter registers must be preserved across steps.
+//
+// The GHASH update does: GHASH_ACC = H_POW4*(GHASHDATA0 + GHASH_ACC) +
+// H_POW3*GHASHDATA1 + H_POW2*GHASHDATA2 + H_POW1*GHASHDATA3, where the
+// operations are vectorized operations on vectors of 16-byte blocks.  E.g.,
+// with VL=32 there are 2 blocks per vector and the vectorized terms correspond
+// to the following non-vectorized terms:
+//
+//	H_POW4*(GHASHDATA0 + GHASH_ACC) => H^8*(blk0 + GHASH_ACC_XMM) and H^7*(blk1 + 0)
+//	H_POW3*GHASHDATA1 => H^6*blk2 and H^5*blk3
+//	H_POW2*GHASHDATA2 => H^4*blk4 and H^3*blk5
+//	H_POW1*GHASHDATA3 => H^2*blk6 and H^1*blk7
+//
+// With VL=64, we use 4 blocks/vector, H^16 through H^1, and blk0 through blk15.
+//
+// More concretely, this code does:
+//   - Do vectorized "schoolbook" multiplications to compute the intermediate
+//     256-bit product of each block and its corresponding hash key power.
+//     There are 4*VL/16 of these intermediate products.
+//   - Sum (XOR) the intermediate 256-bit products across vectors.  This leaves
+//     VL/16 256-bit intermediate values.
+//   - Do a vectorized reduction of these 256-bit intermediate values to
+//     128-bits each.  This leaves VL/16 128-bit intermediate values.
+//   - Sum (XOR) these values and store the 128-bit result in GHASH_ACC_XMM.
+//
+// See _ghash_mul_step for the full explanation of the operations performed for
+// each individual finite field multiplication and reduction.
+.macro	_ghash_step_4x	i
+.if \i == 0
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, GHASHDATA0, GHASHDATA0
+	vpxord		GHASH_ACC, GHASHDATA0, GHASHDATA0
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, GHASHDATA1, GHASHDATA1
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, GHASHDATA2, GHASHDATA2
+.elseif \i == 1
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, GHASHDATA3, GHASHDATA3
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x00, H_POW4, GHASHDATA0, GHASH_ACC	// LO_0
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x00, H_POW3, GHASHDATA1, GHASHTMP0	// LO_1
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x00, H_POW2, GHASHDATA2, GHASHTMP1	// LO_2
+.elseif \i == 2
+	vpxord		GHASHTMP0, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC		// sum(LO_{1,0})
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x00, H_POW1, GHASHDATA3, GHASHTMP2	// LO_3
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, GHASHTMP2, GHASHTMP1, GHASH_ACC	// LO = sum(LO_{3,2,1,0})
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, H_POW4, GHASHDATA0, GHASHTMP0	// MI_0
+.elseif \i == 3
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, H_POW3, GHASHDATA1, GHASHTMP1	// MI_1
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, H_POW2, GHASHDATA2, GHASHTMP2	// MI_2
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, GHASHTMP2, GHASHTMP1, GHASHTMP0	// sum(MI_{2,1,0})
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, H_POW1, GHASHDATA3, GHASHTMP1	// MI_3
+.elseif \i == 4
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x10, H_POW4, GHASHDATA0, GHASHTMP2	// MI_4
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, GHASHTMP2, GHASHTMP1, GHASHTMP0	// sum(MI_{4,3,2,1,0})
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x10, H_POW3, GHASHDATA1, GHASHTMP1	// MI_5
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x10, H_POW2, GHASHDATA2, GHASHTMP2	// MI_6
+.elseif \i == 5
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, GHASHTMP2, GHASHTMP1, GHASHTMP0	// sum(MI_{6,5,4,3,2,1,0})
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, GHASHTMP2	// LO_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57)
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x10, H_POW1, GHASHDATA3, GHASHTMP1	// MI_7
+	vpxord		GHASHTMP1, GHASHTMP0, GHASHTMP0		// MI = sum(MI_{7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0})
+.elseif \i == 6
+	vpshufd		$0x4e, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC		// Swap halves of LO
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x11, H_POW4, GHASHDATA0, GHASHDATA0	// HI_0
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x11, H_POW3, GHASHDATA1, GHASHDATA1	// HI_1
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x11, H_POW2, GHASHDATA2, GHASHDATA2	// HI_2
+.elseif \i == 7
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, GHASHTMP2, GHASH_ACC, GHASHTMP0	// Fold LO into MI
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x11, H_POW1, GHASHDATA3, GHASHDATA3	// HI_3
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, GHASHDATA2, GHASHDATA1, GHASHDATA0 // sum(HI_{2,1,0})
+	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, GHASHTMP0, GFPOLY, GHASHTMP1	// MI_L*(x^63 + x^62 + x^57)
+.elseif \i == 8
+	vpxord		GHASHDATA3, GHASHDATA0, GHASH_ACC	// HI = sum(HI_{3,2,1,0})
+	vpshufd		$0x4e, GHASHTMP0, GHASHTMP0		// Swap halves of MI
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, GHASHTMP1, GHASHTMP0, GHASH_ACC	// Fold MI into HI
+.elseif \i == 9
+	_horizontal_xor	GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC_XMM, GHASH_ACC_XMM, \
+			GHASHDATA0_XMM, GHASHDATA1_XMM, GHASHDATA2_XMM
+.endif
+.endm
+
+// Do one non-last round of AES encryption on the counter blocks in V0-V3 using
+// the round key that has been broadcast to all 128-bit lanes of \round_key.
+.macro	_vaesenc_4x	round_key
+	vaesenc		\round_key, V0, V0
+	vaesenc		\round_key, V1, V1
+	vaesenc		\round_key, V2, V2
+	vaesenc		\round_key, V3, V3
+.endm
+
+// Start the AES encryption of four vectors of counter blocks.
+.macro	_ctr_begin_4x
+
+	// Increment LE_CTR four times to generate four vectors of little-endian
+	// counter blocks, swap each to big-endian, and store them in V0-V3.
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, V0
+	vpaddd		LE_CTR_INC, LE_CTR, LE_CTR
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, V1
+	vpaddd		LE_CTR_INC, LE_CTR, LE_CTR
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, V2
+	vpaddd		LE_CTR_INC, LE_CTR, LE_CTR
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, V3
+	vpaddd		LE_CTR_INC, LE_CTR, LE_CTR
+
+	// AES "round zero": XOR in the zero-th round key.
+	vpxord		RNDKEY0, V0, V0
+	vpxord		RNDKEY0, V1, V1
+	vpxord		RNDKEY0, V2, V2
+	vpxord		RNDKEY0, V3, V3
+.endm
+
+// void aes_gcm_{enc,dec}_update_##suffix(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+//					  const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+//					  const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+//
+// This macro generates a GCM encryption or decryption update function with the
+// above prototype (with \enc selecting which one).  This macro supports both
+// VL=32 and VL=64.  _set_veclen must have been invoked with the desired length.
+//
+// This function computes the next portion of the CTR keystream, XOR's it with
+// |datalen| bytes from |src|, and writes the resulting encrypted or decrypted
+// data to |dst|.  It also updates the GHASH accumulator |ghash_acc| using the
+// next |datalen| ciphertext bytes.
+//
+// |datalen| must be a multiple of 16, except on the last call where it can be
+// any length.  The caller must do any buffering needed to ensure this.  Both
+// in-place and out-of-place en/decryption are supported.
+//
+// |le_ctr| must give the current counter in little-endian format.  For a new
+// message, the low word of the counter must be 2.  This function loads the
+// counter from |le_ctr| and increments the loaded counter as needed, but it
+// does *not* store the updated counter back to |le_ctr|.  The caller must
+// update |le_ctr| if any more data segments follow.  Internally, only the low
+// 32-bit word of the counter is incremented, following the GCM standard.
+.macro	_aes_gcm_update	enc
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+	.set	LE_CTR_PTR,	%rsi
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_PTR,	%rdx
+	.set	SRC,		%rcx
+	.set	DST,		%r8
+	.set	DATALEN,	%r9d
+	.set	DATALEN64,	%r9	// Zero-extend DATALEN before using!
+
+	// Additional local variables
+
+	// %rax and %k1 are used as temporary registers.  LE_CTR_PTR is also
+	// available as a temporary register after the counter is loaded.
+
+	// AES key length in bytes
+	.set	AESKEYLEN,	%r10d
+	.set	AESKEYLEN64,	%r10
+
+	// Pointer to the last AES round key for the chosen AES variant
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST_PTR,	%r11
+
+	// In the main loop, V0-V3 are used as AES input and output.  Elsewhere
+	// they are used as temporary registers.
+
+	// GHASHDATA[0-3] hold the ciphertext blocks and GHASH input data.
+	.set	GHASHDATA0,	V4
+	.set	GHASHDATA0_XMM,	%xmm4
+	.set	GHASHDATA1,	V5
+	.set	GHASHDATA1_XMM,	%xmm5
+	.set	GHASHDATA2,	V6
+	.set	GHASHDATA2_XMM,	%xmm6
+	.set	GHASHDATA3,	V7
+
+	// BSWAP_MASK is the shuffle mask for byte-reflecting 128-bit values
+	// using vpshufb, copied to all 128-bit lanes.
+	.set	BSWAP_MASK,	V8
+
+	// RNDKEY temporarily holds the next AES round key.
+	.set	RNDKEY,		V9
+
+	// GHASH_ACC is the accumulator variable for GHASH.  When fully reduced,
+	// only the lowest 128-bit lane can be nonzero.  When not fully reduced,
+	// more than one lane may be used, and they need to be XOR'd together.
+	.set	GHASH_ACC,	V10
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_XMM,	%xmm10
+
+	// LE_CTR_INC is the vector of 32-bit words that need to be added to a
+	// vector of little-endian counter blocks to advance it forwards.
+	.set	LE_CTR_INC,	V11
+
+	// LE_CTR contains the next set of little-endian counter blocks.
+	.set	LE_CTR,		V12
+
+	// RNDKEY0, RNDKEYLAST, and RNDKEY_M[9-5] contain cached AES round keys,
+	// copied to all 128-bit lanes.  RNDKEY0 is the zero-th round key,
+	// RNDKEYLAST the last, and RNDKEY_M\i the one \i-th from the last.
+	.set	RNDKEY0,	V13
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST,	V14
+	.set	RNDKEY_M9,	V15
+	.set	RNDKEY_M8,	V16
+	.set	RNDKEY_M7,	V17
+	.set	RNDKEY_M6,	V18
+	.set	RNDKEY_M5,	V19
+
+	// RNDKEYLAST[0-3] temporarily store the last AES round key XOR'd with
+	// the corresponding block of source data.  This is useful because
+	// vaesenclast(key, a) ^ b == vaesenclast(key ^ b, a), and key ^ b can
+	// be computed in parallel with the AES rounds.
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST0,	V20
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST1,	V21
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST2,	V22
+	.set	RNDKEYLAST3,	V23
+
+	// GHASHTMP[0-2] are temporary variables used by _ghash_step_4x.  These
+	// cannot coincide with anything used for AES encryption, since for
+	// performance reasons GHASH and AES encryption are interleaved.
+	.set	GHASHTMP0,	V24
+	.set	GHASHTMP1,	V25
+	.set	GHASHTMP2,	V26
+
+	// H_POW[4-1] contain the powers of the hash key H^(4*VL/16)...H^1.  The
+	// descending numbering reflects the order of the key powers.
+	.set	H_POW4,		V27
+	.set	H_POW3,		V28
+	.set	H_POW2,		V29
+	.set	H_POW1,		V30
+
+	// GFPOLY contains the .Lgfpoly constant, copied to all 128-bit lanes.
+	.set	GFPOLY,		V31
+
+	// Load some constants.
+	vbroadcasti32x4	.Lbswap_mask(%rip), BSWAP_MASK
+	vbroadcasti32x4	.Lgfpoly(%rip), GFPOLY
+
+	// Load the GHASH accumulator and the starting counter.
+	vmovdqu		(GHASH_ACC_PTR), GHASH_ACC_XMM
+	vbroadcasti32x4	(LE_CTR_PTR), LE_CTR
+
+	// Load the AES key length in bytes.
+	movl		OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN(KEY), AESKEYLEN
+
+	// Make RNDKEYLAST_PTR point to the last AES round key.  This is the
+	// round key with index 10, 12, or 14 for AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256
+	// respectively.  Then load the zero-th and last round keys.
+	lea		6*16(KEY,AESKEYLEN64,4), RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	vbroadcasti32x4	(KEY), RNDKEY0
+	vbroadcasti32x4	(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), RNDKEYLAST
+
+	// Finish initializing LE_CTR by adding [0, 1, ...] to its low words.
+	vpaddd		.Lctr_pattern(%rip), LE_CTR, LE_CTR
+
+	// Initialize LE_CTR_INC to contain VL/16 in all 128-bit lanes.
+.if VL == 32
+	vbroadcasti32x4	.Linc_2blocks(%rip), LE_CTR_INC
+.elseif VL == 64
+	vbroadcasti32x4	.Linc_4blocks(%rip), LE_CTR_INC
+.else
+	.error "Unsupported vector length"
+.endif
+
+	// If there are at least 4*VL bytes of data, then continue into the loop
+	// that processes 4*VL bytes of data at a time.  Otherwise skip it.
+	//
+	// Pre-subtracting 4*VL from DATALEN saves an instruction from the main
+	// loop and also ensures that at least one write always occurs to
+	// DATALEN, zero-extending it and allowing DATALEN64 to be used later.
+	sub		$4*VL, DATALEN
+	jl		.Lcrypt_loop_4x_done\@
+
+	// Load powers of the hash key.
+	vmovdqu8	OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS-4*VL(KEY), H_POW4
+	vmovdqu8	OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS-3*VL(KEY), H_POW3
+	vmovdqu8	OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS-2*VL(KEY), H_POW2
+	vmovdqu8	OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS-1*VL(KEY), H_POW1
+
+	// Main loop: en/decrypt and hash 4 vectors at a time.
+	//
+	// When possible, interleave the AES encryption of the counter blocks
+	// with the GHASH update of the ciphertext blocks.  This improves
+	// performance on many CPUs because the execution ports used by the VAES
+	// instructions often differ from those used by vpclmulqdq and other
+	// instructions used in GHASH.  For example, many Intel CPUs dispatch
+	// vaesenc to ports 0 and 1 and vpclmulqdq to port 5.
+	//
+	// The interleaving is easiest to do during decryption, since during
+	// decryption the ciphertext blocks are immediately available.  For
+	// encryption, instead encrypt the first set of blocks, then hash those
+	// blocks while encrypting the next set of blocks, repeat that as
+	// needed, and finally hash the last set of blocks.
+
+.if \enc
+	// Encrypt the first 4 vectors of plaintext blocks.  Leave the resulting
+	// ciphertext in GHASHDATA[0-3] for GHASH.
+	_ctr_begin_4x
+	lea		16(KEY), %rax
+1:
+	vbroadcasti32x4	(%rax), RNDKEY
+	_vaesenc_4x	RNDKEY
+	add		$16, %rax
+	cmp		%rax, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	jne		1b
+	vpxord		0*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST0
+	vpxord		1*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST1
+	vpxord		2*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST2
+	vpxord		3*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST3
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST0, V0, GHASHDATA0
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST1, V1, GHASHDATA1
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST2, V2, GHASHDATA2
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST3, V3, GHASHDATA3
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA0, 0*VL(DST)
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA1, 1*VL(DST)
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA2, 2*VL(DST)
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA3, 3*VL(DST)
+	add		$4*VL, SRC
+	add		$4*VL, DST
+	sub		$4*VL, DATALEN
+	jl		.Lghash_last_ciphertext_4x\@
+.endif
+
+	// Cache as many additional AES round keys as possible.
+.irp i, 9,8,7,6,5
+	vbroadcasti32x4	-\i*16(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), RNDKEY_M\i
+.endr
+
+.Lcrypt_loop_4x\@:
+
+	// If decrypting, load more ciphertext blocks into GHASHDATA[0-3].  If
+	// encrypting, GHASHDATA[0-3] already contain the previous ciphertext.
+.if !\enc
+	vmovdqu8	0*VL(SRC), GHASHDATA0
+	vmovdqu8	1*VL(SRC), GHASHDATA1
+	vmovdqu8	2*VL(SRC), GHASHDATA2
+	vmovdqu8	3*VL(SRC), GHASHDATA3
+.endif
+
+	// Start the AES encryption of the counter blocks.
+	_ctr_begin_4x
+	cmp		$24, AESKEYLEN
+	jl		128f	// AES-128?
+	je		192f	// AES-192?
+	// AES-256
+	vbroadcasti32x4	-13*16(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), RNDKEY
+	_vaesenc_4x	RNDKEY
+	vbroadcasti32x4	-12*16(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), RNDKEY
+	_vaesenc_4x	RNDKEY
+192:
+	vbroadcasti32x4	-11*16(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), RNDKEY
+	_vaesenc_4x	RNDKEY
+	vbroadcasti32x4	-10*16(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), RNDKEY
+	_vaesenc_4x	RNDKEY
+128:
+
+	// XOR the source data with the last round key, saving the result in
+	// RNDKEYLAST[0-3].  This reduces latency by taking advantage of the
+	// property vaesenclast(key, a) ^ b == vaesenclast(key ^ b, a).
+.if \enc
+	vpxord		0*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST0
+	vpxord		1*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST1
+	vpxord		2*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST2
+	vpxord		3*VL(SRC), RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST3
+.else
+	vpxord		GHASHDATA0, RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST0
+	vpxord		GHASHDATA1, RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST1
+	vpxord		GHASHDATA2, RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST2
+	vpxord		GHASHDATA3, RNDKEYLAST, RNDKEYLAST3
+.endif
+
+	// Finish the AES encryption of the counter blocks in V0-V3, interleaved
+	// with the GHASH update of the ciphertext blocks in GHASHDATA[0-3].
+.irp i, 9,8,7,6,5
+	_vaesenc_4x	RNDKEY_M\i
+	_ghash_step_4x	(9 - \i)
+.endr
+.irp i, 4,3,2,1
+	vbroadcasti32x4	-\i*16(RNDKEYLAST_PTR), RNDKEY
+	_vaesenc_4x	RNDKEY
+	_ghash_step_4x	(9 - \i)
+.endr
+	_ghash_step_4x	9
+
+	// Do the last AES round.  This handles the XOR with the source data
+	// too, as per the optimization described above.
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST0, V0, GHASHDATA0
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST1, V1, GHASHDATA1
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST2, V2, GHASHDATA2
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST3, V3, GHASHDATA3
+
+	// Store the en/decrypted data to DST.
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA0, 0*VL(DST)
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA1, 1*VL(DST)
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA2, 2*VL(DST)
+	vmovdqu8	GHASHDATA3, 3*VL(DST)
+
+	add		$4*VL, SRC
+	add		$4*VL, DST
+	sub		$4*VL, DATALEN
+	jge		.Lcrypt_loop_4x\@
+
+.if \enc
+.Lghash_last_ciphertext_4x\@:
+	// Update GHASH with the last set of ciphertext blocks.
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
+	_ghash_step_4x	\i
+.endr
+.endif
+
+.Lcrypt_loop_4x_done\@:
+
+	// Undo the extra subtraction by 4*VL and check whether data remains.
+	add		$4*VL, DATALEN
+	jz		.Ldone\@
+
+	// The data length isn't a multiple of 4*VL.  Process the remaining data
+	// of length 1 <= DATALEN < 4*VL, up to one vector (VL bytes) at a time.
+	// Going one vector at a time may seem inefficient compared to having
+	// separate code paths for each possible number of vectors remaining.
+	// However, using a loop keeps the code size down, and it performs
+	// surprising well; modern CPUs will start executing the next iteration
+	// before the previous one finishes and also predict the number of loop
+	// iterations.  For a similar reason, we roll up the AES rounds.
+	//
+	// On the last iteration, the remaining length may be less than VL.
+	// Handle this using masking.
+	//
+	// Since there are enough key powers available for all remaining data,
+	// there is no need to do a GHASH reduction after each iteration.
+	// Instead, multiply each remaining block by its own key power, and only
+	// do a GHASH reduction at the very end.
+
+	// Make POWERS_PTR point to the key powers [H^N, H^(N-1), ...] where N
+	// is the number of blocks that remain.
+	.set		POWERS_PTR, LE_CTR_PTR	// LE_CTR_PTR is free to be reused.
+	mov		DATALEN, %eax
+	neg		%rax
+	and		$~15, %rax  // -round_up(DATALEN, 16)
+	lea		OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS(KEY,%rax), POWERS_PTR
+
+	// Start collecting the unreduced GHASH intermediate value LO, MI, HI.
+	.set		LO, GHASHDATA0
+	.set		LO_XMM, GHASHDATA0_XMM
+	.set		MI, GHASHDATA1
+	.set		MI_XMM, GHASHDATA1_XMM
+	.set		HI, GHASHDATA2
+	.set		HI_XMM, GHASHDATA2_XMM
+	vpxor		LO_XMM, LO_XMM, LO_XMM
+	vpxor		MI_XMM, MI_XMM, MI_XMM
+	vpxor		HI_XMM, HI_XMM, HI_XMM
+
+.Lcrypt_loop_1x\@:
+
+	// Select the appropriate mask for this iteration: all 1's if
+	// DATALEN >= VL, otherwise DATALEN 1's.  Do this branchlessly using the
+	// bzhi instruction from BMI2.  (This relies on DATALEN <= 255.)
+.if VL < 64
+	mov		$-1, %eax
+	bzhi		DATALEN, %eax, %eax
+	kmovd		%eax, %k1
+.else
+	mov		$-1, %rax
+	bzhi		DATALEN64, %rax, %rax
+	kmovq		%rax, %k1
+.endif
+
+	// Encrypt a vector of counter blocks.  This does not need to be masked.
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, V0
+	vpaddd		LE_CTR_INC, LE_CTR, LE_CTR
+	vpxord		RNDKEY0, V0, V0
+	lea		16(KEY), %rax
+1:
+	vbroadcasti32x4	(%rax), RNDKEY
+	vaesenc		RNDKEY, V0, V0
+	add		$16, %rax
+	cmp		%rax, RNDKEYLAST_PTR
+	jne		1b
+	vaesenclast	RNDKEYLAST, V0, V0
+
+	// XOR the data with the appropriate number of keystream bytes.
+	vmovdqu8	(SRC), V1{%k1}{z}
+	vpxord		V1, V0, V0
+	vmovdqu8	V0, (DST){%k1}
+
+	// Update GHASH with the ciphertext block(s), without reducing.
+	//
+	// In the case of DATALEN < VL, the ciphertext is zero-padded to VL.
+	// (If decrypting, it's done by the above masked load.  If encrypting,
+	// it's done by the below masked register-to-register move.)  Note that
+	// if DATALEN <= VL - 16, there will be additional padding beyond the
+	// padding of the last block specified by GHASH itself; i.e., there may
+	// be whole block(s) that get processed by the GHASH multiplication and
+	// reduction instructions but should not actually be included in the
+	// GHASH.  However, any such blocks are all-zeroes, and the values that
+	// they're multiplied with are also all-zeroes.  Therefore they just add
+	// 0 * 0 = 0 to the final GHASH result, which makes no difference.
+	vmovdqu8        (POWERS_PTR), H_POW1
+.if \enc
+	vmovdqu8	V0, V1{%k1}{z}
+.endif
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, V1, V0
+	vpxord		GHASH_ACC, V0, V0
+	_ghash_mul_noreduce	H_POW1, V0, LO, MI, HI, GHASHDATA3, V1, V2, V3
+	vpxor		GHASH_ACC_XMM, GHASH_ACC_XMM, GHASH_ACC_XMM
+
+	add		$VL, POWERS_PTR
+	add		$VL, SRC
+	add		$VL, DST
+	sub		$VL, DATALEN
+	jg		.Lcrypt_loop_1x\@
+
+	// Finally, do the GHASH reduction.
+	_ghash_reduce	LO, MI, HI, GFPOLY, V0
+	_horizontal_xor	HI, HI_XMM, GHASH_ACC_XMM, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2
+
+.Ldone\@:
+	// Store the updated GHASH accumulator back to memory.
+	vmovdqu		GHASH_ACC_XMM, (GHASH_ACC_PTR)
+
+	vzeroupper	// This is needed after using ymm or zmm registers.
+	RET
+.endm
+
+// void aes_gcm_enc_final_vaes_avx10(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+//				     const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+//				     u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen);
+// bool aes_gcm_dec_final_vaes_avx10(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+//				     const u32 le_ctr[4],
+//				     const u8 ghash_acc[16],
+//				     u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen,
+//				     const u8 tag[16], int taglen);
+//
+// This macro generates one of the above two functions (with \enc selecting
+// which one).  Both functions finish computing the GCM authentication tag by
+// updating GHASH with the lengths block and encrypting the GHASH accumulator.
+// |total_aadlen| and |total_datalen| must be the total length of the additional
+// authenticated data and the en/decrypted data in bytes, respectively.
+//
+// The encryption function then stores the full-length (16-byte) computed
+// authentication tag to |ghash_acc|.  The decryption function instead loads the
+// expected authentication tag (the one that was transmitted) from the 16-byte
+// buffer |tag|, compares the first 4 <= |taglen| <= 16 bytes of it to the
+// computed tag in constant time, and returns true if and only if they match.
+.macro	_aes_gcm_final	enc
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+	.set	LE_CTR_PTR,	%rsi
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_PTR,	%rdx
+	.set	TOTAL_AADLEN,	%rcx
+	.set	TOTAL_DATALEN,	%r8
+	.set	TAG,		%r9
+	.set	TAGLEN,		%r10d	// Originally at 8(%rsp)
+
+	// Additional local variables.
+	// %rax, %xmm0-%xmm3, and %k1 are used as temporary registers.
+	.set	AESKEYLEN,	%r11d
+	.set	AESKEYLEN64,	%r11
+	.set	GFPOLY,		%xmm4
+	.set	BSWAP_MASK,	%xmm5
+	.set	LE_CTR,		%xmm6
+	.set	GHASH_ACC,	%xmm7
+	.set	H_POW1,		%xmm8
+
+	// Load some constants.
+	vmovdqa		.Lgfpoly(%rip), GFPOLY
+	vmovdqa		.Lbswap_mask(%rip), BSWAP_MASK
+
+	// Load the AES key length in bytes.
+	movl		OFFSETOF_AESKEYLEN(KEY), AESKEYLEN
+
+	// Set up a counter block with 1 in the low 32-bit word.  This is the
+	// counter that produces the ciphertext needed to encrypt the auth tag.
+	// GFPOLY has 1 in the low word, so grab the 1 from there using a blend.
+	vpblendd	$0xe, (LE_CTR_PTR), GFPOLY, LE_CTR
+
+	// Build the lengths block and XOR it with the GHASH accumulator.
+	// Although the lengths block is defined as the AAD length followed by
+	// the en/decrypted data length, both in big-endian byte order, a byte
+	// reflection of the full block is needed because of the way we compute
+	// GHASH (see _ghash_mul_step).  By using little-endian values in the
+	// opposite order, we avoid having to reflect any bytes here.
+	vmovq		TOTAL_DATALEN, %xmm0
+	vpinsrq		$1, TOTAL_AADLEN, %xmm0, %xmm0
+	vpsllq		$3, %xmm0, %xmm0	// Bytes to bits
+	vpxor		(GHASH_ACC_PTR), %xmm0, GHASH_ACC
+
+	// Load the first hash key power (H^1), which is stored last.
+	vmovdqu8	OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS-16(KEY), H_POW1
+
+.if !\enc
+	// Prepare a mask of TAGLEN one bits.
+	movl		8(%rsp), TAGLEN
+	mov		$-1, %eax
+	bzhi		TAGLEN, %eax, %eax
+	kmovd		%eax, %k1
+.endif
+
+	// Make %rax point to the last AES round key for the chosen AES variant.
+	lea		6*16(KEY,AESKEYLEN64,4), %rax
+
+	// Start the AES encryption of the counter block by swapping the counter
+	// block to big-endian and XOR-ing it with the zero-th AES round key.
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, LE_CTR, %xmm0
+	vpxor		(KEY), %xmm0, %xmm0
+
+	// Complete the AES encryption and multiply GHASH_ACC by H^1.
+	// Interleave the AES and GHASH instructions to improve performance.
+	cmp		$24, AESKEYLEN
+	jl		128f	// AES-128?
+	je		192f	// AES-192?
+	// AES-256
+	vaesenc		-13*16(%rax), %xmm0, %xmm0
+	vaesenc		-12*16(%rax), %xmm0, %xmm0
+192:
+	vaesenc		-11*16(%rax), %xmm0, %xmm0
+	vaesenc		-10*16(%rax), %xmm0, %xmm0
+128:
+.irp i, 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8
+	_ghash_mul_step	\i, H_POW1, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, \
+			%xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3
+	vaesenc		(\i-9)*16(%rax), %xmm0, %xmm0
+.endr
+	_ghash_mul_step	9, H_POW1, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, \
+			%xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3
+
+	// Undo the byte reflection of the GHASH accumulator.
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC
+
+	// Do the last AES round and XOR the resulting keystream block with the
+	// GHASH accumulator to produce the full computed authentication tag.
+	//
+	// Reduce latency by taking advantage of the property vaesenclast(key,
+	// a) ^ b == vaesenclast(key ^ b, a).  I.e., XOR GHASH_ACC into the last
+	// round key, instead of XOR'ing the final AES output with GHASH_ACC.
+	//
+	// enc_final then returns the computed auth tag, while dec_final
+	// compares it with the transmitted one and returns a bool.  To compare
+	// the tags, dec_final XORs them together and uses vptest to check
+	// whether the result is all-zeroes.  This should be constant-time.
+	// dec_final applies the vaesenclast optimization to this additional
+	// value XOR'd too, using vpternlogd to XOR the last round key, GHASH
+	// accumulator, and transmitted auth tag together in one instruction.
+.if \enc
+	vpxor		(%rax), GHASH_ACC, %xmm1
+	vaesenclast	%xmm1, %xmm0, GHASH_ACC
+	vmovdqu		GHASH_ACC, (GHASH_ACC_PTR)
+.else
+	vmovdqu		(TAG), %xmm1
+	vpternlogd	$0x96, (%rax), GHASH_ACC, %xmm1
+	vaesenclast	%xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0
+	xor		%eax, %eax
+	vmovdqu8	%xmm0, %xmm0{%k1}{z}	// Truncate to TAGLEN bytes
+	vptest		%xmm0, %xmm0
+	sete		%al
+.endif
+	// No need for vzeroupper here, since only used xmm registers were used.
+	RET
+.endm
+
+_set_veclen 32
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_256)
+	_aes_gcm_precompute
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_256)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_256)
+	_aes_gcm_update	1
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_256)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_256)
+	_aes_gcm_update	0
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_256)
+
+_set_veclen 64
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_512)
+	_aes_gcm_precompute
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_512)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_512)
+	_aes_gcm_update	1
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_512)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_512)
+	_aes_gcm_update	0
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_512)
+
+// void aes_gcm_aad_update_vaes_avx10(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+//				      u8 ghash_acc[16],
+//				      const u8 *aad, int aadlen);
+//
+// This function processes the AAD (Additional Authenticated Data) in GCM.
+// Using the key |key|, it updates the GHASH accumulator |ghash_acc| with the
+// data given by |aad| and |aadlen|.  |key->ghash_key_powers| must have been
+// initialized.  On the first call, |ghash_acc| must be all zeroes.  |aadlen|
+// must be a multiple of 16, except on the last call where it can be any length.
+// The caller must do any buffering needed to ensure this.
+//
+// AES-GCM is almost always used with small amounts of AAD, less than 32 bytes.
+// Therefore, for AAD processing we currently only provide this implementation
+// which uses 256-bit vectors (ymm registers) and only has a 1x-wide loop.  This
+// keeps the code size down, and it enables some micro-optimizations, e.g. using
+// VEX-coded instructions instead of EVEX-coded to save some instruction bytes.
+// To optimize for large amounts of AAD, we could implement a 4x-wide loop and
+// provide a version using 512-bit vectors, but that doesn't seem to be useful.
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_aad_update_vaes_avx10)
+
+	// Function arguments
+	.set	KEY,		%rdi
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_PTR,	%rsi
+	.set	AAD,		%rdx
+	.set	AADLEN,		%ecx
+	.set	AADLEN64,	%rcx	// Zero-extend AADLEN before using!
+
+	// Additional local variables.
+	// %rax, %ymm0-%ymm3, and %k1 are used as temporary registers.
+	.set	BSWAP_MASK,	%ymm4
+	.set	GFPOLY,		%ymm5
+	.set	GHASH_ACC,	%ymm6
+	.set	GHASH_ACC_XMM,	%xmm6
+	.set	H_POW1,		%ymm7
+
+	// Load some constants.
+	vbroadcasti128	.Lbswap_mask(%rip), BSWAP_MASK
+	vbroadcasti128	.Lgfpoly(%rip), GFPOLY
+
+	// Load the GHASH accumulator.
+	vmovdqu		(GHASH_ACC_PTR), GHASH_ACC_XMM
+
+	// Update GHASH with 32 bytes of AAD at a time.
+	//
+	// Pre-subtracting 32 from AADLEN saves an instruction from the loop and
+	// also ensures that at least one write always occurs to AADLEN,
+	// zero-extending it and allowing AADLEN64 to be used later.
+	sub		$32, AADLEN
+	jl		.Laad_loop_1x_done
+	vmovdqu8	OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS-32(KEY), H_POW1	// [H^2, H^1]
+.Laad_loop_1x:
+	vmovdqu		(AAD), %ymm0
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpxor		%ymm0, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC
+	_ghash_mul	H_POW1, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, \
+			%ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm2
+	vextracti128	$1, GHASH_ACC, %xmm0
+	vpxor		%xmm0, GHASH_ACC_XMM, GHASH_ACC_XMM
+	add		$32, AAD
+	sub		$32, AADLEN
+	jge		.Laad_loop_1x
+.Laad_loop_1x_done:
+	add		$32, AADLEN
+	jz		.Laad_done
+
+	// Update GHASH with the remaining 1 <= AADLEN < 32 bytes of AAD.
+	mov		$-1, %eax
+	bzhi		AADLEN, %eax, %eax
+	kmovd		%eax, %k1
+	vmovdqu8	(AAD), %ymm0{%k1}{z}
+	neg		AADLEN64
+	and		$~15, AADLEN64  // -round_up(AADLEN, 16)
+	vmovdqu8	OFFSETOFEND_H_POWERS(KEY,AADLEN64), H_POW1
+	vpshufb		BSWAP_MASK, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpxor		%ymm0, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC
+	_ghash_mul	H_POW1, GHASH_ACC, GHASH_ACC, GFPOLY, \
+			%ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm2
+	vextracti128	$1, GHASH_ACC, %xmm0
+	vpxor		%xmm0, GHASH_ACC_XMM, GHASH_ACC_XMM
+
+.Laad_done:
+	// Store the updated GHASH accumulator back to memory.
+	vmovdqu		GHASH_ACC_XMM, (GHASH_ACC_PTR)
+
+	vzeroupper	// This is needed after using ymm or zmm registers.
+	RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_aad_update_vaes_avx10)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_enc_final_vaes_avx10)
+	_aes_gcm_final	1
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_enc_final_vaes_avx10)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aes_gcm_dec_final_vaes_avx10)
+	_aes_gcm_final	0
+SYM_FUNC_END(aes_gcm_dec_final_vaes_avx10)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
index 39066b57a70e..eb153eff9331 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
@@ -10,16 +10,7 @@
  *            Vinodh Gopal <vinodh.gopal@intel.com>
  *            Kahraman Akdemir
  *
- * Added RFC4106 AES-GCM support for 128-bit keys under the AEAD
- * interface for 64-bit kernels.
- *    Authors: Erdinc Ozturk (erdinc.ozturk@intel.com)
- *             Aidan O'Mahony (aidan.o.mahony@intel.com)
- *             Adrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com>
- *             James Guilford (james.guilford@intel.com)
- *             Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com>
- *             Tadeusz Struk (tadeusz.struk@intel.com)
- *             Wajdi Feghali (wajdi.k.feghali@intel.com)
- *    Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
  *
  * Ported x86_64 version to x86:
  *    Author: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
@@ -27,95 +18,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
-
-/*
- * The following macros are used to move an (un)aligned 16 byte value to/from
- * an XMM register.  This can done for either FP or integer values, for FP use
- * movaps (move aligned packed single) or integer use movdqa (move double quad
- * aligned).  It doesn't make a performance difference which instruction is used
- * since Nehalem (original Core i7) was released.  However, the movaps is a byte
- * shorter, so that is the one we'll use for now. (same for unaligned).
- */
-#define MOVADQ	movaps
-#define MOVUDQ	movups
-
-#ifdef __x86_64__
-
-# constants in mergeable sections, linker can reorder and merge
-.section	.rodata.cst16.POLY, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-POLY:   .octa 0xC2000000000000000000000000000001
-.section	.rodata.cst16.TWOONE, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-TWOONE: .octa 0x00000001000000000000000000000001
-
-.section	.rodata.cst16.SHUF_MASK, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-SHUF_MASK:  .octa 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-.section	.rodata.cst16.MASK1, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-MASK1:      .octa 0x0000000000000000ffffffffffffffff
-.section	.rodata.cst16.MASK2, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-MASK2:      .octa 0xffffffffffffffff0000000000000000
-.section	.rodata.cst16.ONE, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-ONE:        .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000001
-.section	.rodata.cst16.F_MIN_MASK, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-F_MIN_MASK: .octa 0xf1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff0
-.section	.rodata.cst16.dec, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-dec:        .octa 0x1
-.section	.rodata.cst16.enc, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-enc:        .octa 0x2
-
-# order of these constants should not change.
-# more specifically, ALL_F should follow SHIFT_MASK,
-# and zero should follow ALL_F
-.section	.rodata, "a", @progbits
-.align 16
-SHIFT_MASK: .octa 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100
-ALL_F:      .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
-            .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000000
-
-.text
-
-#define AadHash 16*0
-#define AadLen 16*1
-#define InLen (16*1)+8
-#define PBlockEncKey 16*2
-#define OrigIV 16*3
-#define CurCount 16*4
-#define PBlockLen 16*5
-#define	HashKey		16*6	// store HashKey <<1 mod poly here
-#define	HashKey_2	16*7	// store HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here
-#define	HashKey_3	16*8	// store HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here
-#define	HashKey_4	16*9	// store HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here
-#define	HashKey_k	16*10	// store XOR of High 64 bits and Low 64
-				// bits of  HashKey <<1 mod poly here
-				//(for Karatsuba purposes)
-#define	HashKey_2_k	16*11	// store XOR of High 64 bits and Low 64
-				// bits of  HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here
-				// (for Karatsuba purposes)
-#define	HashKey_3_k	16*12	// store XOR of High 64 bits and Low 64
-				// bits of  HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here
-				// (for Karatsuba purposes)
-#define	HashKey_4_k	16*13	// store XOR of High 64 bits and Low 64
-				// bits of  HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here
-				// (for Karatsuba purposes)
-
-#define arg1 rdi
-#define arg2 rsi
-#define arg3 rdx
-#define arg4 rcx
-#define arg5 r8
-#define arg6 r9
-#define keysize 2*15*16(%arg1)
-#endif
-
 
 #define STATE1	%xmm0
 #define STATE2	%xmm4
@@ -162,1409 +64,6 @@ ALL_F:      .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
 #define TKEYP	T1
 #endif
 
-.macro FUNC_SAVE
-	push	%r12
-	push	%r13
-	push	%r14
-#
-# states of %xmm registers %xmm6:%xmm15 not saved
-# all %xmm registers are clobbered
-#
-.endm
-
-
-.macro FUNC_RESTORE
-	pop	%r14
-	pop	%r13
-	pop	%r12
-.endm
-
-# Precompute hashkeys.
-# Input: Hash subkey.
-# Output: HashKeys stored in gcm_context_data.  Only needs to be called
-# once per key.
-# clobbers r12, and tmp xmm registers.
-.macro PRECOMPUTE SUBKEY TMP1 TMP2 TMP3 TMP4 TMP5 TMP6 TMP7
-	mov	\SUBKEY, %r12
-	movdqu	(%r12), \TMP3
-	movdqa	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \TMP2
-	pshufb	\TMP2, \TMP3
-
-	# precompute HashKey<<1 mod poly from the HashKey (required for GHASH)
-
-	movdqa	\TMP3, \TMP2
-	psllq	$1, \TMP3
-	psrlq	$63, \TMP2
-	movdqa	\TMP2, \TMP1
-	pslldq	$8, \TMP2
-	psrldq	$8, \TMP1
-	por	\TMP2, \TMP3
-
-	# reduce HashKey<<1
-
-	pshufd	$0x24, \TMP1, \TMP2
-	pcmpeqd TWOONE(%rip), \TMP2
-	pand	POLY(%rip), \TMP2
-	pxor	\TMP2, \TMP3
-	movdqu	\TMP3, HashKey(%arg2)
-
-	movdqa	   \TMP3, \TMP5
-	pshufd	   $78, \TMP3, \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP3, \TMP1
-	movdqu	   \TMP1, HashKey_k(%arg2)
-
-	GHASH_MUL  \TMP5, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP6, \TMP7
-# TMP5 = HashKey^2<<1 (mod poly)
-	movdqu	   \TMP5, HashKey_2(%arg2)
-# HashKey_2 = HashKey^2<<1 (mod poly)
-	pshufd	   $78, \TMP5, \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP5, \TMP1
-	movdqu	   \TMP1, HashKey_2_k(%arg2)
-
-	GHASH_MUL  \TMP5, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP6, \TMP7
-# TMP5 = HashKey^3<<1 (mod poly)
-	movdqu	   \TMP5, HashKey_3(%arg2)
-	pshufd	   $78, \TMP5, \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP5, \TMP1
-	movdqu	   \TMP1, HashKey_3_k(%arg2)
-
-	GHASH_MUL  \TMP5, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP6, \TMP7
-# TMP5 = HashKey^3<<1 (mod poly)
-	movdqu	   \TMP5, HashKey_4(%arg2)
-	pshufd	   $78, \TMP5, \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP5, \TMP1
-	movdqu	   \TMP1, HashKey_4_k(%arg2)
-.endm
-
-# GCM_INIT initializes a gcm_context struct to prepare for encoding/decoding.
-# Clobbers rax, r10-r13 and xmm0-xmm6, %xmm13
-.macro GCM_INIT Iv SUBKEY AAD AADLEN
-	mov \AADLEN, %r11
-	mov %r11, AadLen(%arg2) # ctx_data.aad_length = aad_length
-	xor %r11d, %r11d
-	mov %r11, InLen(%arg2) # ctx_data.in_length = 0
-	mov %r11, PBlockLen(%arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_length = 0
-	mov %r11, PBlockEncKey(%arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_enc_key = 0
-	mov \Iv, %rax
-	movdqu (%rax), %xmm0
-	movdqu %xmm0, OrigIV(%arg2) # ctx_data.orig_IV = iv
-
-	movdqa  SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm2
-	pshufb %xmm2, %xmm0
-	movdqu %xmm0, CurCount(%arg2) # ctx_data.current_counter = iv
-
-	PRECOMPUTE \SUBKEY, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7
-	movdqu HashKey(%arg2), %xmm13
-
-	CALC_AAD_HASH %xmm13, \AAD, \AADLEN, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, \
-	%xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6
-.endm
-
-# GCM_ENC_DEC Encodes/Decodes given data. Assumes that the passed gcm_context
-# struct has been initialized by GCM_INIT.
-# Requires the input data be at least 1 byte long because of READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK
-# Clobbers rax, r10-r13, and xmm0-xmm15
-.macro GCM_ENC_DEC operation
-	movdqu AadHash(%arg2), %xmm8
-	movdqu HashKey(%arg2), %xmm13
-	add %arg5, InLen(%arg2)
-
-	xor %r11d, %r11d # initialise the data pointer offset as zero
-	PARTIAL_BLOCK %arg3 %arg4 %arg5 %r11 %xmm8 \operation
-
-	sub %r11, %arg5		# sub partial block data used
-	mov %arg5, %r13		# save the number of bytes
-
-	and $-16, %r13		# %r13 = %r13 - (%r13 mod 16)
-	mov %r13, %r12
-	# Encrypt/Decrypt first few blocks
-
-	and	$(3<<4), %r12
-	jz	.L_initial_num_blocks_is_0_\@
-	cmp	$(2<<4), %r12
-	jb	.L_initial_num_blocks_is_1_\@
-	je	.L_initial_num_blocks_is_2_\@
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_3_\@:
-	INITIAL_BLOCKS_ENC_DEC	%xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm13, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm0, \
-%xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm8, %xmm5, %xmm6, 5, 678, \operation
-	sub	$48, %r13
-	jmp	.L_initial_blocks_\@
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_2_\@:
-	INITIAL_BLOCKS_ENC_DEC	%xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm13, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm0, \
-%xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm8, %xmm5, %xmm6, 6, 78, \operation
-	sub	$32, %r13
-	jmp	.L_initial_blocks_\@
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_1_\@:
-	INITIAL_BLOCKS_ENC_DEC	%xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm13, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm0, \
-%xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm8, %xmm5, %xmm6, 7, 8, \operation
-	sub	$16, %r13
-	jmp	.L_initial_blocks_\@
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_0_\@:
-	INITIAL_BLOCKS_ENC_DEC	%xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm13, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm0, \
-%xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm8, %xmm5, %xmm6, 8, 0, \operation
-.L_initial_blocks_\@:
-
-	# Main loop - Encrypt/Decrypt remaining blocks
-
-	test	%r13, %r13
-	je	.L_zero_cipher_left_\@
-	sub	$64, %r13
-	je	.L_four_cipher_left_\@
-.L_crypt_by_4_\@:
-	GHASH_4_ENCRYPT_4_PARALLEL_\operation	%xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, \
-	%xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, \
-	%xmm7, %xmm8, enc
-	add	$64, %r11
-	sub	$64, %r13
-	jne	.L_crypt_by_4_\@
-.L_four_cipher_left_\@:
-	GHASH_LAST_4	%xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, \
-%xmm15, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm8
-.L_zero_cipher_left_\@:
-	movdqu %xmm8, AadHash(%arg2)
-	movdqu %xmm0, CurCount(%arg2)
-
-	mov	%arg5, %r13
-	and	$15, %r13			# %r13 = arg5 (mod 16)
-	je	.L_multiple_of_16_bytes_\@
-
-	mov %r13, PBlockLen(%arg2)
-
-	# Handle the last <16 Byte block separately
-	paddd ONE(%rip), %xmm0                # INCR CNT to get Yn
-	movdqu %xmm0, CurCount(%arg2)
-	movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-	pshufb %xmm10, %xmm0
-
-	ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK	%xmm0, %xmm1        # Encrypt(K, Yn)
-	movdqu %xmm0, PBlockEncKey(%arg2)
-
-	cmp	$16, %arg5
-	jge	.L_large_enough_update_\@
-
-	lea (%arg4,%r11,1), %r10
-	mov %r13, %r12
-	READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm2 %xmm1
-	jmp	.L_data_read_\@
-
-.L_large_enough_update_\@:
-	sub	$16, %r11
-	add	%r13, %r11
-
-	# receive the last <16 Byte block
-	movdqu	(%arg4, %r11, 1), %xmm1
-
-	sub	%r13, %r11
-	add	$16, %r11
-
-	lea	SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12
-	# adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift 16-r13 bytes
-	# (r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16)
-	sub	%r13, %r12
-	# get the appropriate shuffle mask
-	movdqu	(%r12), %xmm2
-	# shift right 16-r13 bytes
-	pshufb  %xmm2, %xmm1
-
-.L_data_read_\@:
-	lea ALL_F+16(%rip), %r12
-	sub %r13, %r12
-
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	movdqa  %xmm1, %xmm2
-.endif
-	pxor	%xmm1, %xmm0            # XOR Encrypt(K, Yn)
-	movdqu	(%r12), %xmm1
-	# get the appropriate mask to mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm0
-	pand	%xmm1, %xmm0            # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm0
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	pand    %xmm1, %xmm2
-	movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-	pshufb %xmm10 ,%xmm2
-
-	pxor %xmm2, %xmm8
-.else
-	movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-	pshufb %xmm10,%xmm0
-
-	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm8
-.endif
-
-	movdqu %xmm8, AadHash(%arg2)
-.ifc \operation, enc
-	# GHASH computation for the last <16 byte block
-	movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-	# shuffle xmm0 back to output as ciphertext
-	pshufb %xmm10, %xmm0
-.endif
-
-	# Output %r13 bytes
-	movq %xmm0, %rax
-	cmp $8, %r13
-	jle .L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@
-	mov %rax, (%arg3 , %r11, 1)
-	add $8, %r11
-	psrldq $8, %xmm0
-	movq %xmm0, %rax
-	sub $8, %r13
-.L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@:
-	mov %al,  (%arg3, %r11, 1)
-	add $1, %r11
-	shr $8, %rax
-	sub $1, %r13
-	jne .L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@
-.L_multiple_of_16_bytes_\@:
-.endm
-
-# GCM_COMPLETE Finishes update of tag of last partial block
-# Output: Authorization Tag (AUTH_TAG)
-# Clobbers rax, r10-r12, and xmm0, xmm1, xmm5-xmm15
-.macro GCM_COMPLETE AUTHTAG AUTHTAGLEN
-	movdqu AadHash(%arg2), %xmm8
-	movdqu HashKey(%arg2), %xmm13
-
-	mov PBlockLen(%arg2), %r12
-
-	test %r12, %r12
-	je .L_partial_done\@
-
-	GHASH_MUL %xmm8, %xmm13, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
-
-.L_partial_done\@:
-	mov AadLen(%arg2), %r12  # %r13 = aadLen (number of bytes)
-	shl	$3, %r12		  # convert into number of bits
-	movd	%r12d, %xmm15		  # len(A) in %xmm15
-	mov InLen(%arg2), %r12
-	shl     $3, %r12                  # len(C) in bits (*128)
-	movq    %r12, %xmm1
-
-	pslldq	$8, %xmm15		  # %xmm15 = len(A)||0x0000000000000000
-	pxor	%xmm1, %xmm15		  # %xmm15 = len(A)||len(C)
-	pxor	%xmm15, %xmm8
-	GHASH_MUL	%xmm8, %xmm13, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
-	# final GHASH computation
-	movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-	pshufb %xmm10, %xmm8
-
-	movdqu OrigIV(%arg2), %xmm0       # %xmm0 = Y0
-	ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK	%xmm0,  %xmm1	  # E(K, Y0)
-	pxor	%xmm8, %xmm0
-.L_return_T_\@:
-	mov	\AUTHTAG, %r10                     # %r10 = authTag
-	mov	\AUTHTAGLEN, %r11                    # %r11 = auth_tag_len
-	cmp	$16, %r11
-	je	.L_T_16_\@
-	cmp	$8, %r11
-	jl	.L_T_4_\@
-.L_T_8_\@:
-	movq	%xmm0, %rax
-	mov	%rax, (%r10)
-	add	$8, %r10
-	sub	$8, %r11
-	psrldq	$8, %xmm0
-	test	%r11, %r11
-	je	.L_return_T_done_\@
-.L_T_4_\@:
-	movd	%xmm0, %eax
-	mov	%eax, (%r10)
-	add	$4, %r10
-	sub	$4, %r11
-	psrldq	$4, %xmm0
-	test	%r11, %r11
-	je	.L_return_T_done_\@
-.L_T_123_\@:
-	movd	%xmm0, %eax
-	cmp	$2, %r11
-	jl	.L_T_1_\@
-	mov	%ax, (%r10)
-	cmp	$2, %r11
-	je	.L_return_T_done_\@
-	add	$2, %r10
-	sar	$16, %eax
-.L_T_1_\@:
-	mov	%al, (%r10)
-	jmp	.L_return_T_done_\@
-.L_T_16_\@:
-	movdqu	%xmm0, (%r10)
-.L_return_T_done_\@:
-.endm
-
-#ifdef __x86_64__
-/* GHASH_MUL MACRO to implement: Data*HashKey mod (128,127,126,121,0)
-*
-*
-* Input: A and B (128-bits each, bit-reflected)
-* Output: C = A*B*x mod poly, (i.e. >>1 )
-* To compute GH = GH*HashKey mod poly, give HK = HashKey<<1 mod poly as input
-* GH = GH * HK * x mod poly which is equivalent to GH*HashKey mod poly.
-*
-*/
-.macro GHASH_MUL GH HK TMP1 TMP2 TMP3 TMP4 TMP5
-	movdqa	  \GH, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \GH, \TMP2
-	pshufd	  $78, \HK, \TMP3
-	pxor	  \GH, \TMP2            # TMP2 = a1+a0
-	pxor	  \HK, \TMP3            # TMP3 = b1+b0
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \HK, \TMP1     # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \HK, \GH       # GH = a0*b0
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP3, \TMP2   # TMP2 = (a0+a1)*(b1+b0)
-	pxor	  \GH, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP2          # TMP2 = (a0*b0)+(a1*b0)
-	movdqa	  \TMP2, \TMP3
-	pslldq	  $8, \TMP3             # left shift TMP3 2 DWs
-	psrldq	  $8, \TMP2             # right shift TMP2 2 DWs
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \GH
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP1          # TMP2:GH holds the result of GH*HK
-
-        # first phase of the reduction
-
-	movdqa    \GH, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \GH, \TMP3
-	movdqa    \GH, \TMP4            # copy GH into TMP2,TMP3 and TMP4
-					# in in order to perform
-					# independent shifts
-	pslld     $31, \TMP2            # packed right shift <<31
-	pslld     $30, \TMP3            # packed right shift <<30
-	pslld     $25, \TMP4            # packed right shift <<25
-	pxor      \TMP3, \TMP2          # xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \TMP2, \TMP5
-	psrldq    $4, \TMP5             # right shift TMP5 1 DW
-	pslldq    $12, \TMP2            # left shift TMP2 3 DWs
-	pxor      \TMP2, \GH
-
-        # second phase of the reduction
-
-	movdqa    \GH,\TMP2             # copy GH into TMP2,TMP3 and TMP4
-					# in in order to perform
-					# independent shifts
-	movdqa    \GH,\TMP3
-	movdqa    \GH,\TMP4
-	psrld     $1,\TMP2              # packed left shift >>1
-	psrld     $2,\TMP3              # packed left shift >>2
-	psrld     $7,\TMP4              # packed left shift >>7
-	pxor      \TMP3,\TMP2		# xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4,\TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP5, \TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP2, \GH
-	pxor      \TMP1, \GH            # result is in TMP1
-.endm
-
-# Reads DLEN bytes starting at DPTR and stores in XMMDst
-# where 0 < DLEN < 16
-# Clobbers %rax, DLEN and XMM1
-.macro READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK DPTR DLEN XMM1 XMMDst
-        cmp $8, \DLEN
-        jl .L_read_lt8_\@
-        mov (\DPTR), %rax
-        movq %rax, \XMMDst
-        sub $8, \DLEN
-        jz .L_done_read_partial_block_\@
-	xor %eax, %eax
-.L_read_next_byte_\@:
-        shl $8, %rax
-        mov 7(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al
-        dec \DLEN
-        jnz .L_read_next_byte_\@
-        movq %rax, \XMM1
-	pslldq $8, \XMM1
-        por \XMM1, \XMMDst
-	jmp .L_done_read_partial_block_\@
-.L_read_lt8_\@:
-	xor %eax, %eax
-.L_read_next_byte_lt8_\@:
-        shl $8, %rax
-        mov -1(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al
-        dec \DLEN
-        jnz .L_read_next_byte_lt8_\@
-        movq %rax, \XMMDst
-.L_done_read_partial_block_\@:
-.endm
-
-# CALC_AAD_HASH: Calculates the hash of the data which will not be encrypted.
-# clobbers r10-11, xmm14
-.macro CALC_AAD_HASH HASHKEY AAD AADLEN TMP1 TMP2 TMP3 TMP4 TMP5 \
-	TMP6 TMP7
-	MOVADQ	   SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14
-	mov	   \AAD, %r10		# %r10 = AAD
-	mov	   \AADLEN, %r11		# %r11 = aadLen
-	pxor	   \TMP7, \TMP7
-	pxor	   \TMP6, \TMP6
-
-	cmp	   $16, %r11
-	jl	   .L_get_AAD_rest\@
-.L_get_AAD_blocks\@:
-	movdqu	   (%r10), \TMP7
-	pshufb	   %xmm14, \TMP7 # byte-reflect the AAD data
-	pxor	   \TMP7, \TMP6
-	GHASH_MUL  \TMP6, \HASHKEY, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP3, \TMP4, \TMP5
-	add	   $16, %r10
-	sub	   $16, %r11
-	cmp	   $16, %r11
-	jge	   .L_get_AAD_blocks\@
-
-	movdqu	   \TMP6, \TMP7
-
-	/* read the last <16B of AAD */
-.L_get_AAD_rest\@:
-	test	   %r11, %r11
-	je	   .L_get_AAD_done\@
-
-	READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10, %r11, \TMP1, \TMP7
-	pshufb	   %xmm14, \TMP7 # byte-reflect the AAD data
-	pxor	   \TMP6, \TMP7
-	GHASH_MUL  \TMP7, \HASHKEY, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP3, \TMP4, \TMP5
-	movdqu \TMP7, \TMP6
-
-.L_get_AAD_done\@:
-	movdqu \TMP6, AadHash(%arg2)
-.endm
-
-# PARTIAL_BLOCK: Handles encryption/decryption and the tag partial blocks
-# between update calls.
-# Requires the input data be at least 1 byte long due to READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK
-# Outputs encrypted bytes, and updates hash and partial info in gcm_data_context
-# Clobbers rax, r10, r12, r13, xmm0-6, xmm9-13
-.macro PARTIAL_BLOCK CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \
-	AAD_HASH operation
-	mov 	PBlockLen(%arg2), %r13
-	test	%r13, %r13
-	je	.L_partial_block_done_\@	# Leave Macro if no partial blocks
-	# Read in input data without over reading
-	cmp	$16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN
-	jl	.L_fewer_than_16_bytes_\@
-	movups	(\PLAIN_CYPH_IN), %xmm1	# If more than 16 bytes, just fill xmm
-	jmp	.L_data_read_\@
-
-.L_fewer_than_16_bytes_\@:
-	lea	(\PLAIN_CYPH_IN, \DATA_OFFSET, 1), %r10
-	mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r12
-	READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm0 %xmm1
-
-	mov PBlockLen(%arg2), %r13
-
-.L_data_read_\@:				# Finished reading in data
-
-	movdqu	PBlockEncKey(%arg2), %xmm9
-	movdqu	HashKey(%arg2), %xmm13
-
-	lea	SHIFT_MASK(%rip), %r12
-
-	# adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift r13 bytes
-	# r16-r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16)
-	add	%r13, %r12
-	movdqu	(%r12), %xmm2		# get the appropriate shuffle mask
-	pshufb	%xmm2, %xmm9		# shift right r13 bytes
-
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	movdqa	%xmm1, %xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm1, %xmm9		# Ciphertext XOR E(K, Yn)
-
-	mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10
-	add	%r13, %r10
-	# Set r10 to be the amount of data left in CYPH_PLAIN_IN after filling
-	sub	$16, %r10
-	# Determine if partial block is not being filled and
-	# shift mask accordingly
-	jge	.L_no_extra_mask_1_\@
-	sub	%r10, %r12
-.L_no_extra_mask_1_\@:
-
-	movdqu	ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1
-	# get the appropriate mask to mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9
-	pand	%xmm1, %xmm9		# mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9
-
-	pand	%xmm1, %xmm3
-	movdqa	SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-	pshufb	%xmm10, %xmm3
-	pshufb	%xmm2, %xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm3, \AAD_HASH
-
-	test	%r10, %r10
-	jl	.L_partial_incomplete_1_\@
-
-	# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
-	GHASH_MUL \AAD_HASH, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
-	xor	%eax, %eax
-
-	mov	%rax, PBlockLen(%arg2)
-	jmp	.L_dec_done_\@
-.L_partial_incomplete_1_\@:
-	add	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, PBlockLen(%arg2)
-.L_dec_done_\@:
-	movdqu	\AAD_HASH, AadHash(%arg2)
-.else
-	pxor	%xmm1, %xmm9			# Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn)
-
-	mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10
-	add	%r13, %r10
-	# Set r10 to be the amount of data left in CYPH_PLAIN_IN after filling
-	sub	$16, %r10
-	# Determine if partial block is not being filled and
-	# shift mask accordingly
-	jge	.L_no_extra_mask_2_\@
-	sub	%r10, %r12
-.L_no_extra_mask_2_\@:
-
-	movdqu	ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1
-	# get the appropriate mask to mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9
-	pand	%xmm1, %xmm9
-
-	movdqa	SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm1
-	pshufb	%xmm1, %xmm9
-	pshufb	%xmm2, %xmm9
-	pxor	%xmm9, \AAD_HASH
-
-	test	%r10, %r10
-	jl	.L_partial_incomplete_2_\@
-
-	# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
-	GHASH_MUL \AAD_HASH, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
-	xor	%eax, %eax
-
-	mov	%rax, PBlockLen(%arg2)
-	jmp	.L_encode_done_\@
-.L_partial_incomplete_2_\@:
-	add	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, PBlockLen(%arg2)
-.L_encode_done_\@:
-	movdqu	\AAD_HASH, AadHash(%arg2)
-
-	movdqa	SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-	# shuffle xmm9 back to output as ciphertext
-	pshufb	%xmm10, %xmm9
-	pshufb	%xmm2, %xmm9
-.endif
-	# output encrypted Bytes
-	test	%r10, %r10
-	jl	.L_partial_fill_\@
-	mov	%r13, %r12
-	mov	$16, %r13
-	# Set r13 to be the number of bytes to write out
-	sub	%r12, %r13
-	jmp	.L_count_set_\@
-.L_partial_fill_\@:
-	mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r13
-.L_count_set_\@:
-	movdqa	%xmm9, %xmm0
-	movq	%xmm0, %rax
-	cmp	$8, %r13
-	jle	.L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@
-
-	mov	%rax, (\CYPH_PLAIN_OUT, \DATA_OFFSET, 1)
-	add	$8, \DATA_OFFSET
-	psrldq	$8, %xmm0
-	movq	%xmm0, %rax
-	sub	$8, %r13
-.L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@:
-	movb	%al, (\CYPH_PLAIN_OUT, \DATA_OFFSET, 1)
-	add	$1, \DATA_OFFSET
-	shr	$8, %rax
-	sub	$1, %r13
-	jne	.L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@
-.L_partial_block_done_\@:
-.endm # PARTIAL_BLOCK
-
-/*
-* if a = number of total plaintext bytes
-* b = floor(a/16)
-* num_initial_blocks = b mod 4
-* encrypt the initial num_initial_blocks blocks and apply ghash on
-* the ciphertext
-* %r10, %r11, %r12, %rax, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm9 registers
-* are clobbered
-* arg1, %arg2, %arg3 are used as a pointer only, not modified
-*/
-
-
-.macro INITIAL_BLOCKS_ENC_DEC TMP1 TMP2 TMP3 TMP4 TMP5 XMM0 XMM1 \
-	XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMMDst TMP6 TMP7 i i_seq operation
-	MOVADQ		SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14
-
-	movdqu AadHash(%arg2), %xmm\i		    # XMM0 = Y0
-
-	# start AES for num_initial_blocks blocks
-
-	movdqu CurCount(%arg2), \XMM0                # XMM0 = Y0
-
-.if (\i == 5) || (\i == 6) || (\i == 7)
-
-	MOVADQ		ONE(%RIP),\TMP1
-	MOVADQ		0(%arg1),\TMP2
-.irpc index, \i_seq
-	paddd		\TMP1, \XMM0                 # INCR Y0
-.ifc \operation, dec
-        movdqa     \XMM0, %xmm\index
-.else
-	MOVADQ		\XMM0, %xmm\index
-.endif
-	pshufb	%xmm14, %xmm\index      # perform a 16 byte swap
-	pxor		\TMP2, %xmm\index
-.endr
-	lea	0x10(%arg1),%r10
-	mov	keysize,%eax
-	shr	$2,%eax				# 128->4, 192->6, 256->8
-	add	$5,%eax			      # 128->9, 192->11, 256->13
-
-.Laes_loop_initial_\@:
-	MOVADQ	(%r10),\TMP1
-.irpc	index, \i_seq
-	aesenc	\TMP1, %xmm\index
-.endr
-	add	$16,%r10
-	sub	$1,%eax
-	jnz	.Laes_loop_initial_\@
-
-	MOVADQ	(%r10), \TMP1
-.irpc index, \i_seq
-	aesenclast \TMP1, %xmm\index         # Last Round
-.endr
-.irpc index, \i_seq
-	movdqu	   (%arg4 , %r11, 1), \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP1, %xmm\index
-	movdqu	   %xmm\index, (%arg3 , %r11, 1)
-	# write back plaintext/ciphertext for num_initial_blocks
-	add	   $16, %r11
-
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	movdqa     \TMP1, %xmm\index
-.endif
-	pshufb	   %xmm14, %xmm\index
-
-		# prepare plaintext/ciphertext for GHASH computation
-.endr
-.endif
-
-        # apply GHASH on num_initial_blocks blocks
-
-.if \i == 5
-        pxor       %xmm5, %xmm6
-	GHASH_MUL  %xmm6, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1
-        pxor       %xmm6, %xmm7
-	GHASH_MUL  %xmm7, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1
-        pxor       %xmm7, %xmm8
-	GHASH_MUL  %xmm8, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1
-.elseif \i == 6
-        pxor       %xmm6, %xmm7
-	GHASH_MUL  %xmm7, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1
-        pxor       %xmm7, %xmm8
-	GHASH_MUL  %xmm8, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1
-.elseif \i == 7
-        pxor       %xmm7, %xmm8
-	GHASH_MUL  %xmm8, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1
-.endif
-	cmp	   $64, %r13
-	jl	.L_initial_blocks_done\@
-	# no need for precomputed values
-/*
-*
-* Precomputations for HashKey parallel with encryption of first 4 blocks.
-* Haskey_i_k holds XORed values of the low and high parts of the Haskey_i
-*/
-	MOVADQ	   ONE(%RIP),\TMP1
-	paddd	   \TMP1, \XMM0              # INCR Y0
-	MOVADQ	   \XMM0, \XMM1
-	pshufb  %xmm14, \XMM1        # perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	paddd	   \TMP1, \XMM0              # INCR Y0
-	MOVADQ	   \XMM0, \XMM2
-	pshufb  %xmm14, \XMM2        # perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	paddd	   \TMP1, \XMM0              # INCR Y0
-	MOVADQ	   \XMM0, \XMM3
-	pshufb %xmm14, \XMM3        # perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	paddd	   \TMP1, \XMM0              # INCR Y0
-	MOVADQ	   \XMM0, \XMM4
-	pshufb %xmm14, \XMM4        # perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	MOVADQ	   0(%arg1),\TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM1
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM2
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM3
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM4
-.irpc index, 1234 # do 4 rounds
-	movaps 0x10*\index(%arg1), \TMP1
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM1
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM2
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM3
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM4
-.endr
-.irpc index, 56789 # do next 5 rounds
-	movaps 0x10*\index(%arg1), \TMP1
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM1
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM2
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM3
-	aesenc	   \TMP1, \XMM4
-.endr
-	lea	   0xa0(%arg1),%r10
-	mov	   keysize,%eax
-	shr	   $2,%eax			# 128->4, 192->6, 256->8
-	sub	   $4,%eax			# 128->0, 192->2, 256->4
-	jz	   .Laes_loop_pre_done\@
-
-.Laes_loop_pre_\@:
-	MOVADQ	   (%r10),\TMP2
-.irpc	index, 1234
-	aesenc	   \TMP2, %xmm\index
-.endr
-	add	   $16,%r10
-	sub	   $1,%eax
-	jnz	   .Laes_loop_pre_\@
-
-.Laes_loop_pre_done\@:
-	MOVADQ	   (%r10), \TMP2
-	aesenclast \TMP2, \XMM1
-	aesenclast \TMP2, \XMM2
-	aesenclast \TMP2, \XMM3
-	aesenclast \TMP2, \XMM4
-	movdqu	   16*0(%arg4 , %r11 , 1), \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM1
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	movdqu     \XMM1, 16*0(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-	movdqa     \TMP1, \XMM1
-.endif
-	movdqu	   16*1(%arg4 , %r11 , 1), \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM2
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	movdqu     \XMM2, 16*1(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-	movdqa     \TMP1, \XMM2
-.endif
-	movdqu	   16*2(%arg4 , %r11 , 1), \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM3
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	movdqu     \XMM3, 16*2(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-	movdqa     \TMP1, \XMM3
-.endif
-	movdqu	   16*3(%arg4 , %r11 , 1), \TMP1
-	pxor	   \TMP1, \XMM4
-.ifc \operation, dec
-	movdqu     \XMM4, 16*3(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-	movdqa     \TMP1, \XMM4
-.else
-	movdqu     \XMM1, 16*0(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-	movdqu     \XMM2, 16*1(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-	movdqu     \XMM3, 16*2(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-	movdqu     \XMM4, 16*3(%arg3 , %r11 , 1)
-.endif
-
-	add	   $64, %r11
-	pshufb %xmm14, \XMM1 # perform a 16 byte swap
-	pxor	   \XMMDst, \XMM1
-# combine GHASHed value with the corresponding ciphertext
-	pshufb %xmm14, \XMM2 # perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm14, \XMM3 # perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm14, \XMM4 # perform a 16 byte swap
-
-.L_initial_blocks_done\@:
-
-.endm
-
-/*
-* encrypt 4 blocks at a time
-* ghash the 4 previously encrypted ciphertext blocks
-* arg1, %arg3, %arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified
-* %r11 is the data offset value
-*/
-.macro GHASH_4_ENCRYPT_4_PARALLEL_enc TMP1 TMP2 TMP3 TMP4 TMP5 \
-TMP6 XMM0 XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 operation
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM1, \XMM5
-	movdqa	  \XMM2, \XMM6
-	movdqa	  \XMM3, \XMM7
-	movdqa	  \XMM4, \XMM8
-
-        movdqa    SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm15
-        # multiply TMP5 * HashKey using karatsuba
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM5, \TMP4
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM5, \TMP6
-	pxor	  \XMM5, \TMP6
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqu	  HashKey_4(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP4           # TMP4 = a1*b1
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM1
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM2
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM3
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM4
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM1	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM5           # XMM5 = a0*b0
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM2	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM3	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM4	# perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM1
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM2
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM3
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM4
-	movdqu	  HashKey_4_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP6       # TMP6 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movaps 0x10(%arg1), \TMP1
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM1              # Round 1
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM4
-	movaps 0x20(%arg1), \TMP1
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM1              # Round 2
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM4
-	movdqa	  \XMM6, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM6, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM6, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey_3(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1       # TMP1 = a1 * b1
-	movaps 0x30(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 3
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM6       # XMM6 = a0*b0
-	movaps 0x40(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 4
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	movdqu	  HashKey_3_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movaps 0x50(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 5
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP4
-# accumulate the results in TMP4:XMM5, TMP6 holds the middle part
-	pxor	  \XMM6, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP6
-	movdqa	  \XMM7, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM7, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM7, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey_2(%arg2), \TMP5
-
-        # Multiply TMP5 * HashKey using karatsuba
-
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1       # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	movaps 0x60(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 6
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM7       # XMM7 = a0*b0
-	movaps 0x70(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 7
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	movdqu	  HashKey_2_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movaps 0x80(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 8
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP4
-# accumulate the results in TMP4:XMM5, TMP6 holds the middle part
-	pxor	  \XMM7, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP6
-
-        # Multiply XMM8 * HashKey
-        # XMM8 and TMP5 hold the values for the two operands
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM8, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM8, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM8, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1      # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	movaps 0x90(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1             # Round 9
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM8      # XMM8 = a0*b0
-	lea	  0xa0(%arg1),%r10
-	mov	  keysize,%eax
-	shr	  $2,%eax			# 128->4, 192->6, 256->8
-	sub	  $4,%eax			# 128->0, 192->2, 256->4
-	jz	  .Laes_loop_par_enc_done\@
-
-.Laes_loop_par_enc\@:
-	MOVADQ	  (%r10),\TMP3
-.irpc	index, 1234
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, %xmm\index
-.endr
-	add	  $16,%r10
-	sub	  $1,%eax
-	jnz	  .Laes_loop_par_enc\@
-
-.Laes_loop_par_enc_done\@:
-	MOVADQ	  (%r10), \TMP3
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM1           # Round 10
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM4
-	movdqu    HashKey_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP2          # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movdqu	  (%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM1                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-	movdqu	  16(%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM2                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-	movdqu	  32(%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM3                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-	movdqu	  48(%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM4                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-        movdqu    \XMM1, (%arg3,%r11,1)        # Write to the ciphertext buffer
-        movdqu    \XMM2, 16(%arg3,%r11,1)      # Write to the ciphertext buffer
-        movdqu    \XMM3, 32(%arg3,%r11,1)      # Write to the ciphertext buffer
-        movdqu    \XMM4, 48(%arg3,%r11,1)      # Write to the ciphertext buffer
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM1        # perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM2	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM3	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM4	# perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	pxor	  \TMP4, \TMP1
-	pxor	  \XMM8, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP6, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM5, \TMP2
-	movdqa	  \TMP2, \TMP3
-	pslldq	  $8, \TMP3                    # left shift TMP3 2 DWs
-	psrldq	  $8, \TMP2                    # right shift TMP2 2 DWs
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP1	  # accumulate the results in TMP1:XMM5
-
-        # first phase of reduction
-
-	movdqa    \XMM5, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \XMM5, \TMP3
-	movdqa    \XMM5, \TMP4
-# move XMM5 into TMP2, TMP3, TMP4 in order to perform shifts independently
-	pslld     $31, \TMP2                   # packed right shift << 31
-	pslld     $30, \TMP3                   # packed right shift << 30
-	pslld     $25, \TMP4                   # packed right shift << 25
-	pxor      \TMP3, \TMP2	               # xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \TMP2, \TMP5
-	psrldq    $4, \TMP5                    # right shift T5 1 DW
-	pslldq    $12, \TMP2                   # left shift T2 3 DWs
-	pxor      \TMP2, \XMM5
-
-        # second phase of reduction
-
-	movdqa    \XMM5,\TMP2 # make 3 copies of XMM5 into TMP2, TMP3, TMP4
-	movdqa    \XMM5,\TMP3
-	movdqa    \XMM5,\TMP4
-	psrld     $1, \TMP2                    # packed left shift >>1
-	psrld     $2, \TMP3                    # packed left shift >>2
-	psrld     $7, \TMP4                    # packed left shift >>7
-	pxor      \TMP3,\TMP2		       # xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4,\TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP5, \TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP2, \XMM5
-	pxor      \TMP1, \XMM5                 # result is in TMP1
-
-	pxor	  \XMM5, \XMM1
-.endm
-
-/*
-* decrypt 4 blocks at a time
-* ghash the 4 previously decrypted ciphertext blocks
-* arg1, %arg3, %arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified
-* %r11 is the data offset value
-*/
-.macro GHASH_4_ENCRYPT_4_PARALLEL_dec TMP1 TMP2 TMP3 TMP4 TMP5 \
-TMP6 XMM0 XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 operation
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM1, \XMM5
-	movdqa	  \XMM2, \XMM6
-	movdqa	  \XMM3, \XMM7
-	movdqa	  \XMM4, \XMM8
-
-        movdqa    SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm15
-        # multiply TMP5 * HashKey using karatsuba
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM5, \TMP4
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM5, \TMP6
-	pxor	  \XMM5, \TMP6
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqu	  HashKey_4(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP4           # TMP4 = a1*b1
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM1
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM2
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM3
-	paddd     ONE(%rip), \XMM0		# INCR CNT
-	movdqa    \XMM0, \XMM4
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM1	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM5           # XMM5 = a0*b0
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM2	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM3	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM4	# perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM1
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM2
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM3
-	pxor	  (%arg1), \XMM4
-	movdqu	  HashKey_4_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP6       # TMP6 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movaps 0x10(%arg1), \TMP1
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM1              # Round 1
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM4
-	movaps 0x20(%arg1), \TMP1
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM1              # Round 2
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP1, \XMM4
-	movdqa	  \XMM6, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM6, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM6, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey_3(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1       # TMP1 = a1 * b1
-	movaps 0x30(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 3
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc    \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM6       # XMM6 = a0*b0
-	movaps 0x40(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 4
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	movdqu	  HashKey_3_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movaps 0x50(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 5
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP4
-# accumulate the results in TMP4:XMM5, TMP6 holds the middle part
-	pxor	  \XMM6, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP6
-	movdqa	  \XMM7, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM7, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM7, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey_2(%arg2), \TMP5
-
-        # Multiply TMP5 * HashKey using karatsuba
-
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1       # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	movaps 0x60(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 6
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM7       # XMM7 = a0*b0
-	movaps 0x70(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 7
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	movdqu	  HashKey_2_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movaps 0x80(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1              # Round 8
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP4
-# accumulate the results in TMP4:XMM5, TMP6 holds the middle part
-	pxor	  \XMM7, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP6
-
-        # Multiply XMM8 * HashKey
-        # XMM8 and TMP5 hold the values for the two operands
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM8, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM8, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM8, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1      # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	movaps 0x90(%arg1), \TMP3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM1             # Round 9
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM8      # XMM8 = a0*b0
-	lea	  0xa0(%arg1),%r10
-	mov	  keysize,%eax
-	shr	  $2,%eax		        # 128->4, 192->6, 256->8
-	sub	  $4,%eax			# 128->0, 192->2, 256->4
-	jz	  .Laes_loop_par_dec_done\@
-
-.Laes_loop_par_dec\@:
-	MOVADQ	  (%r10),\TMP3
-.irpc	index, 1234
-	aesenc	  \TMP3, %xmm\index
-.endr
-	add	  $16,%r10
-	sub	  $1,%eax
-	jnz	  .Laes_loop_par_dec\@
-
-.Laes_loop_par_dec_done\@:
-	MOVADQ	  (%r10), \TMP3
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM1           # last round
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM2
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM3
-	aesenclast \TMP3, \XMM4
-	movdqu    HashKey_k(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \TMP2          # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movdqu	  (%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM1                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-	movdqu	  \XMM1, (%arg3,%r11,1)        # Write to plaintext buffer
-	movdqa    \TMP3, \XMM1
-	movdqu	  16(%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM2                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-	movdqu	  \XMM2, 16(%arg3,%r11,1)      # Write to plaintext buffer
-	movdqa    \TMP3, \XMM2
-	movdqu	  32(%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM3                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-	movdqu	  \XMM3, 32(%arg3,%r11,1)      # Write to plaintext buffer
-	movdqa    \TMP3, \XMM3
-	movdqu	  48(%arg4,%r11,1), \TMP3
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM4                 # Ciphertext/Plaintext XOR EK
-	movdqu	  \XMM4, 48(%arg3,%r11,1)      # Write to plaintext buffer
-	movdqa    \TMP3, \XMM4
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM1        # perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM2	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM3	# perform a 16 byte swap
-	pshufb %xmm15, \XMM4	# perform a 16 byte swap
-
-	pxor	  \TMP4, \TMP1
-	pxor	  \XMM8, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP6, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM5, \TMP2
-	movdqa	  \TMP2, \TMP3
-	pslldq	  $8, \TMP3                    # left shift TMP3 2 DWs
-	psrldq	  $8, \TMP2                    # right shift TMP2 2 DWs
-	pxor	  \TMP3, \XMM5
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP1	  # accumulate the results in TMP1:XMM5
-
-        # first phase of reduction
-
-	movdqa    \XMM5, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \XMM5, \TMP3
-	movdqa    \XMM5, \TMP4
-# move XMM5 into TMP2, TMP3, TMP4 in order to perform shifts independently
-	pslld     $31, \TMP2                   # packed right shift << 31
-	pslld     $30, \TMP3                   # packed right shift << 30
-	pslld     $25, \TMP4                   # packed right shift << 25
-	pxor      \TMP3, \TMP2	               # xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \TMP2, \TMP5
-	psrldq    $4, \TMP5                    # right shift T5 1 DW
-	pslldq    $12, \TMP2                   # left shift T2 3 DWs
-	pxor      \TMP2, \XMM5
-
-        # second phase of reduction
-
-	movdqa    \XMM5,\TMP2 # make 3 copies of XMM5 into TMP2, TMP3, TMP4
-	movdqa    \XMM5,\TMP3
-	movdqa    \XMM5,\TMP4
-	psrld     $1, \TMP2                    # packed left shift >>1
-	psrld     $2, \TMP3                    # packed left shift >>2
-	psrld     $7, \TMP4                    # packed left shift >>7
-	pxor      \TMP3,\TMP2		       # xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4,\TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP5, \TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP2, \XMM5
-	pxor      \TMP1, \XMM5                 # result is in TMP1
-
-	pxor	  \XMM5, \XMM1
-.endm
-
-/* GHASH the last 4 ciphertext blocks. */
-.macro	GHASH_LAST_4 TMP1 TMP2 TMP3 TMP4 TMP5 TMP6 \
-TMP7 XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMMDst
-
-        # Multiply TMP6 * HashKey (using Karatsuba)
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM1, \TMP6
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM1, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM1, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey_4(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP6       # TMP6 = a1*b1
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM1       # XMM1 = a0*b0
-	movdqu	  HashKey_4_k(%arg2), \TMP4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP4, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	movdqa	  \XMM1, \XMMDst
-	movdqa	  \TMP2, \XMM1              # result in TMP6, XMMDst, XMM1
-
-        # Multiply TMP1 * HashKey (using Karatsuba)
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM2, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM2, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM2, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey_3(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1       # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM2       # XMM2 = a0*b0
-	movdqu	  HashKey_3_k(%arg2), \TMP4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP4, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP6
-	pxor	  \XMM2, \XMMDst
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \XMM1
-# results accumulated in TMP6, XMMDst, XMM1
-
-        # Multiply TMP1 * HashKey (using Karatsuba)
-
-	movdqa	  \XMM3, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM3, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM3, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey_2(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1       # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM3       # XMM3 = a0*b0
-	movdqu	  HashKey_2_k(%arg2), \TMP4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP4, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP6
-	pxor	  \XMM3, \XMMDst
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \XMM1   # results accumulated in TMP6, XMMDst, XMM1
-
-        # Multiply TMP1 * HashKey (using Karatsuba)
-	movdqa	  \XMM4, \TMP1
-	pshufd	  $78, \XMM4, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMM4, \TMP2
-	movdqu	  HashKey(%arg2), \TMP5
-	pclmulqdq $0x11, \TMP5, \TMP1	    # TMP1 = a1*b1
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP5, \XMM4       # XMM4 = a0*b0
-	movdqu	  HashKey_k(%arg2), \TMP4
-	pclmulqdq $0x00, \TMP4, \TMP2       # TMP2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-	pxor	  \TMP1, \TMP6
-	pxor	  \XMM4, \XMMDst
-	pxor	  \XMM1, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \TMP6, \TMP2
-	pxor	  \XMMDst, \TMP2
-	# middle section of the temp results combined as in karatsuba algorithm
-	movdqa	  \TMP2, \TMP4
-	pslldq	  $8, \TMP4                 # left shift TMP4 2 DWs
-	psrldq	  $8, \TMP2                 # right shift TMP2 2 DWs
-	pxor	  \TMP4, \XMMDst
-	pxor	  \TMP2, \TMP6
-# TMP6:XMMDst holds the result of the accumulated carry-less multiplications
-	# first phase of the reduction
-	movdqa    \XMMDst, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \XMMDst, \TMP3
-	movdqa    \XMMDst, \TMP4
-# move XMMDst into TMP2, TMP3, TMP4 in order to perform 3 shifts independently
-	pslld     $31, \TMP2                # packed right shifting << 31
-	pslld     $30, \TMP3                # packed right shifting << 30
-	pslld     $25, \TMP4                # packed right shifting << 25
-	pxor      \TMP3, \TMP2              # xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4, \TMP2
-	movdqa    \TMP2, \TMP7
-	psrldq    $4, \TMP7                 # right shift TMP7 1 DW
-	pslldq    $12, \TMP2                # left shift TMP2 3 DWs
-	pxor      \TMP2, \XMMDst
-
-        # second phase of the reduction
-	movdqa    \XMMDst, \TMP2
-	# make 3 copies of XMMDst for doing 3 shift operations
-	movdqa    \XMMDst, \TMP3
-	movdqa    \XMMDst, \TMP4
-	psrld     $1, \TMP2                 # packed left shift >> 1
-	psrld     $2, \TMP3                 # packed left shift >> 2
-	psrld     $7, \TMP4                 # packed left shift >> 7
-	pxor      \TMP3, \TMP2              # xor the shifted versions
-	pxor      \TMP4, \TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP7, \TMP2
-	pxor      \TMP2, \XMMDst
-	pxor      \TMP6, \XMMDst            # reduced result is in XMMDst
-.endm
-
-
-/* Encryption of a single block
-* uses eax & r10
-*/
-
-.macro ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK XMM0 TMP1
-
-	pxor		(%arg1), \XMM0
-	mov		keysize,%eax
-	shr		$2,%eax			# 128->4, 192->6, 256->8
-	add		$5,%eax			# 128->9, 192->11, 256->13
-	lea		16(%arg1), %r10	  # get first expanded key address
-
-_esb_loop_\@:
-	MOVADQ		(%r10),\TMP1
-	aesenc		\TMP1,\XMM0
-	add		$16,%r10
-	sub		$1,%eax
-	jnz		_esb_loop_\@
-
-	MOVADQ		(%r10),\TMP1
-	aesenclast	\TMP1,\XMM0
-.endm
-
-/*****************************************************************************
-* void aesni_gcm_init(void *aes_ctx,      // AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
-*                     struct gcm_context_data *data,
-*                                         // context data
-*                     u8 *iv,             // Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt (from Security Association)
-*                                         // concatenated with 8 byte Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
-*                                         // concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer.
-*                     u8 *hash_subkey,    // H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary.
-*                     const u8 *aad,      // Additional Authentication Data (AAD)
-*                     u64 aad_len)        // Length of AAD in bytes.
-*/
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_init)
-	FUNC_SAVE
-	GCM_INIT %arg3, %arg4,%arg5, %arg6
-	FUNC_RESTORE
-	RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_init)
-
-/*****************************************************************************
-* void aesni_gcm_enc_update(void *aes_ctx,      // AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
-*                    struct gcm_context_data *data,
-*                                        // context data
-*                    u8 *out,            // Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed.
-*                    const u8 *in,       // Plaintext input
-*                    u64 plaintext_len,  // Length of data in bytes for encryption.
-*/
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc_update)
-	FUNC_SAVE
-	GCM_ENC_DEC enc
-	FUNC_RESTORE
-	RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc_update)
-
-/*****************************************************************************
-* void aesni_gcm_dec_update(void *aes_ctx,      // AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
-*                    struct gcm_context_data *data,
-*                                        // context data
-*                    u8 *out,            // Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed.
-*                    const u8 *in,       // Plaintext input
-*                    u64 plaintext_len,  // Length of data in bytes for encryption.
-*/
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec_update)
-	FUNC_SAVE
-	GCM_ENC_DEC dec
-	FUNC_RESTORE
-	RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec_update)
-
-/*****************************************************************************
-* void aesni_gcm_finalize(void *aes_ctx,      // AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
-*                    struct gcm_context_data *data,
-*                                        // context data
-*                    u8 *auth_tag,       // Authenticated Tag output.
-*                    u64 auth_tag_len);  // Authenticated Tag Length in bytes. Valid values are 16 (most likely),
-*                                        // 12 or 8.
-*/
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_finalize)
-	FUNC_SAVE
-	GCM_COMPLETE %arg3 %arg4
-	FUNC_RESTORE
-	RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_finalize)
-
-#endif
-
 SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_256a)
 	pshufd $0b11111111, %xmm1, %xmm1
 	shufps $0b00010000, %xmm0, %xmm4
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c9749ed0651..000000000000
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2804 +0,0 @@
-########################################################################
-# Copyright (c) 2013, Intel Corporation
-#
-# This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
-# licenses.  You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
-# General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
-# COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
-# OpenIB.org BSD license below:
-#
-# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
-# met:
-#
-# * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-#   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-#
-# * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-#   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-#   documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-#   distribution.
-#
-# * Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its
-#   contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
-#   this software without specific prior written permission.
-#
-#
-# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY
-# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-# PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR
-# CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
-# EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
-# PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
-# PROFITS# OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
-# NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
-# SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-########################################################################
-##
-## Authors:
-##	Erdinc Ozturk <erdinc.ozturk@intel.com>
-##	Vinodh Gopal <vinodh.gopal@intel.com>
-##	James Guilford <james.guilford@intel.com>
-##	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
-##
-## References:
-##       This code was derived and highly optimized from the code described in paper:
-##               Vinodh Gopal et. al. Optimized Galois-Counter-Mode Implementation
-##			on Intel Architecture Processors. August, 2010
-##       The details of the implementation is explained in:
-##               Erdinc Ozturk et. al. Enabling High-Performance Galois-Counter-Mode
-##			on Intel Architecture Processors. October, 2012.
-##
-## Assumptions:
-##
-##
-##
-## iv:
-##       0                   1                   2                   3
-##       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                             Salt  (From the SA)               |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                     Initialization Vector                     |
-##       |         (This is the sequence number from IPSec header)       |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                              0x1                              |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##
-##
-##
-## AAD:
-##       AAD padded to 128 bits with 0
-##       for example, assume AAD is a u32 vector
-##
-##       if AAD is 8 bytes:
-##       AAD[3] = {A0, A1}#
-##       padded AAD in xmm register = {A1 A0 0 0}
-##
-##       0                   1                   2                   3
-##       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                               SPI (A1)                        |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                     32-bit Sequence Number (A0)               |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                              0x0                              |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##
-##                                       AAD Format with 32-bit Sequence Number
-##
-##       if AAD is 12 bytes:
-##       AAD[3] = {A0, A1, A2}#
-##       padded AAD in xmm register = {A2 A1 A0 0}
-##
-##       0                   1                   2                   3
-##       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                               SPI (A2)                        |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                 64-bit Extended Sequence Number {A1,A0}       |
-##       |                                                               |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##       |                              0x0                              |
-##       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-##
-##        AAD Format with 64-bit Extended Sequence Number
-##
-##
-## aadLen:
-##       from the definition of the spec, aadLen can only be 8 or 12 bytes.
-##	 The code additionally supports aadLen of length 16 bytes.
-##
-## TLen:
-##       from the definition of the spec, TLen can only be 8, 12 or 16 bytes.
-##
-## poly = x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1
-## throughout the code, one tab and two tab indentations are used. one tab is
-## for GHASH part, two tabs is for AES part.
-##
-
-#include <linux/linkage.h>
-
-# constants in mergeable sections, linker can reorder and merge
-.section	.rodata.cst16.POLY, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-POLY:            .octa     0xC2000000000000000000000000000001
-
-.section	.rodata.cst16.POLY2, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-POLY2:           .octa     0xC20000000000000000000001C2000000
-
-.section	.rodata.cst16.TWOONE, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-TWOONE:          .octa     0x00000001000000000000000000000001
-
-.section	.rodata.cst16.SHUF_MASK, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-SHUF_MASK:       .octa     0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-
-.section	.rodata.cst16.ONE, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-ONE:             .octa     0x00000000000000000000000000000001
-
-.section	.rodata.cst16.ONEf, "aM", @progbits, 16
-.align 16
-ONEf:            .octa     0x01000000000000000000000000000000
-
-# order of these constants should not change.
-# more specifically, ALL_F should follow SHIFT_MASK, and zero should follow ALL_F
-.section	.rodata, "a", @progbits
-.align 16
-SHIFT_MASK:      .octa     0x0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100
-ALL_F:           .octa     0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
-                 .octa     0x00000000000000000000000000000000
-
-.text
-
-
-#define AadHash 16*0
-#define AadLen 16*1
-#define InLen (16*1)+8
-#define PBlockEncKey 16*2
-#define OrigIV 16*3
-#define CurCount 16*4
-#define PBlockLen 16*5
-
-HashKey        = 16*6   # store HashKey <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_2      = 16*7   # store HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_3      = 16*8   # store HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_4      = 16*9   # store HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_5      = 16*10   # store HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_6      = 16*11   # store HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_7      = 16*12   # store HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_8      = 16*13   # store HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here
-HashKey_k      = 16*14   # store XOR of HashKey <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-HashKey_2_k    = 16*15   # store XOR of HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-HashKey_3_k    = 16*16   # store XOR of HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-HashKey_4_k    = 16*17   # store XOR of HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-HashKey_5_k    = 16*18   # store XOR of HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-HashKey_6_k    = 16*19   # store XOR of HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-HashKey_7_k    = 16*20   # store XOR of HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-HashKey_8_k    = 16*21   # store XOR of HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes)
-
-#define arg1 %rdi
-#define arg2 %rsi
-#define arg3 %rdx
-#define arg4 %rcx
-#define arg5 %r8
-#define arg6 %r9
-#define keysize 2*15*16(arg1)
-
-i = 0
-j = 0
-
-out_order = 0
-in_order = 1
-DEC = 0
-ENC = 1
-
-.macro define_reg r n
-reg_\r = %xmm\n
-.endm
-
-.macro setreg
-.altmacro
-define_reg i %i
-define_reg j %j
-.noaltmacro
-.endm
-
-TMP1 =   16*0    # Temporary storage for AAD
-TMP2 =   16*1    # Temporary storage for AES State 2 (State 1 is stored in an XMM register)
-TMP3 =   16*2    # Temporary storage for AES State 3
-TMP4 =   16*3    # Temporary storage for AES State 4
-TMP5 =   16*4    # Temporary storage for AES State 5
-TMP6 =   16*5    # Temporary storage for AES State 6
-TMP7 =   16*6    # Temporary storage for AES State 7
-TMP8 =   16*7    # Temporary storage for AES State 8
-
-VARIABLE_OFFSET = 16*8
-
-################################
-# Utility Macros
-################################
-
-.macro FUNC_SAVE
-        push    %r12
-        push    %r13
-        push    %r15
-
-	push	%rbp
-	mov	%rsp, %rbp
-
-        sub     $VARIABLE_OFFSET, %rsp
-        and     $~63, %rsp                    # align rsp to 64 bytes
-.endm
-
-.macro FUNC_RESTORE
-        mov     %rbp, %rsp
-	pop	%rbp
-
-        pop     %r15
-        pop     %r13
-        pop     %r12
-.endm
-
-# Encryption of a single block
-.macro ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK REP XMM0
-                vpxor    (arg1), \XMM0, \XMM0
-               i = 1
-               setreg
-.rep \REP
-                vaesenc  16*i(arg1), \XMM0, \XMM0
-               i = (i+1)
-               setreg
-.endr
-                vaesenclast 16*i(arg1), \XMM0, \XMM0
-.endm
-
-# combined for GCM encrypt and decrypt functions
-# clobbering all xmm registers
-# clobbering r10, r11, r12, r13, r15, rax
-.macro  GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL GHASH_LAST_8 GHASH_MUL ENC_DEC REP
-        vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), %xmm8
-        vmovdqu  HashKey(arg2), %xmm13      # xmm13 = HashKey
-        add arg5, InLen(arg2)
-
-        # initialize the data pointer offset as zero
-        xor     %r11d, %r11d
-
-        PARTIAL_BLOCK \GHASH_MUL, arg3, arg4, arg5, %r11, %xmm8, \ENC_DEC
-        sub %r11, arg5
-
-        mov     arg5, %r13                  # save the number of bytes of plaintext/ciphertext
-        and     $-16, %r13                  # r13 = r13 - (r13 mod 16)
-
-        mov     %r13, %r12
-        shr     $4, %r12
-        and     $7, %r12
-        jz      .L_initial_num_blocks_is_0\@
-
-        cmp     $7, %r12
-        je      .L_initial_num_blocks_is_7\@
-        cmp     $6, %r12
-        je      .L_initial_num_blocks_is_6\@
-        cmp     $5, %r12
-        je      .L_initial_num_blocks_is_5\@
-        cmp     $4, %r12
-        je      .L_initial_num_blocks_is_4\@
-        cmp     $3, %r12
-        je      .L_initial_num_blocks_is_3\@
-        cmp     $2, %r12
-        je      .L_initial_num_blocks_is_2\@
-
-        jmp     .L_initial_num_blocks_is_1\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_7\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 7, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-        sub     $16*7, %r13
-        jmp     .L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_6\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 6, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-        sub     $16*6, %r13
-        jmp     .L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_5\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 5, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-        sub     $16*5, %r13
-        jmp     .L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_4\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 4, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-        sub     $16*4, %r13
-        jmp     .L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_3\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 3, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-        sub     $16*3, %r13
-        jmp     .L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_2\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 2, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-        sub     $16*2, %r13
-        jmp     .L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_1\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 1, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-        sub     $16*1, %r13
-        jmp     .L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@
-
-.L_initial_num_blocks_is_0\@:
-        \INITIAL_BLOCKS  \REP, 0, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC
-
-
-.L_initial_blocks_encrypted\@:
-        test    %r13, %r13
-        je      .L_zero_cipher_left\@
-
-        sub     $128, %r13
-        je      .L_eight_cipher_left\@
-
-
-
-
-        vmovd   %xmm9, %r15d
-        and     $255, %r15d
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9
-
-
-.L_encrypt_by_8_new\@:
-        cmp     $(255-8), %r15d
-        jg      .L_encrypt_by_8\@
-
-
-
-        add     $8, %r15b
-        \GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL      \REP, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, out_order, \ENC_DEC
-        add     $128, %r11
-        sub     $128, %r13
-        jne     .L_encrypt_by_8_new\@
-
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9
-        jmp     .L_eight_cipher_left\@
-
-.L_encrypt_by_8\@:
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9
-        add     $8, %r15b
-        \GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL      \REP, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, in_order, \ENC_DEC
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9
-        add     $128, %r11
-        sub     $128, %r13
-        jne     .L_encrypt_by_8_new\@
-
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9
-
-
-
-
-.L_eight_cipher_left\@:
-        \GHASH_LAST_8    %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8
-
-
-.L_zero_cipher_left\@:
-        vmovdqu %xmm14, AadHash(arg2)
-        vmovdqu %xmm9, CurCount(arg2)
-
-        # check for 0 length
-        mov     arg5, %r13
-        and     $15, %r13                            # r13 = (arg5 mod 16)
-
-        je      .L_multiple_of_16_bytes\@
-
-        # handle the last <16 Byte block separately
-
-        mov %r13, PBlockLen(arg2)
-
-        vpaddd  ONE(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9              # INCR CNT to get Yn
-        vmovdqu %xmm9, CurCount(arg2)
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9
-
-        ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK    \REP, %xmm9                # E(K, Yn)
-        vmovdqu %xmm9, PBlockEncKey(arg2)
-
-        cmp $16, arg5
-        jge .L_large_enough_update\@
-
-        lea (arg4,%r11,1), %r10
-        mov %r13, %r12
-
-        READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm1
-
-        lea     SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12
-        sub     %r13, %r12                           # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be
-						     # able to shift 16-r13 bytes (r13 is the
-	# number of bytes in plaintext mod 16)
-
-        jmp .L_final_ghash_mul\@
-
-.L_large_enough_update\@:
-        sub $16, %r11
-        add %r13, %r11
-
-        # receive the last <16 Byte block
-        vmovdqu	(arg4, %r11, 1), %xmm1
-
-        sub	%r13, %r11
-        add	$16, %r11
-
-        lea	SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12
-        # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift 16-r13 bytes
-        # (r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16)
-        sub	%r13, %r12
-        # get the appropriate shuffle mask
-        vmovdqu	(%r12), %xmm2
-        # shift right 16-r13 bytes
-        vpshufb  %xmm2, %xmm1, %xmm1
-
-.L_final_ghash_mul\@:
-        .if  \ENC_DEC ==  DEC
-        vmovdqa %xmm1, %xmm2
-        vpxor   %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9                  # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn)
-        vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1        # get the appropriate mask to
-						     # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9
-        vpand   %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9                  # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9
-        vpand   %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2
-        vpxor   %xmm2, %xmm14, %xmm14
-
-        vmovdqu %xmm14, AadHash(arg2)
-        .else
-        vpxor   %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9                  # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn)
-        vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1        # get the appropriate mask to
-						     # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9
-        vpand   %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9                  # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9
-        vpxor   %xmm9, %xmm14, %xmm14
-
-        vmovdqu %xmm14, AadHash(arg2)
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9        # shuffle xmm9 back to output as ciphertext
-        .endif
-
-
-        #############################
-        # output r13 Bytes
-        vmovq   %xmm9, %rax
-        cmp     $8, %r13
-        jle     .L_less_than_8_bytes_left\@
-
-        mov     %rax, (arg3 , %r11)
-        add     $8, %r11
-        vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        vmovq   %xmm9, %rax
-        sub     $8, %r13
-
-.L_less_than_8_bytes_left\@:
-        movb    %al, (arg3 , %r11)
-        add     $1, %r11
-        shr     $8, %rax
-        sub     $1, %r13
-        jne     .L_less_than_8_bytes_left\@
-        #############################
-
-.L_multiple_of_16_bytes\@:
-.endm
-
-
-# GCM_COMPLETE Finishes update of tag of last partial block
-# Output: Authorization Tag (AUTH_TAG)
-# Clobbers rax, r10-r12, and xmm0, xmm1, xmm5-xmm15
-.macro GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL REP AUTH_TAG AUTH_TAG_LEN
-        vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), %xmm14
-        vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13
-
-        mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r12
-        test %r12, %r12
-        je .L_partial_done\@
-
-	#GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
-        \GHASH_MUL       %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
-
-.L_partial_done\@:
-        mov AadLen(arg2), %r12                          # r12 = aadLen (number of bytes)
-        shl     $3, %r12                             # convert into number of bits
-        vmovd   %r12d, %xmm15                        # len(A) in xmm15
-
-        mov InLen(arg2), %r12
-        shl     $3, %r12                        # len(C) in bits  (*128)
-        vmovq   %r12, %xmm1
-        vpslldq $8, %xmm15, %xmm15                   # xmm15 = len(A)|| 0x0000000000000000
-        vpxor   %xmm1, %xmm15, %xmm15                # xmm15 = len(A)||len(C)
-
-        vpxor   %xmm15, %xmm14, %xmm14
-        \GHASH_MUL       %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6    # final GHASH computation
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14, %xmm14      # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-        vmovdqu OrigIV(arg2), %xmm9
-
-        ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK    \REP, %xmm9                # E(K, Y0)
-
-        vpxor   %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm9
-
-
-
-.L_return_T\@:
-        mov     \AUTH_TAG, %r10              # r10 = authTag
-        mov     \AUTH_TAG_LEN, %r11              # r11 = auth_tag_len
-
-        cmp     $16, %r11
-        je      .L_T_16\@
-
-        cmp     $8, %r11
-        jl      .L_T_4\@
-
-.L_T_8\@:
-        vmovq   %xmm9, %rax
-        mov     %rax, (%r10)
-        add     $8, %r10
-        sub     $8, %r11
-        vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        test    %r11, %r11
-        je     .L_return_T_done\@
-.L_T_4\@:
-        vmovd   %xmm9, %eax
-        mov     %eax, (%r10)
-        add     $4, %r10
-        sub     $4, %r11
-        vpsrldq     $4, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        test    %r11, %r11
-        je     .L_return_T_done\@
-.L_T_123\@:
-        vmovd     %xmm9, %eax
-        cmp     $2, %r11
-        jl     .L_T_1\@
-        mov     %ax, (%r10)
-        cmp     $2, %r11
-        je     .L_return_T_done\@
-        add     $2, %r10
-        sar     $16, %eax
-.L_T_1\@:
-        mov     %al, (%r10)
-        jmp     .L_return_T_done\@
-
-.L_T_16\@:
-        vmovdqu %xmm9, (%r10)
-
-.L_return_T_done\@:
-.endm
-
-.macro CALC_AAD_HASH GHASH_MUL AAD AADLEN T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
-
-	mov     \AAD, %r10                      # r10 = AAD
-	mov     \AADLEN, %r12                      # r12 = aadLen
-
-
-	mov     %r12, %r11
-
-	vpxor   \T8, \T8, \T8
-	vpxor   \T7, \T7, \T7
-	cmp     $16, %r11
-	jl      .L_get_AAD_rest8\@
-.L_get_AAD_blocks\@:
-	vmovdqu (%r10), \T7
-	vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \T7, \T7
-	vpxor   \T7, \T8, \T8
-	\GHASH_MUL       \T8, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6
-	add     $16, %r10
-	sub     $16, %r12
-	sub     $16, %r11
-	cmp     $16, %r11
-	jge     .L_get_AAD_blocks\@
-	vmovdqu \T8, \T7
-	test    %r11, %r11
-	je      .L_get_AAD_done\@
-
-	vpxor   \T7, \T7, \T7
-
-	/* read the last <16B of AAD. since we have at least 4B of
-	data right after the AAD (the ICV, and maybe some CT), we can
-	read 4B/8B blocks safely, and then get rid of the extra stuff */
-.L_get_AAD_rest8\@:
-	cmp     $4, %r11
-	jle     .L_get_AAD_rest4\@
-	movq    (%r10), \T1
-	add     $8, %r10
-	sub     $8, %r11
-	vpslldq $8, \T1, \T1
-	vpsrldq $8, \T7, \T7
-	vpxor   \T1, \T7, \T7
-	jmp     .L_get_AAD_rest8\@
-.L_get_AAD_rest4\@:
-	test    %r11, %r11
-	jle     .L_get_AAD_rest0\@
-	mov     (%r10), %eax
-	movq    %rax, \T1
-	add     $4, %r10
-	sub     $4, %r11
-	vpslldq $12, \T1, \T1
-	vpsrldq $4, \T7, \T7
-	vpxor   \T1, \T7, \T7
-.L_get_AAD_rest0\@:
-	/* finalize: shift out the extra bytes we read, and align
-	left. since pslldq can only shift by an immediate, we use
-	vpshufb and a pair of shuffle masks */
-	leaq	ALL_F(%rip), %r11
-	subq	%r12, %r11
-	vmovdqu	16(%r11), \T1
-	andq	$~3, %r11
-	vpshufb (%r11), \T7, \T7
-	vpand	\T1, \T7, \T7
-.L_get_AAD_rest_final\@:
-	vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \T7, \T7
-	vpxor   \T8, \T7, \T7
-	\GHASH_MUL       \T7, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6
-
-.L_get_AAD_done\@:
-        vmovdqu \T7, AadHash(arg2)
-.endm
-
-.macro INIT GHASH_MUL PRECOMPUTE
-        mov arg6, %r11
-        mov %r11, AadLen(arg2) # ctx_data.aad_length = aad_length
-        xor %r11d, %r11d
-        mov %r11, InLen(arg2) # ctx_data.in_length = 0
-
-        mov %r11, PBlockLen(arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_length = 0
-        mov %r11, PBlockEncKey(arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_enc_key = 0
-        mov arg3, %rax
-        movdqu (%rax), %xmm0
-        movdqu %xmm0, OrigIV(arg2) # ctx_data.orig_IV = iv
-
-        vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm0
-        movdqu %xmm0, CurCount(arg2) # ctx_data.current_counter = iv
-
-        vmovdqu  (arg4), %xmm6              # xmm6 = HashKey
-
-        vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm6, %xmm6
-        ###############  PRECOMPUTATION of HashKey<<1 mod poly from the HashKey
-        vmovdqa  %xmm6, %xmm2
-        vpsllq   $1, %xmm6, %xmm6
-        vpsrlq   $63, %xmm2, %xmm2
-        vmovdqa  %xmm2, %xmm1
-        vpslldq  $8, %xmm2, %xmm2
-        vpsrldq  $8, %xmm1, %xmm1
-        vpor     %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6
-        #reduction
-        vpshufd  $0b00100100, %xmm1, %xmm2
-        vpcmpeqd TWOONE(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2
-        vpand    POLY(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2
-        vpxor    %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6        # xmm6 holds the HashKey<<1 mod poly
-        #######################################################################
-        vmovdqu  %xmm6, HashKey(arg2)       # store HashKey<<1 mod poly
-
-        CALC_AAD_HASH \GHASH_MUL, arg5, arg6, %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm7, %xmm1, %xmm0
-
-        \PRECOMPUTE  %xmm6, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5
-.endm
-
-
-# Reads DLEN bytes starting at DPTR and stores in XMMDst
-# where 0 < DLEN < 16
-# Clobbers %rax, DLEN
-.macro READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK DPTR DLEN XMMDst
-        vpxor \XMMDst, \XMMDst, \XMMDst
-
-        cmp $8, \DLEN
-        jl .L_read_lt8_\@
-        mov (\DPTR), %rax
-        vpinsrq $0, %rax, \XMMDst, \XMMDst
-        sub $8, \DLEN
-        jz .L_done_read_partial_block_\@
-        xor %eax, %eax
-.L_read_next_byte_\@:
-        shl $8, %rax
-        mov 7(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al
-        dec \DLEN
-        jnz .L_read_next_byte_\@
-        vpinsrq $1, %rax, \XMMDst, \XMMDst
-        jmp .L_done_read_partial_block_\@
-.L_read_lt8_\@:
-        xor %eax, %eax
-.L_read_next_byte_lt8_\@:
-        shl $8, %rax
-        mov -1(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al
-        dec \DLEN
-        jnz .L_read_next_byte_lt8_\@
-        vpinsrq $0, %rax, \XMMDst, \XMMDst
-.L_done_read_partial_block_\@:
-.endm
-
-# PARTIAL_BLOCK: Handles encryption/decryption and the tag partial blocks
-# between update calls.
-# Requires the input data be at least 1 byte long due to READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK
-# Outputs encrypted bytes, and updates hash and partial info in gcm_data_context
-# Clobbers rax, r10, r12, r13, xmm0-6, xmm9-13
-.macro PARTIAL_BLOCK GHASH_MUL CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \
-        AAD_HASH ENC_DEC
-        mov 	PBlockLen(arg2), %r13
-        test	%r13, %r13
-        je	.L_partial_block_done_\@	# Leave Macro if no partial blocks
-        # Read in input data without over reading
-        cmp	$16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN
-        jl	.L_fewer_than_16_bytes_\@
-        vmovdqu	(\PLAIN_CYPH_IN), %xmm1	# If more than 16 bytes, just fill xmm
-        jmp	.L_data_read_\@
-
-.L_fewer_than_16_bytes_\@:
-        lea	(\PLAIN_CYPH_IN, \DATA_OFFSET, 1), %r10
-        mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r12
-        READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm1
-
-        mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r13
-
-.L_data_read_\@:				# Finished reading in data
-
-        vmovdqu	PBlockEncKey(arg2), %xmm9
-        vmovdqu	HashKey(arg2), %xmm13
-
-        lea	SHIFT_MASK(%rip), %r12
-
-        # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift r13 bytes
-        # r16-r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16)
-        add	%r13, %r12
-        vmovdqu	(%r12), %xmm2		# get the appropriate shuffle mask
-        vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9		# shift right r13 bytes
-
-.if  \ENC_DEC ==  DEC
-        vmovdqa	%xmm1, %xmm3
-        pxor	%xmm1, %xmm9		# Ciphertext XOR E(K, Yn)
-
-        mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10
-        add	%r13, %r10
-        # Set r10 to be the amount of data left in CYPH_PLAIN_IN after filling
-        sub	$16, %r10
-        # Determine if partial block is not being filled and
-        # shift mask accordingly
-        jge	.L_no_extra_mask_1_\@
-        sub	%r10, %r12
-.L_no_extra_mask_1_\@:
-
-        vmovdqu	ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1
-        # get the appropriate mask to mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9
-        vpand	%xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9		# mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9
-
-        vpand	%xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3
-        vmovdqa	SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-        vpshufb	%xmm10, %xmm3, %xmm3
-        vpshufb	%xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3
-        vpxor	%xmm3, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH
-
-        test	%r10, %r10
-        jl	.L_partial_incomplete_1_\@
-
-        # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
-        \GHASH_MUL \AAD_HASH, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
-        xor	%eax,%eax
-
-        mov	%rax, PBlockLen(arg2)
-        jmp	.L_dec_done_\@
-.L_partial_incomplete_1_\@:
-        add	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, PBlockLen(arg2)
-.L_dec_done_\@:
-        vmovdqu	\AAD_HASH, AadHash(arg2)
-.else
-        vpxor	%xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9			# Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn)
-
-        mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10
-        add	%r13, %r10
-        # Set r10 to be the amount of data left in CYPH_PLAIN_IN after filling
-        sub	$16, %r10
-        # Determine if partial block is not being filled and
-        # shift mask accordingly
-        jge	.L_no_extra_mask_2_\@
-        sub	%r10, %r12
-.L_no_extra_mask_2_\@:
-
-        vmovdqu	ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1
-        # get the appropriate mask to mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9
-        vpand	%xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9
-
-        vmovdqa	SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm1
-        vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        vpxor	%xmm9, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH
-
-        test	%r10, %r10
-        jl	.L_partial_incomplete_2_\@
-
-        # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
-        \GHASH_MUL \AAD_HASH, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
-        xor	%eax,%eax
-
-        mov	%rax, PBlockLen(arg2)
-        jmp	.L_encode_done_\@
-.L_partial_incomplete_2_\@:
-        add	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, PBlockLen(arg2)
-.L_encode_done_\@:
-        vmovdqu	\AAD_HASH, AadHash(arg2)
-
-        vmovdqa	SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10
-        # shuffle xmm9 back to output as ciphertext
-        vpshufb	%xmm10, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        vpshufb	%xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9
-.endif
-        # output encrypted Bytes
-        test	%r10, %r10
-        jl	.L_partial_fill_\@
-        mov	%r13, %r12
-        mov	$16, %r13
-        # Set r13 to be the number of bytes to write out
-        sub	%r12, %r13
-        jmp	.L_count_set_\@
-.L_partial_fill_\@:
-        mov	\PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r13
-.L_count_set_\@:
-        vmovdqa	%xmm9, %xmm0
-        vmovq	%xmm0, %rax
-        cmp	$8, %r13
-        jle	.L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@
-
-        mov	%rax, (\CYPH_PLAIN_OUT, \DATA_OFFSET, 1)
-        add	$8, \DATA_OFFSET
-        psrldq	$8, %xmm0
-        vmovq	%xmm0, %rax
-        sub	$8, %r13
-.L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@:
-        movb	%al, (\CYPH_PLAIN_OUT, \DATA_OFFSET, 1)
-        add	$1, \DATA_OFFSET
-        shr	$8, %rax
-        sub	$1, %r13
-        jne	.L_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@
-.L_partial_block_done_\@:
-.endm # PARTIAL_BLOCK
-
-###############################################################################
-# GHASH_MUL MACRO to implement: Data*HashKey mod (128,127,126,121,0)
-# Input: A and B (128-bits each, bit-reflected)
-# Output: C = A*B*x mod poly, (i.e. >>1 )
-# To compute GH = GH*HashKey mod poly, give HK = HashKey<<1 mod poly as input
-# GH = GH * HK * x mod poly which is equivalent to GH*HashKey mod poly.
-###############################################################################
-.macro  GHASH_MUL_AVX GH HK T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \GH, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \HK, \T3
-        vpxor           \GH     , \T2, \T2      # T2 = (a1+a0)
-        vpxor           \HK     , \T3, \T3      # T3 = (b1+b0)
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \HK, \GH, \T1    # T1 = a1*b1
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \HK, \GH, \GH    # GH = a0*b0
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2    # T2 = (a1+a0)*(b1+b0)
-        vpxor           \GH, \T2,\T2
-        vpxor           \T1, \T2,\T2            # T2 = a0*b1+a1*b0
-
-        vpslldq         $8, \T2,\T3             # shift-L T3 2 DWs
-        vpsrldq         $8, \T2,\T2             # shift-R T2 2 DWs
-        vpxor           \T3, \GH, \GH
-        vpxor           \T2, \T1, \T1           # <T1:GH> = GH x HK
-
-        #first phase of the reduction
-        vpslld  $31, \GH, \T2                   # packed right shifting << 31
-        vpslld  $30, \GH, \T3                   # packed right shifting shift << 30
-        vpslld  $25, \GH, \T4                   # packed right shifting shift << 25
-
-        vpxor   \T3, \T2, \T2                   # xor the shifted versions
-        vpxor   \T4, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpsrldq $4, \T2, \T5                    # shift-R T5 1 DW
-
-        vpslldq $12, \T2, \T2                   # shift-L T2 3 DWs
-        vpxor   \T2, \GH, \GH                   # first phase of the reduction complete
-
-        #second phase of the reduction
-
-        vpsrld  $1,\GH, \T2                     # packed left shifting >> 1
-        vpsrld  $2,\GH, \T3                     # packed left shifting >> 2
-        vpsrld  $7,\GH, \T4                     # packed left shifting >> 7
-        vpxor   \T3, \T2, \T2                   # xor the shifted versions
-        vpxor   \T4, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor   \T5, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor   \T2, \GH, \GH
-        vpxor   \T1, \GH, \GH                   # the result is in GH
-
-
-.endm
-
-.macro PRECOMPUTE_AVX HK T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
-
-        # Haskey_i_k holds XORed values of the low and high parts of the Haskey_i
-        vmovdqa  \HK, \T5
-
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_k(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2  #  T5 = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_2(arg2)                    #  [HashKey_2] = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_2_k(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2  #  T5 = HashKey^3<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_3(arg2)
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_3_k(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2  #  T5 = HashKey^4<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_4(arg2)
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_4_k(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2  #  T5 = HashKey^5<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_5(arg2)
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_5_k(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2  #  T5 = HashKey^6<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_6(arg2)
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_6_k(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2  #  T5 = HashKey^7<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_7(arg2)
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_7_k(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2  #  T5 = HashKey^8<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_8(arg2)
-        vpshufd  $0b01001110, \T5, \T1
-        vpxor    \T5, \T1, \T1
-        vmovdqu  \T1, HashKey_8_k(arg2)
-
-.endm
-
-## if a = number of total plaintext bytes
-## b = floor(a/16)
-## num_initial_blocks = b mod 4#
-## encrypt the initial num_initial_blocks blocks and apply ghash on the ciphertext
-## r10, r11, r12, rax are clobbered
-## arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified
-
-.macro INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX REP num_initial_blocks T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T6 T_key ENC_DEC
-	i = (8-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-        vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), reg_i
-
-	# start AES for num_initial_blocks blocks
-	vmovdqu CurCount(arg2), \CTR
-
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR		# INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa \CTR, reg_i
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i   # perform a 16Byte swap
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-	vmovdqa  (arg1), \T_key
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-                vpxor   \T_key, reg_i, reg_i
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-       j = 1
-       setreg
-.rep \REP
-       vmovdqa  16*j(arg1), \T_key
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-        vaesenc \T_key, reg_i, reg_i
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-       j = (j+1)
-       setreg
-.endr
-
-	vmovdqa  16*j(arg1), \T_key
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-        vaesenclast      \T_key, reg_i, reg_i
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-                vmovdqu (arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor   \T1, reg_i, reg_i
-                vmovdqu reg_i, (arg3 , %r11)           # write back ciphertext for num_initial_blocks blocks
-                add     $16, %r11
-.if  \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa \T1, reg_i
-.endif
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i  # prepare ciphertext for GHASH computations
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-
-	i = (8-\num_initial_blocks)
-	j = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-        vpxor    reg_i, reg_j, reg_j
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX       reg_j, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6 # apply GHASH on num_initial_blocks blocks
-	i = (i+1)
-	j = (j+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-        # XMM8 has the combined result here
-
-        vmovdqa  \XMM8, TMP1(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa  \XMM8, \T3
-
-        cmp     $128, %r13
-        jl      .L_initial_blocks_done\@                  # no need for precomputed constants
-
-###############################################################################
-# Haskey_i_k holds XORed values of the low and high parts of the Haskey_i
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM1
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM2
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM3
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM4
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM5
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM6
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM7
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM8
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vmovdqa  (arg1), \T_key
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-               i = 1
-               setreg
-.rep    \REP       # do REP rounds
-                vmovdqa  16*i(arg1), \T_key
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8
-               i = (i+1)
-               setreg
-.endr
-
-                vmovdqa  16*i(arg1), \T_key
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-                vmovdqu  (arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vmovdqu  \XMM1, (arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM1
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*1(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vmovdqu  \XMM2, 16*1(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM2
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*2(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vmovdqu  \XMM3, 16*2(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM3
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*3(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vmovdqu  \XMM4, 16*3(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM4
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*4(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vmovdqu  \XMM5, 16*4(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM5
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*5(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vmovdqu  \XMM6, 16*5(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM6
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*6(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vmovdqu  \XMM7, 16*6(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM7
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*7(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-                vmovdqu  \XMM8, 16*7(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM8
-                .endif
-
-                add     $128, %r11
-
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpxor    TMP1(%rsp), \XMM1, \XMM1          # combine GHASHed value with the corresponding ciphertext
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8     # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-###############################################################################
-
-.L_initial_blocks_done\@:
-
-.endm
-
-# encrypt 8 blocks at a time
-# ghash the 8 previously encrypted ciphertext blocks
-# arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified
-# r11 is the data offset value
-.macro GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX REP T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T7 loop_idx ENC_DEC
-
-        vmovdqa \XMM1, \T2
-        vmovdqa \XMM2, TMP2(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM3, TMP3(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM4, TMP4(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM5, TMP5(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM6, TMP6(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM7, TMP7(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM8, TMP8(%rsp)
-
-.if \loop_idx == in_order
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \CTR, \XMM1           # INCR CNT
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM2
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM3
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM4
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM5
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM6
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM7
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM8
-                vmovdqa \XMM8, \CTR
-
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1    # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2    # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3    # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4    # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5    # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6    # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7    # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8    # perform a 16Byte swap
-.else
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \CTR, \XMM1           # INCR CNT
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM2
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM3
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM4
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM5
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM6
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM7
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM8
-                vmovdqa \XMM8, \CTR
-.endif
-
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-                vmovdqu (arg1), \T1
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-
-
-
-
-                vmovdqu 16*1(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-                vmovdqu 16*2(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_8(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T2, \T4             # T4 = a1*b1
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T2, \T7             # T7 = a0*b0
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T2, \T6
-        vpxor           \T2, \T6, \T6
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_8_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*3(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP2(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_7(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T1, \T3, \T3
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_7_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*4(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP3(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_6(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T1, \T3, \T3
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_6_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*5(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP4(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_5(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T1, \T3, \T3
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_5_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*6(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP5(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_4(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T1, \T3, \T3
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_4_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*7(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP6(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_3(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T1, \T3, \T3
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_3_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-
-                vmovdqu 16*8(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP7(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_2(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T1, \T3, \T3
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_2_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-                vmovdqu 16*9(arg1), \T5
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP8(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T1, \T3, \T3
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_k(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-        vpxor           \T7, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*10(arg1), \T5
-
-        i = 11
-        setreg
-.rep (\REP-9)
-
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM1, \XMM1
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM2, \XMM2
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM3, \XMM3
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM4, \XMM4
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM5, \XMM5
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM6, \XMM6
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM7, \XMM7
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqu 16*i(arg1), \T5
-        i = i + 1
-        setreg
-.endr
-
-	i = 0
-	j = 1
-	setreg
-.rep 8
-		vpxor	16*i(arg4, %r11), \T5, \T2
-                .if \ENC_DEC == ENC
-                vaesenclast     \T2, reg_j, reg_j
-                .else
-                vaesenclast     \T2, reg_j, \T3
-                vmovdqu 16*i(arg4, %r11), reg_j
-                vmovdqu \T3, 16*i(arg3, %r11)
-                .endif
-	i = (i+1)
-	j = (j+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-	#######################################################################
-
-
-	vpslldq	$8, \T6, \T3				# shift-L T3 2 DWs
-	vpsrldq	$8, \T6, \T6				# shift-R T2 2 DWs
-	vpxor	\T3, \T7, \T7
-	vpxor	\T4, \T6, \T6				# accumulate the results in T6:T7
-
-
-
-	#######################################################################
-	#first phase of the reduction
-	#######################################################################
-        vpslld  $31, \T7, \T2                           # packed right shifting << 31
-        vpslld  $30, \T7, \T3                           # packed right shifting shift << 30
-        vpslld  $25, \T7, \T4                           # packed right shifting shift << 25
-
-        vpxor   \T3, \T2, \T2                           # xor the shifted versions
-        vpxor   \T4, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpsrldq $4, \T2, \T1                            # shift-R T1 1 DW
-
-        vpslldq $12, \T2, \T2                           # shift-L T2 3 DWs
-        vpxor   \T2, \T7, \T7                           # first phase of the reduction complete
-	#######################################################################
-                .if \ENC_DEC == ENC
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM1,	16*0(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM2,	16*1(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM3,	16*2(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM4,	16*3(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM5,	16*4(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM6,	16*5(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM7,	16*6(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM8,	16*7(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-                .endif
-
-	#######################################################################
-	#second phase of the reduction
-        vpsrld  $1, \T7, \T2                            # packed left shifting >> 1
-        vpsrld  $2, \T7, \T3                            # packed left shifting >> 2
-        vpsrld  $7, \T7, \T4                            # packed left shifting >> 7
-        vpxor   \T3, \T2, \T2                           # xor the shifted versions
-        vpxor   \T4, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor   \T1, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor   \T2, \T7, \T7
-        vpxor   \T7, \T6, \T6                           # the result is in T6
-	#######################################################################
-
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8	# perform a 16Byte swap
-
-
-	vpxor	\T6, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-
-
-.endm
-
-
-# GHASH the last 4 ciphertext blocks.
-.macro  GHASH_LAST_8_AVX T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8
-
-        ## Karatsuba Method
-
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM1, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM1, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_8(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM1, \T6
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM1, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_8_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM2, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM2, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_7(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM2, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM2, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_7_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM3, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM3, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_6(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM3, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM3, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_6_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM4, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM4, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_5(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM4, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM4, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_5_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM5, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM5, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_4(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM5, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM5, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_4_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM6, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM6, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_3(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM6, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM6, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_3_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM7, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM7, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_2(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM7, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM7, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_2_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM8, \T2
-        vpxor           \XMM8, \T2, \T2
-        vmovdqu         HashKey(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM8, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM8, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_k(arg2), \T3
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-        vpxor           \T6, \XMM1, \XMM1
-        vpxor           \T7, \XMM1, \T2
-
-
-
-
-        vpslldq $8, \T2, \T4
-        vpsrldq $8, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor   \T4, \T7, \T7
-        vpxor   \T2, \T6, \T6   # <T6:T7> holds the result of
-				# the accumulated carry-less multiplications
-
-        #######################################################################
-        #first phase of the reduction
-        vpslld  $31, \T7, \T2   # packed right shifting << 31
-        vpslld  $30, \T7, \T3   # packed right shifting shift << 30
-        vpslld  $25, \T7, \T4   # packed right shifting shift << 25
-
-        vpxor   \T3, \T2, \T2   # xor the shifted versions
-        vpxor   \T4, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpsrldq $4, \T2, \T1    # shift-R T1 1 DW
-
-        vpslldq $12, \T2, \T2   # shift-L T2 3 DWs
-        vpxor   \T2, \T7, \T7   # first phase of the reduction complete
-        #######################################################################
-
-
-        #second phase of the reduction
-        vpsrld  $1, \T7, \T2    # packed left shifting >> 1
-        vpsrld  $2, \T7, \T3    # packed left shifting >> 2
-        vpsrld  $7, \T7, \T4    # packed left shifting >> 7
-        vpxor   \T3, \T2, \T2   # xor the shifted versions
-        vpxor   \T4, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor   \T1, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor   \T2, \T7, \T7
-        vpxor   \T7, \T6, \T6   # the result is in T6
-
-.endm
-
-#############################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2
-#        (gcm_data     *my_ctx_data,
-#         gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8     *hash_subkey# /* H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */
-#        u8      *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt
-#			(from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte
-#			Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
-#			concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */
-#        const   u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
-#        u64     aad_len) /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
-#############################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX, PRECOMPUTE_AVX
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2)
-
-###############################################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2(
-#        gcm_data        *my_ctx_data,     /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
-#        gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8      *out, /* Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed.  */
-#        const   u8 *in, /* Plaintext input */
-#        u64     plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
-###############################################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        mov     keysize, %eax
-        cmp     $32, %eax
-        je      key_256_enc_update
-        cmp     $16, %eax
-        je      key_128_enc_update
-        # must be 192
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 11
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_128_enc_update:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 9
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_256_enc_update:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 13
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2)
-
-###############################################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2(
-#        gcm_data        *my_ctx_data,     /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
-#        gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8      *out, /* Plaintext output. Decrypt in-place is allowed.  */
-#        const   u8 *in, /* Ciphertext input */
-#        u64     plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
-###############################################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        mov     keysize,%eax
-        cmp     $32, %eax
-        je      key_256_dec_update
-        cmp     $16, %eax
-        je      key_128_dec_update
-        # must be 192
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 11
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_128_dec_update:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 9
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_256_dec_update:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 13
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2)
-
-###############################################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2(
-#        gcm_data        *my_ctx_data,     /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
-#        gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8      *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
-#        u64     auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
-#				Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
-###############################################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        mov	keysize,%eax
-        cmp     $32, %eax
-        je      key_256_finalize
-        cmp     $16, %eax
-        je      key_128_finalize
-        # must be 192
-        GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 11, arg3, arg4
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_128_finalize:
-        GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 9, arg3, arg4
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_256_finalize:
-        GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 13, arg3, arg4
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2)
-
-###############################################################################
-# GHASH_MUL MACRO to implement: Data*HashKey mod (128,127,126,121,0)
-# Input: A and B (128-bits each, bit-reflected)
-# Output: C = A*B*x mod poly, (i.e. >>1 )
-# To compute GH = GH*HashKey mod poly, give HK = HashKey<<1 mod poly as input
-# GH = GH * HK * x mod poly which is equivalent to GH*HashKey mod poly.
-###############################################################################
-.macro  GHASH_MUL_AVX2 GH HK T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11,\HK,\GH,\T1      # T1 = a1*b1
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00,\HK,\GH,\T2      # T2 = a0*b0
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01,\HK,\GH,\T3      # T3 = a1*b0
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10,\HK,\GH,\GH      # GH = a0*b1
-        vpxor           \T3, \GH, \GH
-
-
-        vpsrldq         $8 , \GH, \T3          # shift-R GH 2 DWs
-        vpslldq         $8 , \GH, \GH          # shift-L GH 2 DWs
-
-        vpxor           \T3, \T1, \T1
-        vpxor           \T2, \GH, \GH
-
-        #######################################################################
-        #first phase of the reduction
-        vmovdqa         POLY2(%rip), \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \GH, \T3, \T2
-        vpslldq         $8, \T2, \T2           # shift-L T2 2 DWs
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \GH, \GH          # first phase of the reduction complete
-        #######################################################################
-        #second phase of the reduction
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \GH, \T3, \T2
-        vpsrldq         $4, \T2, \T2           # shift-R T2 1 DW (Shift-R only 1-DW to obtain 2-DWs shift-R)
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \GH, \T3, \GH
-        vpslldq         $4, \GH, \GH           # shift-L GH 1 DW (Shift-L 1-DW to obtain result with no shifts)
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \GH, \GH          # second phase of the reduction complete
-        #######################################################################
-        vpxor           \T1, \GH, \GH          # the result is in GH
-
-
-.endm
-
-.macro PRECOMPUTE_AVX2 HK T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
-
-        # Haskey_i_k holds XORed values of the low and high parts of the Haskey_i
-        vmovdqa  \HK, \T5
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2    #  T5 = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_2(arg2)                       #  [HashKey_2] = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2    #  T5 = HashKey^3<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_3(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2    #  T5 = HashKey^4<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_4(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2    #  T5 = HashKey^5<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_5(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2    #  T5 = HashKey^6<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_6(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2    #  T5 = HashKey^7<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_7(arg2)
-
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2    #  T5 = HashKey^8<<1 mod poly
-        vmovdqu  \T5, HashKey_8(arg2)
-
-.endm
-
-## if a = number of total plaintext bytes
-## b = floor(a/16)
-## num_initial_blocks = b mod 4#
-## encrypt the initial num_initial_blocks blocks and apply ghash on the ciphertext
-## r10, r11, r12, rax are clobbered
-## arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified
-
-.macro INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 REP num_initial_blocks T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T6 T_key ENC_DEC VER
-	i = (8-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-	vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), reg_i
-
-	# start AES for num_initial_blocks blocks
-	vmovdqu CurCount(arg2), \CTR
-
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR   # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa \CTR, reg_i
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i     # perform a 16Byte swap
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-	vmovdqa  (arg1), \T_key
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-                vpxor   \T_key, reg_i, reg_i
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-	j = 1
-	setreg
-.rep \REP
-	vmovdqa  16*j(arg1), \T_key
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-        vaesenc \T_key, reg_i, reg_i
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-	j = (j+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-
-	vmovdqa  16*j(arg1), \T_key
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-        vaesenclast      \T_key, reg_i, reg_i
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-	i = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-                vmovdqu (arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor   \T1, reg_i, reg_i
-                vmovdqu reg_i, (arg3 , %r11)           # write back ciphertext for
-						       # num_initial_blocks blocks
-                add     $16, %r11
-.if  \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa \T1, reg_i
-.endif
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i  # prepare ciphertext for GHASH computations
-	i = (i+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-
-
-	i = (8-\num_initial_blocks)
-	j = (9-\num_initial_blocks)
-	setreg
-
-.rep \num_initial_blocks
-        vpxor    reg_i, reg_j, reg_j
-        GHASH_MUL_AVX2       reg_j, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6  # apply GHASH on num_initial_blocks blocks
-	i = (i+1)
-	j = (j+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-        # XMM8 has the combined result here
-
-        vmovdqa  \XMM8, TMP1(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa  \XMM8, \T3
-
-        cmp     $128, %r13
-        jl      .L_initial_blocks_done\@                  # no need for precomputed constants
-
-###############################################################################
-# Haskey_i_k holds XORed values of the low and high parts of the Haskey_i
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM1
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM2
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM3
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM4
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM5
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM6
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM7
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vpaddd   ONE(%rip), \CTR, \CTR          # INCR Y0
-                vmovdqa  \CTR, \XMM8
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8  # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-                vmovdqa  (arg1), \T_key
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vpxor    \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-		i = 1
-		setreg
-.rep    \REP       # do REP rounds
-                vmovdqa  16*i(arg1), \T_key
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc  \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8
-		i = (i+1)
-		setreg
-.endr
-
-
-                vmovdqa  16*i(arg1), \T_key
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenclast  \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-                vmovdqu  (arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vmovdqu  \XMM1, (arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM1
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*1(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vmovdqu  \XMM2, 16*1(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM2
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*2(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vmovdqu  \XMM3, 16*2(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM3
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*3(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vmovdqu  \XMM4, 16*3(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM4
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*4(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vmovdqu  \XMM5, 16*4(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM5
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*5(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vmovdqu  \XMM6, 16*5(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM6
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*6(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vmovdqu  \XMM7, 16*6(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM7
-                .endif
-
-                vmovdqu  16*7(arg4, %r11), \T1
-                vpxor    \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-                vmovdqu  \XMM8, 16*7(arg3 , %r11)
-                .if   \ENC_DEC == DEC
-                vmovdqa  \T1, \XMM8
-                .endif
-
-                add     $128, %r11
-
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpxor    TMP1(%rsp), \XMM1, \XMM1          # combine GHASHed value with
-							   # the corresponding ciphertext
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb  SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8     # perform a 16Byte swap
-
-###############################################################################
-
-.L_initial_blocks_done\@:
-
-
-.endm
-
-
-
-# encrypt 8 blocks at a time
-# ghash the 8 previously encrypted ciphertext blocks
-# arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified
-# r11 is the data offset value
-.macro GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2 REP T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T7 loop_idx ENC_DEC
-
-        vmovdqa \XMM1, \T2
-        vmovdqa \XMM2, TMP2(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM3, TMP3(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM4, TMP4(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM5, TMP5(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM6, TMP6(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM7, TMP7(%rsp)
-        vmovdqa \XMM8, TMP8(%rsp)
-
-.if \loop_idx == in_order
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \CTR, \XMM1            # INCR CNT
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM2
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM3
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM4
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM5
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM6
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM7
-                vpaddd  ONE(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM8
-                vmovdqa \XMM8, \CTR
-
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7     # perform a 16Byte swap
-                vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8     # perform a 16Byte swap
-.else
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \CTR, \XMM1            # INCR CNT
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM2
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM3
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM4
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM5
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM6
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM7
-                vpaddd  ONEf(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM8
-                vmovdqa \XMM8, \CTR
-.endif
-
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-                vmovdqu (arg1), \T1
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vpxor   \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-
-
-
-
-                vmovdqu 16*1(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-                vmovdqu 16*2(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_8(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T2, \T4              # T4 = a1*b1
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T2, \T7              # T7 = a0*b0
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T2, \T6              # T6 = a1*b0
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T2, \T5              # T5 = a0*b1
-        vpxor           \T5, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*3(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP2(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_7(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*4(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP3(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_6(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*5(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP4(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_5(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*6(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP5(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_4(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*7(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP6(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_3(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-                vmovdqu 16*8(arg1), \T1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP7(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_2(arg2), \T5
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T4
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-
-        #######################################################################
-
-                vmovdqu 16*9(arg1), \T5
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM1, \XMM1
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM2, \XMM2
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM3, \XMM3
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM4, \XMM4
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM5, \XMM5
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM6, \XMM6
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM7, \XMM7
-                vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqa         TMP8(%rsp), \T1
-        vmovdqu         HashKey(arg2), \T5
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3
-        vpxor           \T3, \T4, \T1
-
-
-                vmovdqu 16*10(arg1), \T5
-
-        i = 11
-        setreg
-.rep (\REP-9)
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM1, \XMM1
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM2, \XMM2
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM3, \XMM3
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM4, \XMM4
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM5, \XMM5
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM6, \XMM6
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM7, \XMM7
-        vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8
-
-        vmovdqu 16*i(arg1), \T5
-        i = i + 1
-        setreg
-.endr
-
-	i = 0
-	j = 1
-	setreg
-.rep 8
-		vpxor	16*i(arg4, %r11), \T5, \T2
-                .if \ENC_DEC == ENC
-                vaesenclast     \T2, reg_j, reg_j
-                .else
-                vaesenclast     \T2, reg_j, \T3
-                vmovdqu 16*i(arg4, %r11), reg_j
-                vmovdqu \T3, 16*i(arg3, %r11)
-                .endif
-	i = (i+1)
-	j = (j+1)
-	setreg
-.endr
-	#######################################################################
-
-
-	vpslldq	$8, \T6, \T3				# shift-L T3 2 DWs
-	vpsrldq	$8, \T6, \T6				# shift-R T2 2 DWs
-	vpxor	\T3, \T7, \T7
-	vpxor	\T6, \T1, \T1				# accumulate the results in T1:T7
-
-
-
-	#######################################################################
-	#first phase of the reduction
-	vmovdqa         POLY2(%rip), \T3
-
-	vpclmulqdq	$0x01, \T7, \T3, \T2
-	vpslldq		$8, \T2, \T2			# shift-L xmm2 2 DWs
-
-	vpxor		\T2, \T7, \T7			# first phase of the reduction complete
-	#######################################################################
-                .if \ENC_DEC == ENC
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM1,	16*0(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM2,	16*1(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM3,	16*2(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM4,	16*3(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM5,	16*4(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM6,	16*5(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM7,	16*6(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-		vmovdqu	 \XMM8,	16*7(arg3,%r11)		# Write to the Ciphertext buffer
-                .endif
-
-	#######################################################################
-	#second phase of the reduction
-	vpclmulqdq	$0x00, \T7, \T3, \T2
-	vpsrldq		$4, \T2, \T2			# shift-R xmm2 1 DW (Shift-R only 1-DW to obtain 2-DWs shift-R)
-
-	vpclmulqdq	$0x10, \T7, \T3, \T4
-	vpslldq		$4, \T4, \T4			# shift-L xmm0 1 DW (Shift-L 1-DW to obtain result with no shifts)
-
-	vpxor		\T2, \T4, \T4			# second phase of the reduction complete
-	#######################################################################
-	vpxor		\T4, \T1, \T1			# the result is in T1
-
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM1, \XMM1	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM2, \XMM2	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM3, \XMM3	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM4, \XMM4	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM5, \XMM5	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM6, \XMM6	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM7, \XMM7	# perform a 16Byte swap
-		vpshufb	SHUF_MASK(%rip), \XMM8, \XMM8	# perform a 16Byte swap
-
-
-	vpxor	\T1, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-
-
-.endm
-
-
-# GHASH the last 4 ciphertext blocks.
-.macro  GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8
-
-        ## Karatsuba Method
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_8(arg2), \T5
-
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM1, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM1, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM1, \T6
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM1, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_7(arg2), \T5
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM2, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM2, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM2, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM2, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_6(arg2), \T5
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM3, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM3, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM3, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM3, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_5(arg2), \T5
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM4, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM4, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM4, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM4, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_4(arg2), \T5
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM5, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM5, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM5, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM5, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_3(arg2), \T5
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM6, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM6, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM6, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM6, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey_2(arg2), \T5
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM7, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM7, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM7, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM7, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-
-        ######################
-
-        vmovdqu         HashKey(arg2), \T5
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \XMM8, \T2
-        vpshufd         $0b01001110, \T5, \T3
-        vpxor           \XMM8, \T2, \T2
-        vpxor           \T5, \T3, \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x11, \T5, \XMM8, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T5, \XMM8, \T4
-        vpxor           \T4, \T7, \T7
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1
-        vpxor           \T6, \XMM1, \XMM1
-        vpxor           \T7, \XMM1, \T2
-
-
-
-
-        vpslldq $8, \T2, \T4
-        vpsrldq $8, \T2, \T2
-
-        vpxor   \T4, \T7, \T7
-        vpxor   \T2, \T6, \T6                      # <T6:T7> holds the result of the
-						   # accumulated carry-less multiplications
-
-        #######################################################################
-        #first phase of the reduction
-        vmovdqa         POLY2(%rip), \T3
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x01, \T7, \T3, \T2
-        vpslldq         $8, \T2, \T2               # shift-L xmm2 2 DWs
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \T7, \T7              # first phase of the reduction complete
-        #######################################################################
-
-
-        #second phase of the reduction
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x00, \T7, \T3, \T2
-        vpsrldq         $4, \T2, \T2               # shift-R T2 1 DW (Shift-R only 1-DW to obtain 2-DWs shift-R)
-
-        vpclmulqdq      $0x10, \T7, \T3, \T4
-        vpslldq         $4, \T4, \T4               # shift-L T4 1 DW (Shift-L 1-DW to obtain result with no shifts)
-
-        vpxor           \T2, \T4, \T4              # second phase of the reduction complete
-        #######################################################################
-        vpxor           \T4, \T6, \T6              # the result is in T6
-.endm
-
-
-
-#############################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4
-#        (gcm_data     *my_ctx_data,
-#         gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8      *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt
-#			(from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte
-#			Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
-#			concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */
-#        u8     *hash_subkey# /* H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */
-#        const   u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
-#        u64     aad_len) /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
-#############################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX2, PRECOMPUTE_AVX2
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4)
-
-###############################################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4(
-#        gcm_data        *my_ctx_data,     /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
-#        gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8      *out, /* Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed.  */
-#        const   u8 *in, /* Plaintext input */
-#        u64     plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
-###############################################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        mov     keysize,%eax
-        cmp     $32, %eax
-        je      key_256_enc_update4
-        cmp     $16, %eax
-        je      key_128_enc_update4
-        # must be 192
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 11
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-	RET
-key_128_enc_update4:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 9
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-	RET
-key_256_enc_update4:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 13
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-	RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4)
-
-###############################################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4(
-#        gcm_data        *my_ctx_data,     /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
-#        gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8      *out, /* Plaintext output. Decrypt in-place is allowed.  */
-#        const   u8 *in, /* Ciphertext input */
-#        u64     plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
-###############################################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        mov     keysize,%eax
-        cmp     $32, %eax
-        je      key_256_dec_update4
-        cmp     $16, %eax
-        je      key_128_dec_update4
-        # must be 192
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 11
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_128_dec_update4:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 9
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_256_dec_update4:
-        GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 13
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4)
-
-###############################################################################
-#void   aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4(
-#        gcm_data        *my_ctx_data,     /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
-#        gcm_context_data *data,
-#        u8      *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
-#        u64     auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
-#                              Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
-###############################################################################
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4)
-        FUNC_SAVE
-        mov	keysize,%eax
-        cmp     $32, %eax
-        je      key_256_finalize4
-        cmp     $16, %eax
-        je      key_128_finalize4
-        # must be 192
-        GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 11, arg3, arg4
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_128_finalize4:
-        GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 9, arg3, arg4
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-key_256_finalize4:
-        GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 13, arg3, arg4
-        FUNC_RESTORE
-        RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
index ef031655b2d3..cd37de5ec404 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 /*
- * Support for Intel AES-NI instructions. This file contains glue
- * code, the real AES implementation is in intel-aes_asm.S.
+ * Support for AES-NI and VAES instructions.  This file contains glue code.
+ * The real AES implementations are in aesni-intel_asm.S and other .S files.
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2008, Intel Corp.
  *    Author: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
  *             Tadeusz Struk (tadeusz.struk@intel.com)
  *             Aidan O'Mahony (aidan.o.mahony@intel.com)
  *    Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2024 Google LLC
  */
 
 #include <linux/hardirq.h>
@@ -44,41 +46,11 @@
 #define CRYPTO_AES_CTX_SIZE (sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN_EXTRA)
 #define XTS_AES_CTX_SIZE (sizeof(struct aesni_xts_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN_EXTRA)
 
-/* This data is stored at the end of the crypto_tfm struct.
- * It's a type of per "session" data storage location.
- * This needs to be 16 byte aligned.
- */
-struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx {
-	u8 hash_subkey[16] AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
-	u8 nonce[4];
-};
-
-struct generic_gcmaes_ctx {
-	u8 hash_subkey[16] AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
-};
-
 struct aesni_xts_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx tweak_ctx AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx crypt_ctx AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
 };
 
-#define GCM_BLOCK_LEN 16
-
-struct gcm_context_data {
-	/* init, update and finalize context data */
-	u8 aad_hash[GCM_BLOCK_LEN];
-	u64 aad_length;
-	u64 in_length;
-	u8 partial_block_enc_key[GCM_BLOCK_LEN];
-	u8 orig_IV[GCM_BLOCK_LEN];
-	u8 current_counter[GCM_BLOCK_LEN];
-	u64 partial_block_len;
-	u64 unused;
-	u8 hash_keys[GCM_BLOCK_LEN * 16];
-};
-
 static inline void *aes_align_addr(void *addr)
 {
 	if (crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() >= AESNI_ALIGN)
@@ -103,9 +75,6 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_cts_cbc_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
 asmlinkage void aesni_cts_cbc_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
 				  const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
 
-#define AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE 640
-#define AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE 4096
-
 asmlinkage void aesni_xts_enc(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
 			      const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
 
@@ -118,23 +87,6 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_ctr_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
 			      const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
 DEFINE_STATIC_CALL(aesni_ctr_enc_tfm, aesni_ctr_enc);
 
-/* Scatter / Gather routines, with args similar to above */
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init(void *ctx,
-			       struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
-			       u8 *iv,
-			       u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad,
-			       unsigned long aad_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_update(void *ctx,
-				     struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
-				     const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_update(void *ctx,
-				     struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
-				     const u8 *in,
-				     unsigned long ciphertext_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize(void *ctx,
-				   struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
-				   u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
-
 asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_128_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv,
 		void *keys, u8 *out, unsigned int num_bytes);
 asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_192_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv,
@@ -154,67 +106,6 @@ asmlinkage void aes_xctr_enc_192_avx_by8(const u8 *in, const u8 *iv,
 asmlinkage void aes_xctr_enc_256_avx_by8(const u8 *in, const u8 *iv,
 	const void *keys, u8 *out, unsigned int num_bytes,
 	unsigned int byte_ctr);
-
-/*
- * asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2()
- * gcm_data *my_ctx_data, context data
- * u8 *hash_subkey,  the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary.
- */
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2(void *my_ctx_data,
-					struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
-					u8 *iv,
-					u8 *hash_subkey,
-					const u8 *aad,
-					unsigned long aad_len);
-
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
-				     struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
-				     const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
-				     struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
-				     const u8 *in,
-				     unsigned long ciphertext_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
-				   struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
-				   u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
-
-/*
- * asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4()
- * gcm_data *my_ctx_data, context data
- * u8 *hash_subkey,  the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary.
- */
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4(void *my_ctx_data,
-					struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
-					u8 *iv,
-					u8 *hash_subkey,
-					const u8 *aad,
-					unsigned long aad_len);
-
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
-				     struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
-				     const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
-				     struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
-				     const u8 *in,
-				     unsigned long ciphertext_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
-				   struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
-				   u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
-
-static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(gcm_use_avx);
-static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(gcm_use_avx2);
-
-static inline struct
-aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
-{
-	return aes_align_addr(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm));
-}
-
-static inline struct
-generic_gcmaes_ctx *generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
-{
-	return aes_align_addr(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm));
-}
 #endif
 
 static inline struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx(void *raw_ctx)
@@ -588,280 +479,6 @@ static int xctr_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 	return err;
 }
-
-static int aes_gcm_derive_hash_subkey(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_key,
-				      u8 hash_subkey[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
-	static const u8 zeroes[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-
-	aes_encrypt(aes_key, hash_subkey, zeroes);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int common_rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
-				  unsigned int key_len)
-{
-	struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(aead);
-
-	if (key_len < 4)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/*Account for 4 byte nonce at the end.*/
-	key_len -= 4;
-
-	memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + key_len, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
-
-	return aes_set_key_common(&ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?:
-	       aes_gcm_derive_hash_subkey(&ctx->aes_key_expanded,
-					  ctx->hash_subkey);
-}
-
-/* This is the Integrity Check Value (aka the authentication tag) length and can
- * be 8, 12 or 16 bytes long. */
-static int common_rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *aead,
-				       unsigned int authsize)
-{
-	switch (authsize) {
-	case 8:
-	case 12:
-	case 16:
-		break;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int generic_gcmaes_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
-				       unsigned int authsize)
-{
-	switch (authsize) {
-	case 4:
-	case 8:
-	case 12:
-	case 13:
-	case 14:
-	case 15:
-	case 16:
-		break;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
-			      unsigned int assoclen, u8 *hash_subkey,
-			      u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx, u8 *auth_tag,
-			      unsigned long auth_tag_len)
-{
-	u8 databuf[sizeof(struct gcm_context_data) + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
-	struct gcm_context_data *data = PTR_ALIGN((void *)databuf, AESNI_ALIGN);
-	unsigned long left = req->cryptlen;
-	struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
-	struct skcipher_walk walk;
-	bool do_avx, do_avx2;
-	u8 *assocmem = NULL;
-	u8 *assoc;
-	int err;
-
-	if (!enc)
-		left -= auth_tag_len;
-
-	do_avx = (left >= AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE);
-	do_avx2 = (left >= AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE);
-
-	/* Linearize assoc, if not already linear */
-	if (req->src->length >= assoclen && req->src->length) {
-		scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->src);
-		assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
-	} else {
-		gfp_t flags = (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) ?
-			      GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC;
-
-		/* assoc can be any length, so must be on heap */
-		assocmem = kmalloc(assoclen, flags);
-		if (unlikely(!assocmem))
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		assoc = assocmem;
-
-		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0, assoclen, 0);
-	}
-
-	kernel_fpu_begin();
-	if (static_branch_likely(&gcm_use_avx2) && do_avx2)
-		aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4(aes_ctx, data, iv, hash_subkey, assoc,
-					assoclen);
-	else if (static_branch_likely(&gcm_use_avx) && do_avx)
-		aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2(aes_ctx, data, iv, hash_subkey, assoc,
-					assoclen);
-	else
-		aesni_gcm_init(aes_ctx, data, iv, hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen);
-	kernel_fpu_end();
-
-	if (!assocmem)
-		scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
-	else
-		kfree(assocmem);
-
-	err = enc ? skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, false)
-		  : skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false);
-
-	while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
-		kernel_fpu_begin();
-		if (static_branch_likely(&gcm_use_avx2) && do_avx2) {
-			if (enc)
-				aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4(aes_ctx, data,
-							      walk.dst.virt.addr,
-							      walk.src.virt.addr,
-							      walk.nbytes);
-			else
-				aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4(aes_ctx, data,
-							      walk.dst.virt.addr,
-							      walk.src.virt.addr,
-							      walk.nbytes);
-		} else if (static_branch_likely(&gcm_use_avx) && do_avx) {
-			if (enc)
-				aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2(aes_ctx, data,
-							      walk.dst.virt.addr,
-							      walk.src.virt.addr,
-							      walk.nbytes);
-			else
-				aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2(aes_ctx, data,
-							      walk.dst.virt.addr,
-							      walk.src.virt.addr,
-							      walk.nbytes);
-		} else if (enc) {
-			aesni_gcm_enc_update(aes_ctx, data, walk.dst.virt.addr,
-					     walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
-		} else {
-			aesni_gcm_dec_update(aes_ctx, data, walk.dst.virt.addr,
-					     walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
-		}
-		kernel_fpu_end();
-
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
-	}
-
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	kernel_fpu_begin();
-	if (static_branch_likely(&gcm_use_avx2) && do_avx2)
-		aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4(aes_ctx, data, auth_tag,
-					    auth_tag_len);
-	else if (static_branch_likely(&gcm_use_avx) && do_avx)
-		aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2(aes_ctx, data, auth_tag,
-					    auth_tag_len);
-	else
-		aesni_gcm_finalize(aes_ctx, data, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
-	kernel_fpu_end();
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
-			  u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
-{
-	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
-	unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
-	u8 auth_tag[16];
-	int err;
-
-	err = gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(true, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, aes_ctx,
-				 auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(auth_tag, req->dst,
-				 req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
-				 auth_tag_len, 1);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
-			  u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
-{
-	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
-	unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
-	u8 auth_tag_msg[16];
-	u8 auth_tag[16];
-	int err;
-
-	err = gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(false, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, aes_ctx,
-				 auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	/* Copy out original auth_tag */
-	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(auth_tag_msg, req->src,
-				 req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len,
-				 auth_tag_len, 0);
-
-	/* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
-	if (crypto_memneq(auth_tag_msg, auth_tag, auth_tag_len)) {
-		memzero_explicit(auth_tag, sizeof(auth_tag));
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
-{
-	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
-	struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
-	void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
-	u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
-	u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
-	unsigned int i;
-	__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
-
-	/* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
-	/* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length equal */
-	/* to 16 or 20 bytes */
-	if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 16 && req->assoclen != 20))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/* IV below built */
-	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-		*(iv+i) = ctx->nonce[i];
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
-	*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
-
-	return gcmaes_encrypt(req, req->assoclen - 8, ctx->hash_subkey, iv,
-			      aes_ctx);
-}
-
-static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
-{
-	__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
-	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
-	struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
-	void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
-	u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
-	u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
-	unsigned int i;
-
-	if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 16 && req->assoclen != 20))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
-	/* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */
-	/* equal to 16 or 20 bytes */
-
-	/* IV below built */
-	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-		*(iv+i) = ctx->nonce[i];
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
-	*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
-
-	return gcmaes_decrypt(req, req->assoclen - 8, ctx->hash_subkey, iv,
-			      aes_ctx);
-}
 #endif
 
 static int xts_setkey_aesni(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
@@ -1216,11 +833,717 @@ DEFINE_XTS_ALG(vaes_avx10_256, "xts-aes-vaes-avx10_256", 700);
 DEFINE_XTS_ALG(vaes_avx10_512, "xts-aes-vaes-avx10_512", 800);
 #endif
 
+/* The common part of the x86_64 AES-GCM key struct */
+struct aes_gcm_key {
+	/* Expanded AES key and the AES key length in bytes */
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key;
+
+	/* RFC4106 nonce (used only by the rfc4106 algorithms) */
+	u32 rfc4106_nonce;
+};
+
+/* Key struct used by the AES-NI implementations of AES-GCM */
+struct aes_gcm_key_aesni {
+	/*
+	 * Common part of the key.  The assembly code requires 16-byte alignment
+	 * for the round keys; we get this by them being located at the start of
+	 * the struct and the whole struct being 16-byte aligned.
+	 */
+	struct aes_gcm_key base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Powers of the hash key H^8 through H^1.  These are 128-bit values.
+	 * They all have an extra factor of x^-1 and are byte-reversed.  16-byte
+	 * alignment is required by the assembly code.
+	 */
+	u64 h_powers[8][2] __aligned(16);
+
+	/*
+	 * h_powers_xored[i] contains the two 64-bit halves of h_powers[i] XOR'd
+	 * together.  It's used for Karatsuba multiplication.  16-byte alignment
+	 * is required by the assembly code.
+	 */
+	u64 h_powers_xored[8] __aligned(16);
+
+	/*
+	 * H^1 times x^64 (and also the usual extra factor of x^-1).  16-byte
+	 * alignment is required by the assembly code.
+	 */
+	u64 h_times_x64[2] __aligned(16);
+};
+#define AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key)	\
+	container_of((key), struct aes_gcm_key_aesni, base)
+#define AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI_SIZE	\
+	(sizeof(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni) + (15 & ~(CRYPTO_MINALIGN - 1)))
+
+/* Key struct used by the VAES + AVX10 implementations of AES-GCM */
+struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 {
+	/*
+	 * Common part of the key.  The assembly code prefers 16-byte alignment
+	 * for the round keys; we get this by them being located at the start of
+	 * the struct and the whole struct being 64-byte aligned.
+	 */
+	struct aes_gcm_key base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Powers of the hash key H^16 through H^1.  These are 128-bit values.
+	 * They all have an extra factor of x^-1 and are byte-reversed.  This
+	 * array is aligned to a 64-byte boundary to make it naturally aligned
+	 * for 512-bit loads, which can improve performance.  (The assembly code
+	 * doesn't *need* the alignment; this is just an optimization.)
+	 */
+	u64 h_powers[16][2] __aligned(64);
+
+	/* Three padding blocks required by the assembly code */
+	u64 padding[3][2];
+};
+#define AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key)	\
+	container_of((key), struct aes_gcm_key_avx10, base)
+#define AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10_SIZE	\
+	(sizeof(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10) + (63 & ~(CRYPTO_MINALIGN - 1)))
+
+/*
+ * These flags are passed to the AES-GCM helper functions to specify the
+ * specific version of AES-GCM (RFC4106 or not), whether it's encryption or
+ * decryption, and which assembly functions should be called.  Assembly
+ * functions are selected using flags instead of function pointers to avoid
+ * indirect calls (which are very expensive on x86) regardless of inlining.
+ */
+#define FLAG_RFC4106	BIT(0)
+#define FLAG_ENC	BIT(1)
+#define FLAG_AVX	BIT(2)
+#if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ)
+#  define FLAG_AVX10_256	BIT(3)
+#  define FLAG_AVX10_512	BIT(4)
+#else
+   /*
+    * This should cause all calls to the AVX10 assembly functions to be
+    * optimized out, avoiding the need to ifdef each call individually.
+    */
+#  define FLAG_AVX10_256	0
+#  define FLAG_AVX10_512	0
+#endif
+
+static inline struct aes_gcm_key *
+aes_gcm_key_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int flags)
+{
+	if (flags & (FLAG_AVX10_256 | FLAG_AVX10_512))
+		return PTR_ALIGN(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), 64);
+	else
+		return PTR_ALIGN(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), 16);
+}
+
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_precompute_aesni(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_precompute_aesni_avx(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_256(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_512(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key);
+
+static void aes_gcm_precompute(struct aes_gcm_key *key, int flags)
+{
+	/*
+	 * To make things a bit easier on the assembly side, the AVX10
+	 * implementations use the same key format.  Therefore, a single
+	 * function using 256-bit vectors would suffice here.  However, it's
+	 * straightforward to provide a 512-bit one because of how the assembly
+	 * code is structured, and it works nicely because the total size of the
+	 * key powers is a multiple of 512 bits.  So we take advantage of that.
+	 *
+	 * A similar situation applies to the AES-NI implementations.
+	 */
+	if (flags & FLAG_AVX10_512)
+		aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_512(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key));
+	else if (flags & FLAG_AVX10_256)
+		aes_gcm_precompute_vaes_avx10_256(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key));
+	else if (flags & FLAG_AVX)
+		aes_gcm_precompute_aesni_avx(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key));
+	else
+		aes_gcm_precompute_aesni(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key));
+}
+
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			 u8 ghash_acc[16], const u8 *aad, int aadlen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni_avx(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			     u8 ghash_acc[16], const u8 *aad, int aadlen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_aad_update_vaes_avx10(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+			      u8 ghash_acc[16], const u8 *aad, int aadlen);
+
+static void aes_gcm_aad_update(const struct aes_gcm_key *key, u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			       const u8 *aad, int aadlen, int flags)
+{
+	if (flags & (FLAG_AVX10_256 | FLAG_AVX10_512))
+		aes_gcm_aad_update_vaes_avx10(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key), ghash_acc,
+					      aad, aadlen);
+	else if (flags & FLAG_AVX)
+		aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni_avx(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key), ghash_acc,
+					     aad, aadlen);
+	else
+		aes_gcm_aad_update_aesni(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key), ghash_acc,
+					 aad, aadlen);
+}
+
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			 const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			 const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni_avx(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			     const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			     const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_256(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+				  const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+				  const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_512(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+				  const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+				  const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			 const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			 const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni_avx(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			     const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			     const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_256(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+				  const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+				  const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_512(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+				  const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+				  const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen);
+
+/* __always_inline to optimize out the branches based on @flags */
+static __always_inline void
+aes_gcm_update(const struct aes_gcm_key *key,
+	       const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+	       const u8 *src, u8 *dst, int datalen, int flags)
+{
+	if (flags & FLAG_ENC) {
+		if (flags & FLAG_AVX10_512)
+			aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_512(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key),
+							  le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+							  src, dst, datalen);
+		else if (flags & FLAG_AVX10_256)
+			aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_256(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key),
+							  le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+							  src, dst, datalen);
+		else if (flags & FLAG_AVX)
+			aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni_avx(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key),
+						     le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+						     src, dst, datalen);
+		else
+			aes_gcm_enc_update_aesni(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key), le_ctr,
+						 ghash_acc, src, dst, datalen);
+	} else {
+		if (flags & FLAG_AVX10_512)
+			aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_512(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key),
+							  le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+							  src, dst, datalen);
+		else if (flags & FLAG_AVX10_256)
+			aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_256(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key),
+							  le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+							  src, dst, datalen);
+		else if (flags & FLAG_AVX)
+			aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni_avx(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key),
+						     le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+						     src, dst, datalen);
+		else
+			aes_gcm_dec_update_aesni(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key),
+						 le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+						 src, dst, datalen);
+	}
+}
+
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni_avx(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			    const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			    u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen);
+asmlinkage void
+aes_gcm_enc_final_vaes_avx10(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+			     const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			     u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen);
+
+/* __always_inline to optimize out the branches based on @flags */
+static __always_inline void
+aes_gcm_enc_final(const struct aes_gcm_key *key,
+		  const u32 le_ctr[4], u8 ghash_acc[16],
+		  u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen, int flags)
+{
+	if (flags & (FLAG_AVX10_256 | FLAG_AVX10_512))
+		aes_gcm_enc_final_vaes_avx10(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key),
+					     le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+					     total_aadlen, total_datalen);
+	else if (flags & FLAG_AVX)
+		aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni_avx(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key),
+					    le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+					    total_aadlen, total_datalen);
+	else
+		aes_gcm_enc_final_aesni(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key),
+					le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+					total_aadlen, total_datalen);
+}
+
+asmlinkage bool __must_check
+aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			const u32 le_ctr[4], const u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen,
+			const u8 tag[16], int taglen);
+asmlinkage bool __must_check
+aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni_avx(const struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *key,
+			    const u32 le_ctr[4], const u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			    u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen,
+			    const u8 tag[16], int taglen);
+asmlinkage bool __must_check
+aes_gcm_dec_final_vaes_avx10(const struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *key,
+			     const u32 le_ctr[4], const u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			     u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen,
+			     const u8 tag[16], int taglen);
+
+/* __always_inline to optimize out the branches based on @flags */
+static __always_inline bool __must_check
+aes_gcm_dec_final(const struct aes_gcm_key *key, const u32 le_ctr[4],
+		  u8 ghash_acc[16], u64 total_aadlen, u64 total_datalen,
+		  u8 tag[16], int taglen, int flags)
+{
+	if (flags & (FLAG_AVX10_256 | FLAG_AVX10_512))
+		return aes_gcm_dec_final_vaes_avx10(AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key),
+						    le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+						    total_aadlen, total_datalen,
+						    tag, taglen);
+	else if (flags & FLAG_AVX)
+		return aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni_avx(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key),
+						   le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+						   total_aadlen, total_datalen,
+						   tag, taglen);
+	else
+		return aes_gcm_dec_final_aesni(AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key),
+					       le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+					       total_aadlen, total_datalen,
+					       tag, taglen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the Integrity Check Value (aka the authentication tag) length and can
+ * be 8, 12 or 16 bytes long.
+ */
+static int common_rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *aead,
+				       unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int generic_gcmaes_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+				       unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 4:
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 13:
+	case 14:
+	case 15:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the setkey function for the x86_64 implementations of AES-GCM.  It
+ * saves the RFC4106 nonce if applicable, expands the AES key, and precomputes
+ * powers of the hash key.
+ *
+ * To comply with the crypto_aead API, this has to be usable in no-SIMD context.
+ * For that reason, this function includes a portable C implementation of the
+ * needed logic.  However, the portable C implementation is very slow, taking
+ * about the same time as encrypting 37 KB of data.  To be ready for users that
+ * may set a key even somewhat frequently, we therefore also include a SIMD
+ * assembly implementation, expanding the AES key using AES-NI and precomputing
+ * the hash key powers using PCLMULQDQ or VPCLMULQDQ.
+ */
+static int gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *raw_key,
+		      unsigned int keylen, int flags)
+{
+	struct aes_gcm_key *key = aes_gcm_key_get(tfm, flags);
+	int err;
+
+	if (flags & FLAG_RFC4106) {
+		if (keylen < 4)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		keylen -= 4;
+		key->rfc4106_nonce = get_unaligned_be32(raw_key + keylen);
+	}
+
+	/* The assembly code assumes the following offsets. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni, base.aes_key.key_enc) != 0);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni, base.aes_key.key_length) != 480);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni, h_powers) != 496);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni, h_powers_xored) != 624);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_aesni, h_times_x64) != 688);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10, base.aes_key.key_enc) != 0);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10, base.aes_key.key_length) != 480);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10, h_powers) != 512);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct aes_gcm_key_avx10, padding) != 768);
+
+	if (likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
+		err = aes_check_keylen(keylen);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		kernel_fpu_begin();
+		aesni_set_key(&key->aes_key, raw_key, keylen);
+		aes_gcm_precompute(key, flags);
+		kernel_fpu_end();
+	} else {
+		static const u8 x_to_the_minus1[16] __aligned(__alignof__(be128)) = {
+			[0] = 0xc2, [15] = 1
+		};
+		static const u8 x_to_the_63[16] __aligned(__alignof__(be128)) = {
+			[7] = 1,
+		};
+		be128 h1 = {};
+		be128 h;
+		int i;
+
+		err = aes_expandkey(&key->aes_key, raw_key, keylen);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		/* Encrypt the all-zeroes block to get the hash key H^1 */
+		aes_encrypt(&key->aes_key, (u8 *)&h1, (u8 *)&h1);
+
+		/* Compute H^1 * x^-1 */
+		h = h1;
+		gf128mul_lle(&h, (const be128 *)x_to_the_minus1);
+
+		/* Compute the needed key powers */
+		if (flags & (FLAG_AVX10_256 | FLAG_AVX10_512)) {
+			struct aes_gcm_key_avx10 *k = AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10(key);
+
+			for (i = ARRAY_SIZE(k->h_powers) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+				k->h_powers[i][0] = be64_to_cpu(h.b);
+				k->h_powers[i][1] = be64_to_cpu(h.a);
+				gf128mul_lle(&h, &h1);
+			}
+			memset(k->padding, 0, sizeof(k->padding));
+		} else {
+			struct aes_gcm_key_aesni *k = AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI(key);
+
+			for (i = ARRAY_SIZE(k->h_powers) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+				k->h_powers[i][0] = be64_to_cpu(h.b);
+				k->h_powers[i][1] = be64_to_cpu(h.a);
+				k->h_powers_xored[i] = k->h_powers[i][0] ^
+						       k->h_powers[i][1];
+				gf128mul_lle(&h, &h1);
+			}
+			gf128mul_lle(&h1, (const be128 *)x_to_the_63);
+			k->h_times_x64[0] = be64_to_cpu(h1.b);
+			k->h_times_x64[1] = be64_to_cpu(h1.a);
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize @ghash_acc, then pass all @assoclen bytes of associated data
+ * (a.k.a. additional authenticated data) from @sg_src through the GHASH update
+ * assembly function.  kernel_fpu_begin() must have already been called.
+ */
+static void gcm_process_assoc(const struct aes_gcm_key *key, u8 ghash_acc[16],
+			      struct scatterlist *sg_src, unsigned int assoclen,
+			      int flags)
+{
+	struct scatter_walk walk;
+	/*
+	 * The assembly function requires that the length of any non-last
+	 * segment of associated data be a multiple of 16 bytes, so this
+	 * function does the buffering needed to achieve that.
+	 */
+	unsigned int pos = 0;
+	u8 buf[16];
+
+	memset(ghash_acc, 0, 16);
+	scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg_src);
+
+	while (assoclen) {
+		unsigned int len_this_page = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, assoclen);
+		void *mapped = scatterwalk_map(&walk);
+		const void *src = mapped;
+		unsigned int len;
+
+		assoclen -= len_this_page;
+		scatterwalk_advance(&walk, len_this_page);
+		if (unlikely(pos)) {
+			len = min(len_this_page, 16 - pos);
+			memcpy(&buf[pos], src, len);
+			pos += len;
+			src += len;
+			len_this_page -= len;
+			if (pos < 16)
+				goto next;
+			aes_gcm_aad_update(key, ghash_acc, buf, 16, flags);
+			pos = 0;
+		}
+		len = len_this_page;
+		if (unlikely(assoclen)) /* Not the last segment yet? */
+			len = round_down(len, 16);
+		aes_gcm_aad_update(key, ghash_acc, src, len, flags);
+		src += len;
+		len_this_page -= len;
+		if (unlikely(len_this_page)) {
+			memcpy(buf, src, len_this_page);
+			pos = len_this_page;
+		}
+next:
+		scatterwalk_unmap(mapped);
+		scatterwalk_pagedone(&walk, 0, assoclen);
+		if (need_resched()) {
+			kernel_fpu_end();
+			kernel_fpu_begin();
+		}
+	}
+	if (unlikely(pos))
+		aes_gcm_aad_update(key, ghash_acc, buf, pos, flags);
+}
+
+
+/* __always_inline to optimize out the branches based on @flags */
+static __always_inline int
+gcm_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int flags)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct aes_gcm_key *key = aes_gcm_key_get(tfm, flags);
+	unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes;
+	u8 ghash_acc[16]; /* GHASH accumulator */
+	u32 le_ctr[4]; /* Counter in little-endian format */
+	int taglen;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Initialize the counter and determine the associated data length. */
+	le_ctr[0] = 2;
+	if (flags & FLAG_RFC4106) {
+		if (unlikely(assoclen != 16 && assoclen != 20))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		assoclen -= 8;
+		le_ctr[1] = get_unaligned_be32(req->iv + 4);
+		le_ctr[2] = get_unaligned_be32(req->iv + 0);
+		le_ctr[3] = key->rfc4106_nonce; /* already byte-swapped */
+	} else {
+		le_ctr[1] = get_unaligned_be32(req->iv + 8);
+		le_ctr[2] = get_unaligned_be32(req->iv + 4);
+		le_ctr[3] = get_unaligned_be32(req->iv + 0);
+	}
+
+	/* Begin walking through the plaintext or ciphertext. */
+	if (flags & FLAG_ENC)
+		err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, false);
+	else
+		err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the AES-GCM assembly code requires that at least three assembly
+	 * functions be called to process any message (this is needed to support
+	 * incremental updates cleanly), to reduce overhead we try to do all
+	 * three calls in the same kernel FPU section if possible.  We close the
+	 * section and start a new one if there are multiple data segments or if
+	 * rescheduling is needed while processing the associated data.
+	 */
+	kernel_fpu_begin();
+
+	/* Pass the associated data through GHASH. */
+	gcm_process_assoc(key, ghash_acc, req->src, assoclen, flags);
+
+	/* En/decrypt the data and pass the ciphertext through GHASH. */
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		if (unlikely(nbytes < walk.total)) {
+			/*
+			 * Non-last segment.  In this case, the assembly
+			 * function requires that the length be a multiple of 16
+			 * (AES_BLOCK_SIZE) bytes.  The needed buffering of up
+			 * to 16 bytes is handled by the skcipher_walk.  Here we
+			 * just need to round down to a multiple of 16.
+			 */
+			nbytes = round_down(nbytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			aes_gcm_update(key, le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+				       walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+				       nbytes, flags);
+			le_ctr[0] += nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			kernel_fpu_end();
+			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
+			kernel_fpu_begin();
+		} else {
+			/* Last segment: process all remaining data. */
+			aes_gcm_update(key, le_ctr, ghash_acc,
+				       walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+				       nbytes, flags);
+			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
+			/*
+			 * The low word of the counter isn't used by the
+			 * finalize, so there's no need to increment it here.
+			 */
+		}
+	}
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Finalize */
+	taglen = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+	if (flags & FLAG_ENC) {
+		/* Finish computing the auth tag. */
+		aes_gcm_enc_final(key, le_ctr, ghash_acc, assoclen,
+				  req->cryptlen, flags);
+
+		/* Store the computed auth tag in the dst scatterlist. */
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ghash_acc, req->dst, req->assoclen +
+					 req->cryptlen, taglen, 1);
+	} else {
+		unsigned int datalen = req->cryptlen - taglen;
+		u8 tag[16];
+
+		/* Get the transmitted auth tag from the src scatterlist. */
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tag, req->src, req->assoclen + datalen,
+					 taglen, 0);
+		/*
+		 * Finish computing the auth tag and compare it to the
+		 * transmitted one.  The assembly function does the actual tag
+		 * comparison.  Here, just check the boolean result.
+		 */
+		if (!aes_gcm_dec_final(key, le_ctr, ghash_acc, assoclen,
+				       datalen, tag, taglen, flags))
+			err = -EBADMSG;
+	}
+out:
+	kernel_fpu_end();
+	return err;
+}
+
+#define DEFINE_GCM_ALGS(suffix, flags, generic_driver_name, rfc_driver_name,   \
+			ctxsize, priority)				       \
+									       \
+static int gcm_setkey_##suffix(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *raw_key,     \
+			       unsigned int keylen)			       \
+{									       \
+	return gcm_setkey(tfm, raw_key, keylen, (flags));		       \
+}									       \
+									       \
+static int gcm_encrypt_##suffix(struct aead_request *req)		       \
+{									       \
+	return gcm_crypt(req, (flags) | FLAG_ENC);			       \
+}									       \
+									       \
+static int gcm_decrypt_##suffix(struct aead_request *req)		       \
+{									       \
+	return gcm_crypt(req, (flags));					       \
+}									       \
+									       \
+static int rfc4106_setkey_##suffix(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *raw_key, \
+				   unsigned int keylen)			       \
+{									       \
+	return gcm_setkey(tfm, raw_key, keylen, (flags) | FLAG_RFC4106);       \
+}									       \
+									       \
+static int rfc4106_encrypt_##suffix(struct aead_request *req)		       \
+{									       \
+	return gcm_crypt(req, (flags) | FLAG_RFC4106 | FLAG_ENC);	       \
+}									       \
+									       \
+static int rfc4106_decrypt_##suffix(struct aead_request *req)		       \
+{									       \
+	return gcm_crypt(req, (flags) | FLAG_RFC4106);			       \
+}									       \
+									       \
+static struct aead_alg aes_gcm_algs_##suffix[] = { {			       \
+	.setkey			= gcm_setkey_##suffix,			       \
+	.setauthsize		= generic_gcmaes_set_authsize,		       \
+	.encrypt		= gcm_encrypt_##suffix,			       \
+	.decrypt		= gcm_decrypt_##suffix,			       \
+	.ivsize			= GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,			       \
+	.chunksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,			       \
+	.maxauthsize		= 16,					       \
+	.base = {							       \
+		.cra_name		= "__gcm(aes)",			       \
+		.cra_driver_name	= "__" generic_driver_name,	       \
+		.cra_priority		= (priority),			       \
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,		       \
+		.cra_blocksize		= 1,				       \
+		.cra_ctxsize		= (ctxsize),			       \
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,			       \
+	},								       \
+}, {									       \
+	.setkey			= rfc4106_setkey_##suffix,		       \
+	.setauthsize		= common_rfc4106_set_authsize,		       \
+	.encrypt		= rfc4106_encrypt_##suffix,		       \
+	.decrypt		= rfc4106_decrypt_##suffix,		       \
+	.ivsize			= GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE,			       \
+	.chunksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,			       \
+	.maxauthsize		= 16,					       \
+	.base = {							       \
+		.cra_name		= "__rfc4106(gcm(aes))",	       \
+		.cra_driver_name	= "__" rfc_driver_name,		       \
+		.cra_priority		= (priority),			       \
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,		       \
+		.cra_blocksize		= 1,				       \
+		.cra_ctxsize		= (ctxsize),			       \
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,			       \
+	},								       \
+} };									       \
+									       \
+static struct simd_aead_alg *aes_gcm_simdalgs_##suffix[2]		       \
+
+/* aes_gcm_algs_aesni */
+DEFINE_GCM_ALGS(aesni, /* no flags */ 0,
+		"generic-gcm-aesni", "rfc4106-gcm-aesni",
+		AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI_SIZE, 400);
+
+/* aes_gcm_algs_aesni_avx */
+DEFINE_GCM_ALGS(aesni_avx, FLAG_AVX,
+		"generic-gcm-aesni-avx", "rfc4106-gcm-aesni-avx",
+		AES_GCM_KEY_AESNI_SIZE, 500);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ)
+/* aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_256 */
+DEFINE_GCM_ALGS(vaes_avx10_256, FLAG_AVX10_256,
+		"generic-gcm-vaes-avx10_256", "rfc4106-gcm-vaes-avx10_256",
+		AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10_SIZE, 700);
+
+/* aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_512 */
+DEFINE_GCM_ALGS(vaes_avx10_512, FLAG_AVX10_512,
+		"generic-gcm-vaes-avx10_512", "rfc4106-gcm-vaes-avx10_512",
+		AES_GCM_KEY_AVX10_SIZE, 800);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AS_VAES && CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ */
+
 /*
  * This is a list of CPU models that are known to suffer from downclocking when
- * zmm registers (512-bit vectors) are used.  On these CPUs, the AES-XTS
- * implementation with zmm registers won't be used by default.  An
- * implementation with ymm registers (256-bit vectors) will be used instead.
+ * zmm registers (512-bit vectors) are used.  On these CPUs, the AES mode
+ * implementations with zmm registers won't be used by default.  Implementations
+ * with ymm registers (256-bit vectors) will be used by default instead.
  */
 static const struct x86_cpu_id zmm_exclusion_list[] = {
 	X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,		0),
@@ -1236,7 +1559,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id zmm_exclusion_list[] = {
 	{},
 };
 
-static int __init register_xts_algs(void)
+static int __init register_avx_algs(void)
 {
 	int err;
 
@@ -1246,6 +1569,11 @@ static int __init register_xts_algs(void)
 					     &aes_xts_simdalg_aesni_avx);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
+	err = simd_register_aeads_compat(aes_gcm_algs_aesni_avx,
+					 ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_aesni_avx),
+					 aes_gcm_simdalgs_aesni_avx);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 #if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) ||
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VAES) ||
@@ -1269,23 +1597,42 @@ static int __init register_xts_algs(void)
 					     &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_256);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
+	err = simd_register_aeads_compat(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_256,
+					 ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_256),
+					 aes_gcm_simdalgs_vaes_avx10_256);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (x86_match_cpu(zmm_exclusion_list)) {
+		int i;
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(zmm_exclusion_list))
 		aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_512.base.cra_priority = 1;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_512); i++)
+			aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_512[i].base.cra_priority = 1;
+	}
 
 	err = simd_register_skciphers_compat(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_512, 1,
 					     &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_512);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
+	err = simd_register_aeads_compat(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_512,
+					 ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_512),
+					 aes_gcm_simdalgs_vaes_avx10_512);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 #endif /* CONFIG_AS_VAES && CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ */
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void unregister_xts_algs(void)
+static void unregister_avx_algs(void)
 {
 	if (aes_xts_simdalg_aesni_avx)
 		simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_aesni_avx, 1,
 					  &aes_xts_simdalg_aesni_avx);
+	if (aes_gcm_simdalgs_aesni_avx[0])
+		simd_unregister_aeads(aes_gcm_algs_aesni_avx,
+				      ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_aesni_avx),
+				      aes_gcm_simdalgs_aesni_avx);
 #if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ)
 	if (aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx2)
 		simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx2, 1,
@@ -1293,106 +1640,33 @@ static void unregister_xts_algs(void)
 	if (aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_256)
 		simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_256, 1,
 					  &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_256);
+	if (aes_gcm_simdalgs_vaes_avx10_256[0])
+		simd_unregister_aeads(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_256,
+				      ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_256),
+				      aes_gcm_simdalgs_vaes_avx10_256);
 	if (aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_512)
 		simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_512, 1,
 					  &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_512);
+	if (aes_gcm_simdalgs_vaes_avx10_512[0])
+		simd_unregister_aeads(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_512,
+				      ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_vaes_avx10_512),
+				      aes_gcm_simdalgs_vaes_avx10_512);
 #endif
 }
 #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
-static int __init register_xts_algs(void)
+static struct aead_alg aes_gcm_algs_aesni[0];
+static struct simd_aead_alg *aes_gcm_simdalgs_aesni[0];
+
+static int __init register_avx_algs(void)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void unregister_xts_algs(void)
+static void unregister_avx_algs(void)
 {
 }
 #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static int generic_gcmaes_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
-				  unsigned int key_len)
-{
-	struct generic_gcmaes_ctx *ctx = generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(aead);
-
-	return aes_set_key_common(&ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?:
-	       aes_gcm_derive_hash_subkey(&ctx->aes_key_expanded,
-					  ctx->hash_subkey);
-}
-
-static int generic_gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
-{
-	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
-	struct generic_gcmaes_ctx *ctx = generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(tfm);
-	void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
-	u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
-	u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
-	__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
-
-	memcpy(iv, req->iv, 12);
-	*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
-
-	return gcmaes_encrypt(req, req->assoclen, ctx->hash_subkey, iv,
-			      aes_ctx);
-}
-
-static int generic_gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
-{
-	__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
-	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
-	struct generic_gcmaes_ctx *ctx = generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(tfm);
-	void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
-	u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
-	u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
-
-	memcpy(iv, req->iv, 12);
-	*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
-
-	return gcmaes_decrypt(req, req->assoclen, ctx->hash_subkey, iv,
-			      aes_ctx);
-}
-
-static struct aead_alg aesni_aeads[] = { {
-	.setkey			= common_rfc4106_set_key,
-	.setauthsize		= common_rfc4106_set_authsize,
-	.encrypt		= helper_rfc4106_encrypt,
-	.decrypt		= helper_rfc4106_decrypt,
-	.ivsize			= GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE,
-	.maxauthsize		= 16,
-	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__rfc4106-gcm-aesni",
-		.cra_priority		= 400,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
-		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
-		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx),
-		.cra_alignmask		= 0,
-		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
-	},
-}, {
-	.setkey			= generic_gcmaes_set_key,
-	.setauthsize		= generic_gcmaes_set_authsize,
-	.encrypt		= generic_gcmaes_encrypt,
-	.decrypt		= generic_gcmaes_decrypt,
-	.ivsize			= GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
-	.maxauthsize		= 16,
-	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__gcm(aes)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__generic-gcm-aesni",
-		.cra_priority		= 400,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
-		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
-		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct generic_gcmaes_ctx),
-		.cra_alignmask		= 0,
-		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
-	},
-} };
-#else
-static struct aead_alg aesni_aeads[0];
-#endif
-
-static struct simd_aead_alg *aesni_simd_aeads[ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_aeads)];
-
 static const struct x86_cpu_id aesni_cpu_id[] = {
 	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_AES, NULL),
 	{}
@@ -1406,17 +1680,6 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void)
 	if (!x86_match_cpu(aesni_cpu_id))
 		return -ENODEV;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2)) {
-		pr_info("AVX2 version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n");
-		static_branch_enable(&gcm_use_avx);
-		static_branch_enable(&gcm_use_avx2);
-	} else
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) {
-		pr_info("AVX version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n");
-		static_branch_enable(&gcm_use_avx);
-	} else {
-		pr_info("SSE version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n");
-	}
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) {
 		/* optimize performance of ctr mode encryption transform */
 		static_call_update(aesni_ctr_enc_tfm, aesni_ctr_enc_avx_tfm);
@@ -1434,8 +1697,9 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void)
 	if (err)
 		goto unregister_cipher;
 
-	err = simd_register_aeads_compat(aesni_aeads, ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_aeads),
-					 aesni_simd_aeads);
+	err = simd_register_aeads_compat(aes_gcm_algs_aesni,
+					 ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_aesni),
+					 aes_gcm_simdalgs_aesni);
 	if (err)
 		goto unregister_skciphers;
 
@@ -1447,22 +1711,22 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void)
 		goto unregister_aeads;
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
-	err = register_xts_algs();
+	err = register_avx_algs();
 	if (err)
-		goto unregister_xts;
+		goto unregister_avx;
 
 	return 0;
 
-unregister_xts:
-	unregister_xts_algs();
+unregister_avx:
+	unregister_avx_algs();
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	if (aesni_simd_xctr)
 		simd_unregister_skciphers(&aesni_xctr, 1, &aesni_simd_xctr);
 unregister_aeads:
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
-	simd_unregister_aeads(aesni_aeads, ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_aeads),
-				aesni_simd_aeads);
-
+	simd_unregister_aeads(aes_gcm_algs_aesni,
+			      ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_aesni),
+			      aes_gcm_simdalgs_aesni);
 unregister_skciphers:
 	simd_unregister_skciphers(aesni_skciphers, ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_skciphers),
 				  aesni_simd_skciphers);
@@ -1473,8 +1737,9 @@ unregister_cipher:
 
 static void __exit aesni_exit(void)
 {
-	simd_unregister_aeads(aesni_aeads, ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_aeads),
-			      aesni_simd_aeads);
+	simd_unregister_aeads(aes_gcm_algs_aesni,
+			      ARRAY_SIZE(aes_gcm_algs_aesni),
+			      aes_gcm_simdalgs_aesni);
 	simd_unregister_skciphers(aesni_skciphers, ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_skciphers),
 				  aesni_simd_skciphers);
 	crypto_unregister_alg(&aesni_cipher_alg);
@@ -1482,7 +1747,7 @@ static void __exit aesni_exit(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
 		simd_unregister_skciphers(&aesni_xctr, 1, &aesni_simd_xctr);
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
-	unregister_xts_algs();
+	unregister_avx_algs();
 }
 
 late_initcall(aesni_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_glue.c
index 98cf3b4e4c9f..9f5e342b9845 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_glue.c
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ module_init(crc32_pclmul_mod_init);
 module_exit(crc32_pclmul_mod_fini);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Alexander Boyko <alexander_boyko@xyratex.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("CRC32 algorithm (IEEE 802.3) accelerated with PCLMULQDQ");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32");
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c b/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
index d55fa9e9b9e6..dcfc0de333de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
@@ -1720,5 +1720,6 @@ module_exit(curve25519_mod_exit);
 
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519-x86");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Curve25519 algorithm, ADX optimized");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
index 1dfb8af48a3c..08ff4b489f7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/sizes.h>
-#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 
 asmlinkage void poly1305_init_x86_64(void *ctx,
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int __init poly1305_simd_mod_init(void)
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512F) &&
 	    cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL) &&
 	    /* Skylake downclocks unacceptably much when using zmm, but later generations are fast. */
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86_model != INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X)
+	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm != INTEL_SKYLAKE_X)
 		static_branch_enable(&poly1305_use_avx512);
 	return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ? crypto_register_shash(&alg) : 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c
index 90454cf18e0d..1a1ecfa7f72a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2011 Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@mbnet.fi>
  */
 
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/twofish.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
@@ -107,10 +108,10 @@ static bool is_blacklisted_cpu(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
 		return false;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x06 &&
-		(boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x1c ||
-		 boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x26 ||
-		 boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x36)) {
+	switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm) {
+	case INTEL_ATOM_BONNELL:
+	case INTEL_ATOM_BONNELL_MID:
+	case INTEL_ATOM_SALTWELL:
 		/*
 		 * On Atom, twofish-3way is slower than original assembler
 		 * implementation. Twofish-3way trades off some performance in
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 5688d42a59c2..72e2decb8c6a 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -313,24 +313,6 @@ config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
 	  One of the Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
 	  algorithms). Only signature verification is implemented.
 
-config CRYPTO_SM2
-	tristate "SM2 (ShangMi 2)"
-	select CRYPTO_SM3
-	select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
-	select CRYPTO_MANAGER
-	select MPILIB
-	select ASN1
-	help
-	  SM2 (ShangMi 2) public key algorithm
-
-	  Published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China,
-	  as specified by OSCCA GM/T 0003.1-2012 -- 0003.5-2012.
-
-	  References:
-	  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/
-	  http://www.oscca.gov.cn/sca/xxgk/2010-12/17/content_1002386.shtml
-	  http://www.gmbz.org.cn/main/bzlb.html
-
 config CRYPTO_CURVE25519
 	tristate "Curve25519"
 	select CRYPTO_KPP
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index edbbaa3ffef5..4c99e5d376f6 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -50,14 +50,6 @@ rsa_generic-y += rsa_helper.o
 rsa_generic-y += rsa-pkcs1pad.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA) += rsa_generic.o
 
-$(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.o: $(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.c $(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.h
-$(obj)/sm2.o: $(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.h
-
-sm2_generic-y += sm2signature.asn1.o
-sm2_generic-y += sm2.o
-
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) += sm2_generic.o
-
 $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
 $(obj)/ecdsa.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
 ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsa.o
diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index 18cfead0081d..0da7c1ac778a 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -1317,5 +1317,6 @@ static void __exit af_alg_exit(void)
 
 module_init(af_alg_init);
 module_exit(af_alg_exit);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Crypto userspace interface");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_ALIAS_NETPROTO(AF_ALG);
diff --git a/crypto/algapi.c b/crypto/algapi.c
index 85bc279b4233..122cd910c4e1 100644
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -1056,6 +1056,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_type_has_alg);
 
 static void __init crypto_start_tests(void)
 {
+	if (!IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI))
+		return;
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index 7c7394d46a23..5498a87249d3 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -471,4 +471,5 @@ static void __exit algif_hash_exit(void)
 
 module_init(algif_hash_init);
 module_exit(algif_hash_exit);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Userspace interface for hash algorithms");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
index 02cea2149504..125d395c5e00 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -437,4 +437,5 @@ static void __exit algif_skcipher_exit(void)
 
 module_init(algif_skcipher_init);
 module_exit(algif_skcipher_exit);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Userspace interface for skcipher algorithms");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/api.c b/crypto/api.c
index 6aa5a3b4ed5e..22556907b3bc 100644
--- a/crypto/api.c
+++ b/crypto/api.c
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_alg_sem);
 BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(crypto_chain);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chain);
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+#if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI) && \
+    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS)
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__crypto_boot_test_finished);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__crypto_boot_test_finished);
 #endif
 
 static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 231ad7b3789d..423d13c47545 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -292,10 +292,6 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
 		ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "x962";
 		break;
-	case OID_SM2_with_SM3:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "sm2";
-		ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
-		break;
 	case OID_gost2012PKey256:
 	case OID_gost2012PKey512:
 		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 3474fb34ded9..422940a6706a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -124,13 +124,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
 		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-384") != 0 &&
 		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-512") != 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
-	} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) {
-		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		if (!hash_algo)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sm3") != 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) {
 		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 25cc4273472f..ee2fdab42334 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -257,10 +257,6 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
 	case OID_gost2012Signature512:
 		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";
 		goto ecrdsa;
-
-	case OID_SM2_with_SM3:
-		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sm3";
-		goto sm2;
 	}
 
 rsa_pkcs1:
@@ -273,11 +269,6 @@ ecrdsa:
 	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
 	ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
 	return 0;
-sm2:
-	ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "sm2";
-	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
-	ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
-	return 0;
 ecdsa:
 	ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
 	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "x962";
@@ -309,7 +300,6 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 
 	if (strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") == 0) {
 		/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
 		if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
@@ -514,17 +504,11 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	case OID_gost2012PKey512:
 		ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
 		break;
-	case OID_sm2:
-		ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2";
-		break;
 	case OID_id_ecPublicKey:
 		if (parse_OID(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, &oid) != 0)
 			return -EBADMSG;
 
 		switch (oid) {
-		case OID_sm2:
-			ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2";
-			break;
 		case OID_id_prime192v1:
 			ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p192";
 			break;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 00ac7159fba2..8409d7d36cb4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sm2.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
@@ -64,20 +63,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 
 	desc->tfm = tfm;
 
-	if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) {
-		ret = strcmp(sig->hash_algo, "sm3") != 0 ? -EINVAL :
-		      crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
-		      sm2_compute_z_digest(desc, cert->pub->key,
-					   cert->pub->keylen, sig->digest) ?:
-		      crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
-		      crypto_shash_update(desc, sig->digest,
-					  sig->digest_size) ?:
-		      crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
-					 sig->digest);
-	} else {
-		ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
-					  sig->digest);
-	}
+	ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
+				  sig->digest);
 
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_2;
diff --git a/crypto/cast_common.c b/crypto/cast_common.c
index 9b2f60fd4cef..fec1f6609a40 100644
--- a/crypto/cast_common.c
+++ b/crypto/cast_common.c
@@ -282,4 +282,5 @@ __visible const u32 cast_s4[256] = {
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cast_s4);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Common lookup tables for CAST-128 (cast5) and CAST-256 (cast6)");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/curve25519-generic.c b/crypto/curve25519-generic.c
index d055b0784c77..68a673262e04 100644
--- a/crypto/curve25519-generic.c
+++ b/crypto/curve25519-generic.c
@@ -87,4 +87,5 @@ module_exit(curve25519_exit);
 
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519-generic");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Curve25519 elliptic curve (RFC7748)");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/deflate.c b/crypto/deflate.c
index 6e31e0db0e86..98e8bcb81a6a 100644
--- a/crypto/deflate.c
+++ b/crypto/deflate.c
@@ -311,3 +311,4 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Deflate Compression Algorithm for IPCOMP");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("deflate");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("deflate-generic");
diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
index fe761256e335..420decdad7d9 100644
--- a/crypto/ecc.c
+++ b/crypto/ecc.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ void ecc_digits_from_bytes(const u8 *in, unsigned int nbytes,
 	/* diff > 0: not enough input bytes: set most significant digits to 0 */
 	if (diff > 0) {
 		ndigits -= diff;
-		memset(&out[ndigits - 1], 0, diff * sizeof(u64));
+		memset(&out[ndigits], 0, diff * sizeof(u64));
 	}
 
 	if (o) {
@@ -1715,4 +1715,5 @@ out:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_ecdh_shared_secret);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("core elliptic curve module");
 MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c
index 258fffbf623d..d5a10959ec28 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
 	size_t bufsize = ndigits * sizeof(u64);
 	ssize_t diff = vlen - bufsize;
 	const char *d = value;
-	u8 rs[ECC_MAX_BYTES];
 
 	if (!value || !vlen)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
 	/* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size
 	 * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that
 	 *           makes the value a positive integer; error on more
-	 * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros, which we add
+	 * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros
 	 */
 	if (diff > 0) {
 		/* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */
@@ -61,14 +60,7 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
 	if (-diff >= bufsize)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (diff) {
-		/* leading zeros not given in 'value' */
-		memset(rs, 0, -diff);
-	}
-
-	memcpy(&rs[-diff], d, vlen);
-
-	ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rs, dest, ndigits);
+	ecc_digits_from_bytes(d, vlen, dest, ndigits);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -142,10 +134,8 @@ static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
 	struct ecdsa_signature_ctx sig_ctx = {
 		.curve = ctx->curve,
 	};
-	u8 rawhash[ECC_MAX_BYTES];
 	u64 hash[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
 	unsigned char *buffer;
-	ssize_t diff;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (unlikely(!ctx->pub_key_set))
@@ -164,18 +154,11 @@ static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
-	/* if the hash is shorter then we will add leading zeros to fit to ndigits */
-	diff = bufsize - req->dst_len;
-	if (diff >= 0) {
-		if (diff)
-			memset(rawhash, 0, diff);
-		memcpy(&rawhash[diff], buffer + req->src_len, req->dst_len);
-	} else if (diff < 0) {
-		/* given hash is longer, we take the left-most bytes */
-		memcpy(&rawhash, buffer + req->src_len, bufsize);
-	}
+	if (bufsize > req->dst_len)
+		bufsize = req->dst_len;
 
-	ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rawhash, hash, ctx->curve->g.ndigits);
+	ecc_digits_from_bytes(buffer + req->src_len, bufsize,
+			      hash, ctx->curve->g.ndigits);
 
 	ret = _ecdsa_verify(ctx, hash, sig_ctx.r, sig_ctx.s);
 
@@ -215,9 +198,8 @@ static int ecdsa_ecc_ctx_reset(struct ecc_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * Set the public key given the raw uncompressed key data from an X509
- * certificate. The key data contain the concatenated X and Y coordinates of
- * the public key.
+ * Set the public ECC key as defined by RFC5480 section 2.2 "Subject Public
+ * Key". Only the uncompressed format is supported.
  */
 static int ecdsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/internal.h b/crypto/internal.h
index 63e59240d5fb..aee31319be2e 100644
--- a/crypto/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/internal.h
@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ extern struct blocking_notifier_head crypto_chain;
 
 int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+#if !IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI) || \
+    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS)
 static inline bool crypto_boot_test_finished(void)
 {
 	return true;
@@ -84,7 +85,9 @@ static inline void set_crypto_boot_test_finished(void)
 {
 	static_branch_enable(&__crypto_boot_test_finished);
 }
-#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS */
+#endif /* !IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI) ||
+	* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS)
+	*/
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 void __init crypto_init_proc(void);
diff --git a/crypto/simd.c b/crypto/simd.c
index edaa479a1ec5..2aa4f72e224f 100644
--- a/crypto/simd.c
+++ b/crypto/simd.c
@@ -523,4 +523,5 @@ void simd_unregister_aeads(struct aead_alg *algs, int count,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(simd_unregister_aeads);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Shared crypto SIMD helpers");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/sm2.c b/crypto/sm2.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ab120d74c59..000000000000
--- a/crypto/sm2.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,498 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
-/*
- * SM2 asymmetric public-key algorithm
- * as specified by OSCCA GM/T 0003.1-2012 -- 0003.5-2012 SM2 and
- * described at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2020, Alibaba Group.
- * Authors: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/mpi.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
-#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/rng.h>
-#include <crypto/sm2.h>
-#include "sm2signature.asn1.h"
-
-/* The default user id as specified in GM/T 0009-2012 */
-#define SM2_DEFAULT_USERID "1234567812345678"
-#define SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN 16
-
-#define MPI_NBYTES(m)   ((mpi_get_nbits(m) + 7) / 8)
-
-struct ecc_domain_parms {
-	const char *desc;           /* Description of the curve.  */
-	unsigned int nbits;         /* Number of bits.  */
-	unsigned int fips:1; /* True if this is a FIPS140-2 approved curve */
-
-	/* The model describing this curve.  This is mainly used to select
-	 * the group equation.
-	 */
-	enum gcry_mpi_ec_models model;
-
-	/* The actual ECC dialect used.  This is used for curve specific
-	 * optimizations and to select encodings etc.
-	 */
-	enum ecc_dialects dialect;
-
-	const char *p;              /* The prime defining the field.  */
-	const char *a, *b;          /* The coefficients.  For Twisted Edwards
-				     * Curves b is used for d.  For Montgomery
-				     * Curves (a,b) has ((A-2)/4,B^-1).
-				     */
-	const char *n;              /* The order of the base point.  */
-	const char *g_x, *g_y;      /* Base point.  */
-	unsigned int h;             /* Cofactor.  */
-};
-
-static const struct ecc_domain_parms sm2_ecp = {
-	.desc = "sm2p256v1",
-	.nbits = 256,
-	.fips = 0,
-	.model = MPI_EC_WEIERSTRASS,
-	.dialect = ECC_DIALECT_STANDARD,
-	.p   = "0xfffffffeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffff",
-	.a   = "0xfffffffeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000000fffffffffffffffc",
-	.b   = "0x28e9fa9e9d9f5e344d5a9e4bcf6509a7f39789f515ab8f92ddbcbd414d940e93",
-	.n   = "0xfffffffeffffffffffffffffffffffff7203df6b21c6052b53bbf40939d54123",
-	.g_x = "0x32c4ae2c1f1981195f9904466a39c9948fe30bbff2660be1715a4589334c74c7",
-	.g_y = "0xbc3736a2f4f6779c59bdcee36b692153d0a9877cc62a474002df32e52139f0a0",
-	.h = 1
-};
-
-static int __sm2_set_pub_key(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec,
-			     const void *key, unsigned int keylen);
-
-static int sm2_ec_ctx_init(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
-{
-	const struct ecc_domain_parms *ecp = &sm2_ecp;
-	MPI p, a, b;
-	MPI x, y;
-	int rc = -EINVAL;
-
-	p = mpi_scanval(ecp->p);
-	a = mpi_scanval(ecp->a);
-	b = mpi_scanval(ecp->b);
-	if (!p || !a || !b)
-		goto free_p;
-
-	x = mpi_scanval(ecp->g_x);
-	y = mpi_scanval(ecp->g_y);
-	if (!x || !y)
-		goto free;
-
-	rc = -ENOMEM;
-
-	ec->Q = mpi_point_new(0);
-	if (!ec->Q)
-		goto free;
-
-	/* mpi_ec_setup_elliptic_curve */
-	ec->G = mpi_point_new(0);
-	if (!ec->G) {
-		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
-		goto free;
-	}
-
-	mpi_set(ec->G->x, x);
-	mpi_set(ec->G->y, y);
-	mpi_set_ui(ec->G->z, 1);
-
-	rc = -EINVAL;
-	ec->n = mpi_scanval(ecp->n);
-	if (!ec->n) {
-		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
-		mpi_point_release(ec->G);
-		goto free;
-	}
-
-	ec->h = ecp->h;
-	ec->name = ecp->desc;
-	mpi_ec_init(ec, ecp->model, ecp->dialect, 0, p, a, b);
-
-	rc = 0;
-
-free:
-	mpi_free(x);
-	mpi_free(y);
-free_p:
-	mpi_free(p);
-	mpi_free(a);
-	mpi_free(b);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-static void sm2_ec_ctx_deinit(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
-{
-	mpi_ec_deinit(ec);
-
-	memset(ec, 0, sizeof(*ec));
-}
-
-/* RESULT must have been initialized and is set on success to the
- * point given by VALUE.
- */
-static int sm2_ecc_os2ec(MPI_POINT result, MPI value)
-{
-	int rc;
-	size_t n;
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	MPI x, y;
-
-	n = MPI_NBYTES(value);
-	buf = kmalloc(n, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buf)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	rc = mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf, n, &n, value);
-	if (rc)
-		goto err_freebuf;
-
-	rc = -EINVAL;
-	if (n < 1 || ((n - 1) % 2))
-		goto err_freebuf;
-	/* No support for point compression */
-	if (*buf != 0x4)
-		goto err_freebuf;
-
-	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	n = (n - 1) / 2;
-	x = mpi_read_raw_data(buf + 1, n);
-	if (!x)
-		goto err_freebuf;
-	y = mpi_read_raw_data(buf + 1 + n, n);
-	if (!y)
-		goto err_freex;
-
-	mpi_normalize(x);
-	mpi_normalize(y);
-	mpi_set(result->x, x);
-	mpi_set(result->y, y);
-	mpi_set_ui(result->z, 1);
-
-	rc = 0;
-
-	mpi_free(y);
-err_freex:
-	mpi_free(x);
-err_freebuf:
-	kfree(buf);
-	return rc;
-}
-
-struct sm2_signature_ctx {
-	MPI sig_r;
-	MPI sig_s;
-};
-
-int sm2_get_signature_r(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
-				const void *value, size_t vlen)
-{
-	struct sm2_signature_ctx *sig = context;
-
-	if (!value || !vlen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	sig->sig_r = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen);
-	if (!sig->sig_r)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int sm2_get_signature_s(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
-				const void *value, size_t vlen)
-{
-	struct sm2_signature_ctx *sig = context;
-
-	if (!value || !vlen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	sig->sig_s = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen);
-	if (!sig->sig_s)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int sm2_z_digest_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
-			       MPI m, unsigned int pbytes)
-{
-	static const unsigned char zero[32];
-	unsigned char *in;
-	unsigned int inlen;
-	int err;
-
-	in = mpi_get_buffer(m, &inlen, NULL);
-	if (!in)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (inlen < pbytes) {
-		/* padding with zero */
-		err = crypto_shash_update(desc, zero, pbytes - inlen) ?:
-		      crypto_shash_update(desc, in, inlen);
-	} else if (inlen > pbytes) {
-		/* skip the starting zero */
-		err = crypto_shash_update(desc, in + inlen - pbytes, pbytes);
-	} else {
-		err = crypto_shash_update(desc, in, inlen);
-	}
-
-	kfree(in);
-	return err;
-}
-
-static int sm2_z_digest_update_point(struct shash_desc *desc,
-				     MPI_POINT point, struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec,
-				     unsigned int pbytes)
-{
-	MPI x, y;
-	int ret = -EINVAL;
-
-	x = mpi_new(0);
-	y = mpi_new(0);
-
-	ret = mpi_ec_get_affine(x, y, point, ec) ? -EINVAL :
-	      sm2_z_digest_update(desc, x, pbytes) ?:
-	      sm2_z_digest_update(desc, y, pbytes);
-
-	mpi_free(x);
-	mpi_free(y);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-int sm2_compute_z_digest(struct shash_desc *desc,
-			 const void *key, unsigned int keylen, void *dgst)
-{
-	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec;
-	unsigned int bits_len;
-	unsigned int pbytes;
-	u8 entl[2];
-	int err;
-
-	ec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ec), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ec)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	err = sm2_ec_ctx_init(ec);
-	if (err)
-		goto out_free_ec;
-
-	err = __sm2_set_pub_key(ec, key, keylen);
-	if (err)
-		goto out_deinit_ec;
-
-	bits_len = SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN * 8;
-	entl[0] = bits_len >> 8;
-	entl[1] = bits_len & 0xff;
-
-	pbytes = MPI_NBYTES(ec->p);
-
-	/* ZA = H256(ENTLA | IDA | a | b | xG | yG | xA | yA) */
-	err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
-	if (err)
-		goto out_deinit_ec;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_update(desc, entl, 2);
-	if (err)
-		goto out_deinit_ec;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_update(desc, SM2_DEFAULT_USERID,
-				  SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN);
-	if (err)
-		goto out_deinit_ec;
-
-	err = sm2_z_digest_update(desc, ec->a, pbytes) ?:
-	      sm2_z_digest_update(desc, ec->b, pbytes) ?:
-	      sm2_z_digest_update_point(desc, ec->G, ec, pbytes) ?:
-	      sm2_z_digest_update_point(desc, ec->Q, ec, pbytes);
-	if (err)
-		goto out_deinit_ec;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dgst);
-
-out_deinit_ec:
-	sm2_ec_ctx_deinit(ec);
-out_free_ec:
-	kfree(ec);
-	return err;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sm2_compute_z_digest);
-
-static int _sm2_verify(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec, MPI hash, MPI sig_r, MPI sig_s)
-{
-	int rc = -EINVAL;
-	struct gcry_mpi_point sG, tP;
-	MPI t = NULL;
-	MPI x1 = NULL, y1 = NULL;
-
-	mpi_point_init(&sG);
-	mpi_point_init(&tP);
-	x1 = mpi_new(0);
-	y1 = mpi_new(0);
-	t = mpi_new(0);
-
-	/* r, s in [1, n-1] */
-	if (mpi_cmp_ui(sig_r, 1) < 0 || mpi_cmp(sig_r, ec->n) > 0 ||
-		mpi_cmp_ui(sig_s, 1) < 0 || mpi_cmp(sig_s, ec->n) > 0) {
-		goto leave;
-	}
-
-	/* t = (r + s) % n, t == 0 */
-	mpi_addm(t, sig_r, sig_s, ec->n);
-	if (mpi_cmp_ui(t, 0) == 0)
-		goto leave;
-
-	/* sG + tP = (x1, y1) */
-	rc = -EBADMSG;
-	mpi_ec_mul_point(&sG, sig_s, ec->G, ec);
-	mpi_ec_mul_point(&tP, t, ec->Q, ec);
-	mpi_ec_add_points(&sG, &sG, &tP, ec);
-	if (mpi_ec_get_affine(x1, y1, &sG, ec))
-		goto leave;
-
-	/* R = (e + x1) % n */
-	mpi_addm(t, hash, x1, ec->n);
-
-	/* check R == r */
-	rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
-	if (mpi_cmp(t, sig_r))
-		goto leave;
-
-	rc = 0;
-
-leave:
-	mpi_point_free_parts(&sG);
-	mpi_point_free_parts(&tP);
-	mpi_free(x1);
-	mpi_free(y1);
-	mpi_free(t);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-static int sm2_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
-{
-	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-	unsigned char *buffer;
-	struct sm2_signature_ctx sig;
-	MPI hash;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (unlikely(!ec->Q))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	buffer = kmalloc(req->src_len + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buffer)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
-		sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->src_len + req->dst_len),
-		buffer, req->src_len + req->dst_len, 0);
-
-	sig.sig_r = NULL;
-	sig.sig_s = NULL;
-	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&sm2signature_decoder, &sig,
-				buffer, req->src_len);
-	if (ret)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	hash = mpi_read_raw_data(buffer + req->src_len, req->dst_len);
-	if (!hash)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = _sm2_verify(ec, hash, sig.sig_r, sig.sig_s);
-
-	mpi_free(hash);
-error:
-	mpi_free(sig.sig_r);
-	mpi_free(sig.sig_s);
-	kfree(buffer);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sm2_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
-			const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
-{
-	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-
-	return __sm2_set_pub_key(ec, key, keylen);
-
-}
-
-static int __sm2_set_pub_key(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec,
-			     const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
-{
-	MPI a;
-	int rc;
-
-	/* include the uncompressed flag '0x04' */
-	a = mpi_read_raw_data(key, keylen);
-	if (!a)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	mpi_normalize(a);
-	rc = sm2_ecc_os2ec(ec->Q, a);
-	mpi_free(a);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-static unsigned int sm2_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
-{
-	/* Unlimited max size */
-	return PAGE_SIZE;
-}
-
-static int sm2_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
-{
-	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-
-	return sm2_ec_ctx_init(ec);
-}
-
-static void sm2_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
-{
-	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-
-	sm2_ec_ctx_deinit(ec);
-}
-
-static struct akcipher_alg sm2 = {
-	.verify = sm2_verify,
-	.set_pub_key = sm2_set_pub_key,
-	.max_size = sm2_max_size,
-	.init = sm2_init_tfm,
-	.exit = sm2_exit_tfm,
-	.base = {
-		.cra_name = "sm2",
-		.cra_driver_name = "sm2-generic",
-		.cra_priority = 100,
-		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct mpi_ec_ctx),
-	},
-};
-
-static int __init sm2_init(void)
-{
-	return crypto_register_akcipher(&sm2);
-}
-
-static void __exit sm2_exit(void)
-{
-	crypto_unregister_akcipher(&sm2);
-}
-
-subsys_initcall(sm2_init);
-module_exit(sm2_exit);
-
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SM2 generic algorithm");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sm2-generic");
diff --git a/crypto/sm2signature.asn1 b/crypto/sm2signature.asn1
deleted file mode 100644
index ab8c0b754d21..000000000000
--- a/crypto/sm2signature.asn1
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Sm2Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
-	sig_r	INTEGER ({ sm2_get_signature_r }),
-	sig_s	INTEGER ({ sm2_get_signature_s })
-}
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 8aea416f6480..e9e7dceb606e 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -2613,6 +2613,15 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb)
 		break;
 
 	case 600:
+		if (alg) {
+			u8 speed_template[2] = {klen, 0};
+			test_mb_skcipher_speed(alg, ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+					       speed_template, num_mb);
+			test_mb_skcipher_speed(alg, DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+					       speed_template, num_mb);
+			break;
+		}
+
 		test_mb_skcipher_speed("ecb(aes)", ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
 				       speed_template_16_24_32, num_mb);
 		test_mb_skcipher_speed("ecb(aes)", DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 00f5a6cf341a..f02cb075bd68 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -293,6 +293,10 @@ struct test_sg_division {
  *				      the @key_offset
  * @finalization_type: what finalization function to use for hashes
  * @nosimd: execute with SIMD disabled?  Requires !CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
+ *	    This applies to the parts of the operation that aren't controlled
+ *	    individually by @nosimd_setkey or @src_divs[].nosimd.
+ * @nosimd_setkey: set the key (if applicable) with SIMD disabled?  Requires
+ *		   !CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
  */
 struct testvec_config {
 	const char *name;
@@ -306,6 +310,7 @@ struct testvec_config {
 	bool key_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
 	enum finalization_type finalization_type;
 	bool nosimd;
+	bool nosimd_setkey;
 };
 
 #define TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN	192
@@ -533,7 +538,8 @@ static bool valid_testvec_config(const struct testvec_config *cfg)
 	    cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST)
 		return false;
 
-	if ((cfg->nosimd || (flags & SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
+	if ((cfg->nosimd || cfg->nosimd_setkey ||
+	     (flags & SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
 	    (cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP))
 		return false;
 
@@ -841,7 +847,10 @@ static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Like setkey_f(tfm, key, ksize), but sometimes misalign the key */
+/*
+ * Like setkey_f(tfm, key, ksize), but sometimes misalign the key.
+ * In addition, run the setkey function in no-SIMD context if requested.
+ */
 #define do_setkey(setkey_f, tfm, key, ksize, cfg, alignmask)		\
 ({									\
 	const u8 *keybuf, *keyptr;					\
@@ -850,7 +859,11 @@ static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize,
 	err = prepare_keybuf((key), (ksize), (cfg), (alignmask),	\
 			     &keybuf, &keyptr);				\
 	if (err == 0) {							\
+		if ((cfg)->nosimd_setkey)				\
+			crypto_disable_simd_for_test();			\
 		err = setkey_f((tfm), keyptr, (ksize));			\
+		if ((cfg)->nosimd_setkey)				\
+			crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();		\
 		kfree(keybuf);						\
 	}								\
 	err;								\
@@ -903,14 +916,20 @@ static unsigned int generate_random_length(struct rnd_state *rng,
 
 	switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
 	case 0:
-		return len % 64;
+		len %= 64;
+		break;
 	case 1:
-		return len % 256;
+		len %= 256;
+		break;
 	case 2:
-		return len % 1024;
+		len %= 1024;
+		break;
 	default:
-		return len;
+		break;
 	}
+	if (len && prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+		len = rounddown_pow_of_two(len);
+	return len;
 }
 
 /* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */
@@ -1006,6 +1025,8 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct rnd_state *rng,
 
 		if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_bool(rng))
 			this_len = remaining;
+		else if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+			this_len = (remaining + 1) / 2;
 		else
 			this_len = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, remaining);
 		div->proportion_of_total = this_len;
@@ -1118,9 +1139,15 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct rnd_state *rng,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && prandom_bool(rng)) {
-		cfg->nosimd = true;
-		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd");
+	if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)) {
+		if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+			cfg->nosimd = true;
+			p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd");
+		}
+		if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+			cfg->nosimd_setkey = true;
+			p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd_setkey");
+		}
 	}
 
 	p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=[");
@@ -5590,12 +5617,6 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 			.hash = __VECS(sha512_tv_template)
 		}
 	}, {
-		.alg = "sm2",
-		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
-		.suite = {
-			.akcipher = __VECS(sm2_tv_template)
-		}
-	}, {
 		.alg = "sm3",
 		.test = alg_test_hash,
 		.suite = {
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 5350cfd9d325..9b38501a17b2 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -5774,65 +5774,6 @@ static const struct hash_testvec hmac_streebog512_tv_template[] = {
 	},
 };
 
-/*
- * SM2 test vectors.
- */
-static const struct akcipher_testvec sm2_tv_template[] = {
-	{ /* Generated from openssl */
-	.key =
-	"\x04"
-	"\x8e\xa0\x33\x69\x91\x7e\x3d\xec\xad\x8e\xf0\x45\x5e\x13\x3e\x68"
-	"\x5b\x8c\xab\x5c\xc6\xc8\x50\xdf\x91\x00\xe0\x24\x73\x4d\x31\xf2"
-	"\x2e\xc0\xd5\x6b\xee\xda\x98\x93\xec\xd8\x36\xaa\xb9\xcf\x63\x82"
-	"\xef\xa7\x1a\x03\xed\x16\xba\x74\xb8\x8b\xf9\xe5\x70\x39\xa4\x70",
-	.key_len = 65,
-	.param_len = 0,
-	.c =
-	"\x30\x45"
-	"\x02\x20"
-	"\x70\xab\xb6\x7d\xd6\x54\x80\x64\x42\x7e\x2d\x05\x08\x36\xc9\x96"
-	"\x25\xc2\xbb\xff\x08\xe5\x43\x15\x5e\xf3\x06\xd9\x2b\x2f\x0a\x9f"
-	"\x02\x21"
-	"\x00"
-	"\xbf\x21\x5f\x7e\x5d\x3f\x1a\x4d\x8f\x84\xc2\xe9\xa6\x4c\xa4\x18"
-	"\xb2\xb8\x46\xf4\x32\x96\xfa\x57\xc6\x29\xd4\x89\xae\xcc\xda\xdb",
-	.c_size = 71,
-	.algo = OID_SM2_with_SM3,
-	.m =
-	"\x47\xa7\xbf\xd3\xda\xc4\x79\xee\xda\x8b\x4f\xe8\x40\x94\xd4\x32"
-	"\x8f\xf1\xcd\x68\x4d\xbd\x9b\x1d\xe0\xd8\x9a\x5d\xad\x85\x47\x5c",
-	.m_size = 32,
-	.public_key_vec = true,
-	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
-	},
-	{ /* From libgcrypt */
-	.key =
-	"\x04"
-	"\x87\x59\x38\x9a\x34\xaa\xad\x07\xec\xf4\xe0\xc8\xc2\x65\x0a\x44"
-	"\x59\xc8\xd9\x26\xee\x23\x78\x32\x4e\x02\x61\xc5\x25\x38\xcb\x47"
-	"\x75\x28\x10\x6b\x1e\x0b\x7c\x8d\xd5\xff\x29\xa9\xc8\x6a\x89\x06"
-	"\x56\x56\xeb\x33\x15\x4b\xc0\x55\x60\x91\xef\x8a\xc9\xd1\x7d\x78",
-	.key_len = 65,
-	.param_len = 0,
-	.c =
-	"\x30\x44"
-	"\x02\x20"
-	"\xd9\xec\xef\xe8\x5f\xee\x3c\x59\x57\x8e\x5b\xab\xb3\x02\xe1\x42"
-	"\x4b\x67\x2c\x0b\x26\xb6\x51\x2c\x3e\xfc\xc6\x49\xec\xfe\x89\xe5"
-	"\x02\x20"
-	"\x43\x45\xd0\xa5\xff\xe5\x13\x27\x26\xd0\xec\x37\xad\x24\x1e\x9a"
-	"\x71\x9a\xa4\x89\xb0\x7e\x0f\xc4\xbb\x2d\x50\xd0\xe5\x7f\x7a\x68",
-	.c_size = 70,
-	.algo = OID_SM2_with_SM3,
-	.m =
-	"\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x00"
-	"\x12\x34\x56\x78\x9a\xbc\xde\xf0\x12\x34\x56\x78\x9a\xbc\xde\xf0",
-	.m_size = 32,
-	.public_key_vec = true,
-	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
-	},
-};
-
 /* Example vectors below taken from
  * http://www.oscca.gov.cn/UpFile/20101222141857786.pdf
  *
diff --git a/crypto/xor.c b/crypto/xor.c
index 8e72e5d5db0d..a1363162978c 100644
--- a/crypto/xor.c
+++ b/crypto/xor.c
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ out:
 
 static __exit void xor_exit(void) { }
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RAID-5 checksumming functions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 
 #ifndef MODULE
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig
index 442c40efb200..01e2e1ef82cf 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig
@@ -555,7 +555,6 @@ config HW_RANDOM_ARM_SMCCC_TRNG
 config HW_RANDOM_CN10K
        tristate "Marvell CN10K Random Number Generator support"
        depends on HW_RANDOM && PCI && (ARM64 || (64BIT && COMPILE_TEST))
-       default HW_RANDOM
        help
 	 This driver provides support for the True Random Number
 	 generator available in Marvell CN10K SoCs.
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c
index 86162a13681e..9a24d19236dc 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c
@@ -143,8 +143,10 @@ static int __init amd_rng_mod_init(void)
 
 found:
 	err = pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x58, &pmbase);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		err = pcibios_err_to_errno(err);
 		goto put_dev;
+	}
 
 	pmbase &= 0x0000FF00;
 	if (pmbase == 0) {
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/arm_smccc_trng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/arm_smccc_trng.c
index 7e954341b09f..dcb8e7f37f25 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/arm_smccc_trng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/arm_smccc_trng.c
@@ -118,4 +118,5 @@ module_platform_driver(smccc_trng_driver);
 
 MODULE_ALIAS("platform:smccc_trng");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Andre Przywara");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Arm SMCCC TRNG firmware interface support");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c
index c99c54cd99c6..c1b8918b2292 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c
@@ -266,4 +266,5 @@ static struct pci_driver cavium_rng_vf_driver = {
 module_pci_driver(cavium_rng_vf_driver);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Omer Khaliq <okhaliq@caviumnetworks.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Cavium ThunderX Random Number Generator VF support");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c
index b96579222408..d9d7b6038c06 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c
@@ -88,4 +88,5 @@ static struct pci_driver cavium_rng_pf_driver = {
 
 module_pci_driver(cavium_rng_pf_driver);
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Omer Khaliq <okhaliq@caviumnetworks.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Cavium ThunderX Random Number Generator support");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 4084df65c9fa..57c51efa5613 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -161,7 +161,6 @@ static int hwrng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
 	reinit_completion(&rng->cleanup_done);
 
 skip_init:
-	rng->quality = min_t(u16, min_t(u16, default_quality, 1024), rng->quality ?: 1024);
 	current_quality = rng->quality; /* obsolete */
 
 	return 0;
@@ -470,16 +469,6 @@ static struct attribute *rng_dev_attrs[] = {
 
 ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(rng_dev);
 
-static void __exit unregister_miscdev(void)
-{
-	misc_deregister(&rng_miscdev);
-}
-
-static int __init register_miscdev(void)
-{
-	return misc_register(&rng_miscdev);
-}
-
 static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 {
 	size_t entropy, entropy_credit = 0; /* in 1/1024 of a bit */
@@ -545,6 +534,9 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
 	complete(&rng->cleanup_done);
 	init_completion(&rng->dying);
 
+	/* Adjust quality field to always have a proper value */
+	rng->quality = min_t(u16, min_t(u16, default_quality, 1024), rng->quality ?: 1024);
+
 	if (!current_rng ||
 	    (!cur_rng_set_by_user && rng->quality > current_rng->quality)) {
 		/*
@@ -668,7 +660,7 @@ static int __init hwrng_modinit(void)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	ret = register_miscdev();
+	ret = misc_register(&rng_miscdev);
 	if (ret) {
 		kfree(rng_fillbuf);
 		kfree(rng_buffer);
@@ -685,7 +677,7 @@ static void __exit hwrng_modexit(void)
 	kfree(rng_fillbuf);
 	mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
 
-	unregister_miscdev();
+	misc_deregister(&rng_miscdev);
 }
 
 fs_initcall(hwrng_modinit); /* depends on misc_register() */
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/exynos-trng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/exynos-trng.c
index 0ed5d22fe667..9f039fddaee3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/exynos-trng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/exynos-trng.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  * Krzysztof Kozłowski <krzk@kernel.org>
  */
 
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
@@ -22,46 +23,69 @@
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
-
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CLKDIV         (0x0)
-
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CTRL           (0x20)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CTRL_RNGEN     BIT(31)
-
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_POST_CTRL      (0x30)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_ONLINE_CTRL    (0x40)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_ONLINE_STAT    (0x44)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_ONLINE_MAXCHI2 (0x48)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_CTRL      (0x50)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_0         (0x80)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_1         (0x84)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_2         (0x88)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_3         (0x8c)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_4         (0x90)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_5         (0x94)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_6         (0x98)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_7         (0x9c)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_LEN       (8)
-#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CLOCK_RATE     (500000)
-
+#include <linux/property.h>
+
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CLKDIV		0x0
+
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CTRL		0x20
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CTRL_RNGEN		BIT(31)
+
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_POST_CTRL		0x30
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_ONLINE_CTRL		0x40
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_ONLINE_STAT		0x44
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_ONLINE_MAXCHI2	0x48
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_CTRL		0x50
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_0		0x80
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_1		0x84
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_2		0x88
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_3		0x8c
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_4		0x90
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_5		0x94
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_6		0x98
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_7		0x9c
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_LEN		8
+#define EXYNOS_TRNG_CLOCK_RATE		500000
+
+/* Driver feature flags */
+#define EXYNOS_SMC			BIT(0)
+
+#define EXYNOS_SMC_CALL_VAL(func_num)			\
+	ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL,		\
+			   ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32,		\
+			   ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_SIP,		\
+			   func_num)
+
+/* SMC command for DTRNG access */
+#define SMC_CMD_RANDOM			EXYNOS_SMC_CALL_VAL(0x1012)
+
+/* SMC_CMD_RANDOM: arguments */
+#define HWRNG_INIT			0x0
+#define HWRNG_EXIT			0x1
+#define HWRNG_GET_DATA			0x2
+#define HWRNG_RESUME			0x3
+
+/* SMC_CMD_RANDOM: return values */
+#define HWRNG_RET_OK			0x0
+#define HWRNG_RET_RETRY_ERROR		0x2
+
+#define HWRNG_MAX_TRIES			100
 
 struct exynos_trng_dev {
-	struct device    *dev;
-	void __iomem     *mem;
-	struct clk       *clk;
-	struct hwrng rng;
+	struct device	*dev;
+	void __iomem	*mem;
+	struct clk	*clk;	/* operating clock */
+	struct clk	*pclk;	/* bus clock */
+	struct hwrng	rng;
+	unsigned long	flags;
 };
 
-static int exynos_trng_do_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max,
-			       bool wait)
+static int exynos_trng_do_read_reg(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max,
+				   bool wait)
 {
-	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng;
+	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng = (struct exynos_trng_dev *)rng->priv;
 	int val;
 
 	max = min_t(size_t, max, (EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_LEN * 4));
-
-	trng = (struct exynos_trng_dev *)rng->priv;
-
 	writel_relaxed(max * 8, trng->mem + EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_CTRL);
 	val = readl_poll_timeout(trng->mem + EXYNOS_TRNG_FIFO_CTRL, val,
 				 val == 0, 200, 1000000);
@@ -73,7 +97,40 @@ static int exynos_trng_do_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max,
 	return max;
 }
 
-static int exynos_trng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
+static int exynos_trng_do_read_smc(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max,
+				   bool wait)
+{
+	struct arm_smccc_res res;
+	unsigned int copied = 0;
+	u32 *buf = data;
+	int tries = 0;
+
+	while (copied < max) {
+		arm_smccc_smc(SMC_CMD_RANDOM, HWRNG_GET_DATA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			      &res);
+		switch (res.a0) {
+		case HWRNG_RET_OK:
+			*buf++ = res.a2;
+			*buf++ = res.a3;
+			copied += 8;
+			tries = 0;
+			break;
+		case HWRNG_RET_RETRY_ERROR:
+			if (!wait)
+				return copied;
+			if (++tries >= HWRNG_MAX_TRIES)
+				return copied;
+			cond_resched();
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return copied;
+}
+
+static int exynos_trng_init_reg(struct hwrng *rng)
 {
 	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng = (struct exynos_trng_dev *)rng->priv;
 	unsigned long sss_rate;
@@ -87,7 +144,7 @@ static int exynos_trng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
 	 */
 	val = sss_rate / (EXYNOS_TRNG_CLOCK_RATE * 2);
 	if (val > 0x7fff) {
-		dev_err(trng->dev, "clock divider too large: %d", val);
+		dev_err(trng->dev, "clock divider too large: %d\n", val);
 		return -ERANGE;
 	}
 	val = val << 1;
@@ -106,6 +163,24 @@ static int exynos_trng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int exynos_trng_init_smc(struct hwrng *rng)
+{
+	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng = (struct exynos_trng_dev *)rng->priv;
+	struct arm_smccc_res res;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	arm_smccc_smc(SMC_CMD_RANDOM, HWRNG_INIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
+	if (res.a0 != HWRNG_RET_OK) {
+		dev_err(trng->dev, "SMC command for TRNG init failed (%d)\n",
+			(int)res.a0);
+		ret = -EIO;
+	}
+	if ((int)res.a0 == -1)
+		dev_info(trng->dev, "Make sure LDFW is loaded by your BL\n");
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int exynos_trng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng;
@@ -115,21 +190,29 @@ static int exynos_trng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (!trng)
 		return ret;
 
+	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, trng);
+	trng->dev = &pdev->dev;
+
+	trng->flags = (unsigned long)device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
+
 	trng->rng.name = devm_kstrdup(&pdev->dev, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
 				      GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!trng->rng.name)
 		return ret;
 
-	trng->rng.init = exynos_trng_init;
-	trng->rng.read = exynos_trng_do_read;
-	trng->rng.priv = (unsigned long) trng;
+	trng->rng.priv = (unsigned long)trng;
 
-	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, trng);
-	trng->dev = &pdev->dev;
+	if (trng->flags & EXYNOS_SMC) {
+		trng->rng.init = exynos_trng_init_smc;
+		trng->rng.read = exynos_trng_do_read_smc;
+	} else {
+		trng->rng.init = exynos_trng_init_reg;
+		trng->rng.read = exynos_trng_do_read_reg;
 
-	trng->mem = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(trng->mem))
-		return PTR_ERR(trng->mem);
+		trng->mem = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(trng->mem))
+			return PTR_ERR(trng->mem);
+	}
 
 	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 	ret = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(&pdev->dev);
@@ -138,32 +221,30 @@ static int exynos_trng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		goto err_pm_get;
 	}
 
-	trng->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "secss");
+	trng->clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, "secss");
 	if (IS_ERR(trng->clk)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(trng->clk);
-		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Could not get clock.\n");
+		ret = dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, PTR_ERR(trng->clk),
+				    "Could not get clock\n");
 		goto err_clock;
 	}
 
-	ret = clk_prepare_enable(trng->clk);
-	if (ret) {
-		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Could not enable the clk.\n");
+	trng->pclk = devm_clk_get_optional_enabled(&pdev->dev, "pclk");
+	if (IS_ERR(trng->pclk)) {
+		ret = dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, PTR_ERR(trng->pclk),
+				    "Could not get pclk\n");
 		goto err_clock;
 	}
 
 	ret = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &trng->rng);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Could not register hwrng device.\n");
-		goto err_register;
+		goto err_clock;
 	}
 
 	dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Exynos True Random Number Generator.\n");
 
 	return 0;
 
-err_register:
-	clk_disable_unprepare(trng->clk);
-
 err_clock:
 	pm_runtime_put_noidle(&pdev->dev);
 
@@ -175,9 +256,14 @@ err_pm_get:
 
 static void exynos_trng_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
-	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng =  platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
-	clk_disable_unprepare(trng->clk);
+	if (trng->flags & EXYNOS_SMC) {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+		arm_smccc_smc(SMC_CMD_RANDOM, HWRNG_EXIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			      &res);
+	}
 
 	pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
@@ -185,6 +271,16 @@ static void exynos_trng_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 static int exynos_trng_suspend(struct device *dev)
 {
+	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+	if (trng->flags & EXYNOS_SMC) {
+		arm_smccc_smc(SMC_CMD_RANDOM, HWRNG_EXIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			      &res);
+		if (res.a0 != HWRNG_RET_OK)
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	pm_runtime_put_sync(dev);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -192,6 +288,7 @@ static int exynos_trng_suspend(struct device *dev)
 
 static int exynos_trng_resume(struct device *dev)
 {
+	struct exynos_trng_dev *trng = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(dev);
@@ -200,15 +297,32 @@ static int exynos_trng_resume(struct device *dev)
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	if (trng->flags & EXYNOS_SMC) {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+		arm_smccc_smc(SMC_CMD_RANDOM, HWRNG_RESUME, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			      &res);
+		if (res.a0 != HWRNG_RET_OK)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		arm_smccc_smc(SMC_CMD_RANDOM, HWRNG_INIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			      &res);
+		if (res.a0 != HWRNG_RET_OK)
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static DEFINE_SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(exynos_trng_pm_ops, exynos_trng_suspend,
-			 exynos_trng_resume);
+				exynos_trng_resume);
 
 static const struct of_device_id exynos_trng_dt_match[] = {
 	{
 		.compatible = "samsung,exynos5250-trng",
+	}, {
+		.compatible = "samsung,exynos850-trng",
+		.data = (void *)EXYNOS_SMC,
 	},
 	{ },
 };
@@ -225,6 +339,7 @@ static struct platform_driver exynos_trng_driver = {
 };
 
 module_platform_driver(exynos_trng_driver);
+
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Łukasz Stelmach");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("H/W TRNG driver for Exynos chips");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c
index d4c02e900466..4914a8720e58 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c
@@ -564,4 +564,5 @@ static struct platform_driver omap_rng_driver = {
 module_platform_driver(omap_rng_driver);
 MODULE_ALIAS("platform:omap_rng");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Deepak Saxena (and others)");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RNG driver for TI OMAP CPU family");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap3-rom-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap3-rom-rng.c
index 18dc46b1b58e..8064c792caf0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap3-rom-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap3-rom-rng.c
@@ -178,4 +178,5 @@ module_platform_driver(omap3_rom_rng_driver);
 MODULE_ALIAS("platform:omap3-rom-rng");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Juha Yrjola");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RNG driver for TI OMAP3 CPU family");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
index 0e903d6e22e3..9d041a67c295 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct stm32_rng_config {
 
 struct stm32_rng_private {
 	struct hwrng rng;
+	struct device *dev;
 	void __iomem *base;
 	struct clk *clk;
 	struct reset_control *rst;
@@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ struct stm32_rng_private {
  */
 static int stm32_rng_conceal_seed_error_cond_reset(struct stm32_rng_private *priv)
 {
-	struct device *dev = (struct device *)priv->rng.priv;
+	struct device *dev = priv->dev;
 	u32 sr = readl_relaxed(priv->base + RNG_SR);
 	u32 cr = readl_relaxed(priv->base + RNG_CR);
 	int err;
@@ -171,7 +172,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_conceal_seed_error(struct hwrng *rng)
 {
 	struct stm32_rng_private *priv = container_of(rng, struct stm32_rng_private, rng);
 
-	dev_dbg((struct device *)priv->rng.priv, "Concealing seed error\n");
+	dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Concealing seed error\n");
 
 	if (priv->data->has_cond_reset)
 		return stm32_rng_conceal_seed_error_cond_reset(priv);
@@ -187,7 +188,9 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
 	int retval = 0, err = 0;
 	u32 sr;
 
-	pm_runtime_get_sync((struct device *) priv->rng.priv);
+	retval = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(priv->dev);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
 
 	if (readl_relaxed(priv->base + RNG_SR) & RNG_SR_SEIS)
 		stm32_rng_conceal_seed_error(rng);
@@ -204,8 +207,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
 								   sr, sr,
 								   10, 50000);
 			if (err) {
-				dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv,
-					"%s: timeout %x!\n", __func__, sr);
+				dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: timeout %x!\n", __func__, sr);
 				break;
 			}
 		} else if (!sr) {
@@ -218,8 +220,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
 				err = stm32_rng_conceal_seed_error(rng);
 				i++;
 				if (err && i > RNG_NB_RECOVER_TRIES) {
-					dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv,
-						"Couldn't recover from seed error\n");
+					dev_err(priv->dev, "Couldn't recover from seed error\n");
 					retval = -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
 					goto exit_rpm;
 				}
@@ -237,8 +238,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
 			err = stm32_rng_conceal_seed_error(rng);
 			i++;
 			if (err && i > RNG_NB_RECOVER_TRIES) {
-				dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv,
-					"Couldn't recover from seed error");
+				dev_err(priv->dev, "Couldn't recover from seed error");
 				retval = -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
 				goto exit_rpm;
 			}
@@ -253,8 +253,8 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
 	}
 
 exit_rpm:
-	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy((struct device *) priv->rng.priv);
-	pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend((struct device *) priv->rng.priv);
+	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(priv->dev);
+	pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend(priv->dev);
 
 	return retval || !wait ? retval : -EIO;
 }
@@ -329,8 +329,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
 							10, 50000);
 		if (err) {
 			clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk);
-			dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv,
-				"%s: timeout %x!\n", __func__, reg);
+			dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: timeout %x!\n", __func__, reg);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -358,8 +357,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
 						10, 100000);
 	if (err || (reg & ~RNG_SR_DRDY)) {
 		clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk);
-		dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv,
-			"%s: timeout:%x SR: %x!\n", __func__, err, reg);
+		dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: timeout:%x SR: %x!\n", __func__, err, reg);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -465,8 +463,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused stm32_rng_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 		if (err) {
 			clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk);
-			dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv,
-				"%s: timeout:%x CR: %x!\n", __func__, err, reg);
+			dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: timeout:%x CR: %x!\n", __func__, err, reg);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -520,7 +517,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev)
 	struct stm32_rng_private *priv;
 	struct resource *res;
 
-	priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(struct stm32_rng_private), GFP_KERNEL);
+	priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!priv)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -541,6 +538,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev)
 
 	priv->ced = of_property_read_bool(np, "clock-error-detect");
 	priv->lock_conf = of_property_read_bool(np, "st,rng-lock-conf");
+	priv->dev = dev;
 
 	priv->data = of_device_get_match_data(dev);
 	if (!priv->data)
@@ -551,7 +549,6 @@ static int stm32_rng_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev)
 	priv->rng.name = dev_driver_string(dev);
 	priv->rng.init = stm32_rng_init;
 	priv->rng.read = stm32_rng_read;
-	priv->rng.priv = (unsigned long) dev;
 	priv->rng.quality = 900;
 
 	pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(dev, 100);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
index de50c00ba218..19b7fb4a93e8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static int sun8i_ce_cipher_prepare(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *async_req
 		err = -EFAULT;
 		goto theend;
 	}
-	cet->t_key = cpu_to_le32(rctx->addr_key);
+	cet->t_key = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, rctx->addr_key);
 
 	ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
 	if (areq->iv && crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 0) {
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int sun8i_ce_cipher_prepare(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *async_req
 			err = -ENOMEM;
 			goto theend_iv;
 		}
-		cet->t_iv = cpu_to_le32(rctx->addr_iv);
+		cet->t_iv = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, rctx->addr_iv);
 	}
 
 	if (areq->src == areq->dst) {
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int sun8i_ce_cipher_prepare(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *async_req
 
 	len = areq->cryptlen;
 	for_each_sg(areq->src, sg, nr_sgs, i) {
-		cet->t_src[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(sg_dma_address(sg));
+		cet->t_src[i].addr = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, sg_dma_address(sg));
 		todo = min(len, sg_dma_len(sg));
 		cet->t_src[i].len = cpu_to_le32(todo / 4);
 		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "%s total=%u SG(%d %u off=%d) todo=%u\n", __func__,
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static int sun8i_ce_cipher_prepare(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *async_req
 
 	len = areq->cryptlen;
 	for_each_sg(areq->dst, sg, nr_sgd, i) {
-		cet->t_dst[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(sg_dma_address(sg));
+		cet->t_dst[i].addr = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, sg_dma_address(sg));
 		todo = min(len, sg_dma_len(sg));
 		cet->t_dst[i].len = cpu_to_le32(todo / 4);
 		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "%s total=%u SG(%d %u off=%d) todo=%u\n", __func__,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-core.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-core.c
index 0408b2d5d533..e55e58e164db 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-core.c
@@ -92,6 +92,30 @@ static const struct ce_variant ce_h6_variant = {
 	.trng = CE_ALG_TRNG_V2,
 };
 
+static const struct ce_variant ce_h616_variant = {
+	.alg_cipher = { CE_ALG_AES, CE_ALG_DES, CE_ALG_3DES,
+	},
+	.alg_hash = { CE_ALG_MD5, CE_ALG_SHA1, CE_ALG_SHA224, CE_ALG_SHA256,
+		CE_ALG_SHA384, CE_ALG_SHA512
+	},
+	.op_mode = { CE_OP_ECB, CE_OP_CBC
+	},
+	.cipher_t_dlen_in_bytes = true,
+	.hash_t_dlen_in_bits = true,
+	.prng_t_dlen_in_bytes = true,
+	.trng_t_dlen_in_bytes = true,
+	.needs_word_addresses = true,
+	.ce_clks = {
+		{ "bus", 0, 200000000 },
+		{ "mod", 300000000, 0 },
+		{ "ram", 0, 400000000 },
+		{ "trng", 0, 0 },
+		},
+	.esr = ESR_H6,
+	.prng = CE_ALG_PRNG_V2,
+	.trng = CE_ALG_TRNG_V2,
+};
+
 static const struct ce_variant ce_a64_variant = {
 	.alg_cipher = { CE_ALG_AES, CE_ALG_DES, CE_ALG_3DES,
 	},
@@ -172,7 +196,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_run_task(struct sun8i_ce_dev *ce, int flow, const char *name)
 	writel(v, ce->base + CE_ICR);
 
 	reinit_completion(&ce->chanlist[flow].complete);
-	writel(ce->chanlist[flow].t_phy, ce->base + CE_TDQ);
+	writel(desc_addr_val(ce, ce->chanlist[flow].t_phy), ce->base + CE_TDQ);
 
 	ce->chanlist[flow].status = 0;
 	/* Be sure all data is written before enabling the task */
@@ -1097,6 +1121,8 @@ static const struct of_device_id sun8i_ce_crypto_of_match_table[] = {
 	  .data = &ce_h5_variant },
 	{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h6-crypto",
 	  .data = &ce_h6_variant },
+	{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h616-crypto",
+	  .data = &ce_h616_variant },
 	{}
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, sun8i_ce_crypto_of_match_table);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-hash.c
index ee2a28c906ed..6072dd9f390b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-hash.c
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_hash_run(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *breq)
 
 	len = areq->nbytes;
 	for_each_sg(areq->src, sg, nr_sgs, i) {
-		cet->t_src[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(sg_dma_address(sg));
+		cet->t_src[i].addr = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, sg_dma_address(sg));
 		todo = min(len, sg_dma_len(sg));
 		cet->t_src[i].len = cpu_to_le32(todo / 4);
 		len -= todo;
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_hash_run(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *breq)
 		goto theend;
 	}
 	addr_res = dma_map_single(ce->dev, result, digestsize, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
-	cet->t_dst[0].addr = cpu_to_le32(addr_res);
+	cet->t_dst[0].addr = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, addr_res);
 	cet->t_dst[0].len = cpu_to_le32(digestsize / 4);
 	if (dma_mapping_error(ce->dev, addr_res)) {
 		dev_err(ce->dev, "DMA map dest\n");
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_hash_run(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *breq)
 	}
 
 	addr_pad = dma_map_single(ce->dev, buf, j * 4, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-	cet->t_src[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(addr_pad);
+	cet->t_src[i].addr = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, addr_pad);
 	cet->t_src[i].len = cpu_to_le32(j);
 	if (dma_mapping_error(ce->dev, addr_pad)) {
 		dev_err(ce->dev, "DMA error on padding SG\n");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-prng.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-prng.c
index 80815379f6fc..762459867b6c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-prng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-prng.c
@@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ int sun8i_ce_prng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src,
 	cet->t_sym_ctl = cpu_to_le32(sym);
 	cet->t_asym_ctl = 0;
 
-	cet->t_key = cpu_to_le32(dma_iv);
-	cet->t_iv = cpu_to_le32(dma_iv);
+	cet->t_key = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, dma_iv);
+	cet->t_iv = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, dma_iv);
 
-	cet->t_dst[0].addr = cpu_to_le32(dma_dst);
+	cet->t_dst[0].addr = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, dma_dst);
 	cet->t_dst[0].len = cpu_to_le32(todo / 4);
 	ce->chanlist[flow].timeout = 2000;
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-trng.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-trng.c
index 9c35f2a83eda..e1e8bc15202e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-trng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-trng.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int sun8i_ce_trng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wa
 	cet->t_sym_ctl = 0;
 	cet->t_asym_ctl = 0;
 
-	cet->t_dst[0].addr = cpu_to_le32(dma_dst);
+	cet->t_dst[0].addr = desc_addr_val_le32(ce, dma_dst);
 	cet->t_dst[0].len = cpu_to_le32(todo / 4);
 	ce->chanlist[flow].timeout = todo;
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce.h b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce.h
index 93d4985def87..3b5c2af013d0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct ce_variant {
 	bool hash_t_dlen_in_bits;
 	bool prng_t_dlen_in_bytes;
 	bool trng_t_dlen_in_bytes;
+	bool needs_word_addresses;
 	struct ce_clock ce_clks[CE_MAX_CLOCKS];
 	int esr;
 	unsigned char prng;
@@ -241,6 +242,20 @@ struct sun8i_ce_dev {
 #endif
 };
 
+static inline u32 desc_addr_val(struct sun8i_ce_dev *dev, dma_addr_t addr)
+{
+	if (dev->variant->needs_word_addresses)
+		return addr / 4;
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+static inline __le32 desc_addr_val_le32(struct sun8i_ce_dev *dev,
+					dma_addr_t addr)
+{
+	return cpu_to_le32(desc_addr_val(dev, addr));
+}
+
 /*
  * struct sun8i_cipher_req_ctx - context for a skcipher request
  * @op_dir:		direction (encrypt vs decrypt) for this request
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c b/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c
index 24ffdf505023..a02d496f4c41 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int atmel_sha204a_otp_read(struct i2c_client *client, u16 addr, u8 *otp)
 
 	if (cmd.data[0] == 0xff) {
 		dev_err(&client->dev, "failed, device not ready\n");
-		return -ret;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	memcpy(otp, cmd.data+1, 4);
@@ -232,4 +232,5 @@ module_init(atmel_sha204a_init);
 module_exit(atmel_sha204a_exit);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Microchip / Atmel SHA204A (I2C) driver");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c
index dbc1d483f2af..75440ea6206e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c
@@ -2811,13 +2811,6 @@ static struct aead_alg aead_algos[] = {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
 
-struct dbgfs_u32 {
-	char *name;
-	mode_t mode;
-	u32 *flag;
-	char *desc;
-};
-
 static struct dentry *dbgfs_root;
 
 static void artpec6_crypto_init_debugfs(void)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
index aa0ba2d17e1e..394484929dae 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP) += psp-dev.o \
                                    sev-dev.o \
                                    tee-dev.o \
                                    platform-access.o \
-                                   dbc.o
+                                   dbc.o \
+                                   hsti.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO) += ccp-crypto.o
 ccp-crypto-objs := ccp-crypto-main.o \
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/dbc.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/dbc.c
index d373caab52f8..5b105a23f699 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/dbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/dbc.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ int dbc_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
 	dbc_dev->dev = dev;
 	dbc_dev->psp = psp;
 
-	if (PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, DBC_THRU_EXT)) {
+	if (psp->capability.dbc_thru_ext) {
 		dbc_dev->use_ext = true;
 		dbc_dev->payload_size = &dbc_dev->mbox->ext_req.header.payload_size;
 		dbc_dev->result = &dbc_dev->mbox->ext_req.header.status;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/hsti.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/hsti.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1b39a4fb55c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/hsti.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD Secure Processor device driver, security attributes
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023-2024 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/device.h>
+
+#include "psp-dev.h"
+#include "hsti.h"
+
+#define PSP_CAPABILITY_PSP_SECURITY_OFFSET	8
+
+struct hsti_request {
+	struct psp_req_buffer_hdr header;
+	u32 hsti;
+} __packed;
+
+#define security_attribute_show(name)						\
+static ssize_t name##_show(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr,	\
+			   char *buf)						\
+{										\
+	struct sp_device *sp = dev_get_drvdata(d);				\
+	struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;					\
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", psp->capability.name);		\
+}
+
+security_attribute_show(fused_part)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(fused_part);
+security_attribute_show(debug_lock_on)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(debug_lock_on);
+security_attribute_show(tsme_status)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(tsme_status);
+security_attribute_show(anti_rollback_status)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(anti_rollback_status);
+security_attribute_show(rpmc_production_enabled)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(rpmc_production_enabled);
+security_attribute_show(rpmc_spirom_available)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(rpmc_spirom_available);
+security_attribute_show(hsp_tpm_available)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(hsp_tpm_available);
+security_attribute_show(rom_armor_enforced)
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(rom_armor_enforced);
+
+static struct attribute *psp_security_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_fused_part.attr,
+	&dev_attr_debug_lock_on.attr,
+	&dev_attr_tsme_status.attr,
+	&dev_attr_anti_rollback_status.attr,
+	&dev_attr_rpmc_production_enabled.attr,
+	&dev_attr_rpmc_spirom_available.attr,
+	&dev_attr_hsp_tpm_available.attr,
+	&dev_attr_rom_armor_enforced.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static umode_t psp_security_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int idx)
+{
+	struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
+	struct sp_device *sp = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
+
+	if (psp && psp->capability.security_reporting)
+		return 0444;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct attribute_group psp_security_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = psp_security_attrs,
+	.is_visible = psp_security_is_visible,
+};
+
+static int psp_poulate_hsti(struct psp_device *psp)
+{
+	struct hsti_request *req;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Are the security attributes already reported? */
+	if (psp->capability.security_reporting)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Allocate command-response buffer */
+	req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	req->header.payload_size = sizeof(req);
+
+	ret = psp_send_platform_access_msg(PSP_CMD_HSTI_QUERY, (struct psp_request *)req);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (req->header.status != 0) {
+		dev_dbg(psp->dev, "failed to populate HSTI state: %d\n", req->header.status);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	psp->capability.security_reporting = 1;
+	psp->capability.raw |= req->hsti << PSP_CAPABILITY_PSP_SECURITY_OFFSET;
+
+out:
+	kfree(req);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int psp_init_hsti(struct psp_device *psp)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (PSP_FEATURE(psp, HSTI)) {
+		ret = psp_poulate_hsti(psp);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * At this stage, if security information hasn't been populated by
+	 * either the PSP or by the driver through the platform command,
+	 * then there is nothing more to do.
+	 */
+	if (!psp->capability.security_reporting)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (psp->capability.tsme_status) {
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+			dev_notice(psp->dev, "psp: Both TSME and SME are active, SME is unnecessary when TSME is active.\n");
+		else
+			dev_notice(psp->dev, "psp: TSME enabled\n");
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/hsti.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/hsti.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a70f922d2c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/hsti.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AMD Secure Processor device driver, security attributes
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023-2024 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __HSTI_H
+#define __HSTI_H
+
+extern struct attribute_group psp_security_attr_group;
+
+int psp_init_hsti(struct psp_device *psp);
+
+#endif /* __HSTI_H */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index 56bf832c2947..1c5a7189631e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include "tee-dev.h"
 #include "platform-access.h"
 #include "dbc.h"
+#include "hsti.h"
 
 struct psp_device *psp_master;
 
@@ -154,16 +155,7 @@ static unsigned int psp_get_capability(struct psp_device *psp)
 		dev_notice(psp->dev, "psp: unable to access the device: you might be running a broken BIOS.\n");
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
-	psp->capability = val;
-
-	/* Detect TSME and/or SME status */
-	if (PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, PSP_SECURITY_REPORTING) &&
-	    psp->capability & (PSP_SECURITY_TSME_STATUS << PSP_CAPABILITY_PSP_SECURITY_OFFSET)) {
-		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
-			dev_notice(psp->dev, "psp: Both TSME and SME are active, SME is unnecessary when TSME is active.\n");
-		else
-			dev_notice(psp->dev, "psp: TSME enabled\n");
-	}
+	psp->capability.raw = val;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -171,7 +163,7 @@ static unsigned int psp_get_capability(struct psp_device *psp)
 static int psp_check_sev_support(struct psp_device *psp)
 {
 	/* Check if device supports SEV feature */
-	if (!PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, SEV)) {
+	if (!psp->capability.sev) {
 		dev_dbg(psp->dev, "psp does not support SEV\n");
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
@@ -182,7 +174,7 @@ static int psp_check_sev_support(struct psp_device *psp)
 static int psp_check_tee_support(struct psp_device *psp)
 {
 	/* Check if device supports TEE feature */
-	if (!PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, TEE)) {
+	if (!psp->capability.tee) {
 		dev_dbg(psp->dev, "psp does not support TEE\n");
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
@@ -214,12 +206,17 @@ static int psp_init(struct psp_device *psp)
 
 	/* dbc must come after platform access as it tests the feature */
 	if (PSP_FEATURE(psp, DBC) ||
-	    PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, DBC_THRU_EXT)) {
+	    psp->capability.dbc_thru_ext) {
 		ret = dbc_dev_init(psp);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	}
 
+	/* HSTI uses platform access on some systems. */
+	ret = psp_init_hsti(psp);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
index ae582ba63729..e43ce87ede76 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
@@ -26,6 +26,29 @@ extern struct psp_device *psp_master;
 
 typedef void (*psp_irq_handler_t)(int, void *, unsigned int);
 
+union psp_cap_register {
+	unsigned int raw;
+	struct {
+		unsigned int sev			:1,
+			     tee			:1,
+			     dbc_thru_ext		:1,
+			     rsvd1			:4,
+			     security_reporting		:1,
+			     fused_part			:1,
+			     rsvd2			:1,
+			     debug_lock_on		:1,
+			     rsvd3			:2,
+			     tsme_status		:1,
+			     rsvd4			:1,
+			     anti_rollback_status	:1,
+			     rpmc_production_enabled	:1,
+			     rpmc_spirom_available	:1,
+			     hsp_tpm_available		:1,
+			     rom_armor_enforced		:1,
+			     rsvd5			:12;
+	};
+};
+
 struct psp_device {
 	struct list_head entry;
 
@@ -46,7 +69,7 @@ struct psp_device {
 	void *platform_access_data;
 	void *dbc_data;
 
-	unsigned int capability;
+	union psp_cap_register capability;
 };
 
 void psp_set_sev_irq_handler(struct psp_device *psp, psp_irq_handler_t handler,
@@ -55,27 +78,6 @@ void psp_clear_sev_irq_handler(struct psp_device *psp);
 
 struct psp_device *psp_get_master_device(void);
 
-#define PSP_CAPABILITY_SEV			BIT(0)
-#define PSP_CAPABILITY_TEE			BIT(1)
-#define PSP_CAPABILITY_DBC_THRU_EXT		BIT(2)
-#define PSP_CAPABILITY_PSP_SECURITY_REPORTING	BIT(7)
-
-#define PSP_CAPABILITY_PSP_SECURITY_OFFSET	8
-/*
- * The PSP doesn't directly store these bits in the capability register
- * but instead copies them from the results of query command.
- *
- * The offsets from the query command are below, and shifted when used.
- */
-#define PSP_SECURITY_FUSED_PART			BIT(0)
-#define PSP_SECURITY_DEBUG_LOCK_ON		BIT(2)
-#define PSP_SECURITY_TSME_STATUS		BIT(5)
-#define PSP_SECURITY_ANTI_ROLLBACK_STATUS	BIT(7)
-#define PSP_SECURITY_RPMC_PRODUCTION_ENABLED	BIT(8)
-#define PSP_SECURITY_RPMC_SPIROM_AVAILABLE	BIT(9)
-#define PSP_SECURITY_HSP_TPM_AVAILABLE		BIT(10)
-#define PSP_SECURITY_ROM_ARMOR_ENFORCED		BIT(11)
-
 /**
  * enum psp_cmd - PSP mailbox commands
  * @PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_INIT:	Initialize TEE ring buffer
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 2102377f727b..1912bee22dd4 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -1642,10 +1642,16 @@ fw_err:
 
 static int __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(int *error, bool panic)
 {
-	struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+	struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
+	struct sev_device *sev;
 	struct sev_data_snp_shutdown_ex data;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!psp || !psp->sev_data)
+		return 0;
+
+	sev = psp->sev_data;
+
 	if (!sev->snp_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
index 03d5b9e04084..0895de823674 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
 #define CACHE_WB_NO_ALLOC		0xb7
 
 #define PLATFORM_FEATURE_DBC		0x1
+#define PLATFORM_FEATURE_HSTI		0x2
 
-#define PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, cap) (psp->capability & PSP_CAPABILITY_##cap)
 #define PSP_FEATURE(psp, feat)	(psp->vdata && psp->vdata->platform_features & PLATFORM_FEATURE_##feat)
 
 /* Structure to hold CCP device data */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
index 300dda14182b..248d98fd8c48 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 
 #include "ccp-dev.h"
 #include "psp-dev.h"
+#include "hsti.h"
 
 /* used for version string AA.BB.CC.DD */
 #define AA				GENMASK(31, 24)
@@ -39,62 +40,6 @@ struct sp_pci {
 };
 static struct sp_device *sp_dev_master;
 
-#define security_attribute_show(name, def)					\
-static ssize_t name##_show(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr,	\
-			   char *buf)						\
-{										\
-	struct sp_device *sp = dev_get_drvdata(d);				\
-	struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;					\
-	int bit = PSP_SECURITY_##def << PSP_CAPABILITY_PSP_SECURITY_OFFSET;	\
-	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", (psp->capability & bit) > 0);		\
-}
-
-security_attribute_show(fused_part, FUSED_PART)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(fused_part);
-security_attribute_show(debug_lock_on, DEBUG_LOCK_ON)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(debug_lock_on);
-security_attribute_show(tsme_status, TSME_STATUS)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(tsme_status);
-security_attribute_show(anti_rollback_status, ANTI_ROLLBACK_STATUS)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(anti_rollback_status);
-security_attribute_show(rpmc_production_enabled, RPMC_PRODUCTION_ENABLED)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(rpmc_production_enabled);
-security_attribute_show(rpmc_spirom_available, RPMC_SPIROM_AVAILABLE)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(rpmc_spirom_available);
-security_attribute_show(hsp_tpm_available, HSP_TPM_AVAILABLE)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(hsp_tpm_available);
-security_attribute_show(rom_armor_enforced, ROM_ARMOR_ENFORCED)
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(rom_armor_enforced);
-
-static struct attribute *psp_security_attrs[] = {
-	&dev_attr_fused_part.attr,
-	&dev_attr_debug_lock_on.attr,
-	&dev_attr_tsme_status.attr,
-	&dev_attr_anti_rollback_status.attr,
-	&dev_attr_rpmc_production_enabled.attr,
-	&dev_attr_rpmc_spirom_available.attr,
-	&dev_attr_hsp_tpm_available.attr,
-	&dev_attr_rom_armor_enforced.attr,
-	NULL
-};
-
-static umode_t psp_security_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int idx)
-{
-	struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
-	struct sp_device *sp = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-	struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
-
-	if (psp && PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, PSP_SECURITY_REPORTING))
-		return 0444;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static struct attribute_group psp_security_attr_group = {
-	.attrs = psp_security_attrs,
-	.is_visible = psp_security_is_visible,
-};
-
 #define version_attribute_show(name, _offset)					\
 static ssize_t name##_show(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr,	\
 			   char *buf)						\
@@ -134,8 +79,7 @@ static umode_t psp_firmware_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *a
 	    psp->vdata->bootloader_info_reg)
 		val = ioread32(psp->io_regs + psp->vdata->bootloader_info_reg);
 
-	if (attr == &dev_attr_tee_version.attr &&
-	    PSP_CAPABILITY(psp, TEE) &&
+	if (attr == &dev_attr_tee_version.attr && psp->capability.tee &&
 	    psp->vdata->tee->info_reg)
 		val = ioread32(psp->io_regs + psp->vdata->tee->info_reg);
 
@@ -152,7 +96,9 @@ static struct attribute_group psp_firmware_attr_group = {
 };
 
 static const struct attribute_group *psp_groups[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
 	&psp_security_attr_group,
+#endif
 	&psp_firmware_attr_group,
 	NULL,
 };
@@ -451,10 +397,12 @@ static const struct psp_vdata pspv1 = {
 
 static const struct psp_vdata pspv2 = {
 	.sev			= &sevv2,
+	.platform_access	= &pa_v1,
 	.bootloader_info_reg	= 0x109ec,	/* C2PMSG_59 */
 	.feature_reg		= 0x109fc,	/* C2PMSG_63 */
 	.inten_reg		= 0x10690,	/* P2CMSG_INTEN */
 	.intsts_reg		= 0x10694,	/* P2CMSG_INTSTS */
+	.platform_features	= PLATFORM_FEATURE_HSTI,
 };
 
 static const struct psp_vdata pspv3 = {
@@ -467,7 +415,8 @@ static const struct psp_vdata pspv3 = {
 	.feature_reg		= 0x109fc,	/* C2PMSG_63 */
 	.inten_reg		= 0x10690,	/* P2CMSG_INTEN */
 	.intsts_reg		= 0x10694,	/* P2CMSG_INTSTS */
-	.platform_features	= PLATFORM_FEATURE_DBC,
+	.platform_features	= PLATFORM_FEATURE_DBC |
+				  PLATFORM_FEATURE_HSTI,
 };
 
 static const struct psp_vdata pspv4 = {
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
index cd66a580e8b6..3fb667a17bbb 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
@@ -261,12 +261,6 @@ static void cc_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 	kfree_sensitive(ctx_p->user.key);
 }
 
-struct tdes_keys {
-	u8	key1[DES_KEY_SIZE];
-	u8	key2[DES_KEY_SIZE];
-	u8	key3[DES_KEY_SIZE];
-};
-
 static enum cc_hw_crypto_key cc_slot_to_hw_key(u8 slot_num)
 {
 	switch (slot_num) {
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hifn_795x.c b/drivers/crypto/hifn_795x.c
index b4a4ec35bce0..925991526745 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/hifn_795x.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/hifn_795x.c
@@ -495,16 +495,6 @@ struct hifn_crypt_command {
 #define	HIFN_CRYPT_CMD_SRCLEN_M		0xc000
 #define	HIFN_CRYPT_CMD_SRCLEN_S		14
 
-/*
- * Structure to help build up the command data structure.
- */
-struct hifn_mac_command {
-	volatile __le16	masks;
-	volatile __le16	header_skip;
-	volatile __le16	source_count;
-	volatile __le16	reserved;
-};
-
 #define	HIFN_MAC_CMD_ALG_MASK		0x0001
 #define	HIFN_MAC_CMD_ALG_SHA1		0x0000
 #define	HIFN_MAC_CMD_ALG_MD5		0x0001
@@ -526,13 +516,6 @@ struct hifn_mac_command {
 #define	HIFN_MAC_CMD_POS_IPSEC		0x0200
 #define	HIFN_MAC_CMD_NEW_KEY		0x0800
 
-struct hifn_comp_command {
-	volatile __le16		masks;
-	volatile __le16		header_skip;
-	volatile __le16		source_count;
-	volatile __le16		reserved;
-};
-
 #define	HIFN_COMP_CMD_SRCLEN_M		0xc000
 #define	HIFN_COMP_CMD_SRCLEN_S		14
 #define	HIFN_COMP_CMD_ONE		0x0100	/* must be one */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c
index 3dac8d8e8568..f614fd228b56 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c
@@ -3793,14 +3793,13 @@ int hisi_qm_sriov_enable(struct pci_dev *pdev, int max_vfs)
 		goto err_put_sync;
 	}
 
-	qm->vfs_num = num_vfs;
-
 	ret = pci_enable_sriov(pdev, num_vfs);
 	if (ret) {
 		pci_err(pdev, "Can't enable VF!\n");
 		qm_clear_vft_config(qm);
 		goto err_put_sync;
 	}
+	qm->vfs_num = num_vfs;
 
 	pci_info(pdev, "VF enabled, vfs_num(=%d)!\n", num_vfs);
 
@@ -3822,7 +3821,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hisi_qm_sriov_enable);
 int hisi_qm_sriov_disable(struct pci_dev *pdev, bool is_frozen)
 {
 	struct hisi_qm *qm = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
-	int ret;
 
 	if (pci_vfs_assigned(pdev)) {
 		pci_err(pdev, "Failed to disable VFs as VFs are assigned!\n");
@@ -3837,13 +3835,10 @@ int hisi_qm_sriov_disable(struct pci_dev *pdev, bool is_frozen)
 
 	pci_disable_sriov(pdev);
 
-	ret = qm_clear_vft_config(qm);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
+	qm->vfs_num = 0;
 	qm_pm_put_sync(qm);
 
-	return 0;
+	return qm_clear_vft_config(qm);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hisi_qm_sriov_disable);
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/zip/zip_main.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/zip/zip_main.c
index c94a7b20d07e..7c2d803886fd 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/zip/zip_main.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/zip/zip_main.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 #define HZIP_QM_IDEL_STATUS		0x3040e4
 
 #define HZIP_CORE_DFX_BASE		0x301000
-#define HZIP_CLOCK_GATED_CONTL		0X301004
+#define HZIP_CORE_DFX_DECOMP_BASE	0x304000
 #define HZIP_CORE_DFX_COMP_0		0x302000
 #define HZIP_CORE_DFX_COMP_1		0x303000
 #define HZIP_CORE_DFX_DECOMP_0		0x304000
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #define HZIP_CORE_DFX_DECOMP_5		0x309000
 #define HZIP_CORE_REGS_BASE_LEN		0xB0
 #define HZIP_CORE_REGS_DFX_LEN		0x28
+#define HZIP_CORE_ADDR_INTRVL		0x1000
 
 #define HZIP_CORE_INT_SOURCE		0x3010A0
 #define HZIP_CORE_INT_MASK_REG		0x3010A4
@@ -269,28 +270,6 @@ static const u32 zip_pre_store_caps[] = {
 	ZIP_DEV_ALG_BITMAP,
 };
 
-enum {
-	HZIP_COMP_CORE0,
-	HZIP_COMP_CORE1,
-	HZIP_DECOMP_CORE0,
-	HZIP_DECOMP_CORE1,
-	HZIP_DECOMP_CORE2,
-	HZIP_DECOMP_CORE3,
-	HZIP_DECOMP_CORE4,
-	HZIP_DECOMP_CORE5,
-};
-
-static const u64 core_offsets[] = {
-	[HZIP_COMP_CORE0]   = 0x302000,
-	[HZIP_COMP_CORE1]   = 0x303000,
-	[HZIP_DECOMP_CORE0] = 0x304000,
-	[HZIP_DECOMP_CORE1] = 0x305000,
-	[HZIP_DECOMP_CORE2] = 0x306000,
-	[HZIP_DECOMP_CORE3] = 0x307000,
-	[HZIP_DECOMP_CORE4] = 0x308000,
-	[HZIP_DECOMP_CORE5] = 0x309000,
-};
-
 static const struct debugfs_reg32 hzip_dfx_regs[] = {
 	{"HZIP_GET_BD_NUM                ",  0x00},
 	{"HZIP_GET_RIGHT_BD              ",  0x04},
@@ -807,6 +786,18 @@ static int hisi_zip_regs_show(struct seq_file *s, void *unused)
 
 DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(hisi_zip_regs);
 
+static void __iomem *get_zip_core_addr(struct hisi_qm *qm, int core_num)
+{
+	u32 zip_comp_core_num = qm->cap_tables.dev_cap_table[ZIP_CLUSTER_COMP_NUM_CAP_IDX].cap_val;
+
+	if (core_num < zip_comp_core_num)
+		return qm->io_base + HZIP_CORE_DFX_BASE +
+			(core_num + 1) * HZIP_CORE_ADDR_INTRVL;
+
+	return qm->io_base + HZIP_CORE_DFX_DECOMP_BASE +
+		(core_num - zip_comp_core_num) * HZIP_CORE_ADDR_INTRVL;
+}
+
 static int hisi_zip_core_debug_init(struct hisi_qm *qm)
 {
 	u32 zip_core_num, zip_comp_core_num;
@@ -832,7 +823,7 @@ static int hisi_zip_core_debug_init(struct hisi_qm *qm)
 
 		regset->regs = hzip_dfx_regs;
 		regset->nregs = ARRAY_SIZE(hzip_dfx_regs);
-		regset->base = qm->io_base + core_offsets[i];
+		regset->base = get_zip_core_addr(qm, i);
 		regset->dev = dev;
 
 		tmp_d = debugfs_create_dir(buf, qm->debug.debug_root);
@@ -921,13 +912,14 @@ debugfs_remove:
 /* hisi_zip_debug_regs_clear() - clear the zip debug regs */
 static void hisi_zip_debug_regs_clear(struct hisi_qm *qm)
 {
+	u32 zip_core_num = qm->cap_tables.dev_cap_table[ZIP_CORE_NUM_CAP_IDX].cap_val;
 	int i, j;
 
 	/* enable register read_clear bit */
 	writel(HZIP_RD_CNT_CLR_CE_EN, qm->io_base + HZIP_SOFT_CTRL_CNT_CLR_CE);
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(core_offsets); i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < zip_core_num; i++)
 		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(hzip_dfx_regs); j++)
-			readl(qm->io_base + core_offsets[i] +
+			readl(get_zip_core_addr(qm, i) +
 			      hzip_dfx_regs[j].offset);
 
 	/* disable register read_clear bit */
@@ -970,7 +962,7 @@ static int hisi_zip_show_last_regs_init(struct hisi_qm *qm)
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < zip_core_num; i++) {
-		io_base = qm->io_base + core_offsets[i];
+		io_base = get_zip_core_addr(qm, i);
 		for (j = 0; j < core_dfx_regs_num; j++) {
 			idx = com_dfx_regs_num + i * core_dfx_regs_num + j;
 			debug->last_words[idx] = readl_relaxed(
@@ -1022,7 +1014,7 @@ static void hisi_zip_show_last_dfx_regs(struct hisi_qm *qm)
 		else
 			scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Decomp_core-%d",
 				  i - zip_comp_core_num);
-		base = qm->io_base + core_offsets[i];
+		base = get_zip_core_addr(qm, i);
 
 		pci_info(qm->pdev, "==>%s:\n", buf);
 		/* dump last word for dfx regs during control resetting */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/keembay/ocs-hcu.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/keembay/ocs-hcu.c
index deb9bd460ee6..55a41e6ab103 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/keembay/ocs-hcu.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/keembay/ocs-hcu.c
@@ -837,4 +837,5 @@ complete:
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Intel Keem Bay OCS HCU Crypto Driver");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c
index 8836f015c39c..2cf102ad4ca8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c
@@ -290,17 +290,19 @@ int adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 	 * 3. if the key exists with the same value, then return without doing
 	 *    anything (the newly created key_val is freed).
 	 */
+	down_write(&cfg->lock);
 	if (!adf_cfg_key_val_get(accel_dev, section_name, key, temp_val)) {
 		if (strncmp(temp_val, key_val->val, sizeof(temp_val))) {
 			adf_cfg_keyval_remove(key, section);
 		} else {
 			kfree(key_val);
-			return 0;
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
-	down_write(&cfg->lock);
 	adf_cfg_keyval_add(key_val, section);
+
+out:
 	up_write(&cfg->lock);
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
index 29c4422f243c..26a1662fafbb 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
@@ -31,19 +31,22 @@ static const struct file_operations adf_ctl_ops = {
 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
 };
 
+static const struct class adf_ctl_class = {
+	.name = DEVICE_NAME,
+};
+
 struct adf_ctl_drv_info {
 	unsigned int major;
 	struct cdev drv_cdev;
-	struct class *drv_class;
 };
 
 static struct adf_ctl_drv_info adf_ctl_drv;
 
 static void adf_chr_drv_destroy(void)
 {
-	device_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class, MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0));
+	device_destroy(&adf_ctl_class, MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0));
 	cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev);
-	class_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class);
+	class_unregister(&adf_ctl_class);
 	unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0), 1);
 }
 
@@ -51,17 +54,17 @@ static int adf_chr_drv_create(void)
 {
 	dev_t dev_id;
 	struct device *drv_device;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (alloc_chrdev_region(&dev_id, 0, 1, DEVICE_NAME)) {
 		pr_err("QAT: unable to allocate chrdev region\n");
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
-	adf_ctl_drv.drv_class = class_create(DEVICE_NAME);
-	if (IS_ERR(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class)) {
-		pr_err("QAT: class_create failed for adf_ctl\n");
+	ret = class_register(&adf_ctl_class);
+	if (ret)
 		goto err_chrdev_unreg;
-	}
+
 	adf_ctl_drv.major = MAJOR(dev_id);
 	cdev_init(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, &adf_ctl_ops);
 	if (cdev_add(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, dev_id, 1)) {
@@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ static int adf_chr_drv_create(void)
 		goto err_class_destr;
 	}
 
-	drv_device = device_create(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class, NULL,
+	drv_device = device_create(&adf_ctl_class, NULL,
 				   MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0),
 				   NULL, DEVICE_NAME);
 	if (IS_ERR(drv_device)) {
@@ -80,7 +83,7 @@ static int adf_chr_drv_create(void)
 err_cdev_del:
 	cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev);
 err_class_destr:
-	class_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class);
+	class_unregister(&adf_ctl_class);
 err_chrdev_unreg:
 	unregister_chrdev_region(dev_id, 1);
 	return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
index f07b748795f7..96ddd1c419c4 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int adf_get_vf_real_id(u32 fake)
 }
 
 /**
- * adf_clean_vf_map() - Cleans VF id mapings
+ * adf_clean_vf_map() - Cleans VF id mappings
  * @vf: flag indicating whether mappings is cleaned
  *	for vfs only or for vfs and pfs
  *
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c
index 70ef11963938..43af81fcab86 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c
@@ -100,7 +100,9 @@ static u32 adf_gen2_disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr)
 	errmsk3 |= ADF_GEN2_ERR_MSK_VF2PF(ADF_GEN2_VF_MSK);
 	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
 
-	errmsk3 &= ADF_GEN2_ERR_MSK_VF2PF(sources | disabled);
+	/* Update only section of errmsk3 related to VF2PF */
+	errmsk3 &= ~ADF_GEN2_ERR_MSK_VF2PF(ADF_GEN2_VF_MSK);
+	errmsk3 |= ADF_GEN2_ERR_MSK_VF2PF(sources | disabled);
 	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
 
 	/* Return the sources of the (new) interrupt(s) */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c
index 346ef8bee99d..e782c23fc1bf 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c
@@ -1106,6 +1106,7 @@ int adf_rl_init(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev)
 	mutex_init(&rl->rl_lock);
 	rl->device_data = &accel_dev->hw_device->rl_data;
 	rl->accel_dev = accel_dev;
+	init_rwsem(&rl->user_input.lock);
 	accel_dev->rate_limiting = rl;
 
 err_ret:
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c
index 6e24d57e6b98..c0661ff5e929 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c
@@ -193,8 +193,12 @@ static u32 disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr)
 	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
 	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5, errmsk5);
 
-	errmsk3 &= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_L(sources | disabled);
-	errmsk5 &= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_U(sources | disabled);
+	/* Update only section of errmsk3 and errmsk5 related to VF2PF */
+	errmsk3 &= ~ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_L(ADF_DH895XCC_VF_MSK);
+	errmsk5 &= ~ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_U(ADF_DH895XCC_VF_MSK);
+
+	errmsk3 |= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_L(sources | disabled);
+	errmsk5 |= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_U(sources | disabled);
 	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
 	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5, errmsk5);
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
index 057d73c370b7..c82775dbb557 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx)
 static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx,
 			   struct skcipher_request *req, int init)
 {
-	dma_addr_t key_phys, src_phys, dst_phys;
+	dma_addr_t key_phys = 0;
+	dma_addr_t src_phys, dst_phys;
 	struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp;
 	struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan];
 	struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/n2_core.c b/drivers/crypto/n2_core.c
index 59d472cb11e7..251e088a53df 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/n2_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/n2_core.c
@@ -720,10 +720,6 @@ static inline struct n2_skcipher_alg *n2_skcipher_alg(struct crypto_skcipher *tf
 	return container_of(alg, struct n2_skcipher_alg, skcipher);
 }
 
-struct n2_skcipher_request_context {
-	struct skcipher_walk	walk;
-};
-
 static int n2_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key,
 			 unsigned int keylen)
 {
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c
index 78a4930c6480..461eca40e878 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c
@@ -2496,4 +2496,5 @@ static struct platform_driver sa_ul_driver = {
 		   },
 };
 module_platform_driver(sa_ul_driver);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("K3 SA2UL crypto accelerator driver");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-cryp.h b/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-cryp.h
index 494a74f52706..5ed4ba5da7f9 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-cryp.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-cryp.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE				SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE
 #define STARFIVE_AES_IV_LEN			AES_BLOCK_SIZE
 #define STARFIVE_AES_CTR_LEN			AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+#define STARFIVE_RSA_MAX_KEYSZ			256
 
 union starfive_aes_csr {
 	u32 v;
@@ -217,12 +218,11 @@ struct starfive_cryp_request_ctx {
 	struct scatterlist			*out_sg;
 	struct ahash_request			ahash_fbk_req;
 	size_t					total;
-	size_t					nents;
 	unsigned int				blksize;
 	unsigned int				digsize;
 	unsigned long				in_sg_len;
 	unsigned char				*adata;
-	u8 rsa_data[] __aligned(sizeof(u32));
+	u8 rsa_data[STARFIVE_RSA_MAX_KEYSZ] __aligned(sizeof(u32));
 };
 
 struct starfive_cryp_dev *starfive_cryp_find_dev(struct starfive_cryp_ctx *ctx);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c b/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c
index 33093ba4b13a..a778c4846025 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 /* A * A * R mod N ==> A */
 #define CRYPTO_CMD_AARN			0x7
 
-#define STARFIVE_RSA_MAX_KEYSZ		256
 #define STARFIVE_RSA_RESET		0x2
 
 static inline int starfive_pka_wait_done(struct starfive_cryp_ctx *ctx)
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ static int starfive_rsa_montgomery_form(struct starfive_cryp_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	struct starfive_cryp_dev *cryp = ctx->cryp;
 	struct starfive_cryp_request_ctx *rctx = ctx->rctx;
-	int count = rctx->total / sizeof(u32) - 1;
+	int count = (ALIGN(rctx->total, 4) / 4) - 1;
 	int loop;
 	u32 temp;
 	u8 opsize;
@@ -251,12 +250,17 @@ static int starfive_rsa_enc_core(struct starfive_cryp_ctx *ctx, int enc)
 	struct starfive_cryp_dev *cryp = ctx->cryp;
 	struct starfive_cryp_request_ctx *rctx = ctx->rctx;
 	struct starfive_rsa_key *key = &ctx->rsa_key;
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret = 0, shift = 0;
 
 	writel(STARFIVE_RSA_RESET, cryp->base + STARFIVE_PKA_CACR_OFFSET);
 
-	rctx->total = sg_copy_to_buffer(rctx->in_sg, rctx->nents,
-					rctx->rsa_data, rctx->total);
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(rctx->total, sizeof(u32))) {
+		shift = sizeof(u32) - (rctx->total & 0x3);
+		memset(rctx->rsa_data, 0, shift);
+	}
+
+	rctx->total = sg_copy_to_buffer(rctx->in_sg, sg_nents(rctx->in_sg),
+					rctx->rsa_data + shift, rctx->total);
 
 	if (enc) {
 		key->bitlen = key->e_bitlen;
@@ -305,7 +309,6 @@ static int starfive_rsa_enc(struct akcipher_request *req)
 	rctx->in_sg = req->src;
 	rctx->out_sg = req->dst;
 	rctx->total = req->src_len;
-	rctx->nents = sg_nents(rctx->in_sg);
 	ctx->rctx = rctx;
 
 	return starfive_rsa_enc_core(ctx, 1);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-cryp.c b/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-cryp.c
index 11ad4ffdce0d..937f6dab8955 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-cryp.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-cryp.c
@@ -11,8 +11,11 @@
 #include <crypto/internal/des.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/bottom_half.h>
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/dmaengine.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/iopoll.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
@@ -40,6 +43,8 @@
 /* Mode mask = bits [15..0] */
 #define FLG_MODE_MASK           GENMASK(15, 0)
 /* Bit [31..16] status  */
+#define FLG_IN_OUT_DMA          BIT(16)
+#define FLG_HEADER_DMA          BIT(17)
 
 /* Registers */
 #define CRYP_CR                 0x00000000
@@ -121,8 +126,12 @@
 #define CR_PH_MASK              0x00030000
 #define CR_NBPBL_SHIFT          20
 
-#define SR_BUSY                 0x00000010
-#define SR_OFNE                 0x00000004
+#define SR_IFNF                 BIT(1)
+#define SR_OFNE                 BIT(2)
+#define SR_BUSY                 BIT(8)
+
+#define DMACR_DIEN              BIT(0)
+#define DMACR_DOEN              BIT(1)
 
 #define IMSCR_IN                BIT(0)
 #define IMSCR_OUT               BIT(1)
@@ -133,7 +142,15 @@
 /* Misc */
 #define AES_BLOCK_32            (AES_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
 #define GCM_CTR_INIT            2
-#define CRYP_AUTOSUSPEND_DELAY	50
+#define CRYP_AUTOSUSPEND_DELAY  50
+
+#define CRYP_DMA_BURST_REG      4
+
+enum stm32_dma_mode {
+	NO_DMA,
+	DMA_PLAIN_SG,
+	DMA_NEED_SG_TRUNC
+};
 
 struct stm32_cryp_caps {
 	bool			aeads_support;
@@ -146,6 +163,7 @@ struct stm32_cryp_caps {
 	u32			sr;
 	u32			din;
 	u32			dout;
+	u32			dmacr;
 	u32			imsc;
 	u32			mis;
 	u32			k1l;
@@ -172,6 +190,7 @@ struct stm32_cryp {
 	struct list_head        list;
 	struct device           *dev;
 	void __iomem            *regs;
+	phys_addr_t             phys_base;
 	struct clk              *clk;
 	unsigned long           flags;
 	u32                     irq_status;
@@ -190,8 +209,20 @@ struct stm32_cryp {
 	size_t                  header_in;
 	size_t                  payload_out;
 
+	/* DMA process fields */
+	struct scatterlist      *in_sg;
+	struct scatterlist      *header_sg;
 	struct scatterlist      *out_sg;
+	size_t                  in_sg_len;
+	size_t                  header_sg_len;
+	size_t                  out_sg_len;
+	struct completion	dma_completion;
+
+	struct dma_chan         *dma_lch_in;
+	struct dma_chan         *dma_lch_out;
+	enum stm32_dma_mode     dma_mode;
 
+	/* IT process fields */
 	struct scatter_walk     in_walk;
 	struct scatter_walk     out_walk;
 
@@ -291,12 +322,20 @@ static inline int stm32_cryp_wait_enable(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
 			!(status & CR_CRYPEN), 10, 100000);
 }
 
+static inline int stm32_cryp_wait_input(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
+{
+	u32 status;
+
+	return readl_relaxed_poll_timeout_atomic(cryp->regs + cryp->caps->sr, status,
+			status & SR_IFNF, 1, 10);
+}
+
 static inline int stm32_cryp_wait_output(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
 {
 	u32 status;
 
-	return readl_relaxed_poll_timeout(cryp->regs + cryp->caps->sr, status,
-			status & SR_OFNE, 10, 100000);
+	return readl_relaxed_poll_timeout_atomic(cryp->regs + cryp->caps->sr, status,
+			status & SR_OFNE, 1, 10);
 }
 
 static inline void stm32_cryp_key_read_enable(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
@@ -311,8 +350,13 @@ static inline void stm32_cryp_key_read_disable(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
 		       cryp->regs + cryp->caps->cr);
 }
 
+static void stm32_cryp_irq_read_data(struct stm32_cryp *cryp);
+static void stm32_cryp_irq_write_data(struct stm32_cryp *cryp);
+static void stm32_cryp_irq_write_gcmccm_header(struct stm32_cryp *cryp);
 static int stm32_cryp_read_auth_tag(struct stm32_cryp *cryp);
 static void stm32_cryp_finish_req(struct stm32_cryp *cryp, int err);
+static int stm32_cryp_dma_start(struct stm32_cryp *cryp);
+static int stm32_cryp_it_start(struct stm32_cryp *cryp);
 
 static struct stm32_cryp *stm32_cryp_find_dev(struct stm32_cryp_ctx *ctx)
 {
@@ -813,11 +857,238 @@ static void stm32_cryp_finish_req(struct stm32_cryp *cryp, int err)
 	if (is_gcm(cryp) || is_ccm(cryp))
 		crypto_finalize_aead_request(cryp->engine, cryp->areq, err);
 	else
-		crypto_finalize_skcipher_request(cryp->engine, cryp->req,
-						   err);
+		crypto_finalize_skcipher_request(cryp->engine, cryp->req, err);
+}
+
+static void stm32_cryp_header_dma_callback(void *param)
+{
+	struct stm32_cryp *cryp = (struct stm32_cryp *)param;
+	int ret;
+	u32 reg;
+
+	dma_unmap_sg(cryp->dev, cryp->header_sg, cryp->header_sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+	reg = stm32_cryp_read(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr);
+	stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr, reg & ~(DMACR_DOEN | DMACR_DIEN));
+
+	kfree(cryp->header_sg);
+
+	reg = stm32_cryp_read(cryp, cryp->caps->cr);
+
+	if (cryp->header_in) {
+		stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->cr, reg | CR_CRYPEN);
+
+		ret = stm32_cryp_wait_input(cryp);
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(cryp->dev, "input header ready timeout after dma\n");
+			stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, ret);
+			return;
+		}
+		stm32_cryp_irq_write_gcmccm_header(cryp);
+		WARN_ON(cryp->header_in);
+	}
+
+	if (stm32_cryp_get_input_text_len(cryp)) {
+		/* Phase 3 : payload */
+		reg = stm32_cryp_read(cryp, cryp->caps->cr);
+		stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->cr, reg & ~CR_CRYPEN);
+
+		reg &= ~CR_PH_MASK;
+		reg |= CR_PH_PAYLOAD | CR_CRYPEN;
+		stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->cr, reg);
+
+		if (cryp->flags & FLG_IN_OUT_DMA) {
+			ret = stm32_cryp_dma_start(cryp);
+			if (ret)
+				stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, ret);
+		} else {
+			stm32_cryp_it_start(cryp);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Phase 4 : tag.
+		 * Nothing to read, nothing to write => end request
+		 */
+		stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static void stm32_cryp_dma_callback(void *param)
+{
+	struct stm32_cryp *cryp = (struct stm32_cryp *)param;
+	int ret;
+	u32 reg;
+
+	complete(&cryp->dma_completion); /* completion to indicate no timeout */
+
+	dma_sync_sg_for_device(cryp->dev, cryp->out_sg, cryp->out_sg_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+	if (cryp->in_sg != cryp->out_sg)
+		dma_unmap_sg(cryp->dev, cryp->in_sg, cryp->in_sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+	dma_unmap_sg(cryp->dev, cryp->out_sg, cryp->out_sg_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+	reg = stm32_cryp_read(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr);
+	stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr, reg & ~(DMACR_DOEN | DMACR_DIEN));
+
+	reg = stm32_cryp_read(cryp, cryp->caps->cr);
+
+	if (is_gcm(cryp) || is_ccm(cryp)) {
+		kfree(cryp->in_sg);
+		kfree(cryp->out_sg);
+	} else {
+		if (cryp->in_sg != cryp->req->src)
+			kfree(cryp->in_sg);
+		if (cryp->out_sg != cryp->req->dst)
+			kfree(cryp->out_sg);
+	}
+
+	if (cryp->payload_in) {
+		stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->cr, reg | CR_CRYPEN);
+
+		ret = stm32_cryp_wait_input(cryp);
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(cryp->dev, "input ready timeout after dma\n");
+			stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, ret);
+			return;
+		}
+		stm32_cryp_irq_write_data(cryp);
+
+		ret = stm32_cryp_wait_output(cryp);
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(cryp->dev, "output ready timeout after dma\n");
+			stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, ret);
+			return;
+		}
+		stm32_cryp_irq_read_data(cryp);
+	}
+
+	stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, 0);
+}
+
+static int stm32_cryp_header_dma_start(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_in;
+	u32 reg;
+	size_t align_size;
+
+	ret = dma_map_sg(cryp->dev, cryp->header_sg, cryp->header_sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	if (!ret) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "dma_map_sg() error\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	dma_sync_sg_for_device(cryp->dev, cryp->header_sg, cryp->header_sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+	tx_in = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(cryp->dma_lch_in, cryp->header_sg, cryp->header_sg_len,
+					DMA_MEM_TO_DEV, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
+	if (!tx_in) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "IN prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tx_in->callback_param = cryp;
+	tx_in->callback = stm32_cryp_header_dma_callback;
+
+	/* Advance scatterwalk to not DMA'ed data */
+	align_size = ALIGN_DOWN(cryp->header_in, cryp->hw_blocksize);
+	scatterwalk_copychunks(NULL, &cryp->in_walk, align_size, 2);
+	cryp->header_in -= align_size;
+
+	ret = dma_submit_error(dmaengine_submit(tx_in));
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "DMA in submit failed\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+	dma_async_issue_pending(cryp->dma_lch_in);
+
+	reg = stm32_cryp_read(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr);
+	stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr, reg | DMACR_DIEN);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stm32_cryp_dma_start(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
+{
+	int ret;
+	size_t align_size;
+	struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_in, *tx_out;
+	u32 reg;
+
+	if (cryp->in_sg != cryp->out_sg) {
+		ret = dma_map_sg(cryp->dev, cryp->in_sg, cryp->in_sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		if (!ret) {
+			dev_err(cryp->dev, "dma_map_sg() error\n");
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = dma_map_sg(cryp->dev, cryp->out_sg, cryp->out_sg_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+	if (!ret) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "dma_map_sg() error\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	dma_sync_sg_for_device(cryp->dev, cryp->in_sg, cryp->in_sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+	tx_in = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(cryp->dma_lch_in, cryp->in_sg, cryp->in_sg_len,
+					DMA_MEM_TO_DEV, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
+	if (!tx_in) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "IN prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* No callback necessary */
+	tx_in->callback_param = cryp;
+	tx_in->callback = NULL;
+
+	tx_out = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(cryp->dma_lch_out, cryp->out_sg, cryp->out_sg_len,
+					 DMA_DEV_TO_MEM, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
+	if (!tx_out) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "OUT prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	reinit_completion(&cryp->dma_completion);
+	tx_out->callback = stm32_cryp_dma_callback;
+	tx_out->callback_param = cryp;
+
+	/* Advance scatterwalk to not DMA'ed data */
+	align_size = ALIGN_DOWN(cryp->payload_in, cryp->hw_blocksize);
+	scatterwalk_copychunks(NULL, &cryp->in_walk, align_size, 2);
+	cryp->payload_in -= align_size;
+
+	ret = dma_submit_error(dmaengine_submit(tx_in));
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "DMA in submit failed\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+	dma_async_issue_pending(cryp->dma_lch_in);
+
+	/* Advance scatterwalk to not DMA'ed data */
+	scatterwalk_copychunks(NULL, &cryp->out_walk, align_size, 2);
+	cryp->payload_out -= align_size;
+	ret = dma_submit_error(dmaengine_submit(tx_out));
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "DMA out submit failed\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+	dma_async_issue_pending(cryp->dma_lch_out);
+
+	reg = stm32_cryp_read(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr);
+	stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->dmacr, reg | DMACR_DOEN | DMACR_DIEN);
+
+	if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&cryp->dma_completion, msecs_to_jiffies(1000))) {
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "DMA out timed out\n");
+		dmaengine_terminate_sync(cryp->dma_lch_out);
+		return -ETIMEDOUT;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static int stm32_cryp_cpu_start(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
+static int stm32_cryp_it_start(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
 {
 	/* Enable interrupt and let the IRQ handler do everything */
 	stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->imsc, IMSCR_IN | IMSCR_OUT);
@@ -1149,13 +1420,256 @@ static int stm32_cryp_tdes_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return stm32_cryp_crypt(req, FLG_TDES | FLG_CBC);
 }
 
+static enum stm32_dma_mode stm32_cryp_dma_check_sg(struct scatterlist *test_sg, size_t len,
+						   size_t block_size)
+{
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+	int i;
+
+	if (len <= 16)
+		return NO_DMA; /* Faster */
+
+	for_each_sg(test_sg, sg, sg_nents(test_sg), i) {
+		if (!IS_ALIGNED(sg->length, block_size) && !sg_is_last(sg))
+			return NO_DMA;
+
+		if (sg->offset % sizeof(u32))
+			return NO_DMA;
+
+		if (sg_is_last(sg) && !IS_ALIGNED(sg->length, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+			return DMA_NEED_SG_TRUNC;
+	}
+
+	return DMA_PLAIN_SG;
+}
+
+static enum stm32_dma_mode stm32_cryp_dma_check(struct stm32_cryp *cryp, struct scatterlist *in_sg,
+						struct scatterlist *out_sg)
+{
+	enum stm32_dma_mode ret = DMA_PLAIN_SG;
+
+	if (!is_aes(cryp))
+		return NO_DMA;
+
+	if (!cryp->dma_lch_in || !cryp->dma_lch_out)
+		return NO_DMA;
+
+	ret = stm32_cryp_dma_check_sg(in_sg, cryp->payload_in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	if (ret == NO_DMA)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = stm32_cryp_dma_check_sg(out_sg, cryp->payload_out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	if (ret == NO_DMA)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Check CTR counter overflow */
+	if (is_aes(cryp) && is_ctr(cryp)) {
+		u32 c;
+		__be32 iv3;
+
+		memcpy(&iv3, &cryp->req->iv[3 * sizeof(u32)], sizeof(iv3));
+		c = be32_to_cpu(iv3);
+		if ((c + cryp->payload_in) < cryp->payload_in)
+			return NO_DMA;
+	}
+
+	/* Workaround */
+	if (is_aes(cryp) && is_ctr(cryp) && ret == DMA_NEED_SG_TRUNC)
+		return NO_DMA;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int stm32_cryp_truncate_sg(struct scatterlist **new_sg, size_t *new_sg_len,
+				  struct scatterlist *sg, off_t skip, size_t size)
+{
+	struct scatterlist *cur;
+	int alloc_sg_len;
+
+	*new_sg_len = 0;
+
+	if (!sg || !size) {
+		*new_sg = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	alloc_sg_len = sg_nents_for_len(sg, skip + size);
+	if (alloc_sg_len < 0)
+		return alloc_sg_len;
+
+	/* We allocate to much sg entry, but it is easier */
+	*new_sg = kmalloc_array((size_t)alloc_sg_len, sizeof(struct scatterlist), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!*new_sg)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sg_init_table(*new_sg, (unsigned int)alloc_sg_len);
+
+	cur = *new_sg;
+	while (sg && size) {
+		unsigned int len = sg->length;
+		unsigned int offset = sg->offset;
+
+		if (skip > len) {
+			skip -= len;
+			sg = sg_next(sg);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (skip) {
+			len -= skip;
+			offset += skip;
+			skip = 0;
+		}
+
+		if (size < len)
+			len = size;
+
+		if (len > 0) {
+			(*new_sg_len)++;
+			size -= len;
+			sg_set_page(cur, sg_page(sg), len, offset);
+			if (size == 0)
+				sg_mark_end(cur);
+			cur = sg_next(cur);
+		}
+
+		sg = sg_next(sg);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stm32_cryp_cipher_prepare(struct stm32_cryp *cryp, struct scatterlist *in_sg,
+				     struct scatterlist *out_sg)
+{
+	size_t align_size;
+	int ret;
+
+	cryp->dma_mode = stm32_cryp_dma_check(cryp, in_sg, out_sg);
+
+	scatterwalk_start(&cryp->in_walk, in_sg);
+	scatterwalk_start(&cryp->out_walk, out_sg);
+
+	if (cryp->dma_mode == NO_DMA) {
+		cryp->flags &= ~FLG_IN_OUT_DMA;
+
+		if (is_ctr(cryp))
+			memset(cryp->last_ctr, 0, sizeof(cryp->last_ctr));
+
+	} else if (cryp->dma_mode == DMA_NEED_SG_TRUNC) {
+
+		cryp->flags |= FLG_IN_OUT_DMA;
+
+		align_size = ALIGN_DOWN(cryp->payload_in, cryp->hw_blocksize);
+		ret = stm32_cryp_truncate_sg(&cryp->in_sg, &cryp->in_sg_len, in_sg, 0, align_size);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = stm32_cryp_truncate_sg(&cryp->out_sg, &cryp->out_sg_len, out_sg, 0,
+					     align_size);
+		if (ret) {
+			kfree(cryp->in_sg);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	} else {
+		cryp->flags |= FLG_IN_OUT_DMA;
+
+		cryp->in_sg = in_sg;
+		cryp->out_sg = out_sg;
+
+		ret = sg_nents_for_len(cryp->in_sg, cryp->payload_in);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		cryp->in_sg_len = (size_t)ret;
+
+		ret = sg_nents_for_len(out_sg, cryp->payload_out);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		cryp->out_sg_len = (size_t)ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stm32_cryp_aead_prepare(struct stm32_cryp *cryp, struct scatterlist *in_sg,
+				   struct scatterlist *out_sg)
+{
+	size_t align_size;
+	off_t skip;
+	int ret, ret2;
+
+	cryp->header_sg = NULL;
+	cryp->in_sg = NULL;
+	cryp->out_sg = NULL;
+
+	if (!cryp->dma_lch_in || !cryp->dma_lch_out) {
+		cryp->dma_mode = NO_DMA;
+		cryp->flags &= ~(FLG_IN_OUT_DMA | FLG_HEADER_DMA);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* CCM hw_init may have advanced in header */
+	skip = cryp->areq->assoclen - cryp->header_in;
+
+	align_size = ALIGN_DOWN(cryp->header_in, cryp->hw_blocksize);
+	ret = stm32_cryp_truncate_sg(&cryp->header_sg, &cryp->header_sg_len, in_sg, skip,
+				     align_size);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = stm32_cryp_dma_check_sg(cryp->header_sg, align_size, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	if (ret == NO_DMA) {
+		/* We cannot DMA the header */
+		kfree(cryp->header_sg);
+		cryp->header_sg = NULL;
+
+		cryp->flags &= ~FLG_HEADER_DMA;
+	} else {
+		cryp->flags |= FLG_HEADER_DMA;
+	}
+
+	/* Now skip all header to be at payload start */
+	skip = cryp->areq->assoclen;
+	align_size = ALIGN_DOWN(cryp->payload_in, cryp->hw_blocksize);
+	ret = stm32_cryp_truncate_sg(&cryp->in_sg, &cryp->in_sg_len, in_sg, skip, align_size);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(cryp->header_sg);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* For out buffer align_size is same as in buffer */
+	ret = stm32_cryp_truncate_sg(&cryp->out_sg, &cryp->out_sg_len, out_sg, skip, align_size);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(cryp->header_sg);
+		kfree(cryp->in_sg);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = stm32_cryp_dma_check_sg(cryp->in_sg, align_size, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	ret2 = stm32_cryp_dma_check_sg(cryp->out_sg, align_size, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	if (ret == NO_DMA || ret2 == NO_DMA) {
+		kfree(cryp->in_sg);
+		cryp->in_sg = NULL;
+
+		kfree(cryp->out_sg);
+		cryp->out_sg = NULL;
+
+		cryp->flags &= ~FLG_IN_OUT_DMA;
+	} else {
+		cryp->flags |= FLG_IN_OUT_DMA;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int stm32_cryp_prepare_req(struct skcipher_request *req,
 				  struct aead_request *areq)
 {
 	struct stm32_cryp_ctx *ctx;
 	struct stm32_cryp *cryp;
 	struct stm32_cryp_reqctx *rctx;
-	struct scatterlist *in_sg;
+	struct scatterlist *in_sg, *out_sg;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!req && !areq)
@@ -1169,8 +1683,6 @@ static int stm32_cryp_prepare_req(struct skcipher_request *req,
 	rctx = req ? skcipher_request_ctx(req) : aead_request_ctx(areq);
 	rctx->mode &= FLG_MODE_MASK;
 
-	ctx->cryp = cryp;
-
 	cryp->flags = (cryp->flags & ~FLG_MODE_MASK) | rctx->mode;
 	cryp->hw_blocksize = is_aes(cryp) ? AES_BLOCK_SIZE : DES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	cryp->ctx = ctx;
@@ -1182,6 +1694,15 @@ static int stm32_cryp_prepare_req(struct skcipher_request *req,
 		cryp->payload_in = req->cryptlen;
 		cryp->payload_out = req->cryptlen;
 		cryp->authsize = 0;
+
+		in_sg = req->src;
+		out_sg = req->dst;
+
+		ret = stm32_cryp_cipher_prepare(cryp, in_sg, out_sg);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = stm32_cryp_hw_init(cryp);
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * Length of input and output data:
@@ -1211,23 +1732,22 @@ static int stm32_cryp_prepare_req(struct skcipher_request *req,
 			cryp->header_in = areq->assoclen;
 			cryp->payload_out = cryp->payload_in;
 		}
-	}
 
-	in_sg = req ? req->src : areq->src;
-	scatterwalk_start(&cryp->in_walk, in_sg);
-
-	cryp->out_sg = req ? req->dst : areq->dst;
-	scatterwalk_start(&cryp->out_walk, cryp->out_sg);
+		in_sg = areq->src;
+		out_sg = areq->dst;
 
-	if (is_gcm(cryp) || is_ccm(cryp)) {
+		scatterwalk_start(&cryp->in_walk, in_sg);
+		scatterwalk_start(&cryp->out_walk, out_sg);
 		/* In output, jump after assoc data */
 		scatterwalk_copychunks(NULL, &cryp->out_walk, cryp->areq->assoclen, 2);
-	}
 
-	if (is_ctr(cryp))
-		memset(cryp->last_ctr, 0, sizeof(cryp->last_ctr));
+		ret = stm32_cryp_hw_init(cryp);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = stm32_cryp_aead_prepare(cryp, in_sg, out_sg);
+	}
 
-	ret = stm32_cryp_hw_init(cryp);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1239,12 +1759,24 @@ static int stm32_cryp_cipher_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
 	struct stm32_cryp_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(
 			crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
 	struct stm32_cryp *cryp = ctx->cryp;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!cryp)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	return stm32_cryp_prepare_req(req, NULL) ?:
-	       stm32_cryp_cpu_start(cryp);
+	ret = stm32_cryp_prepare_req(req, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (cryp->flags & FLG_IN_OUT_DMA)
+		ret = stm32_cryp_dma_start(cryp);
+	else
+		ret = stm32_cryp_it_start(cryp);
+
+	if (ret == -ETIMEDOUT)
+		stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, ret);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int stm32_cryp_aead_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
@@ -1262,13 +1794,20 @@ static int stm32_cryp_aead_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (unlikely(!cryp->payload_in && !cryp->header_in)) {
+	if (!stm32_cryp_get_input_text_len(cryp) && !cryp->header_in &&
+	    !(cryp->flags & FLG_HEADER_DMA)) {
 		/* No input data to process: get tag and finish */
 		stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, 0);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	return stm32_cryp_cpu_start(cryp);
+	if (cryp->flags & FLG_HEADER_DMA)
+		return stm32_cryp_header_dma_start(cryp);
+
+	if (!cryp->header_in && cryp->flags & FLG_IN_OUT_DMA)
+		return stm32_cryp_dma_start(cryp);
+
+	return stm32_cryp_it_start(cryp);
 }
 
 static int stm32_cryp_read_auth_tag(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
@@ -1665,8 +2204,11 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32_cryp_irq_thread(int irq, void *arg)
 		it_mask &= ~IMSCR_OUT;
 	stm32_cryp_write(cryp, cryp->caps->imsc, it_mask);
 
-	if (!cryp->payload_in && !cryp->header_in && !cryp->payload_out)
+	if (!cryp->payload_in && !cryp->header_in && !cryp->payload_out) {
+		local_bh_disable();
 		stm32_cryp_finish_req(cryp, 0);
+		local_bh_enable();
+	}
 
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
@@ -1680,13 +2222,72 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32_cryp_irq(int irq, void *arg)
 	return IRQ_WAKE_THREAD;
 }
 
+static int stm32_cryp_dma_init(struct stm32_cryp *cryp)
+{
+	struct dma_slave_config dma_conf;
+	struct dma_chan *chan;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(&dma_conf, 0, sizeof(dma_conf));
+
+	dma_conf.direction = DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
+	dma_conf.dst_addr = cryp->phys_base + cryp->caps->din;
+	dma_conf.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
+	dma_conf.dst_maxburst = CRYP_DMA_BURST_REG;
+	dma_conf.device_fc = false;
+
+	chan = dma_request_chan(cryp->dev, "in");
+	if (IS_ERR(chan))
+		return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+	cryp->dma_lch_in = chan;
+	ret = dmaengine_slave_config(cryp->dma_lch_in, &dma_conf);
+	if (ret) {
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_in);
+		cryp->dma_lch_in = NULL;
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "Couldn't configure DMA in slave.\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	memset(&dma_conf, 0, sizeof(dma_conf));
+
+	dma_conf.direction = DMA_DEV_TO_MEM;
+	dma_conf.src_addr = cryp->phys_base + cryp->caps->dout;
+	dma_conf.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
+	dma_conf.src_maxburst = CRYP_DMA_BURST_REG;
+	dma_conf.device_fc = false;
+
+	chan = dma_request_chan(cryp->dev, "out");
+	if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_in);
+		cryp->dma_lch_in = NULL;
+		return PTR_ERR(chan);
+	}
+
+	cryp->dma_lch_out = chan;
+
+	ret = dmaengine_slave_config(cryp->dma_lch_out, &dma_conf);
+	if (ret) {
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_out);
+		cryp->dma_lch_out = NULL;
+		dev_err(cryp->dev, "Couldn't configure DMA out slave.\n");
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_in);
+		cryp->dma_lch_in = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	init_completion(&cryp->dma_completion);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static struct skcipher_engine_alg crypto_algs[] = {
 {
 	.base = {
 		.base.cra_name		= "ecb(aes)",
 		.base.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-ecb-aes",
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.base.cra_priority	= 300,
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.base.cra_blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.base.cra_alignmask	= 0,
@@ -1707,8 +2308,8 @@ static struct skcipher_engine_alg crypto_algs[] = {
 	.base = {
 		.base.cra_name		= "cbc(aes)",
 		.base.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-cbc-aes",
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.base.cra_priority	= 300,
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.base.cra_blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.base.cra_alignmask	= 0,
@@ -1730,8 +2331,8 @@ static struct skcipher_engine_alg crypto_algs[] = {
 	.base = {
 		.base.cra_name		= "ctr(aes)",
 		.base.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-ctr-aes",
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.base.cra_priority	= 300,
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.base.cra_blocksize	= 1,
 		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.base.cra_alignmask	= 0,
@@ -1753,8 +2354,8 @@ static struct skcipher_engine_alg crypto_algs[] = {
 	.base = {
 		.base.cra_name		= "ecb(des)",
 		.base.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-ecb-des",
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.base.cra_priority	= 300,
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.base.cra_blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.base.cra_alignmask	= 0,
@@ -1775,8 +2376,8 @@ static struct skcipher_engine_alg crypto_algs[] = {
 	.base = {
 		.base.cra_name		= "cbc(des)",
 		.base.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-cbc-des",
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.base.cra_priority	= 300,
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.base.cra_blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.base.cra_alignmask	= 0,
@@ -1798,8 +2399,8 @@ static struct skcipher_engine_alg crypto_algs[] = {
 	.base = {
 		.base.cra_name		= "ecb(des3_ede)",
 		.base.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-ecb-des3",
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.base.cra_priority	= 300,
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.base.cra_blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.base.cra_alignmask	= 0,
@@ -1820,8 +2421,8 @@ static struct skcipher_engine_alg crypto_algs[] = {
 	.base = {
 		.base.cra_name		= "cbc(des3_ede)",
 		.base.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-cbc-des3",
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.base.cra_priority	= 300,
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.base.cra_blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.base.cra_alignmask	= 0,
@@ -1854,8 +2455,8 @@ static struct aead_engine_alg aead_algs[] = {
 	.base.base = {
 		.cra_name		= "gcm(aes)",
 		.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-gcm-aes",
-		.cra_priority		= 200,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.cra_priority		= 300,
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.cra_alignmask		= 0,
@@ -1877,8 +2478,8 @@ static struct aead_engine_alg aead_algs[] = {
 	.base.base = {
 		.cra_name		= "ccm(aes)",
 		.cra_driver_name	= "stm32-ccm-aes",
-		.cra_priority		= 200,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+		.cra_priority		= 300,
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
 		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct stm32_cryp_ctx),
 		.cra_alignmask		= 0,
@@ -1901,6 +2502,7 @@ static const struct stm32_cryp_caps ux500_data = {
 	.sr = UX500_CRYP_SR,
 	.din = UX500_CRYP_DIN,
 	.dout = UX500_CRYP_DOUT,
+	.dmacr = UX500_CRYP_DMACR,
 	.imsc = UX500_CRYP_IMSC,
 	.mis = UX500_CRYP_MIS,
 	.k1l = UX500_CRYP_K1L,
@@ -1923,6 +2525,7 @@ static const struct stm32_cryp_caps f7_data = {
 	.sr = CRYP_SR,
 	.din = CRYP_DIN,
 	.dout = CRYP_DOUT,
+	.dmacr = CRYP_DMACR,
 	.imsc = CRYP_IMSCR,
 	.mis = CRYP_MISR,
 	.k1l = CRYP_K1LR,
@@ -1945,6 +2548,7 @@ static const struct stm32_cryp_caps mp1_data = {
 	.sr = CRYP_SR,
 	.din = CRYP_DIN,
 	.dout = CRYP_DOUT,
+	.dmacr = CRYP_DMACR,
 	.imsc = CRYP_IMSCR,
 	.mis = CRYP_MISR,
 	.k1l = CRYP_K1LR,
@@ -1985,6 +2589,8 @@ static int stm32_cryp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (IS_ERR(cryp->regs))
 		return PTR_ERR(cryp->regs);
 
+	cryp->phys_base = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0)->start;
+
 	irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
 	if (irq < 0)
 		return irq;
@@ -2030,6 +2636,17 @@ static int stm32_cryp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, cryp);
 
+	ret = stm32_cryp_dma_init(cryp);
+	switch (ret) {
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	case -ENODEV:
+		dev_dbg(dev, "DMA mode not available\n");
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto err_dma;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock(&cryp_list.lock);
 	list_add(&cryp->list, &cryp_list.dev_list);
 	spin_unlock(&cryp_list.lock);
@@ -2075,6 +2692,12 @@ err_engine1:
 	spin_lock(&cryp_list.lock);
 	list_del(&cryp->list);
 	spin_unlock(&cryp_list.lock);
+
+	if (cryp->dma_lch_in)
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_in);
+	if (cryp->dma_lch_out)
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_out);
+err_dma:
 err_rst:
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
 	pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev);
@@ -2101,6 +2724,12 @@ static void stm32_cryp_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	list_del(&cryp->list);
 	spin_unlock(&cryp_list.lock);
 
+	if (cryp->dma_lch_in)
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_in);
+
+	if (cryp->dma_lch_out)
+		dma_release_channel(cryp->dma_lch_out);
+
 	pm_runtime_disable(cryp->dev);
 	pm_runtime_put_noidle(cryp->dev);
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c b/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c
index 9955874b3dc3..f94c0331b148 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static void tegra_se_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	crypto_engine_stop(se->engine);
 	crypto_engine_exit(se->engine);
-	iommu_fwspec_free(se->dev);
 	host1x_client_unregister(&se->client);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c
index e61405718840..7f0ec6887a39 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c
@@ -446,4 +446,5 @@ static struct platform_driver zynqmp_aes_driver = {
 };
 
 module_platform_driver(zynqmp_aes_driver);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Xilinx ZynqMP AES Driver");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/ecc.h b/include/crypto/internal/ecc.h
index f7e75e1e71f3..0717a53ae732 100644
--- a/include/crypto/internal/ecc.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/ecc.h
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ static inline void ecc_swap_digits(const void *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigit
  * @nbytes    Size of input byte array
  * @out       Output digits array
  * @ndigits:  Number of digits to create from byte array
+ *
+ * The first byte in the input byte array is expected to hold the most
+ * significant bits of the large integer.
  */
 void ecc_digits_from_bytes(const u8 *in, unsigned int nbytes,
 			   u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits);
diff --git a/include/crypto/sm2.h b/include/crypto/sm2.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 04a92c1013c8..000000000000
--- a/include/crypto/sm2.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
-/*
- * sm2.h - SM2 asymmetric public-key algorithm
- * as specified by OSCCA GM/T 0003.1-2012 -- 0003.5-2012 SM2 and
- * described at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2020, Alibaba Group.
- * Written by Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
- */
-
-#ifndef _CRYPTO_SM2_H
-#define _CRYPTO_SM2_H
-
-struct shash_desc;
-
-#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2)
-int sm2_compute_z_digest(struct shash_desc *desc,
-			 const void *key, unsigned int keylen, void *dgst);
-#else
-static inline int sm2_compute_z_digest(struct shash_desc *desc,
-				       const void *key, unsigned int keylen,
-				       void *dgst)
-{
-	return -ENOTSUPP;
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* _CRYPTO_SM2_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h
index 136e9842120e..b424555753b1 100644
--- a/include/linux/hw_random.h
+++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
 #define LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_
 
 #include <linux/completion.h>
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
 
 /**
  * struct hwrng - Hardware Random Number Generator driver
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-platform-access.h b/include/linux/psp-platform-access.h
index c1dc87fc536b..1504fb012c05 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-platform-access.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-platform-access.h
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
 #include <linux/psp.h>
 
 enum psp_platform_access_msg {
-	PSP_CMD_NONE = 0x0,
-	PSP_I2C_REQ_BUS_CMD = 0x64,
+	PSP_CMD_NONE			= 0x0,
+	PSP_CMD_HSTI_QUERY		= 0x14,
+	PSP_I2C_REQ_BUS_CMD		= 0x64,
 	PSP_DYNAMIC_BOOST_GET_NONCE,
 	PSP_DYNAMIC_BOOST_SET_UID,
 	PSP_DYNAMIC_BOOST_GET_PARAMETER,
diff --git a/lib/crypto/arc4.c b/lib/crypto/arc4.c
index c2020f19c652..838812d18216 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/arc4.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/arc4.c
@@ -71,4 +71,5 @@ void arc4_crypt(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned int len)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(arc4_crypt);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ARC4 Cipher Algorithm");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/des.c b/lib/crypto/des.c
index ef5bb8822aba..9518658b97cf 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/des.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/des.c
@@ -899,4 +899,5 @@ void des3_ede_decrypt(const struct des3_ede_ctx *dctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(des3_ede_decrypt);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DES & Triple DES EDE Cipher Algorithms");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/libchacha.c b/lib/crypto/libchacha.c
index dabc3accae05..cc1be0496eb9 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/libchacha.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/libchacha.c
@@ -32,4 +32,5 @@ void chacha_crypt_generic(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_generic);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha stream cipher (RFC7539)");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/mpi/ec.c b/lib/crypto/mpi/ec.c
index e16dca1e23d5..4781f00982ef 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/mpi/ec.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/mpi/ec.c
@@ -1285,14 +1285,12 @@ void mpi_ec_mul_point(MPI_POINT result,
 		sum = &p2_;
 
 		for (j = nbits-1; j >= 0; j--) {
-			MPI_POINT t;
-
 			sw = mpi_test_bit(scalar, j);
 			point_swap_cond(q1, q2, sw, ctx);
 			montgomery_ladder(prd, sum, q1, q2, point->x, ctx);
 			point_swap_cond(prd, sum, sw, ctx);
-			t = q1;  q1 = prd;  prd = t;
-			t = q2;  q2 = sum;  sum = t;
+			swap(q1, prd);
+			swap(q2, sum);
 		}
 
 		mpi_clear(result->y);
diff --git a/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-bit.c b/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-bit.c
index 070ba784c9f1..e08fc202ea5c 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-bit.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-bit.c
@@ -212,12 +212,10 @@ void mpi_rshift(MPI x, MPI a, unsigned int n)
 			return;
 		}
 
-		if (nlimbs) {
-			for (i = 0; i < x->nlimbs - nlimbs; i++)
-				x->d[i] = x->d[i+nlimbs];
-			x->d[i] = 0;
-			x->nlimbs -= nlimbs;
-		}
+		for (i = 0; i < x->nlimbs - nlimbs; i++)
+			x->d[i] = x->d[i+nlimbs];
+		x->d[i] = 0;
+		x->nlimbs -= nlimbs;
 
 		if (x->nlimbs && nbits)
 			mpihelp_rshift(x->d, x->d, x->nlimbs, nbits);
diff --git a/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-pow.c b/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-pow.c
index 2fd7a46d55ec..67fbd4c2503d 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-pow.c
@@ -176,7 +176,6 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod)
 
 		for (;;) {
 			while (c) {
-				mpi_ptr_t tp;
 				mpi_size_t xsize;
 
 				/*if (mpihelp_mul_n(xp, rp, rp, rsize) < 0) goto enomem */
@@ -207,9 +206,7 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod)
 					xsize = msize;
 				}
 
-				tp = rp;
-				rp = xp;
-				xp = tp;
+				swap(rp, xp);
 				rsize = xsize;
 
 				if ((mpi_limb_signed_t) e < 0) {
@@ -235,9 +232,7 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod)
 						xsize = msize;
 					}
 
-					tp = rp;
-					rp = xp;
-					xp = tp;
+					swap(rp, xp);
 					rsize = xsize;
 				}
 				e <<= 1;
diff --git a/lib/crypto/poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
index 26d87fc3823e..5d8378d23e95 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
@@ -76,3 +76,4 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_final_generic);
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/sha1.c b/lib/crypto/sha1.c
index 1aebe7be9401..6d2922747cab 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/sha1.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/sha1.c
@@ -137,4 +137,5 @@ void sha1_init(__u32 *buf)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha1_init);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA-1 Algorithm");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/sha256.c b/lib/crypto/sha256.c
index 3ac1ef8677db..3f42d203c7bc 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/sha256.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/sha256.c
@@ -165,4 +165,5 @@ void sha256(const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA-256 Algorithm");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/utils.c b/lib/crypto/utils.c
index c852c7151b0a..373364141408 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/utils.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/utils.c
@@ -85,4 +85,5 @@ void __crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src1, const u8 *src2, unsigned int len)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__crypto_xor);
 
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Crypto library utility functions");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index de603cf42ac7..457c0a396caf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 	} else if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6)) {
 		/* edcsa-nist-p192 etc. */
 		pks.encoding = "x962";
-	} else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") ||
-		   !strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "sm2")) {
+	} else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa")) {
 		pks.encoding = "raw";
 	} else {
 		ret = -ENOPKG;
author	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>	2024-07-19 08:52:58 -0700
committer	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>	2024-07-19 08:52:58 -0700
commit	c434e25b62f8efcfbb6bf1f7ce55960206c1137e (patch)
tree	824a68893982c718225a1821fda98c495178473d
parent	720261cfc7329406a50c2a8536e0039b9dd9a4e5 (diff)
parent	df1e9791998a92fe9f1e7d3f031b34daaad39e2f (diff)